Prof. Kobi Michael explains that Israel and the United States are pursuing parallel military and diplomatic tracks against Iran, with Trump reopening negotiations without halting ongoing strikes.

He argues that Iran’s core strategy is to gain time, increase pressure via threats to energy infrastructure and the Hormuz Strait, survive Western pressure, and emerge from the war still in power with the ability to rebuild its capabilities, warning that a failed negotiation could trigger a far more intense phase of the war.

The interview took place on Channel I24 on March 25, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Prof. Zaki Shalom: The primary significance of a strike on the reactor would not lie in physical danger, but in a major psychological and symbolic achievement for Iran.

If such a sensitive security site were damaged, even minimally, it can be assumed that Israel would need to respond in an exceptional manner. It would not be able to suffice with a parallel strike on nuclear sites in Iran, since it is already doing so in any case.

The full interview was published in The Times of Israel on March 25, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Prof. Kobi Michael analyzes the strategic goals of mediating the war with Iran, specifically the removal of enriched uranium and the termination of proxy support, while expressing deep skepticism regarding the regime’s cooperation

He emphasizes that the success of these efforts is vital for weakening Hezbollah and fostering a unique opportunity for normalization with a Lebanese government that now views the group as an enemy

The full interview took place on Chai FM on March 24, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The scale of this war’s achievements and the reach of its impact will be shaped by the arrangements forged at its conclusion. Even now, one thing can be said: Iran’s rush toward negotiations under fire – and after the elimination of its supreme leader and a large part of its leadership – may signal the beginning of a surrender.

“Accepting this decision is more bitter and lethal for me than drinking a cup of poison” – those were the words of Iran’s supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, in his famous address of July 20, 1988, in which he explained his acceptance of the ceasefire with Iraq and his retreat from the call to fight until victory. Eight years of bloody war were required to bring him to that point.

Experts argued at the time that this was the first instance in the history of modern revolutions in which a revolutionary leader had made such an extreme reversal on such a fundamental matter. The speech was considered a defining moment, precisely because of the sharp shift from the rhetoric of war-until-victory to painful compromise. The phrase “drinking a cup of poison” has since entered the lexicon of Iranian politics to describe situations in which a leader is compelled to make a pragmatic decision, contrary to his ideological convictions, in order to save the state or the regime.

Despite Iranian denials that advanced discussions between the parties are underway, every sign points to a mutual American and Iranian desire to reach an agreement. The coming days will show how far Khomeini’s successors in Tehran are willing to walk the precedent-setting path he blazed.

According to reports on Al-Mayadeen (the Lebanese television channel affiliated with Hezbollah), the conditions Iran is placing on ending the war are sweeping. They include demands for guarantees against the resumption of hostilities, the closure of US military bases in the region, the payment of reparations to Iran, and a new order in the Strait of Hormuz that would expand Iran’s control over it. These can be assumed to be opening positions – negotiating tactics also designed to show regime supporters that it is not crawling to the table on its stomach.

In any case, Trump will have to accept that for as long as the Iranian regime exists – whoever its representatives may be – it will not change its aspirations and will not change its ways. On the contrary, the current war will provide it with a clear justification for the view that only a military nuclear capability can guarantee its survival. Accordingly, it will spare no effort to achieve precisely that.

Preventing a swift recovery

The first challenge Washington will have to address in any arrangement with Iran is preventing the rapid recovery of the regime. The easing of military pressure, in itself, will already create conditions for that. To prevent it, Washington will need to keep in place, for a considerable period, the economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Such a decision will also reduce both the disappointment of Iran’s civilian masses, who are still waiting for a green light from Trump to take to the streets, and the anxiety of the Gulf states, which understand that they may now be left alone facing a wounded Iranian beast.

The second challenge is the nuclear issue – not only the removal and destruction of the enriched uranium in Iran’s possession, but also the prevention of any enrichment on Iranian soil at any level, along with effective oversight mechanisms to permanently foreclose the possibility of producing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

A further challenge concerns the imposition of limits on the missile program – range, types, and quantities.

The fourth challenge is halting Iranian support for proxy organizations. These challenges, too, are tied to the resources Iran will have at its disposal to rebuild its capabilities, which is another reason not to rush in unfreezing existing restrictions.

No fire and no recovery

The prevailing approach is that it is right for discussions on the core issues to take place precisely while military pressure is at its peak. At that moment, it will be easier to extract concessions. However, the cost of this approach may be the loss of remaining chances of toppling the regime. The moment a comprehensive arrangement is signed – one that releases resources to Iran – the regime’s recovery and rehabilitation will also begin.

The way to address this challenge is to decouple the ceasefire agreement from the arrangement on core issues. That is, not to settle for a halt to fighting if it comes with a lifeline for the regime, but also not to rush toward a comprehensive arrangement that enables its rehabilitation. A ceasefire without regime rehabilitation is preferable to an arrangement that preserves it.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 24, 2026.  

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Meir Ben Shabbat: Washington’s first objective in any arrangement with Iran must be to prevent the regime from recovering quickly. Any agreement should include sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Iran, as well as removal and destruction of the enriched uranium, but also a ban on enrichment at any level on Iranian soil.

Trump put something on the table as a theoretical, it got exactly the desired end state which is, the attempt at negotiations would serve multiple purposes, not least of which is it demonstrates his willingness to pursue a negotiated diplomatic settlement. At the same time, strikes continue.

Published in The Daily Signal, March  24, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Prof. Kobi Michael noted that despite Israeli control over Gaza’s borders, Iran was still giving significant aid to Hamas. Even recently, the Iranians were trying to smuggle weapons and money to the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and to Hamas abroad. Hamas understands that if this regime collapses or is weakened to the degree that it will not be able to continue supporting Hamas, they are in big trouble. The assault on Iran was explicitly designed to target this infrastructure, with multiple IRGC commanders responsible for collaboration with Palestinian terror groups being neutralized in the early days of the campaign. Outlining the strategic intent behind destroying these networks, U.S. President Donald Trump explained in a briefing in early March that the military campaign ensures that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.

The full interview was published in JNS on March 22, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Prof. Kobi Michael explains that the IDF aims to remove Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon to establish a “political horizon” of mutual recognition and potential peace with the Lebanese government.

He further details the conflict’s transition into an “energy war” against national infrastructure, emphasizing the necessity of American pressure and support to effectively weaken Hezbollah and Iranian influence.

The interview took place on ILTV on March 19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Prof. Kobi Michael: The new leader is an empty entity. Mojtaba Khamenei does not appear in public, but we also have reliable information that he does not control or lead the regime or what has been left of the regime.

The current Iranian leadership is broken, confused and is almost misfunctioning.

Published in Fox News, March  19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Asher Fredman: If you look at the numbers, trade between Israel and Morocco, the UAE, Bahrain — even Egypt and Jordan — is up across the board.

Instability in the Strait of Hormuz has renewed interest in the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a proposed overland trade route connecting India to Europe through Gulf states, Jordan, and Israel. As maritime insurance goes up and uncertainty grows, the economic case for this overland route grows as well.

Published in Daily Wire, March  19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Meir Ben Shabbat: The idea is that the internal struggle that is supposed to bring about regime change will occur when the regime has been battered and destabilized, its command-and-control system reduced to only partial functioning, its mechanisms of repression damaged, its legitimacy at a low point, its proxies weak, and its economic hole deep. These are conditions that would enable citizens who oppose the regime to finish the job and take advantage of the rare opportunity. It is true that the outcome cannot be guaranteed, but it is clear that without these prior steps, there is no chance of it happening.

Published in The Free Press, March  19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.