President-elect Donald Trump said this week: “If the hostages are not back by the time I get into office, all hell will break out in the Middle East.” Since December 2, he has repeated this stark message, without embellishment or ambiguity. “The consequences will be unprecedented. Those responsible will be hit harder than anyone has been in the long history of the United States,” he has threatened. When asked a few days ago about the practical implications of his words, he clarified: “It won’t be a ‘don’t’; it will be hell.”

Trump’s declaration is not merely another important expression of identification and solidarity with Israel. It goes far beyond the supportive statements about hostage release of other world leaders, as significant as they may be. When the President-elect puts his prestige on the line and subjects himself to a test with clear metrics for success and with a defined end date (by his inauguration) – he is signing a commitment to deliver results.

Trump understands that his success or failure in this matter will influence his standing and American ability to tackle other challenges, from China to Russia and Iran, and from the Houthis in Yemen to global jihad organizations.

The Israeli public is accustomed to a gap between declarations and actions, and thus may welcome Trump’s approach but cannot rely on it. This skepticism stems from the fact that it is difficult to influence extreme non-state actors with the tools used against states, as well as from the sense that Israel has reached its limits in exerting force on Hamas on its own. As Osama Hamdan, a member of Hamas’ political leadership, said, “Hell is not a threat to Palestinians who are already living in hell.”

One hopes that this sentiment is not shared by Israel’s senior diplomatic and defense leadership, and that it is working to formulate concrete recommendations for the incoming administration on how exactly Trump can deliver the promised “hell” to Hamas.

A plan to dish-out “hell to Hamas” will require, first and foremost, removal of American restraints and handcuffs on the IDF. It should include the following components:

1. Complete support for Israel’s position in negotiations versus Hamas.
2. Tightening the siege on Gaza: Reducing fuel and food supplies to Gaza to the bare minimum and preventing Hamas control over them. This includes support for establishing an Israeli military administration in Gaza and blocking the transfer of non-critical supplies from foreign states and international entities.
3. Backing intensive, high-intensity Israeli military operations: Removing limitations on armament, territorial occupation, and the movement of large populations from combat zones. These operations aim to eliminate the Hamas terrorist threat and to destroy its capabilities. Although Hamas has been hit hard by the IDF, it has not yet been dealt fatal and irreversible blows. Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza with thousands of fighters and operatives, who await the “day after” an IDF withdrawal and meanwhile inflict losses on Israel through local guerrilla actions.
4. Elimination of the Hamas external command structure: Hamas’ leadership in Qatar, Turkey and elsewhere remains intact, turning this from a local problem into a regional issue. Neutralizing Hamas power centers, including assassination of Hamas leaders, would severely harm the organization and its recovery capabilities.
5. Drying up funding sources: It is critical to target Hamas fronts such as the “Coalition of Charity Organizations” and its various components.
6. Utilizing American influence on mediators in negotiations: Egypt and Qatar’s influence on Hamas is neither unlimited nor negligible. Given Trump’s statements on the hostages, it is appropriate to demand that they exert all possible leverage on Hamas to produce results.

Published in Jewish Policy Center, January 13, 2025.

What does American backing for Israel mean in the current wars? Hopefully, the scope and depth of American backing will improve dramatically in the move this month from President Joe Biden to President-elect Donald Trump.

From the day that Hamas savagely attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration has backed Israel in its counterattack to rout Hamas and end its rule in Gaza. The US has given Israel weapons and diplomatic support, blocking dozens of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN, as well as providing negotiation services in the attempt to obtain hostage release.

At the same time, however, Washington unpardonably has insisted that Israel fuel Gaza (read: Hamas), literally and figuratively, every step of the way. It has forced Israel to supply an enemy in wartime with hundreds of thousands of tons of goods ranging from cigarettes and flour to fuel.

Everybody but everybody knows and admits (even UN chiefs and fierce anti-Israel “humanitarian” NGOs) that Hamas has absconded much if not most of the supplies trucked in by Israel, which it then sells to its “own people” (i.e., poor Palestinian civilians) at exorbitant prices – to fuel the Hamas war effort, to keep itself in power, and to continue to torture Israel as Israeli hostages die out, probably day by day.

Washington has also counterproductively restrained the Israeli military. It has been annoyingly mistaken every step of the way, riding Israel’s brakes. Don’t invade Gaza City, said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan – speaking in Biden’s name. Don’t take Shifa Hospital. Don’t enter Khan Yunis. Don’t take Rafah or the Philadelphi Corridor. Don’t try to move civilian populations from the battle zones. Don’t use large-diameter or heavy ordnance bombs. Don’t, don’t, don’t…

The net result of the delays and restraints imposed by America has been the grind in which the IDF now finds itself: A house-by-house slog through Hamas hideouts that is drawing precious blood with Israeli soldiers needlessly falling almost every day – without there being a decisive result.

In the operations in northern Gaza since October aimed at clearing terrorists from Jabaliya, Beit Hanun, and Beit Lahiya – again – more than 80 soldiers have been killed. Tragic and outrageously avoidable.

And, sure enough, despite Israel’s (unfortunately shackled) effort, Hamas retains administrative and terrorist capabilities in northern Gaza, as well as in southern Gaza cities like Rafah, where the IDF was forced by America to tiptoe through the tulips; not to mention the fact that the IDF has not yet operated in 30% of Gaza.

In short, Biden wanted Israel to win the war but simultaneously undermined Israel’s ability to do it

All this is part of Biden’s mania for regional de-escalation. After Iran fired hundreds of missiles toward Israel last April and October (assaults that fortunately were scuttled by Israeli, US and other forces), Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the US “would not be involved” in any Israeli counteroffensive against Iran.

His spokesman said “We don’t seek a wider war in the region. We don’t seek escalated tensions in the region. We don’t seek a wider conflict. We don’t seek a war with Iran.” More “don’ts.”

America went on to assure its European and Mideast allies and the Iranians that it “was not involved” in Israel’s intensive campaign of strikes against Hezbollah missile depots and military installations; “not involved” in the Israeli strike on senior Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil; “not involved” in the beeper bombing of Hezbollah operatives; “not involved” in the assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran or Hezbollah chieftain Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, etc.

Each time, the US predictably prattled that the US “was not involved,” and that it “does not want to see an escalation.”

You get the picture: America has not sufficiently backstopped Israel with American commitment and power in the confrontation against Iran and its terrorist proxies. Rather, its de-escalation mantra has hemmed-in and handcuffed Israel.

Like the Obama administration, the Biden-Harris administration all along and even since October 7, still has sought to reset the region through conciliation with and concession to Iran, not confrontation. It has postured the US less as the leader of a regional coalition against Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance,” and more as a mediator between it and Israel.

The problem is that you cannot defeat evil, never mind truly crush Hamas alone, by posing as a mediator and fetishizing de-escalation.

FORTUNATELY, the neutering by Israel of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria, as well as the stripping naked of Iranian air defenses by the IAF (a strike, once again nonsensically opposed by the US), makes space for a different policy. Even Blinken belatedly admitted this week (in a self-congratulatory New York Times interview) that Israel has wrought a “Mideast transformation.” No thanks to him.

This now allows for an even more decisive reset of the regional strategic architecture; a reset that will neutralize the Iranian nuclear juggernaut and counter Iran’s hegemonic march across the region.

With President-elect Donald Trump returning to the White House in ten days’ time, there is reason to believe that he will give Israel room to maneuver, meaning the American backing or active collaboration necessary to truly cut Iran down to size, something that blessedly might lead to regime change in that country.

This also entails freeing Israel from the burden of fueling Hamas – what the international community naively (or mendaciously) insists on calling “humanitarian aid” to Gaza when it is far more than that. I expect that after January 20, Israel will act to deny Hamas of this supply lifeline.

The IDF will completely clear northern Gaza of civilians and re-direct civilian supplies to southern Gaza only, use massive ordnance to eliminate residual Hamas terrorist cells and infrastructures, and finally clear the way, perhaps, for Palestinian governance that is not under the Hamas thumb.

One hopes and assumes that we will not hear from Trump administration officials the insidious Kamala Harris qualifier “but” – which conditions Israel’s legitimacy and strips it of the ability to defeat its enemies.

Israel “could” defend itself

OUTGOING VICE President Harris allowed that Israel “could” defend itself, “but how it does matters.” Repeatedly she said: “Israel has the right to defend itself, but too many innocent Palestinians have been killed, children, mothers…”

Each time, she went on to proclaim that Israel could fight “only” if this leads rapidly towards a two-state solution “where the Palestinians have security, self-determination, and the dignity they so rightly deserve.”

Since no one in Washington has a recipe for defeating an enemy that hides behind and beneath civilians without causing significant collateral damage, and nobody in the region any longer believes that swift establishment of a full-fledged Palestinian state would truly bring stability or peace – Kamala’s “but” and “only” lingo effectively neutered the IDF and weakened Israel.

Again, one hopes and assumes that Trump, incoming Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio will adopt an entirely different tone and more resolute policies. I suspect that is what Trump means when he says that if Hamas does not immediately release all Israeli hostages “all hell will break loose in Gaza.” Handcuffs off.

Readers should consider this article a strategic warning. The current interregnum in intense combat in Gaza, as well as what appears to be a pause in confrontation with Iran, is about to end.

Hostilities are about to escalate – yes “escalate” – purposefully and usefully so. Israel’s use of force will be overwhelming – necessarily so. The international community can and will scream about the need for “immediate” ceasefires, but Israeli leaders will ignore global received wisdom – appropriately and defiantly so.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2024

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria surprised the leaders of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” who lost a significant part of the fire ring they had built around Israel. The influence and even control over different parts of Syria had allowed Iran land access to Lebanon and the Golan Heights, which is now partially severed. However, the reality in the Middle East often surpasses imagination, and it seems that the leaders of the Islamic Republic are now facing another headache: the concern that their hold on Iraq will continue to weaken.

Baghdad has been at the center of regional attention in recent weeks, as it finds itself at a crossroads: will it disengage from Iran’s grip and use the new circumstances to develop sovereignty and independence, or will it do the opposite—leverage Iran’s need for it to secure a closer embrace from Tehran? For now, before it becomes clear which path the Iraqi leadership will choose, the two contenders for its loyalty are working to position themselves more favorably to influence Baghdad’s decision-making.

For instance, about a week and a half ago, outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited the city and held a deep discussion with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. According to senior American officials familiar with the content of the conversation, Blinken explained to the prime minister that Iran is currently at its lowest point of weakness and that this presents an opportunity for Iraq to reduce the Islamic Republic’s influence in the country.

A senior official said that during the discussion, Blinken also asked al-Sudani to prevent the transfer of Iranian weapons to Syria via Iraqi territory and promised to work with Baghdad’s leadership to prevent the rearming of the Islamic State and its fighters in the country. Additionally, it was reported that Blinken urged the Iraqi government to shut down the offices of the Houthi outpost in the country. Ultimately, in order to combat Tehran’s influence in Iraq, the Secretary of State asked Baghdad to act to disarm the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

In the past year, these militias have gained notoriety for launching drones toward Israel as part of the “Resistance Axis” operations against us during the war. But even before that, they had carried out terror attacks against US forces stationed in Iraq, causing injuries among American soldiers. Thus, when the State Department spokesperson was asked whether the US was working to dismantle the militias, he did not attribute the motivation for the move to the influence struggle with Iran but rather to the fact that the militias pose a threat to American troops. This distinction is significant because, according to him, the US desire to dismantle the militias is not new, as Washington has always acted against those who attack it, and therefore its actions now are not tied to the unique circumstances that have emerged in the Middle East.

However, it seems that this time the US is indeed trying to promote an unconventional initiative. Among other things, it was reported that the Americans held two meetings with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in Iraq and possibly worldwide, to urge him to issue a religious ruling calling for the disarmament of the militias. The elderly Ayatollah refused the American request, and according to a report in Iran, he also recently declined to meet with a representative of the UN Secretary-General who sought to discuss the same issue.

As a result, it seems that the Americans are directing most of their pressure toward the Iraqi leadership, devoting special attention to the matter. American concerns are heightened by the fact that the government in Baghdad has demanded the international coalition, led by the US in the fight against ISIS, to withdraw from the country by the end of next year. The Americans are certainly not eager to leave Iraq, where approximately 2,500 soldiers are currently stationed, leaving the stage to other actors. Still, they are mainly worried about the possibility that Iran and its militias will exploit the vacuum that will be left in the country to solidify their control. From Iraq, the Iranians could also once again destabilize the new regime in Syria and try to increase their influence there as well. Among other concerns, there is a fear that militia members who fled Syria after Assad’s fall may join armed groups in Iraq and continue their activities from there.

A temporary lull

The Iraqis are well aware of the pressure being exerted on them to change the balance of power in the country. Ibrahim al-Sumidei, an advisor to Prime Minister al-Sudani, said last week after Blinken’s visit: “To be honest, we need to reassess the current situation.” According to him, Iraq can no longer remain tied to the “Axis of Resistance,” as he put it, after the fall of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Assad in Syria. Al-Sumidei added that unlike in the past, now “if we don’t comply, it will be forced upon us.” He concluded by noting that talks on disarming the militias have begun with some of them, including the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades and members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (“al-Hashd al-Shaabi”), and that these talks are in an advanced stage.

Another senior advisor to al-Sudani, Hussein Alawi, also confirmed the Western demand from Baghdad, stating that the disarmament of the militias is “a key to Iraq’s national security.” These statements can be interpreted as more than just an American demand—they amount to a threat, coupled with the clarification that failure to comply will result in enforcement.

On the other hand, another close associate of the prime minister, Baha al-Araji, who previously served as deputy prime minister in Baghdad, argued that fears of changes in Iraq’s political or security situation are unfounded. He also stated that the existence of armed militias is a product of the “occupation,” which is also the reason for their continued presence.

Yet despite these denials, this week, it appears that the seeds of American pressure have borne fruit: on Monday, it was reported that at least some militias have reached an agreement with the government in Iraq to stop firing on Israel. A leader in the pro-Iranian al-Nujaba militia confirmed that, at the government’s request and following the events in Syria, there was a consensus to avoid dragging Iraq into a scenario worse than Assad’s ousting, which could plunge the country into chaos and terror. A spokesman for another militia, Kata’ib al-Fartusi, tied the attacks on Israel to Hezbollah’s activity in Lebanon, claiming that once a ceasefire was agreed upon with the organization in the Cedar State, militia activity in Iraq ceased.

However, before the recent report, it appeared that the Iraqis had already halted their attacks, likely around the same time as the ceasefire in Lebanon. According to available information, Iraqi militias have not claimed responsibility for drone launches toward Israel for over a month, since November 24. The ceasefire in Lebanon took effect two days later, on November 26.

Still, despite the declaration of a ceasefire, it is worth paying closer attention to the statements of al-Fartusi, who represents the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades. On Sunday, the day before confirming that his organization had ceased firing at Israel, he declared that the militias “have neither abandoned nor will they abandon” the principle of unifying the fronts against Israel, which calls for coordinated attacks from various directions, including Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere—even if, due to a combination of internal and external circumstances, the militias temporarily suspend their activities. According to him, this principle is “a matter of doctrine and is unrelated to losses or defeats.”

This statement underscores the worldview driving many militia members. They are not fighting solely for interests but are driven by ideology and a comprehensive vision of opposing Israel, the West, and liberalization. This shared vision with Iran and its strategic plan means that even if the militias temporarily cease their attacks on Israel, it is difficult to say they are likely to give up their weapons entirely or willingly reduce their influence in Iraq. Nor can it be assumed that they will participate in an overarching effort to oust Iran’s interests from Iraq while simultaneously allowing for increased American influence and abandoning their “resistance” against Israel.

This likely explains earlier statements from al-Nujaba militia two weeks ago when they strongly condemned “foreign forces plotting to destabilize Iraq.” Similarly, on December 10, the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades claimed there was a conspiracy to overthrow the Baghdad government, alleging an “Anglo-American plot,” with Turkish and Israeli support, to sow chaos in the country. Such statements reflect the pressure the militias are under—fearing that in the struggle against their Iranian patron, they might be forced to surrender their weapons, diminish their influence, or even face existential threats.

Iranian setbacks

Another interesting question relates to the Iraqi government’s interests: why would it comply with American pressure to remove Iranian influence from the country, even at the risk of confrontation with armed militias—a scenario that could spiral out of control into open conflict? After all, US troops are set to leave the country soon, and it seems unlikely—despite the fears of some militia members—that the Americans would launch airstrikes on Baghdad.

There are several possible reasons for this:

First, there are many Iraqis who do not wish to see continued Iranian influence in their country and even openly call for Baghdad’s “liberation.” “The new map of the Middle East will not be complete without Baghdad being set free,” wrote Farouk Yousef last week. “It’s time to free it from Persian occupation, just as Beirut has nearly been rescued and Damascus was indeed liberated from Assad’s claws after he burned it down—not before he fled.”

Another reason might be that the government in Baghdad wants to avoid turning Iraq into a battlefield between Israel and the militias, thereby exposing itself to the kind of damage and destruction seen in other states like Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen. On November 20, Al-Hadath reported that Washington had sent a message to Baghdad’s leadership, warning that the US could no longer prevent Israel from striking militia targets within Iraq and that only government action could avert such attacks. Prime Minister al-Sudani reportedly informed all political factions in the country of this danger. Just days later, drone launches from Iraq ceased and have not resumed since.

Iraqis also need to dedicate their full attention to developments in Syria: there is a deep concern in Iraq that instability during Syria’s transition period, including attempts by groups such as ISIS to exploit the leadership vacuum, could reignite a bloody civil war. A potential Turkish invasion of Syria would only exacerbate tensions. In such a scenario, Iraq fears that unrest will spill across the border, accompanied by terrorist groups seeking to provoke chaos on both sides and draw other actors into the conflict.

This concern has already prompted various Iraqi actions in recent weeks: halting oil exports to Syria due to fears of instability, repatriating thousands of Syrian soldiers who fled into Iraq, and monitoring smuggling along the border. Iraqis have been particularly encouraged by reports of a significant drop in attempts to smuggle Captagon pills across the border following Assad’s fall—a trade long controlled by the Assad family, particularly the former president’s brother, Maher.

In the meantime, as the situation remains unclear, Iraq is examining the new regional order and seeking to score diplomatic points, achievements, and fresh connections. Leading this effort is al-Sudani himself, who may see distancing Iraq from Iranian influence as a way to cultivate a new image in the West—as a key player shaping the new regional reality. At the same time, to maintain appearances, Iraq continues to emphasize its commitment to resolving the Palestinian issue, perhaps echoing Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric. Notably, al-Sudani met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman last week to discuss regional developments.

From Iran’s perspective, if the militias indeed agreed to lay down their weapons, this represents a tremendous setback and disappointment. Another part of the fire ring built by the infamous Qassem Soleimani has crumbled, leaving Iran with only one remaining proxy actively targeting Israel—the Houthis. The only other group that hasn’t ceased its attacks is Hamas, the organization that initiated the current war, though its capabilities have significantly diminished since October 7.

However, Tehran is unlikely to give up so easily. Iraq remains a strategic geographical asset for Iran: aside from bypassing the Turkish border, which is not always a reliable route, Iraq serves as a crucial land corridor back to Syria. Furthermore, it offers a path to another target Tehran has identified for expanding its influence—Jordan.

Iran’s calculations

Iran is recalibrating its strategy following Assad’s fall, attempting to restore confidence among its proxies and supporters. Tehran’s leadership fears a domino effect: after the significant blows suffered by Hezbollah and Hamas, and following the collapse of Assad’s regime in Syria, Iraq is seen as the next potential domino to fall. Pro-Iranian forces in Iraq have essentially already declared their submission, raising the stakes for Tehran. The final target on the axis of resistance could ultimately be the Iranian regime itself.

This concern drives Tehran to consider how to preserve its interests in Iraq and prevent further losses for its regional axis. It may even seek to tighten its grip on Baghdad as compensation for the loss of Syria. Analysts point to three potential paths Iran might pursue:

1. Increase its influence in Iraq, even at the cost of alienating local populations and damaging the government.
2. Loosen its hold on Baghdad as a signal to the West of a willingness to negotiate in the Trump era.
3. Maintain a modest but stable presence, hoping to consolidate its position in the future when circumstances become more favorable.

In the meantime, Tehran is using its media outlets to remind Iraqis of the positive role played by the Popular Mobilization Forces and other militias in defeating terrorist groups such as ISIS—the same forces that the Americans are “maliciously” trying to dismantle. “This is a grassroots resistance organization,” read one Iranian article, “which, alongside the Iraqi army, has become a powerful tool against terrorism and continues to safeguard Iraq’s security.”

References in Iranian media also hint at broader fears, often invoking the name of Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. Once a jihadist fighting with al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Julani’s rise is framed as a warning to Iraqis: the choice isn’t merely between the West and the militias—it’s between forces like al-Julani, who brought devastation to their land and overthrew Assad’s regime in Syria, and the militias that “protected” Iraq from similar fates.

Will Iraqi residents and leadership be swayed by such arguments? For now, it seems that even in this, Tehran is facing yet another defeat.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 25, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Javelin anti-tank missiles, launchers, spare parts, and more: a small Middle Eastern country, led by a dictator who oppresses his people, will pay just over $100 million for American weapons, courtesy of Washington’s foreign service.

As required by law, the US State Department sent a notification to Congress last week detailing the recently approved weapons deal with Tunisia, allowing Congress members to review it. The notice claimed the sale would improve Tunisia’s defense capabilities and advance US interests in the region. The deal would not upset the Middle East’s balance of power, the document stated, nor would it diminish America’s wartime emergency reserves. It would add money to American coffers and create more jobs for Americans. Everyone, apparently, wins.

Tunisia – designated by the US a decade ago as a “major non-NATO ally” – is ruled through a system of oppression, silencing, and imprisonment, but this doesn’t seem to trouble State Department officials as an obstacle to a possible agreement. How is it that officials who scrutinize every Israeli action in Gaza with seven pairs of eyes are not bothered by such a situation?

Tunisia’s president is Kais Saied, 66, a constitutional law expert. He has ruled the country since 2019. Initially, things proceeded smoothly. The COVID-19 pandemic and its restrictions sparked protests in 2021 over the government’s poor performance, which prompted Saied to fire the prime minister, temporarily dissolve parliament – and take almost every possible authority for himself. Since then, the president has restricted freedom of expression, eliminated judicial oversight of himself and his appointed judges, and imprisoned his opponents and electoral rivals. He now rules the country unopposed.

Tunisia’s last presidential election was held two months ago. Saied didn’t even bother to present a platform but won easily with 90% of the votes, partly because he had imprisoned all his rivals. The leading candidate against him is currently serving three separate prison sentences, including one for 12 years. Eight other potential candidates were imprisoned or placed under house arrest. Others were disqualified from running. In the end, only two candidates were allowed to participate in the actual election.

Less than 30% of Tunisia’s eligible voters went to the polls. This minority is much larger than the voter turnout in parliamentary elections less than two years ago, which didn’t even reach 10%. This grim reality reflects a bitter change that has occurred in the country within just a decade, a descent into dark oppression after great hope.

Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East. Young vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in protest of authorities’ harassment and his dire economic situation sparked thousands to take to the streets. The massive demonstrations ended with the ouster of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled for about 24 years. He fled to Saudi Arabia, opening the way for a period of flourishing, prosperity, and democracy in Tunisia.

In fact, Tunisia was perhaps the only country to emerge from the Arab Spring mass protests on what at least then appeared to be a path toward establishing genuine democracy. Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen experienced revolutions, but their subsequent paths were very different.

But the reversal of trends in Tunisia over the past three years is even stranger, because at least officially – if one ignores opposition protests and low voter turnout – it was approved by referendum. Many residents believed the president’s steps to restrict individual rights and political freedoms were necessary, given the country’s difficult economic situation and political mood.

Despite concerned statements from the US and European Union, despite the persecution of candidates and the huge election gap – the White House hasn’t really condemned Tunisia’s government. The Biden administration’s treatment of Saied is not similar, for example, to the US government’s treatment of elections in Venezuela (which it declared “fraudulent”) or to President Joe Biden’s public criticism of election results in Georgia.

Moreover, the situation in Tunisia isn’t stopping Americans from continuing to sell weapons and armaments to the local military there. So why does the State Department, which uses a special unit to monitor the use of American weapons by the IDF to determine if it is committing war crimes and thus restrict their sale to it, suddenly not express concern about selling weapons to an African dictator who has crushed the hopes of millions? How is Tunisia’s case different?

Anger over vaccines

The US has maintained close ties with Tunisia for decades, since its independence in 1956 – long before the Arab Spring revolution. Due to its location in North Africa, it is considered a vital ally of both EU countries and the US. In 2012, it signed agreements to strengthen political and economic ties with countries north of it, and three years later, it gained status as a major non-NATO ally of the US.

Many Tunisians have always viewed America as the model superpower, and the EU was the main trading partner of the former French colony. The local military purchases weapons from European and US manufacturers and conducts joint exercises with their armed forces.

However, since Saied’s rise to power, Tunisia’s relations with the US are approaching a crossroads: Will Tunisia remain an ally of Western nations, or will it drift toward the opposing axis led by Russia, China, and Iran? And what will be decisive – security and economic interests or the state of human rights in Tunisia?

There are multiple reasons why Tunisia itself is distancing itself from the US. One is its traditional stance against what are considered “Western” values and against Israel in particular. Tunisia consistently adopts anti-Israeli or anti-Western positions. Tensions with the US intensified in the 1980s due to Israeli attacks on PLO camps in Tunisia and later due to American intervention in the First Gulf War. The Americans also complained that Tunisia showed too much leniency toward suspects in an attack on the US embassy in the country two decades later, in 2012.

President Saied, even before Operation Iron Swords began, refused to join the Abraham Accords and establish relations with Israel, despite the existence of a Jewish community in the country for hundreds of years. Since the war began, tension has developed between Tunisia and the US over American support for Israel and over the administration’s refusal to use all tools at its disposal to pressure the IDF to end the war. Some analysts have argued that the damage caused by the situation may be irreparable.

There are other reasons for Tunisian disappointment with the Americans: Many there felt dismissal from the US, as if the country was good enough for fighting terrorism but doesn’t receive good treatment in other areas. During the COVID crisis, the outbreak in Tunisia was among the worst in the world, and delays in vaccine shipments from the US frustrated many in the country – especially when shipments of inferior Chinese vaccines arrived in many Arab countries whose relations with the Americans were cold enough for the Chinese taste.

Tunisian relations with Europe have largely focused on immigration issues in recent years. The expectation on the neighboring continent was that Tunisia – as a transit country from sub-Saharan regions to Europe – would make efforts to stop migrants on their way to the continent. In return, Europeans offered very little cooperation, including a $1 billion program in loans and grants. This may seem an enormous sum, but when compared to the $20 billion Europeans offered Tunisia in 2011, it’s not large. Considering the massive effort required from Tunisia to stop the masses of migrants, the amount is considered insufficient.

The Tunisian approach to the West is partly related to the power struggle between world superpowers. China and Russia are trying to accumulate assets worldwide and gain political and economic footholds at the expense of the US and Europe. In this context, countries like Tunisia, sitting at geographical and economic crossroads, are valuable prizes. However, such countries understand that competition for their allegiance allows them to weigh the advantages of connecting with each side. In this case, Tunisia is weighing the benefits of its longstanding alliance with Europe and the US against the tempting possibilities inherent in deepening ties with China and Russia.

The Europeans have developed dependence on the Tunisians – both in trade between the country and the continent, though not a huge portion of their trade, and in fighting illegal immigration to their shores. This means Tunisians have leverage over Europeans, especially regarding immigration. The US also needs Tunisians to fight jihadist terrorism due to the country’s influential geographical location in the Mediterranean region. This means Americans and Europeans must maneuver to maintain relations with Saied, even if they consider his actions problematic.

Moreover, the disadvantages of Tunisian defection to the Russian axis are even more severe. Tunisia would give Moscow an important foothold in the Mediterranean at a time when its main stronghold in Syria is becoming unstable. The Kremlin wants to establish military bases in strategic locations along African and Mediterranean coasts, trying to increase its influence and military prestige – and the Tunisians are using this desire as a tool to increase their bargaining power with the Russians.

Meanwhile, as part of zigzagging between both sides, Tunisia announced abandoning negotiations with the International Monetary Fund over a large rescue package it desperately needs, and instead announced its intention to join BRICS, led by China, Iran, and Russia. This is an economic organization competing with the West, whose members include Brazil, Egypt, India, and South Africa. In President Saied’s view, the loan guarantee conditions from the International Monetary Fund seemed like “foreign dictation” and an attempt at takeover, so he refused to accept them.

The courtship of BRICS may just be an effort to diversify Tunisia’s economic support rather than an attempt to disconnect from its alliances with Western nations. The Tunisians have an interest in expanding relations with both sides, aiming to maintain flexibility in the long term.

Realpolitik

The US understands the trap it’s in regarding Tunisia and is working to convince Saied to maintain good relations with the Western bloc. Dialogue with a dictator is always problematic, as he can defect and switch sides at any moment due to a simple whim.

Therefore, the Americans are trying to promote democratization programs in Tunisia, aiming to spark identification with liberal values and solidify its connection to the Western bloc. Opening Tunisia’s economy to Western channels might also distance its leadership from Russia and China, given the need to operate according to certain economic codes. Thus, the Americans are working with Europeans to create economically beneficial relations with the Tunisians, trying to continue serving as an economic model for the African nation.

Another US course of action is promoting security cooperation. Besides using soft power to enhance America’s power image, Washington ensures arming the Tunisians and making them develop military dependence on it. In recent years, the US went far, and as part of the special relationship with Tunisia as a non-NATO ally, it set a payment floor for military aid to the government: about $150 million annually. The payment floor was canceled only two years ago, a move expressing the Democratic administration’s displeasure with the anti-democratic reform led by President Saied.

Besides this, the Americans maintained relations with the Tunisian military for counterterrorism purposes, while cultivating personal relationships with senior military officials. In parallel, the US worked to conduct training for internal security personnel in the country, aiming to promote democratic procedures in this field in Tunisia as well.

The American deliberation regarding President Saied stemmed partly from popular support for his actions among Tunisians: How can promoting liberal values exist contrary to what the people themselves want? How can the US promote democratization in a country whose population voted to restrict its own freedom?

This dilemma recalls what happened in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in the 2012 elections when Mohamed Morsi rose to power. What the Americans tried to do, attempting to prevent the continuation of anti-democratic steps in Tunisia, was to support programs that would not help the president advance his dictatorship. But now, due to the trend’s continuation, the Americans need to decide again what to do: Should they cut aid funds, making Tunisia more exposed to terrorism and perhaps also joining the Russian-Chinese-Iranian axis? And how will the US continue supporting Tunisia’s army, which has recently become increasingly political?

Meanwhile, it seems the Americans – or at least the State Department – aren’t letting concerns about democracy’s deterioration in Tunisia stand in their way. Anti-tank missiles are considered defensive weapons that cannot harm the local population or be used for offensive atrocities. In any case, the Americans will certainly exercise extra caution regarding their relations with the Tunisians, but for now, they are not expected to alienate or sever them. Donald Trump’s presidency won’t change the trend, as individual rights in Tunisia seem more important, specifically to the Democratic Party in the US.

One can also note that this is a good example of realpolitik that sometimes characterizes Democrats in US foreign relations. Officials in Washington don’t base their foreign policy only on noble values, and not infrequently, they “get their hands dirty” in relations with dictators trying to advance American interests worldwide.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 16, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Incoming US president Donald Trump’s statement that he does not intend to intervene in the war in Syria because “it’s not our war” reflects a narrow perspective; a broader regional vision is necessary.

The rebel factions in Syria eventually conquered Damascus and ousted Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The dramatic changes in Syria harm Iran’s strategic assets in the region, including the Al-Bukamal border crossing between Iraq and Syria, a central choke point in Iran’s land corridor to Hezbollah.

Only a few days ago, the Axis of Resistance signaled its high motivation to save Assad’s regime, as senior officials in Iran’s proxy network have declared their commitment to fight fiercely for the former president.

Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stated in a speech on Thursday that Hezbollah would stand with Assad as much as it can, alongside the Syrian army.

Similarly, Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Iraqi Shi’ite militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, announced last Wednesday that his forces would not allow the Shrine of Zaynab in Damascus to fall into Sunni rebel hands.

Afghan fighters from the Fatemiyoun militia, supported by Iran’s IRGC Quds Force, have also been seen on the ground, attempting unsuccessfully to halt the rebels’ progress.

Despite these efforts, Assad’s regime quickly collapsed without any assistance by Moscow or Tehran to prevent it. In these dramatic hours, eyes turn to Iran, which views Syria as the “main link” in a chain stretching from Tehran to Beirut.

Even in earlier stages of the Syrian civil war, in February 2013, Mehdi Khazali, a member of a think tank advising Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Tehran could afford to lose its oil-rich southern Khuzestan province, but not Syria. He argued that Syria’s fall would eventually lead to Tehran’s downfall.

Since then, Iranian officials have repeatedly described the war in Syria as part of an “American-Israeli plot” aimed at Iran. The astonishment gripping Tehran is therefore evident.

At this critical juncture, the Islamic Republic lacked Qasem Soleimani, who, as commander of the Quds Force, orchestrated Iran’s proxy forces with strategic skill and efficiency. Recent dissatisfaction with his successor, Esmail Qaani, has surfaced in Tehran, accompanied by nostalgia for Soleimani and too-late calls for urgent action in Syria.

Criticism of Iran

Criticism is also mounting regarding the delayed retaliation against Israel, with Iranians mocking the Khamenei-led regime on social media.

Hezbollah’s difficulties in supporting Assad are evident, given the severe blow it suffered at the hands of Israel. The specific reasons for Iran’s inability to assist Assad effectively remain unclear but are expected to become clearer in the coming days.

In any case, Trump will soon realize that Assad’s fall will resonate throughout the region, primarily impacting Tehran. Amid the rapid regional changes driven by the Israel-Hamas War and the renewal of the Syrian conflict, voices within Iran have been becoming increasingly urgent in their demands for Khamenei to adapt the country’s security doctrine to unfolding events.

Prominent figures, regime mouthpieces, and propagandists are calling for a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine, advocating for nuclear weapons development to restore its deterrence capabilities, which have been severely weakened by recent events, including the unprecedented Israeli attacks in October 2024.

Israel and the incoming US administration must urgently formulate a strategic plan addressing the security needs of both nations, given the swiftly and historic changing reality in Syria and its regional repercussions.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 10, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

This week, Amnesty International released a 296-page report, accusing Israel of committing “genocide” in Gaza. This charge, no less than a modern-day blood libel, is just the latest attack in Amnesty’s longstanding campaign of lawfare against and vilification of the State of Israel, having previously accused the Jewish state of the equally unfounded charge of apartheid.

To be sure, this report, written under the guise of international law and human rights, is utterly baseless, replete with malicious lies and gross distortions of fact, as well as wholesale fabrications of law. The crime of genocide, coined in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin to describe the systematic extermination of Jews by the Nazis, is one of the most serious accusations that can be leveled in international law. To accuse Israel of “genocide” in Gaza is a grotesque and egregious subversion and weaponization of the very term itself.

It is important to recognize that genocide is very clearly defined under Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, to mean “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The commission of genocide has nothing to do with the number of civilian casualties that occur in a conflict; the key element here is the need to possess relevant “intent.”

Whatever criticism one may have of Israeli policies or Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actions in Gaza, at no stage has Israel been seeking to destroy the people in Gaza, whether in whole, in part, or in any manner whatsoever.

Israeli leaders are directing military policy in accordance with the decisions of the War Cabinet, and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Defense Minister, and the IDF Chief of Staff have been unequivocal: The intent of the operation in Gaza following October 7 is to eliminate Hamas by destroying its military and governing capabilities and to rescue the hostages. These are both entirely legitimate military objectives under the laws of armed conflict.

That there have been civilian casualties in Gaza is tragic, but it is also the inevitable consequence of Hamas using its own people as human shields and embedding its military operations in schools, hospitals, kindergartens, and homes. Notwithstanding the complex challenge of operating in such difficult environment, the IDF has gone to extraordinary lengths, not seen in modern warfare, to abide by the principles of International humanitarian law and avoid harm to civilians in Gaza. This has included implementing historic measures to prevent civilian harm, such as advanced alerts to provide early warning and temporary evacuations, daily pauses of fighting, distributing maps to civilians, using precision weapons, as well are facilitating daily provision of aid.

In fact, to demonstrate just how utterly ludicrous Amnesty’s accusation of genocide is, one only needs to see that, according to the CIA World Factbook, the population in Gaza has actually increased 2 percent in the last year. This is the very opposite of seeking to destroy, in whole or in part or in any way, a group of people.

Perhaps knowing it doesn’t have a legal leg to stand on, Amnesty has resorted to manufacturing its own definition of genocide. Amnesty claims that the universally established and the sole accepted legal definition as outlined in the Genocide Convention of 1948 which requires the existence of intent is an “overly cramped interpretation of international jurisprudence and one that would effectively preclude a finding of genocide in the context of an armed conflict.”

It’s not just Israel that finds this redefinition ridiculous. In an absolutely scathing rebuke, even Amnesty’s own Israel office has totally rejected Amnesty International’s report, saying it was a “predetermined conclusion” based on “biased” and “artificial” analysis of the situation in Gaza and “motivated by a desire to support a popular narrative among Amnesty International’s target audience.”

If anyone is guilty of genocide here, it is Hamas. Not only does Hamas openly state that the destruction of Israel is its ultimate goal, as evidenced in their Charter, it acted out on those intentions on October 7, when Hamas massacred over 1,200 Israelis in a rampage that included raping, burning, mutilating, executing and abducting women and children. We’ve stood in the kibbutzim and communities in the south of Israel and saw first-hand the death and destruction. That is where the real attempted genocide occurred.

In an interview last year, shortly after the massacre, senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad admitted that the terror group would repeat the October 7 massacre “again and again” until Israel was “annihilated,” openly admitting the group’s genocidal intentions. But Amnesty has completely disregarded this, instead absolving and whitewashing the heinous actions of Hamas.

The incoming Trump Administration should declare Amnesty a hate-group and adopt blistering sanctions against them, including withdrawing financial support and any cooperation with government agencies.

Regrettably, Amnesty International, once a storied human rights organization, has lost all credibility, becoming nothing more than a propaganda mouthpiece for the murderers and rapists of Hamas.

The article was written together with John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point

Published in Newsweek, December 05, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Fast forward one year, with Hamas still holding hostages and firing rockets, and Israel now engaged in multi-front battle for her existence against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its terrorist proxies, including Hezbollah, the Starmer government’s support is no longer unequivocal. In fact, it has completely turned its back on Israel, abandoning the Jewish state in her time of need.

For example, at the current Labour Party conference just concluded in Liverpool, instead of reiterating their support for Israel, Starmer’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy suggested UK could in fact impose further sanctions against Israelis.

This is just latest in a series of appalling betrayals, which follows the UK’s unconscionable decision earlier this month to institute an arms embargo against the Jewish state, while reversing the previous government’s principled appeal over the International Criminal Court’s mendacious and baseless warrants against the Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister.

Britain has also renewed funding to UNRWA, the UN Palestinian refugee agency still embroiled in controversy surrounding their staff’s participation in the October 7^th massacre by Hamas.

One may indeed be forgiven for asking, is Jeremy Corbyn running the Foreign Office or David Lammy?

Whilst Lammy may have triumphantly touted some of these ‘achievements’, by saying“Britain is back,”the only thing Britain has returned to, is the viscerally anti-Israel foreign policy of Corbyn, when he was Labour leader. It would appear, despite different leaders and fanciful pre-election promises, the same disdain for the UK-Israel alliance and cold indifference to Jewish lives, remains at the heart of the UK Labour party under new leader Keir Starmer.

The news that Lammy is now seeking to adopt further sanctions against Israelis that the British government unilaterally deems as ‘extremist’ or ‘violence’, also only underscores the glaring arbitrariness and politicization of the existing UK sanctions regime, which has singled out Israelis for opprobrium and punishment, but not Palestinian extremists and officials who continue to incite violence and racial hatred, or those who call for jihad and intifada on the streets of London every other week, with impunity.

Whilst a robust sanctions regime is as a key foreign policy and national security tool for any nation, it is only credible insofar as it is fair, transparent and based on clearly defined criteria. It must also conform with Britain’s obligations under international law and respect for the principles of due process and individual rights, not a politicized tool to be used at the whim of any sitting Foreign Secretary.

Speaking at the same Labour Party conference, Starmer’s Attorney-General, Lord Hermer, said that the Government must be “militant about our belief in the rule of law and human rights.”

Indeed, it ought to, yet this British government betrays that very commitment, in endorsing the ICC Prosecutor’s attempt to indict Israeli leaders, which is the most egregious and unprecedented abuse of rule of law in recent memory, while applying an arms embargo on Israel, based on a false and politicized interpretation of international humanitarian law and arbitrarily singling out Jewish Israelis for illegitimate sanctions.

In view of the Starmer government’s abdication of principled leadership on the foreign stage and unequivocal determination to fight terror, it is therefore hardly surprising that ahead of his G7 meeting this week, Lammy hasrefused to condemn Hezbollah, a UK-designated terror group which has fired almost 10,000 rockets against Israel the last 12 twelve months, displacing almost 100,000 residents from the north of the country.

Instead, in a Chamberlainesque display, Lammy demonstrated only pitiful moral cowardice, in calling for a “ceasefire on both sides”.

It this kind of exasperation with a once cherished ally, that led even Israel’s normally exceedingly diplomatic President, Isaac Herzog, to proclaim in a Sky News interview this week that “there is a sense of disappointment in Israel. We expect that all our allies will be side by side with us.”

Yet regrettably, the cold hard truth is that, given the choice between standing with its democratic ally Israel, or the jihadist proxies serving at the behest of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this UK government has shamefully turned its back on Israel, betraying an ally engaged in an existential battle and its very own principles and commitment to rule of law.

Published in Eu Reporter, October 1, 2024.

Following the exploding Hezbollah pagers in Lebanon and the elimination of the terrorist organization’s senior leadership in the last week, there is a sense that Israel is shifting from a strategy of containment to one of decisive action. This paradigm shift moves beyond merely managing the threat toward a bolder objective: pre-emption and total victory.  

As President Isaac Herzog said, “we don’t want war, but if it’s waged against us, we go all the way.”

Israeli leaders have long understood the existential danger posed by Iran and its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Yet over the last two decades, instead of eliminating these threats, Israeli policies — at the West’s insistence — have often emboldened the rise of these powerful non-state militias. The policy of limited warfare has allowed these groups to survive, grow and become more entrenched. 

This strategy is not unique to Israel. Since the end of World War II, Western powers have consistently avoided all-out victories, often choosing containment and appeasement or limited engagement over total warfare and the crippling of these terror networks. The result? Persistent, unresolved conflicts which, like the Korean War, linger to this day with continued threats.  

If the West had allowed Gen. Douglas MacArthur to fully deploy his military strategy against North Korea and its Chinese backers — including a blockade of Chinese ports and decisive action to cut off supply lines — the outcome could have been quite different. As matters stand, we are left with a North Korean regime that continues to destabilize global security to this day. 

The Vietnam War presents another example of limited warfare’s long-term costs. President Richard Nixon eventually escalated U.S. actions with the bombing of Haiphong and incursions into Laos and Cambodia, but by then, it was too late. Had the U.S. taken these decisive steps earlier or used the full force of its military to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the start, the course of the war might have shifted. Instead, Vietnam became a symbol of American defeat. 

The escalation in Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel in recent weeks and Israel’s response, including the pinpoint attack on Hezbollah terrorists via their pagers, sparked talk that PM Benjamin Netanyahu would, or maybe should, stay in Jerusalem while the UN General Assembly takes place in New York this week.

Rumors spread that Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer would be delivering the address instead; one high-level diplomatic source said this week that Foreign Minister Israel Katz or UN Ambassador Danny Danon were being considered as understudies for the prime minister. That being said, the source emphasized that Netanyahu planned to be in Turtle Bay on Friday to give his speech: “The U.N is also an arena; the prime minister sees it as an important platform,” the source said.

Some analysts have said that Netanyahu must stay in Israel because of the imminent risk of war with Lebanon. They have even suggested that if the prime minister feels the need to make an address to the world, he can do so from Israel and it will surely be televised.

According to the high-level diplomatic source, Israel is not interested in launching a ground invasion at this point, and Netanyahu has instructed the IDF to pursue a gradual escalation in response to escalations by Hezbollah. Even if that was not the message the Prime Minister’s Office sought to relay to the world this week, it would be unlikely that the IDF would begin a ground invasion while Netanyahu is out of the country, unless doing so was some kind of intentional bait-and-switch.

Still, there are other major security concerns that may arise while he is out of the country. When Hezbollah killed 12 children in the Golan Heights earlier this year, Netanyahu was in Washington, D.C. He was able to get on a flight back to Israel within hours, even though it was still Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, in the U.S. That was possible because Israel now has a plane for prime ministers and presidents, rather than chartering flights from Israel’s flag carrier El Al, which does not fly on the Sabbath. The prime minister’s plane, called Wing of Zion, also has the technology installed allowing him to remain confidentially connected to what is happening in Israel while in the air.

There are also many advantages to Netanyahu being present and delivering a speech at the UNGA this week.

Counter-intuitively, the timing of the UNGA and the escalation in the north may be opportune as opposed to inconvenient. Netanyahu can use the time to effectively make the case that Israel needs to strongly defend itself from the threats of the Shiite jihadist group on its northern border, and his arguments will be fresh in the international community’s minds should the situation escalate into a ground war in Lebanon. This would also be the time to advocate for the world to pressure Hamas to free Israeli hostages, some of whose relatives will be flying to New York with Netanyahu and attending his speech.

Just being in New York during UN week enables Netanyahu to hold face-to-face meetings with world leaders like US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz who addressed the General Assembly this week. This will allow him to make the case for Israel’s defense in person and hear the concerns of Israel’s allies.

Netanyahu has long distrusted Israel’s Foreign Ministry and overshadowed Israel’s foreign ministers when he does not hold the portfolio himself. That attitude has weakened the ability of others to make Israel’s case on a prominent global stage such as the UNGA. The fact that Katz is not fully proficient in English, and that his messages are not always aligned with those of other parts of the government, (for example, he regularly posts AI-generated images mocking antagonistic world leaders,) makes him a less-than-ideal substitute for Netanyahu at this time. And while Danon’s English is better and he is more in sync with Netanyahu, ambassador-level addresses rarely garner attention during the UNGA when presidents and prime ministers speak.

Whether one likes Netanyahu or not, he is by far the best-known Israeli political figure today, and possibly the best-known Israeli, period. That already draws international attention to his speeches in a way that addresses by other Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers in recent years did not. In addition – again, whether one agrees with the message or not – Netanyahu is a gifted orator who knows how to relay messages effectively and memorably, with visual aids and turns of phrase.

For all of these reasons, having Netanyahu address the UN General Assembly this week would be the right thing to do for Israel.