Executive Summary

• The war against Iran established the United Arab Emirates as one of the principal pillars of the pragmatic camp in the Middle East and as an indispensable strategic partner for Israel and the West.
• Abu Dhabi adopted a firm stance toward Tehran, both publicly and diplomatically, while also taking practical measures aimed at increasing pressure on Iran.
• Security cooperation between Israel and the UAE reached an unprecedented level during the war, particularly in the fields of air defense, intelligence coordination, and joint efforts to counter Iranian missile and UAV attacks.
• Despite the Memorandum of Understanding concluded with Tehran, Abu Dhabi is likely to remain deeply concerned about the continued Iranian threat, the possibility of the regime’s recovery, and the risk of renewed direct or proxy attacks.
• Beyond the Iranian arena, Israel and the UAE share strategic interests across the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen, particularly in containing Iran, the Houthis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other radical Islamist actors.
• Israel should deepen cooperation with the UAE in air defense, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, supply chains, and regional initiatives such as IMEC and Pax Silica.
• Strengthening the commercial foundations of the Abraham Accords through investment, trade relations, business delegations, and commercial forums is essential for anchoring the partnership as a long-term strategic asset.

Introduction

When historians look back on the major campaign against Iran, they are likely to identify it as the turning point at which a new regional security architecture emerged in the Middle East. At the heart of this tectonic shift stood not a distant Western power, but the United Arab Emirates. Under the bold and visionary leadership of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi abandoned its traditional policy of strategic ambiguity and demonstrated exceptional leadership at a defining regional moment.

The exposure of the UAE’s active military role during the conflict, together with its steadfast resilience in the face of unprecedented missile barrages, constitutes not merely evidence of remarkable national fortitude but compelling proof that the Abraham Accords have evolved into a strategic alliance capable of reshaping the future of regional stability and prosperity. Abu Dhabi’s determined posture toward Iran fundamentally challenged long-standing Western assumptions regarding reliable partners in the Middle East. While other regional actors opted for hesitation, hedging, or strategic ambiguity, the UAE demonstrated – through actions, sacrifices, and the commitment of significant resources – that it has become Israel’s and the West’s most reliable, consistent, and effective strategic partner in the Arab world.

The strategic importance of the UAE, however, extends well beyond its role in the confrontation with Iran. It is also reflected in its sustained engagement across multiple regional friction points, including Yemen, Somalia, Somaliland, Libya, and Sudan. In each of these arenas, Abu Dhabi has pursued a strategic vision centered on promoting stability, safeguarding international trade routes, and containing extremist organizations and political Islamist movements as essential pillars of regional security, even where some of these initiatives have not fully achieved their intended objectives.

The significance of these efforts has become even more pronounced in light of the declining American and broader Western engagement in several of these theaters, creating a strategic vacuum increasingly filled by actors whose interests do not necessarily align with those of Israel and its Western partners. In this evolving environment, the UAE has become one of Israel’s foremost strategic anchors in regions of growing importance to its national security. Israel should therefore work to deepen cooperation with the UAE across the political, security, economic, and commercial spheres, while consolidating the bilateral relationship as a long-term strategic asset for both countries.

At the same time, the West can no longer regard the UAE merely as a partner of convenience, but rather as one of the principal pillars of the emerging regional order. The war demonstrated that instability in the Middle East no longer remains confined to the region itself. Beyond its impact on global trade routes, energy markets, and international supply chains, the conflict highlighted the expanding range of Iran’s military capabilities, which now pose implications for European security as well.

Against this backdrop, American and European support for regional actors committed to promoting stability is no longer simply a regional interest; it has become a clear strategic imperative for the West. The United States and Europe should therefore provide full support for the UAE’s broader foreign policy, which is guided by a modern, pragmatic vision of peace and prosperity. Today, this vision constitutes one of the principal forces counterbalancing the trends of instability and extremism in the Middle East, making support for it no less a Western strategic interest than a regional one.

The United Arab Emirates on the Front Line

According to a statement issued by the UAE Ministry of Defence in May, Emirati air defenses intercepted more than 2,800 Iranian missiles and drones since the outbreak of the war. Among the Gulf states, Abu Dhabi distinguished itself by adopting one of the most outspoken public positions against Iran. Emirati officials emphasized that they would not tolerate threats posed by terrorist actors and called for legally binding guarantees to prevent future aggression, as well as compensation for damage inflicted on civilian infrastructure.

Beyond its public statements, the UAE took an active role in the international arena by advancing practical measures aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz. According to various reports, in addition to expressing its willingness to participate in a U.S.-led military effort, the UAE engaged in diplomatic initiatives to mobilize international support, including efforts to promote a United Nations Security Council resolution on the matter.

Furthermore, an investigation published by The Wall Street Journal indicated that the UAE took an active military role in the campaign against Iran and reportedly conducted a series of strikes inside Iranian territory. Although Abu Dhabi has not officially acknowledged its involvement, its apparent willingness to bear both the costs and risks of the conflict underscored the depth of the strategic partnership it has forged with Israel.

At the same time, the UAE intensified administrative measures against Iran, increasing pressure on Tehran through significant restrictions imposed on Iranian nationals, including limitations on entry into and transit through Emirati territory. Reports in March also indicated that the UAE had begun taking action against institutions and assets affiliated with the Iranian regime, including the closure of organizations in Dubai identified with Tehran.

The war marked the highest level of security cooperation between Israel and the UAE since the signing of the Abraham Accords. The most prominent aspect of this cooperation was Israeli assistance in defending the UAE against Iranian attacks, alongside close intelligence sharing and strategic coordination between the two countries. It is reasonable to assume that a significant portion of this cooperation remains classified, and therefore its full scope is not publicly known.

In this context, reports in the Western media, later reinforced by statements from U.S. officials, claimed that Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery, together with personnel to operate it, to the UAE during the conflict in order to help defend against Iranian missile and drone attacks. In addition, as in previous rounds of confrontation with Iran, it is reasonable to assess that the UAE contributed indirectly to regional defense efforts through intelligence sharing and operational coordination with Israel, the United States, and other partners, although these activities have not been publicly confirmed.

Despite the positive statements issued by Abu Dhabi following the digital signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on 17 June, it is likely that behind the diplomatic messaging lies a considerable degree of unease regarding the strategic reality that emerged after the conflict. Publicly, the UAE praised the diplomatic efforts led by U.S. President Donald Trump and the mediating parties, while calling for the full implementation of the understandings reached, including an immediate cessation of hostilities, respect for the sovereignty of regional states, and guarantees for freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Nevertheless, the emerging agreement provides the UAE with ample grounds for concern regarding future developments. These concerns stem both from Abu Dhabi’s firm stance toward Iran throughout the conflict and from its geographic proximity to Iran, which made it the primary target of Iranian attacks during the war. From the Emirati perspective, even if current tensions subside, this does not preclude the possibility of renewed drone strikes, missile attacks, or indirect operations carried out by Iran and its regional proxies.

These concerns are further heightened by the fact that the Iranian regime remains in power, while the emerging agreement may provide it with a pathway toward economic recovery and the restoration of its military capabilities. At the same time, Emirati decision-makers recognize that despite the impressive performance of their advanced air defense systems during the conflict, these systems cannot provide absolute protection. Although interception rates were high, civilian infrastructure was nevertheless damaged, casualties were sustained, and losses occurred as a result of successful penetrations and falling interceptor debris. Consequently, from Abu Dhabi’s perspective, while the agreement may contribute to short-term de-escalation, it does not alter the UAE’s fundamental assessment of Iran as a long-term strategic threat to its national security and regional stability.

The Convergence of Israeli-Emirati Interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Beyond their shared efforts to confront the direct Iranian threat, Israel and the United Arab Emirates also share strategic interests across several key arenas in the Red Sea basin and the Horn of Africa. In these regions, both countries seek to contain the influence of Iran’s regional proxies, as well as other radical Islamist actors. In this context, one of the defining characteristics of Emirati foreign policy has been its consistent opposition to political Islam and to the Muslim Brotherhood in all its various manifestations, which Abu Dhabi regards as a principal source of regional instability and as a potential partner of hostile regional coalitions.

Yemen perhaps represents the clearest convergence of Israeli and Emirati strategic interests. While Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, increasingly sought diplomatic arrangements with the Houthis, the UAE has maintained a firmer approach by supporting local anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen and along the country’s western coast, while contributing to military operations around the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. In doing so, it has helped contain one of Iran’s principal regional strongholds while safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

In Somaliland, the UAE has worked to strengthen its local partners through investments in ports, infrastructure, and security cooperation, most notably at the Port of Berbera. Its growing presence along the strategic maritime routes of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has enhanced its ability to address security threats, including the activities of al-Shabaab, while simultaneously reinforcing its regional influence vis-à-vis competing powers, particularly Turkey, whose presence in Somalia has expanded significantly in recent years.

In Sudan, Abu Dhabi has sought to weaken political and military actors associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and with remnants of the Omar al-Bashir regime, viewing these forces as a major source of regional instability that could draw Sudan back into a hostile regional axis and facilitate renewed cooperation with Iran. Against this backdrop, the UAE has pursued a policy designed to curb the influence of these actors within Sudan’s political and security institutions.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

The war against Iran demonstrated the strategic value of the partnership between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, while highlighting the considerable potential for expanding this relationship beyond its current scope – both in times of crisis and in periods of relative stability. It has also created a window of opportunity for advancing long-term initiatives that would strengthen the security and economic resilience of both countries while contributing to the construction of a regional architecture built upon states committed to stability, security, and economic development. Such an architecture would reinforce the region’s pragmatic camp and help contain the influence of actors seeking to undermine the regional order.

The importance of this partnership becomes even greater in light of the possibility of a reduced American presence in the Middle East. Under such circumstances, strengthening ties with the UAE enables Israel to rely on an increasingly influential regional partner that shares its core strategic interests in countering Iran, confronting political Islam, and balancing the growing influence of a regional bloc led by Turkey and its allies, which seeks to promote a regional order rooted in movements affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. For Abu Dhabi, continued cooperation with Israel also complements its national vision of establishing itself as a regional hub for technological innovation, advanced defense industries, and strategic infrastructure.

The United States can play a central role in transforming the Israeli-Emirati partnership into one of the cornerstones of the emerging regional security architecture. Beyond operational cooperation against Iran, there is substantial potential for joint development of defense technologies, critical infrastructure, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and advanced supply chains – areas that lie at the heart of the UAE’s strategy for economic diversification and technological leadership.

1. Expanding Cooperation in Air Defense

Over recent years, Israel and the UAE have concluded a series of agreements covering air defense, sensor technologies, intelligence cooperation, and unmanned systems between their respective defense industries. Building on this foundation, the two countries, with U.S. support, should establish a permanent framework for joint research and development, testing, and procurement.

Such a framework could focus on developing advanced early-warning, detection, and interception systems, including artificial intelligence-based solutions, laser technologies, and cost-effective capabilities for countering large-scale drone swarms. Beyond strengthening the security of both countries, such an initiative would support the UAE’s ambition to evolve from a purchaser of defense systems into a developer and exporter of advanced defense technologies, further consolidating its position as a regional hub for defense innovation.

2. Realizing the Israeli-Emirati Potential in Pax Silica

Israel and the United Arab Emirates are already partners in the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, yet the full potential arising from the complementary strengths of the two countries has not yet been realized. With American backing, both countries should pursue flagship joint projects in artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, semiconductor technologies, and advanced computing.

While Israel contributes world-class research capabilities, technological innovation, and entrepreneurial expertise, the UAE offers substantial investment capital, advanced physical and digital infrastructure, and privileged access to global commercial networks. Such cooperation would advance the UAE’s ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence and data centers while supporting its broader strategy of reducing dependence on oil and gas revenues. At the same time, it would firmly anchor both countries within the core American effort to build a Western technological ecosystem independent of China.

3. Expanding Israeli-Emirati Cooperation through IMEC

The recent war underscored the urgent need to develop alternatives to existing maritime trade routes, particularly given the strategic vulnerability of critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, both of which remain susceptible to disruption, blockade, or coercion by hostile states and non-state actors.

Against this backdrop, Israel and the UAE, with U.S. support, should work to transform the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) into an integrated corridor for trade, energy, data, and innovation. Beyond the development of transportation infrastructure, the two countries should jointly promote projects involving smart ports, data centers, supply chain resilience, and cybersecurity infrastructure.

For the UAE, IMEC’s strategic value extends well beyond facilitating trade. It offers an opportunity to integrate more deeply into the Western technological ecosystem in fields such as artificial intelligence, data infrastructure, and advanced industries. Compared with its participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, IMEC could position the UAE as a more influential partner in shaping the digital and technological infrastructure linking India, the Middle East, and Europe, thereby reinforcing its ambition to become a global center for innovation, data, and artificial intelligence.

4. Strengthening the Civilian and Commercial Foundations of the Abraham Accords

Alongside expanding strategic and security cooperation, Israel should also work to strengthen the civilian and commercial foundations of its relationship with the UAE. Economic ties, private investment, and commercial partnerships have proven to be among the principal engines driving the success of the Abraham Accords. Israel should therefore encourage greater Emirati investment, promote reciprocal delegations of entrepreneurs and investors, and expand the activities of existing frameworks such as the UAE-Israel Business Council.

The more the bilateral relationship is rooted in direct engagement between business leaders, entrepreneurs, investors, and citizens on both sides, the more resilient and enduring the strategic partnership will become for decades to come.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

When President Donald Trump recently challenged America’s Arab allies to join the Abraham Accords as a bloc, he declared that such a move would make the Middle East “united, powerful, and economically strong, like perhaps no other area in the world.”

This was more than a diplomatic appeal. It signaled the evolution of the president’s signature Abraham Accords strategy: from advancing bilateral pacts, as he did in his first term, to building a new US-aligned regional architecture linking the United States, Israel, Arab partners, and other key allies, fueled by mutual interests in security and prosperity.

The past two and a half years have demonstrated both the resilience and the strategic potential of the Abraham Accords, which will mark their sixth anniversary this September. Now, President Trump wants to take them to the next level to fundamentally reshape the Middle East in the wake of the Iran War.

The robustness of the Abraham Accords ties is evidenced by the fact that, despite the multi-front regional war that followed Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks, diplomatic ties between Israel and accords member nations remained firmly in place. Trade between Israel and its Arab partners, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, as well as Jordan and Egypt, was higher in 2025 than in 2024, which was itself a record-breaking year. In fact, trade between Israel and its Arab neighbors has grown every year since the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020.

The UAE was the third-most popular destination for Israeli travelers in 2025. Flights between Israel and the UAE were among the few that continued nearly uninterrupted throughout the post-October 7 war.

These growing ties took place despite the damage to public opinion caused by the war. Indeed, undermining public support for Arab-Israeli peace was likely one of Iran‘s and Hamas’s central goals in launching the October 7 attacks.

As President Trump understands, the answer is not to retreat in the face of this hostility, but to advance a comprehensive strategy for a more secure, stable, and prosperous region. Several important steps have already been taken, and more should follow.

In January, US Central Command announced the establishment of a new Middle Eastern Air Defense-Combined Defense Operations Cell, designed to enhance coordination among regional partners. This builds on the first Trump administration’s farsighted decision to move Israel from EUCOM’s to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.

Such cooperation is not limited to the Persian Gulf. In January, Morocco and Israel, at a meeting marking five years since the reestablishment of relations under the Abraham Accords, signed a joint military work plan for 2026. This groundbreaking security cooperation follows Moroccan purchases of Israeli air and missile defense systems and satellites to enhance homeland security, as well as Israeli participation in the US-led African Lion exercises in Morocco.

Houthi and Iranian disruptions to global shipping also demonstrated the urgency of advancing the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was envisioned in the first Trump term. The corridor would link India and the Gulf States to Europe via Israel in a physical manifestation of the regional cooperation President Trump envisions.

Yet IMEC should not be viewed only through the lens of trade. Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline connecting its refineries to the Red Sea has demonstrated the strategic value of energy infrastructure capable of bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The energy component of IMEC should shift from its originally envisioned focus on green energy to the more immediate priority of natural gas, including pipelines from the Persian Gulf to Israel’s Mediterranean ports, which could then transit through the eastern Mediterranean pipeline to Europe.

After almost six years of success under the Abraham Accords, the benefits of partnership with Israel and the United States are beyond question. Now is the time for America’s Arab and Muslim partners to take the historic and courageous step of joining the accords and helping build this new regional architecture.

Such an alliance would certainly strengthen the campaign against the radical Iranian regime, but the accords’ expansion should not be tied to any particular Iran deal. It should be rooted in the sovereign priorities of every country. The United States should therefore develop detailed, country-specific plans for each potential member of the accords to help ensure that all those joining the circle of peace receive concrete benefits aligned with their national goals.

By doing so, President Trump can transform the region and counter the Iranian threat, while advancing America’s critical economic, technological, security, and diplomatic interests in the Middle East and far beyond.

This article was written in collaboration with Victoria Coates, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation. A former Deputy National Security Advisor in the first Trump administration, Coates has also held key positions within the US Senate, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy.

Published in  National Interest, June 12, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

On May 25, President Donald Trump made clear that expanding the Abraham Accords is a key American national security goal. He explicitly called on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan to join these historic agreements.

Suddenly, US President Donald Trump is talking up Abraham Accord peace treaties between Israel and Arab and Islamic countries.

On Wednesday he suggested that he might not sign a war-ending agreement with Iran if America’s Arab partners in the region do not agree to recognize Israel. Trump listed Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait as among the countries that should join the Abraham Accords (– accords that in 2020 established diplomatic relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, and that were subsequently joined by Morocco and Kazakhstan).

“I think they owe that to us, to be honest,” Trump said. “I’m not sure we should make the deal [with Iran] if they don’t sign.”

I am all for more Abraham Accord partners, but Trump is mistaken if he thinks that such advances can sugarcoat a bad deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran; a deal that might leave Iran with much of its enriched uranium and its nuclear and missile production facilities, and that would give Iran tens of billions of dollars of sanctions relief and leave it in de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz.

No, a thaw in Indonesian ties with Israel or a Paki and Saudi smile at Israel cannot compensate for a bad deal with Iran. Such US-brokered delicacies would not be any consolation. Not even a booby prize.

Neither Israeli nor Arab leaders in the region are so gullible. Nobody will be mollified by nice handshakes on the White House lawn. Nobody will consider them a sufficient or substantive conclusion to the US military campaign to cripple Iran.

Trump must more decisively crush Iran, period. Only on top of that could additional Abraham Accord treaties be viewed as very fine refinements to the Mideast situation.

THREE central strategic considerations undergird my assessment.

First, nothing is more important than ending Iran’s hegemonic march to control the Mideast, to intimidate the West and Western allies in the region, and to annihilate Israel. Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, as well as the 12-day war against Iran in 2025, have gone a long way in doing so.

But the job is incomplete. America (and Israel) have the ability to knock Iran back much father, and collapse of the radical Islamic clerical regime in Tehran is within reach too. The military and economic siege on Iran is truly effective, and additional strikes on that country’s energy and internal security nodes could drive the mullahs over the cliff.

Trump ought not retreat now. He certainly should not try to sell us a JCPOA Mark II accord (a reheated, slightly varnished version of then-President Obama’s rotten 2015 nuclear deal with Iran) with a puny Abraham Accords cherry on top.

The second strategic consideration is the seriousness of the Abraham Accords. The Accords truly were and remain the bedrock for a transformed Middle East; the most exciting and promising foundations for Arab-Israeli peace and regional stability, and for ideological rehabilitation from within of the Arab world towards modernity, moderation, and tolerance.

In other words, the Accords are too meaningful and meaty, too brave and consequential, to be treated as chickenfeed; as watery icing meant to smooth over defeat in the Arabian Gulf. You cannot whitewash the survival and strengthening of the ayatollahs with diplomatic pronouncements that merely promise featherlike melting of hostilities toward Israel.

Again, give us real victory over Iran, and then give us substantial Abraham Accord partnerships. Fudging either would be a grave mistake.

THE THIRD strategic consideration is that the Trump administration, for all its brave and forceful confrontation of Iran, has blinders on regarding the double-dealing and back-stabbing of Saudi Arabia and Turkey (and Pakistan too). Both countries have undermined the American and Israeli war effort, and neither is anywhere close to, or deserving of, upgraded ties with Israel.

Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia denied basing rights for assault on Iran to the US Air Force and failed to contribute his own large US-supplied air force to the war effort – unlike his courageous counterpart Mohammed Bin Zayed of the UAE. MBS also has not really backed American efforts to force-out Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Recip Tayyip Erdogan, the dictator of Turkey, has supported Iran, not the US, throughout the war in multiple ways, while continuing to back Hamas and to undermine US attempts to draw Syria out of the radical Islamist camp.

Peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia? Yes, that has been the holy grail of regional peacemaking since the dawn of the Abraham Accords, but now it seems not only distant but unworthy. At this point, the Saudis need Israel more than Israel needs the Saudis, and the ungrateful Gulf kingdom does not deserve Israeli felicitations.

Israel should not pay any ridiculous price for rapprochement with Riyadh. It certainly should not bend to the outrageous Saudi demand for Palestinian statehood as the cost of an embassy staffed in Tel Aviv by a representative of MBS; certainly not after October 7 and Saudi lassitude in confronting Hamas and Iran.

In sum, Trump should not be treating the Abraham Accords as candy to cover-up capitulation to Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, the IRGC, and whoever might be in charge in Tehran today.

Strike now to enervate Iran; save the sweet glaze for later.

Published in The Jerusalem Post and Israel Hayom 29.05.2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

What are the chances that Israel’s peace agreements with Arab states can withstand an intense multi-front war that brings tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths, hundreds of thousands wounded and displaced, and unprecedented destruction in Gaza? Two years ago, the likely answer would have been: none.

The reality turned out differently. Relations held firm despite images from Gaza, accusations of a “starvation campaign,” and an international smear campaign against Israel. From the outset of the war, the Abraham Accords countries signaled their intent to maintain ties with Israel and not allow Hamas to sabotage them. They were among the first to publicly condemn the terrorist organization for its October 7 massacre.

UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog on the sidelines of the climate summit in Dubai; Israeli ministers of economy, energy, and strategic affairs paid public visits and met with their counterparts; the IDF chief of staff attended a summit in Bahrain, while a delegation of Israeli rabbis visited Morocco.

Security cooperation deepened, and it is reasonable to assume it contributed to thwarting attacks on Israel throughout the war. Defense and civilian trade grew in 2024, similar to levels in 2023. Investment in Israeli high-tech continued. Tourism was affected by widespread reserve call-ups, aviation security restrictions, and growing concerns over attacks on Israelis, but it did not stop. Other ties remained intact, albeit at a lower public profile, with fewer meetings, fewer statements, and less fanfare.

The war’s negative impact on public opinion in those countries cannot be denied. Even before Israel’s strike in Qatar, Hamas’ propaganda campaign had severely damaged Israel’s image and expressions of solidarity. Still, those states understand that Israel’s war serves their core interest against their most dangerous foes: Iran and its proxies, and on the Sunni side, the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist movements. For them, lowering the profile and slowing progress is a necessity, but they hope it will be temporary.

Ankara and Doha’s agenda

Turkey and Qatar, the main sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood, hold ideological positions opposed to Israel’s integration in the region and have ambitious aspirations to expand their influence. They invest heavily in this effort, profiting from their ability to present themselves as mediators. The collapse of the Iranian-led Shiite axis created a vacuum they are rushing to fill.

It is no coincidence that both were the first to reopen embassies in Damascus under the rule of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, and to push for international recognition and Syrian reconstruction.

Syria? Not a partner yet

The idea of Damascus joining the Abraham Accords is wishful thinking. The suited jihadist ruler has spoken positively about peace with Israel, which is noteworthy, but so far it is only rhetoric.

Meanwhile, the brutal displays in his fractured state reveal his true character. Even those who believe that Ahmad al-Sharaa has moved on from jihadism and become a statesman would struggle to assume that his circle has abandoned its dream of building a radical Sunni theocracy.

The Muslim Brotherhood challenge

To counter the disruptive influence of Turkey and Qatar and build legitimacy for expanding and deepening the Abraham Accords, the Muslim Brotherhood must also be addressed. It is unlikely Washington will lead such a move while trying to appease Doha after Israel’s strike there. In any case, such a designation would be a long and complex legal process, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently explained.

This is not the first time the issue has been considered at the State Department. It would be a significant step toward a better Middle East. Only this May, Jordan outlawed the Brotherhood after uncovering a terror network run by the movement. It joined Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others that have faced the dangers of the Brotherhood and curbed its activity.

Those who still view the Brotherhood as merely a stream of “political Islam” offering a Sunni alternative to global jihadist organizations forget that its ideology is born of the same doctrine, applied by the same methods. Hamas demonstrated this clearly on October 7.

For US policymakers, pushing for such a designation will be a serious challenge, given America’s sensitive ties with Turkey and Qatar. But it would have a positive effect on normalization prospects with Saudi Arabia and ease internal pressure from Brotherhood-inspired opposition against states that have formal ties with Israel or are considering them.

The Houthi obstacle

Another barrier to realizing the full potential of the Abraham Accords is the Houthis. They control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most vital maritime choke points. Their activity has disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, raised transportation and insurance costs, and harmed global supply chains. Beyond economic losses worth hundreds of billions of dollars, their actions reinforce the perception of an old Middle East threatened by an Iranian-backed neighborhood bully.

Washington seems to believe the Houthis will quiet down once the Gaza war ends, and so it focuses its efforts on ending the war. But it is far from clear that this is the Houthis’ view, even after Israel decapitated their leadership. Even if quiet comes, they will remain a regional threat, with the next clash only postponed. Sooner or later, there will need to be a US-led international campaign to eliminate them. For those citing their survival as proof against confronting them, history shows what happens when Washington truly decides to act: Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Osama bin Laden, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi all ended the same way.

The Palestinian problem

Thirty-two years after the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which led to its creation, the Palestinian Authority is on its deathbed. Even French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative to recognize it as a state offers no revival. It is corrupt, inept, and supportive of terrorism. Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh described Hamas’ October 7 massacre as “a daring, unprecedented action, an important turning point in the history of the Palestinian struggle.”

Israel will need to explore alternative paradigms beyond those repeatedly tried and failed in resolving the conflict. Macron’s declaration, and Israel’s possible responses, will add to the pressures on the Abraham Accords countries, especially the UAE. Israeli policymakers will need to factor this into their reactions.

The Abraham Accords shattered the notion that normalization with Israel was impossible without first solving the Palestinian issue. That issue still weighs heavily in Arab states’ considerations, but letting it dictate policy only strengthens the enemies of peace.

Will we forever live by the sword?

The vision of peace still beats within us, deeply rooted in our hearts, minds, and prayers. But our yearning must not become an intoxicating illusion. True peace will come only after the forces of evil are defeated and lose hope, or alongside continued war against them, as is the case today with the Abraham Accords countries.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, September 14, 2025.

Since that historic announcement, we have worked tirelessly to turn the Abraham Accords peace agreements into bonds of warm friendship, understanding and cooperation, for the benefit of our countries and the entire Middle East. President Trump’s second administration holds the potential for advancing this process, and transforming the Middle East into a global center of prosperity, innovation and peace.

However, President Trump’s return comes at a critical and sensitive moment for the region. Achieving the goal of lasting peace in the Middle East will require defeating extremism, whether in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS, or in the form of the radical regime in Tehran and its terror proxies. These forces of hate are dedicated to undermining the vision of tolerance, acceptance and shared progress at the heart of the Abraham Accords.

President Trump’s efforts to win the release of Israeli hostages from the dungeons of Hamas, and to advance a peaceful future for Gaza, are extremely important. However, as long as Hamas remains the dominant force on the ground in Gaza, there is no hope for a future of stability in the Strip. This is true even if another entity provides a façade of civilian administration. 

Hamas, which still retains 20,000+ armed fighters in Gaza, is already reasserting its control throughout the territory. As long as a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization remains the strongest power on the ground, the next war is only a matter of time. Reconstruction materials sent into the Strip will be diverted to rebuild Hamas’ terror tunnels and bases, and the money spent on Gazan infrastructure will go to waste when that infrastructure is destroyed in the next round of fighting.

A brighter future for Gaza requires not just the elimination of Hamas, but a process of deradicalization. We must recall that Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip 18 years ago, and that the median age in Gaza is 18. This means that half of Gaza’s population grew up studying in Hamas schools, praying in Hamas mosques, and consuming Hamas-aligned media. 

Deradicalization, like denazification after World War II, must therefore be a key element of reconstruction. In this context, the UAE’s example of a national culture and educational curriculum committed to mutual respect and peaceful coexistence can serve as an important model. 

It will also be critical to address media platforms that spread pro-terror and antisemitic incitement, while actively seeking to undermine normalization and the Abraham Accords. Perhaps the most influential of such platforms is Qatar’s Al Jazeera’s network. President Trump should directly raise with Doha the continued efforts of this Qatari-funded platform to glorify Hamas, counter normalization, and delegitimize those who promote peace.

Advancing a future of peace in the Middle East will also require addressing the radical regime in Iran, which is the primary source of terror, destruction and unrest in the region. An end to Iran’s ability to sponsor, fund and direct terror is necessary to end the recurring wars in the region. 

By advancing Peace through Strength, the Middle East can be transformed in the coming years from a source of conflict into a hub of technological breakthroughs, economic growth and interfaith dialogue. The Abraham Accords can be deepened and expanded, while ground-breaking multilateral initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe (IMEC) Corridor and a Middle East Defense Alliance can lead to paradigm shifts in international trade and security. These developments can have tremendous positive benefits for the Palestinian people as well.

On a personal level, we will continue our efforts to build ties of people-to-people peace between our countries and across the region. We look forward to renewed US leadership in countering extremists, advancing win-win cooperation, and creating the groundwork for a lasting and viable peace.

The Abraham Accords began with incredible promise and were on the brink of significant expansion. Over the past four years, that momentum stalled. Now, with God’s help, we can work together to Make the Abraham Accords Great Again.

The article was written together with Loay Alshareef is a content creator of history and languages, and a peace activist.

Published in Breitbart, February 02, 2025.

The terrible war imposed on Israel on Oct. 7 tested not only Israel’s military power and national strength but also its relations with its neighbors in the Arab and Muslim world.

An emergency conference of leaders from these countries that convened in Saudi Arabia in the first month of the war, turned into a verbal demonstration of support for the Palestinians. As Israel’s actions in Gaza increased, so did the fears for the future of peace and the fate of the Abraham Accords, which in a short period of time had enough to experience a pandemic, security crises, and unprecedented political upheavals.

Sunday, Sept. 15, marks the fourth anniversary of the signing of the accords.

Despite difficult conditions, even this time, the question marks were once again replaced by an exclamation mark. The relationship stood strong even in the face of the anti-Israeli campaign and the difficult pictures from Gaza. Except for Sudan — which was shaken by a civil war — stability is maintained in all other arenas.  That same optimism can be attributed to the continued possibility of Saudi Arabia and other countries joining the Abraham Accords.

On Oct. 7, the normalization between Israel and its normal neighbors took a hard hit from its abnormal neighbors, yet remained steady. Already at the beginning of the war, the Abraham Accords countries signaled their intention to preserve relations with Israel and not let Hamas sabotage them. These countries were among the first to publicly condemn Hamas for the monstrous attack it carried out on the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah.

UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed welcomed Israeli President Isaac Herzog for a meeting on the sidelines of COP28 in Dubai while the military campaign on the battlefield continued. Since the war broke out, Israel’s ministers of economy, energy, and strategic affairs all made public visits to the UAE and met with their colleagues. The IDF Chief of Staff participated in a summit in Bahrain, while a delegation of Israeli rabbis visited Morocco.

The Emirati minister of state for foreign trade and the Bahraini minister of finance stated that they intend to continue promoting economic relations with Israel, while at the same time in interviews he gave to the media, the head of the Moroccan mission in Israel praised the cooperation between the countries.

The Technology and Innovation Institute of the United Arab Emirates announced the establishment of an artificial intelligence center at the Technion in Haifa, while the Moroccan government signed a billion-dollar satellite deal with the Israeli Aerospace Industry.

While most foreign airlines canceled their flights to Israel, FlyDubai and Etihad of the United Arab Emirates were among the only airlines in the world that continued flying to Israel.

And perhaps the most surprising: Trade between Israel and the Abraham Accords countries continues to increase significantly. According to a report recently published by the Abraham Accords Peace Institute: In the first half of 2024, there was a 7% increase in trade between Israel and the UAE, a 709% increase in trade between Israel and Bahrain, a 64% increase in trade between Israel and Morocco, and a 53% increase in trade between Israel and Egypt. These figures are relative to the first half of last year and reflect significant progress in economic relations between America’s allies in the region.

Such a significant increase in trade at a time of multifront war that increases uncertainty in the region, is not a matter of course and shouldn’t be taken for granted. As crazy as it seems, one of the factors that contributed to this trade growth is the war itself.

In the recent past, European companies used to send their cargoes of goods to the Gulf countries through the port of Beirut. These goods arrived by boat via the Mediterranean Sea and were loaded in the port of Beirut on trucks that took them from Lebanon through Syria to the Gulf countries. However, because of the Syrian Civil War and escalation in the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the use of this route has decreased over the past decade.

The preferred alternate route was from Egypt through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the Gulf. But in recent months, even this trade route has become problematic. The threats of the Houthis and their attacks in the Red Sea resulted in the shutdown of a significant part of the civilian maritime traffic on this route.

And so, the land route through Israel became the safest trade route between Europe and Asia. What was impossible before the Abraham Accords because of the boycott in the Arab world against Israel, became the preferred and most worthwhile route.

In recent months, the volume of cargo and goods passing through the Sheikh Hussein crossing between Israel and Jordan, and through the Nitsana crossing between Israel and Egypt, has been increasing. The traffic jams and congestion at the border crossings confirm the picture that emerges from the dry data and indicate that despite the war, when it comes to trade — it’s still business as usual.

Israel has a clear interest in preserving the positive momentum created and developing trade along this route. To this end, it will first of all have to expand the infrastructure at the border crossings and ports, including increasing the number of workers there and extending their hours of operation. It would be correct to get Jordan to agree to this effort in order to encourage the increase in trade and to optimize the transportation of cargo.

The diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey, which has negatively affected imports to Israel the food sector, provides an opportunity to expand imports from other sources in the region — mainly from Egypt. Due to the threat from the Houthis in the Red Sea, there are fewer Egyptian exports through the Suez Canal. The Egyptian economy is suffering a serious blow but can improve it through the expansion of land trade with Israel. Moving goods through Israel is the safest way for Egypt to export products eastward to the Gulf and Asia.

To reduce unnecessary regulation, Israel must complete the signing of free trade agreements with Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan similar to the agreement already signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Even if the timing is not suitable for this because of the war, it is right to complete the negotiations and prepare the groundwork for the day when it becomes possible.

The developments in Sudan require Israel and the United States to take emergency measures to stop the Iranian influence that has increased in this region, following the civil war and after the delay in progress of the Abraham Accords. For about a year and a half, a bloody war has been going on in Sudan between the military ruler, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and his deputy, Hemedti, who attempted to stage a coup against him.

Iran saw this as an opportunity to sink its claws into Sudan and began to supply UAVs to Burhan, who had previously been the one to carry the normalization with Israel on his back. His appeal to Tehran was not out of sympathy with it, but as a coercion due to a vacuum left by the United States and the lack of weapons and means to defend his country.

From Iran’s point of view, Sudan is a strategic asset in light of its geographical location that can create an operational base for terror activity against the shores of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sinai, the Gaza Strip and Israel, and on the other hand, against African countries.

Many steps are necessary to expand the circle of peace, but the chances of an agreement with Saudi Arabia have not diminished. The same goes for other desirable countries. They are all waiting for “the right time,” in view of the multi-stakeholder war and the upcoming U.S. presidential election.

One way or another, even in the shadow of the war, the facts on the ground show that the Abraham Accords countries still strive to develop and deepen their ties with Israel in many areas. The Abraham Accords were founded on a concept of peace through strength. Not only military power but also economic and technological power. Although the current war pushed them out of the headlines, these peace treaties have quietly become part of the landscape of our lives.

Published in Newsmax, September 13, 2024.

Key Points:

• Sudanese Transitional Sovereignty Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken major steps to demonstrate his commitment to peace with Israel. Israel must welcome and embrace this serious commitment, rather than taking it for granted.

• Iran’s destabilizing activities in Sudan can be countered by stronger security cooperation between Israel and Sudan. Such cooperation would help prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to Hamas in Gaza.

• Sudan, as the third-largest country in Africa, has the potential to become a major exporter of wheat and agricultural products. This potential can be realized through cooperation with Israeli agri-tech companies, which can provide the necessary technology to develop the fertile Sudanese land.

• Just as peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia is still possible despite Saudi Arabia re-establishing ties with Iran, peace between Israel and Sudan is still possible despite Sudan re-establishing ties with Iran.

  Four years ago, on February 3^rd, 2020, a dramatic meeting took place against all odds and expectations in the Middle East. While on a working visit in Uganda, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a meeting with the leader of Sudan, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The meeting was a breakthrough for numerous reasons. First and foremost, until that point, Sudan was most notable in Israeli history for hosting the Arab League Khartoum Summit of 1967. This summit, which followed Israel’s decisive victory in the Six Day War, established the Arab League’s “Three Nos” – “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.”

The meeting between Netanyahu and Burhan in 2020 helped shift the mindset of Arabs and Israelis, leading them to realize that the region was changing for the better. It became obvious that Netanyahu’s successful campaign of expanding Israel’s engagement with Africa (“Israel is returning to Africa and Africa is returning to Israel”) was producing positive results in the Arab world as well. The immediate publication of the meeting in a statement to the press – as agreed by both Netanyahu and Burhan – showed that Sudan wanted this relationship to be public.

Three days later, on February 6^th, 2020, Burhan announced that Sudan would allow Israeli planes to use its airspace. This move significantly reduced the flight time between Tel Aviv and Johannesburg, as well as to other destinations. Indeed, on February 16^th, 2020, the first-ever commercial Israeli flight entered Sudanese airspace, a historic moment that proved Burhan’s commitment to normalizing ties with Israel.

Eventually, on October 23^rd, 2020, a three-way telephone call was held between Burhan, Netanyahu, and then-US President Donald Trump. In that phone call, it was agreed that Sudan would sign the Abraham Accords and normalize ties with Israel. In exchange, the United States would remove Sudan from its list of state-sponsors of terror. On January 6^th, 2021, Sudan formally signed the Abraham Accords and on April 20^th, 2021, Burhan canceled the official Sudanese boycott of Israel.

Since then, however, there has been little progress made on reaching a full normalization agreement. The Biden Administration, as well as the Bennett-Lapid government, both chose to maintain distance from Burhan. Sadly, potential avenues for collaboration were overlooked. But Burhan was patient and remained optimistic that Israel would eventually advance its normalization with Sudan. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 2022, Burhan said in an interview that he would visit Israel if and when invited – as well as in November 2022, when he was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Netanyahu on his return to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.

Unfortunately, the rebellion launched by rival forces in April 2023 pushed Sudan into a devastating civil war, which has made the situation even more difficult. Burhan has managed to retain control of much of Sudan, while the rebel forces were repeatedly sanctioned and condemned by US and Western officials.

Burhan also made significant trips to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which remain supportive of him. Additionally, Burhan represented Sudan at the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2023 and also met with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine.

Eventually, given the lack of robust support from the US, Israel and other Western nations in the context of the Sudanese civil war, Burhan reluctantly accepted Iranian offers to re-establish diplomatic relations and sign arms deals. This unfortunate development highlights an important reality which Israel must recognize: When Israel neglects its relations, anywhere in the world, our enemies quickly expand their influence. Wherever Israel is not actively pursuing peace, prosperity and security – Iran is actively pursuing terrorism, war, and genocide.

Like the Saudis, Burhan would have preferred not to do a deal with the devil in Iran. This can be seen from his recent decision to prohibit the construction of an Iranian Naval Base in Port Sudan. But just as the decision by Western leaders to distance themselves from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman led Saudi Arabia to draw closer to China and Iran, the West’s similar approach to Burhan has led to the rekindling of Sudan-Iran ties. Just as peace with Saudi Arabia is still possible despite the Saudis re-establishing ties with Iran, finalizing Israel’s peace agreement with Sudan is still possible despite Burhan’s deal with Iran.

Israel should consider offering Burhan options for security cooperation that would allow Sudan to cancel its agreement with Iran, or at the very least, to reduce its need for Iranian military assistance. This could include presenting Burhan with possibilities for cooperation with Israeli defense companies, including those that have expanded their relationships with other Abraham Accords countries since the signing of the Accords. It is imperative that Israel – not Iran – have a strong relationship with the Sudanese military and security forces. Particularly as Israel’s war against Hamas continues, Israel and Sudan should work together to prevent Sudanese territory from being used to smuggle Iranian weapons to the Gaza Strip. This security coordination would strongly bolster Israel’s regional deterrence.

Sudan also has potential to help bring prosperity to the region, including through enhanced agricultural cooperation with Israel. Sudan is the third-largest country in Africa and home to expansive stretches of fertile farmland. In the past, Sudan served as a major exporter of wheat and cotton. As a result of the Russia-Ukraine War, Sudan has the potential to once again become a major supplier of wheat to Europe and Africa. It can partner with Israeli agri-tech companies to do so. This would be a major achievement for both the Israeli and Sudanese economies. It would cause the people of the region to benefit from the fruits of this peace in the most literal sense.

Some continue to question Burhan’s commitment to normalize relations with Israel. As noted, Burhan has openly demonstrated his seriousness on peace with Israel by meeting publicly with Israel’s Prime Minister, annulling Sudan’s boycott of Israel, opening Sudanese airspace to Israeli flights, and joining the Abraham Accords. The various rebel groups in Sudan have taken no such steps towards normalization with Israel – certainly not in public.

Initiatives for security and economic cooperation with Burhan and his government, despite the civil war in Sudan, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, would help ensure that Sudan remains inside the Abraham Accords. As a result of this crucial cooperation at such a critical time, Israel and Sudan could finally sign the long-awaited normalization agreement and realize the potential of peace.

Mohammed bin Salman’s statements on normalization with Israel attest to the seriousness of his efforts in this process and are also designed to prepare public opinion in the kingdom.

The three leaders – Joe Biden, bin Salman, and Netanyahu – have many reasons to try hard and reach a peace deal. The narrow window of opportunity for the three has had them explore the maneuvering room they have and find creative solutions in order to overcome the hurdles on the way: Saudi Arabia demands uranium enrichment capabilities, a defense pact, and real progress in the Palestinian track. Another issue that needs to be decided in Israel is a US-Israel defense pact. If the Israeli defense establishment becomes convinced that the pros outweigh the cons, then the current point in time presents an opportunity to reach such a deal as part of a grand bargain.

The laundry list that Saudi Arabia has sought to get from the US is long. Not only do some pose no real problems for Israel – but they also benefit it. Thus, Israel should not be opposed to a US-Saudi defense alliance. Jerusalem has a vested interest in bolstering the US commitment to its allies in the region, and therefore it should support such a development, even in public.

As for providing advanced US weapon systems to Saudi Arabia, Israel should condition its support on having Washington take steps to cement its qualitative edge. This could take the form of bolstering Israel’s capabilities if the arms sold to Saudi Arabia are deemed to be chipping away at Israel’s superiority. There is a big dilemma when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s demand for US support in setting up a civilian nuclear program, which would include the ability to enrich uranium. You don’t need to be a nuclear expert to understand what purpose this could serve. Having Riyadh join the nuclear club will expand nuclear proliferation in the region, with other countries racing to get enrichment capabilities on their territory.

As far as Israel is concerned, the ideal response from Biden would be along the lines of Saudi Arabia will not have nuclear enrichment, and neither will Iran. Namely, rather than have Saudi Arabia try to keep up with Iran by getting enrichment capabilities, the US will act to bring an neutralize Iran’s threatening capabilities. This response will not only make Saudi Arabia less concerned but will also prevent a nuclear arms race in the region and send a clear message as for the global standard that has to be upheld when it comes to nuclear capabilities.

But the Biden administration has so far gone in the other direction, and it could not be expected to take such a radical turn back. One can assume that the proposals that will be put forward will focus on the various arrangements that would ensure that the US keeps control over a Saudi nuclear program in a way that would prevent it from having military dimensions. A US-Saudi defense pact will also provide various means for the US to keep oversight over Riyadh’s actions. All this will be able to reduce the threats, but it would not be enough to assuage Israel’s fears or prevent a nuclear arms race in the region. As for the Palestinian issues, the expectation in Riyadh is that a meaningful process will put this back on the table and give the Saudi Peace Initiative from 2002 more weight when it comes to ending the Israeli-Arab conflict. The US administration may have been holding on to this prospect to put more pressure on Israel and to have the Palestinian issue move forward along the lines it wishes. This could result in Israel being asked to make concessions that it cannot realistically make. The main criteria under which Israel has to formulate its stand is reversibility: Israel must not agree to concessions that are irreversible (or that the price of reversing them is too steep).

At this point, it is hard to assess whether one should support or oppose a defense pact between Israel and the US, as this would ultimately boil down to what the details of such a deal will be once negotiations conclude. Just like there is medicine without unwanted side effects, such processes always come with drawbacks. Israel should determine its stance based on the overall calculus.

The more the proposed draft bolsters Israel’s deterrence, guarantees its freedom of operation and its ability to defend itself by itself while increasing the US commitment to bolstering the Israeli military capabilities and qualitative edge, and if it all deepens the bipartisan commitment toward the Jewish state, then the Israeli stance will lean more toward a “yes.” One such option is having the US be bound to help Israel only when there is an existential threat, thus potentially resolving the issue of limiting Israel’s freedom of action in this regard, Israel will ask that the overall factors take into account the Saudi component. The combustible security situation has increased the risk of violent incidents in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, as well as in Israeli prisons and on the northern border. This could adversely impact the overall public opinion on the Arab street, which wields power in decision points. In such a situation, any mini-crisis could become a big obstacle.

Published in Israel Hayom, October 25, 2023.