Dr. Raphael BenLevi: Since the 1970s, many Israeli territorial concessions were indirectly facilitated by aid packages — aid that was meant to ‘sweeten’ politically risky moves. We called it ‘land for peace,’ but it was often ‘land for aid.
We became addicted to Washington’s credits. Then came the war on October 7, and suddenly we needed ammunition we couldn’t manufacture fast enough at home.
Published in TPS, May 05, 2025.
Meir Ben Shabbat: Any agreement must include the following components — elimination of enriched uranium stockpiles and destruction of Iran’s centrifuges and conversion and enrichment facilities. In the context of weapon systems, Iran must cease all planning and development activities related to the weapons system [nuclear warheads], fully expose past activities, and dismantle research centers engaged in warhead technologies, which operate under academic and civilian cover.
Iran must stop its ballistic missile program, intended for nuclear warheads.
The full interview was published on Alma, 5 May, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: Israel’s latest measures are aimed at pressuring Hamas — not to reduce the size of the Gaza Strip for the sake of annexation or something like that.
Still, it was likely that Israel would maintain control of buffer zones and seized territory indefinitely, or at least until Hamas’ rule in Gaza is brought to an end, with a new system of authority ushered in.
We are still in a war against Hamas. And this is part of the war.
No safe place left in Gaza as Israel’s ‘humanitarian zones’ shrink.
Published in NBC NEWS, May 04, 2025.
Noa Lazimi: Israel’s efforts to protect its border with Syria are motivated by legitimate security needs, not expansionism.
It is a vital key interest for Israel to ensure that southern Syria remains demilitarized, so the Golan and Galilee aren’t endangered. And by having operational freedom over Syrian airspace, Israel can prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands and thwart attempts by pro-Turkish militia groups from attacking Israel’s border,
Published in Washington Examiner, April 26, 2025.
David M. Weinberg: After all, the insistence on Palestinian statehood—after 30 years of Oslo process failures and the Oct. 7 attacks—flies in the face of logic, justice, history, and basic security realities.
The Palestinian national movement, Fatah and Hamas wings alike, largely have shown themselves to be committed to Israel’s debilitation and destruction, not to a peaceful two-state solution.
Published in JNS, April 22, 2025.
Col. (res.) Dr. Hanan Shai: Statements by Lebanese officials and the activities of the Lebanese army are unequivocally an achievement for Israel.
The weakness of the Lebanese army, the IDF cannot rely on it and must back it up with its own parallel defense— mainly through detailed intelligence monitoring and targeted thwarting of any violation not only in Southern Lebanon but also [deep] within it, including at sea and air ports.
Published in JNS, April 18, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: The Houthi’s military capability has been damaged but not yet eliminated. More time and effort—complementary to the military effort—will be required to bring about their disintegration from most of their capabilities in a more significant way.
The American effort must be assisted by social-political efforts within Yemen itself.
These efforts should be aimed at weakening and fragmenting the Houthis and their regime in northern Yemen, he said, “to assist the government of southern Yemen in cooperation with tribes rival to the Houthi tribes in northern Yemen to regain effective control of the area, alongside the military effort.”
It does not exist in the kinetic context. it does exist in the intelligence context and perhaps in assisting thought and consultations in the political context. The U.S. coordinates and updates, but acts quite independently and very much prefers that there be no Israeli involvement, which can only complicate matters.
Published in JNS, April 14, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: Israel was beginning to doubt Trump’s determination vis a vis Iran. I don’t think prime minister Netanyahu believes that negotiations with Iran can lead to a successful agreement that will prevent Iran from advancing its military nuclear capabilities.
At the same time, I think the prime minister is very concerned about the skillful negotiating capabilities of Iran and the possibility that Israel might find itself in a dangerous strategic stalemate with regard to Iran’s military nuclear capabilities.
Published in The Washington Free Beacon, April 11, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: An uprising against Hamas could be a way to avoid a full Israeli occupation of Gaza.
Occupation is the more probable scenario, unless the protesters reach 100,000 which would be a tipping point to convince Hamas to accept the Witkoff proposal.
Israel’s increased military pressure was to force Hamas to not only free the remaining hostages it seized during the October 7, 2023 attack that triggered the war, but to also lay down its arms and for its leaders to leave Gaza. However, he sees “no indication” that Hamas would agree to this.
Published in The National, April 08, 2025.
Noa Lazimi: The base would enable Turkey to establish air superiority in this area, and this poses a serious concern for Israel because it undermines its operational freedom in the region.
Published in Reuters, April 04, 2025.
