Noa Lazimi: In fact, Iran is highly motivated to retaliate now. And in my view, it’s only a matter of time until it does so. Now, as for the Houthis, despite the fact that they don’t seem to possess a relatively high level of threat to Israel, what worries me most is their consistency and their radical ideology. I mean, they’re not showing any signs of backing down. And you would expect them to be extremely weakened or at least not as motivated to provoke Israel after the major hit that Iran suffered. And obviously that did impact their weapon supply and also taking into account the American air sites on Yemen. But still for them it’s important to show even with a few missiles that they’re still in the picture that they’re here to stay and we have to take them into account in the regional order.

The interview took place on Channel I24, on July 3, 2025.

Meir Ben-Shabbat: Israel faces a delicate decision. If it focuses solely on threats, it risks missing a rare opportunity to reshape the reality along its northern border. On the other hand, if it makes concessions in the style of the ‘Oslo process,’ these could prove to be a dangerous gamble.

The status of the Golan Heights is non-negotiable. The Golan Heights without peace is preferable to peace without the Golan Heights. Israel seeks de jure recognition of its control over the Golan, viewing it as the strategic defense line on its eastern border.

Published in JNS, July  03, 2025.

As Israel and Iran were already exchanging missile strikes and conducting airstrikes, the situation in West Asia further deteriorated following United States’s attack on three Iranian nuclear facilities — Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan — on June 22. Against this backdrop, Organiser Assistant Editor Ravi Mishra spoke exclusively with Joseph Rozen — Geopolitical Strategist, Senior Fellow at the Misgav In…

Published in Organiser, July  01, 2025.

Meir Ben Shabbat: The choice is not simply hostage release versus ending the war, but rather hostage release versus preserving Hamas. This is the implication of an overall deal for the release of all hostages in line with conditions that Hamas is demanding. These conditions include a complete cessation of combat with international guarantees, withdrawal to the Oct. 6, 2023, lines, the rebuilding of Gaza and the release of Palestinian security prisoners.

The blow that Hamas took from Israel is indeed severe, but it is not mortal and not irreversible. Hamas’s ability to pose an immediate significant threat to Israel in terms of rocket fire or a ground attack in the style of October 7th has probably been denied. It has lost many of its personnel, its means of combat and production, but one should not learn from this about its recovery capacity.

Hamas is still the main power in Gaza. Its fighters and leaders operate mainly in tunnels, take few risks, act in a guerrilla-like manner when opportunities arise, and wait for the moment they can safely emerge above ground.

Published in JNS, July  01, 2025.

Prof. Kobi Michael: They came out as the winners of this war. They coordinated Iran’s retaliation on US soil, positioned themselves as the ultimate mediator, not just regionally, but globally. President Trump didn’t negotiate with the Iranians directly. He did it through Qatar.

Qatar’s role went beyond diplomacy. They even coordinated the Iranian retaliation against the US bombing of Fordo, including the attack on the American base in Qatar itself. That shows how far they went in playing both sides.

President Trump is so happy with this result that he’s softening US pressure on Qatar regarding its ongoing support for Hamas. That’s the problem. The Americans were hijacked by the Qataris.

Qatar’s long-standing ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood continue to raise concerns in Israeli and regional policy circles. Together with Turkey, they are the biggest supporters of political Islam. They want Hamas to stay in Gaza—and to dominate the entire Palestinian political arena. Their vision is to reestablish an Islamic caliphate.

Published in The Media Line, June  27, 2025.

Ruth Wasserman Lande: “From the start, I believed the U.S. would realize that the Fordow nuclear facility had to be taken out — for the safety of the entire international community. This isn’t about the Iranian people. It’s about the regime — and that regime must not have a military nuclear program. The U.S. did the right thing.”

“Iran calls it aggression, but for years it has been arming, funding, and training proxies to attack Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and of course, Israel and the Jewish people.”

The interview took place on Radio Times on June 26, 2025.

Asher Fredman: The new reality in the Middle East creates tremendous possibilities for expanding regional cooperation.

As former U.S. National Security Advisor Ambassador Robert O’Brien suggested on the Misgav Institute’s new Mideast Horizons podcast, it may be possible to expand the circle of peace not only to Saudi Arabia, but to additional GCC countries such as Kuwait, Oman and even Qatar.

The interview took place on Channel I24 on June 25, 2025.

Meir Ben Shabbat: Anyone who expects the regime in Iran to behave according to the Western way of thinking, which examines profit and loss considerations in every move, does not understand what a religious, stubborn, and determined regime this is.

The only thing that can cause change is a threat to the regime’s survival. Iran’s behavior shows that it does not think it is at this point yet.

Published in The Times of Israel, June  22, 2025.

Ruth Wasserman Lande: I would say the biggest conflict is not the Israeli-Arab conflict or the Islamic-Jewish conflict, but rather the one between radical Sunni Islamists and radical Shiite Islamists.

In other words, the Shiite axis led by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on the Sunni side, an axis essentially led by several actors — Erdogan of Turkey, Qatar, and others — who fund, train, and actively support the radical Sunni Islamists.

The interview took place on Channel I24 on June 19, 2025.

Ruth Wasserman Lande: “Now that Iran’s access and influence have been significantly weakened — and before they are completely eliminated — this is the time to apply pressure on Qatar and the Hamas leadership comfortably based there. Not on those on the ground, who have already lost everything and have nothing left to lose. They’ve lost. All they can do now is harass the IDF and inflict more harm on our soldiers and civilians. The only leverage they still hold is our poor hostages. What must be done now is for Israel and the United States to translate their military successes into diplomatic pressure on Qatar and the Hamas leadership there. The message should be: If you want anything out of this situation, release all our hostages. Now is the time.”

The interview took place on Channel I24, 19 June, 2025.