From Cyrus to today: Iranian resistance outlasted regime indoctrination

written by Ruth Wasserman Lande | 01.02.2026
Cyrus II of Persia, better known as Cyrus the Great (600–530 BCE), founder of one of the largest empires in the world at that time, was particularly renowned for his policy of tolerance for people’s customs and religions in the lands that he conquered. This, importantly, was not the custom among other nations during that time in history.

He is admired and remembered by the Jewish people for his role in freeing them from Babylonian captivity and allowing them to return to their historic homeland, Zion, or the Land of Israel. Moreover, he allowed for and assisted in the rebuilding of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, which had been destroyed by the Babylonians. In the Book of Isaiah, Cyrus was the only non-Jewish figure to receive the special status of “God’s anointed,” specifically because of this act.

Fighting indoctrination

Many of the Iranian people, who for the past few weeks have been courageously marching in the streets of modern-day Iran against a repressive, inhumane, and evil regime, are descendants of Cyrus the Great.
Modern-day Iran is indeed a culmination of many peoples, such as Balochis, Azeris, and Sunni Arabs, following later conquests. The Islamic conquests were less tolerant; they demanded that non-Muslims either convert to Islam or remain second-class citizens and pay the jizya tax, historically levied on non-Muslim subjects (often called dhimmis) in Islamic states.
Women who did not convert to Islam were often taken as sex slaves, and their children were then forcefully converted –  a mechanism by which to swallow existing cultures, customs, and religions and expand Islamic influence.
However, despite the conversion of the Iranian people to Shia Islam, viewed by the Sunnis as a desecration of Islamic doctrine, they maintained their unique customs, traditions, and mannerisms, which differentiate a vast majority of today’s Iranian people from their counterparts in the wider Islamic world.

The 47-year rule of the current regime, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has created a widespread fear and even aversion among many Iranians toward religious indoctrination in general and Islam in particular.
The pent-up anger that recently erupted in the streets of Iran was the product of years of indoctrination, coercion, massive-scale corruption on the part of the ruling mullahs, and extreme violence and injustice toward the population.

Dreams of freedom

Freedom had become a distant dream. Public hangings, officials raping female prisoners, and many more horrors were everyday occurrences.
Following the ongoing economic crisis, which the average Iranian experiences via unemployment, a severe lack of water, and a rate of inflation that literally stripped families of the ability to feed themselves, the people of Iran had had enough. These feelings were heightened amid the understanding that their leadership continues to fund terror proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis in Yemen, while their own citizens are left untended.
Despite the indoctrination, the endless incitement, and the strict control of media and all means of communication over the years, the Iranian people did not fully succumb to the coerced messaging of the regime.
Why is this important to note? In Gaza, Jordan, Egypt, and many other places in which the populations are predominantly Muslim and where the people are exposed to carefully censored information, the sentiment toward the West and Israel has been shaped into something extremely harsh and hateful.Many in Iran, though massively indoctrinated and controlled during the past few decades, managed to see through the indoctrination and insist on reaching out and finding – albeit at great risk –  alternative sources of information.

Following Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israel, and the well-orchestrated worldwide media and messaging campaign against Israel and the Jews – which was planned, funded, and executed by Iranian and Qatari petrodollars, directly supported logistically and ideologically by Turkey, and indirectly by the Russian Federation and China  – a shifting paradigm has emerged following the current events unfolding in Iran.

After the fall of the Islamic regime, which will lead to the downfall of the Shiite Axis of extreme Islam, the Iranian people will transition to a new reality, creating a strong strategic alliance with the State of Israel and the United States. The addition of the subcontinent of India and other like-minded partners will allow us to form a formidable coalition of innovation, economic prosperity, and military might – creating a brighter future for all those who are part of it.Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 27, 2026.


Iran’s likely response to a US attack

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026

Following concerns over the erosion of the regime’s strong image amid the protests, senior Iranian officials have intensified their threatening rhetoric toward the US. IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour and his deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, have separately declared that Iranian forces are at peak readiness. More significantly, senior decision-making bodies have signaled a shift from reactive deterrence toward preemptive action. On January 6, the Supreme Defense Council stated that Iran would not necessarily wait to be attacked before responding, and on January 11, Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a member of the Supreme National Security Council, explicitly raised the option of a preemptive strike.

Building on the Supreme Defense Council’s statement, the radical wing of the conservative camp, through its affiliated daily Vatan-e Emrooz, called on the regime on January 6 to launch a preemptive strike, arguing that the protests reflect an American-Israeli plot to overthrow the regime and that, therefore, any threat to Iran’s national security constitutes legitimate grounds for preemptive action. Top Iranian officials have further warned that any attack would trigger strikes on U.S. bases and naval assets in the region, attacks against Israel, and retaliation against regional states that assist U.S. or Israeli operations.

Four scenarios

A notable contribution to this discourse came from Defa Press, a news outlet affiliated with Iran’s armed forces coordination body. In an analytical article published on January 21, the site outlined four potential Iranian response scenarios to a U.S. attack. These include: (1) missile and drone strikes against Israel and U.S. bases in the region, particularly Al Udeid (Qatar), Incirlik (Turkey), Sheikh Isa (Bahrain), and Al Dhafra (UAE); (2) missile and drone attacks focused exclusively on Israel; (3) closure of the Strait of Hormuz combined with large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region; and (4) a coordinated response by Iran and the so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Israel and U.S. assets. Notably, this final scenario includes discussion of a potential ground incursion into Israel, an idea that has reemerged in recent months, including through commentary by Mehdi Mohammadi, a security analyst and adviser to Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Israel and the United States treat Tehran’s threats with full seriousness, including its renewed warnings about closing the Strait of Hormuz. While such a move cannot be dismissed outright, its likelihood remains low. Although the strait is often portrayed by Iran as a strategic leverage point—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption passes daily – its closure would disproportionately harm Iran’s own interests. Iranian regime-aligned commentators have acknowledged that approximately 85 percent of the oil transiting Hormuz is tied to Iran’s key economic partners, primarily China and India, making sustained closure strategically self-defeating.

Additional tools available to Iran to harm Israel and the US

Over time, Iran’s intelligence and terror apparatus have developed capabilities that could be employed against the United States and its allies in a conflict scenario. One such capability is Iran’s network of operatives within Israel. Investigations into dozens of Iranian-directed agents apprehended in Israel indicate sustained Iranian efforts to gain access to senior Israeli figures for targeted assassination. Reported targets have included Prime Minister Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Gallant, former Prime Minister Bennett, senior scientists, and other high-level officials. Should Iran retain an active operative with access to a senior figure, a wartime escalation could significantly increase Tehran’s incentive to activate this capability in an effort to impose a maximal cost on Israel.

In parallel, the Quds Force and Hezbollah have previously demonstrated the capability to prepare attacks on U.S. soil – the so-called “homeland option.” In 2011, 2017, and 2019, they operated three Lebanese Shiite operatives and one Iranian-American in planning terrorist activity inside the United States. FBI investigations revealed that these operatives sought employment that would grant access to sensitive locations and facilitate intelligence collection, including at JFK Airport in New York, as well as against senior Israeli military officials present in the United States. Surveillance conducted by one operative targeted major landmarks and crowded sites, including the George Washington Bridge, the Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty, Herald Square, the Washington Monument, and Fenway Park. Separately, in 2011, an Iranian-American was arrested for plotting to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington, D.C. Interrogations of the Lebanese operatives indicate that such sleeper cells are intended to be activated in the event of a direct war between the United States and Iran.

Findings from investigations of Lebanese Hezbollah operatives prompted then–Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen to warn in October 2017 that Hezbollah is intent on maintaining terrorist infrastructure inside the United States as a core component of its operational portfolio. In subsequent years, Iranian regime figures have implicitly reaffirmed this capability, asserting that Iran can strike the United States on its own territory. Notably, in January 2021, Esmail Qaani – Qassem Soleimani’s successor as Quds Force commander – stated that those responsible for Soleimani’s killing should know that Iran has the ability to respond “even in their own homes.” Similar threats were echoed by a Friday prayer preacher in Yasuj in March 2022, who claimed Iran could strike both Tel Aviv and Washington if attacked. In October 2025, the Mossad further exposed the identity of Mohsen Bargi, the Quds Force official responsible for operations in the United States and Europe. Despite these signals, an attack on U.S. soil would almost certainly trigger a significant American escalation against Tehran, making the use of this capability unlikely under current conditions. However, in the event of a large-scale U.S. strike on Tehran, the regime could consider activating this option as a last-resort deterrent.

The Iranian toolbox necessitates preparedness

An assessment of Iran’s conduct during “Am Kelavi” (the Iran-Israel June war) provides insight into the current state of its capabilities. During the conflict, Iran employed missile and drone attacks. Of approximately 550 missiles launched, 69 penetrated Israeli air defenses, resulting in damage to strategic sites and the deaths of 34 Israelis. By contrast, Iran’s drone campaign largely failed, with reported interception rates by Israel and the United States approaching 99 percent.

Following the U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran responded with a missile launch against an American base in Qatar in an operation that was primarily cognitive and deterrent in nature, having been coordinated in advance with the United States. Tehran also refrained from closing the Strait of Hormuz, apparently recognizing it as a U.S. red line that would trigger a severe response. Iran did not receive meaningful support from the Axis of Resistance, much of which was weakened or incapacitated following the collapse of the Assad regime and the elimination of Hezbollah’s senior leadership. Notably, however, Iran did employ its agent network inside Israel to mark targets and assess the performance of Israeli air defense systems.

Should the current escalation develop into a full-scale war, Iran is likely to continue relying mainly on missile and drone attacks, but it may also seek to expand its options by promoting ground-based attacks through its proxies. Among Iran’s proxy forces, the Houthis appear to have the capability to pursue such a plan, which requires heightened Israeli preparedness along the Jordanian border.

According to information that has emerged, the Houthis have considered a scenario in which thousands of operatives would move through Saudi Arabia or Iraq into Jordan, acquire weapons there, and attempt to enter Israel from the east. In addition, in November 2025, Defense Minister Israel Katz revealed that the Houthis have also established a presence in Syria, prompting IDF preparations for a possible ground threat from that arena as well.

Beyond proxy forces, Iran may also retain sleeper cells inside Israel intended for activation in wartime, potentially supported by weapons smuggled by the Quds Force through Jordan. A similar risk cannot be ruled out along the Egyptian border, given past weapons smuggling routes. Overall, the more damage Iran sustains in a war, the greater its incentive will be to employ additional tools it has developed, if operationally viable, in order to raise the costs imposed on Israel and the United States and to pressure for an end to the fighting.

Implications for escalation management and preparedness

Iran’s past behavior suggests that even in a direct confrontation with the United States, Tehran is unlikely to respond impulsively. Instead, it would likely pursue a gradual, calculated, and multi-theater response. This approach reflects a balance between Iran’s desire to impose significant costs on its adversaries and its need to avoid an escalation that could threaten the survival of the regime itself.

Accordingly, the initial Iranian response would likely rely primarily on missile and drone attacks, which Tehran views as its main deterrent tools and as a way to control escalation. However, as the damage to the regime increases and the conflict drags on, Iran’s incentive to expand its range of actions would grow. This could include activating proxies in additional arenas, promoting targeted terrorist operations, and potentially employing sleeper capabilities against U.S. targets, despite the substantial risks involved.

For this reason, effective deterrence and defense require Israeli and American preparedness not only for direct missile threats, but also for lower-probability, high-impact scenarios that may become more likely as Iran’s room for maneuver narrows.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 30, 2026.



No opportunity to topple Iran’s regime should be missed

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 01.02.2026

Less than 24 hours have passed since the arrest of the dictator from his palace in Caracas was announced, and the world remains in shock. US President Donald Trump’s bold decision to send his forces to arrest a sitting ruler, and his declaration that the US will govern Venezuela until the completion of the regime change process, have shaken the foundational assumptions of leaders, diplomats, security officials, legal experts, and academics regarding the rules of the game in the international system. This is happening at a difficult time for Tehran, which is not only losing a significant partner and ally but also receiving a clear hint about the country’s internal conduct.

The stated factors that led Trump to approve, and perhaps even initiate, the operation are well known. It should be assumed that deterrence considerations that such an action creates toward “problematic actors” like Khamenei were also taken into account. As the well-known saying goes, “Shout at the tree so the donkey will hear.”

Even before the Venezuela operation and the current wave of protests that struck Iran, the Israeli-American agenda addressed the question of dealing with Iran’s rearmament and Hezbollah’s rearmament. It is difficult to know what was agreed upon in the Netanyahu-Trump meeting on this issue. The American president’s statements were quite clear regarding his support for forceful enforcement measures to halt nuclear advancement and rearmament with ballistic missiles.

It should be assumed that the demonstrations in Iran and the possibility that they will develop into a threat to the regime’s stability place Israel and the US in a dilemma regarding military action against Iran.

It is difficult to assess the true strength of this wave and its potential to bring about fundamental change. Beyond the difficulty of forecasting how such events unfold during their occurrence and the complexities of identifying the point at which systems collapse under the accumulated weight of factors and circumstances, it isn’t easy to obtain even a complete and reliable picture of reality. Every report on events is influenced by the reporter’s position on the matter and their hopes regarding the impact on the regime’s survival.

The trend is escalation

Currently, it appears that the wave of demonstrations in Iran is escalating. The joining of labor unions and the expansion of demonstrations to universities, regions, and additional sectors, sometimes involving violent confrontations with repression mechanisms, are evidence of this. The disconnection of the internet by regime mechanisms, as reported in recent updates, also indicates growing tension in the country.

The prevailing assessment among Iran experts is that the current protest wave is very far from threatening the regime’s existence. The fact that no cracks have formed in the regime’s loyal mechanisms and the absence of an organized opposition capable of replacing the government raise doubts that this wave will end differently from its predecessors.

This does not exempt decision-makers from the dilemma. On the one hand, military action against Iran at a stage when the flames are still low could extinguish the fire completely and lead to consensus and a joint stance, even if temporary, against the external attacker. On the other hand, such action might actually give the protests a tailwind, divide attention among the repression mechanisms and thereby harm them, and additionally worsen the economic crisis that fuels these protests.

Why should this be given such great importance? Because today, more than ever, it is clear that a fundamental and permanent solution to the challenges Iran poses to the West and the threats emanating from it toward Israel will be achieved only when the regime is replaced. As long as the Mullah regime exists, it will continue to strive for regional hegemony and Israel’s erasure. It will continue to build and also operate its strategic capabilities to achieve these goals.

Unlike democratic regimes, the regime in Tehran is not limited by term lengths and is not obligated to win public trust. It can afford to plan its moves with a long-term vision, without considering political needs and short-term considerations. A temporary slowdown or lowering of profile in the face of obstacles like what Trump represents does not constitute a deviation from policy. On the contrary, this is a built-in component in the strategy for dealing with resistance. From such a regime’s perspective, it is quite reasonable to lower the head until Trump is gone, and then return and act with greater vigor to achieve the goals.

When this is the state of affairs, no opportunity to replace the regime should be missed, and since such replacement depends on internal forces in Iran, it is vital to exhaust every possibility for this and examine Israeli-American moves in this sphere.

Trump’s formula

The formula that President Trump chose to deal with the Iran problem at this time is setting red lines regarding rearmament and regarding shooting at demonstrators. Alongside additional internal challenges and difficult economic problems, it places Iran in a dilemma regarding its conduct and creates potential for regime exhaustion. Trump’s warnings to Iran about standing alongside demonstrators in case regime mechanisms act against them with shooting achieve three important goals. The first is encouraging the continuation of protests and, indirectly, the growth of leadership that can lead them. The second is tying the hands of repression mechanisms. It should be assumed they would prefer to reach a quick extinguishing of the fire. Trump’s position allows demonstrations to persist over time. The third goal is preserving the legitimacy of the protests, even if regime elements continue to claim they are the product of external interference.

The Israeli and American leadership do not hide the hope for the regime’s fall. Although this was not defined as a strategic goal in efforts vis-à-vis Iran, it is clear that as long as this regime continues to exist, threats from it to stability and security in the region and beyond will continue.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 06, 2026.



Iranian regime shows signs of weakening

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026

Kamal Kharazi, chairman of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, is one of the closest advisors to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In an interview published last week on Khamenei’s official website, Kharazi laid out his vision of what he called “the primary threat posed by the Zionist regime to the world.”

Presented as a geo-strategic analysis, Kharazi’s remarks in fact revealed dangerous, classical antisemitism, cloaked in diplomatic language. His statements only proves the antisemitic nature of Iran’s regime, and offers another glimpse into the ideological justification Tehran promotes for the destruction of Israel.

Kharazi warned that Israel seeks to establish a “Greater Israel” spanning from the Nile to the Euphrates – a goal, he claimed, rooted in promises made in the Torah. He accused Israel of following a 24-point plan allegedly crafted by the Freemasons in a clear reference to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious 19th-century antisemitic forgery that fueled persecution of Jews in Europe. Kharazi added that “the Jews are a small minority seeking to control the world,” thereby explicitly embracing the conspiratorial narrative of the “cosmopolitan Jew” pulling the strings behind global powers. His deliberate mention of the Freemasons was also no coincidence, reviving the old antisemitic myth that Jews secretly control this shadowy group, a theme common in late 19th-century propaganda promoting the notion of a global Jewish takeover.

A ‘just’ Jihad

Kharazi also likened Israel to the Islamic State terrorist organization, claiming that like ISIS, Israel too promotes “sacred violence.” This is a familiar dehumanizing tactic used in Iranian regime rhetoric, aimed at framing aggression against Israel and Jews as legitimate self-defense, even as a service to humanity. Tehran thus attempts to lend a moral veneer to its hatred of Israel, portraying the fight against it as a righteous jihad.

At a regional conference in Qatar this past May, Kharazi had already urged regional states to unite against Israel’s expansionist ambitions. Now, it seems that his remarks, widely disseminated by Khamenei’s English-language media arm, were intended not only for governments and peoples in the region but also aimed at leveraging the global surge in antisemitism since October 7, to draw broader Western audiences into Iran’s orbit.

These statements were no off-the-cuff remarks. Kharazi was quoted directly on the supreme leader’s official website, one of the regime’s top platforms for broadcasting carefully coordinated messaging both internally and externally. The conclusion is clear: Antisemitism is a central pillar in the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic. The religious justification provided by Khamenei and other regime figures for the October 7 massacre stems from this antisemitic worldview. Kharazi’s rhetoric helps set the ideological stage for another such atrocity.

In doing so, Kharazi joins a long list of Iranian officials, led by Khamenei himself, who have transformed “the Jewish question” into a political and propaganda weapon. Instead of criticizing specific Israeli policies, they adopt a religious-mythological narrative of a cosmic battle against the “Zionist entity,” which they view as a direct continuation of the biblical “Jew.” Even after Operation Shield and Arrow and the blow dealt to Iran’s axis of resistance in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war known as Operation Iron Swords, Tehran continues to pursue its vision of Israel’s annihilation. In his recent speeches, Khamenei reaffirmed this goal, effectively instructing his subordinates to redouble efforts toward its realization, especially in light of the disruption of their previous plan, stemming from a lack of coordination with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

Riding the wave

While Iran publicly claims to distinguish between Jews and Zionism, it is actively laying the groundwork for yet another war crime in the mold of October 7. Israel must intensify its efforts on the international stage to expose and highlight the antisemitic discourse promoted by the Iranian regime. Such a campaign would undermine Iran’s legitimacy, shed appropriate light on the dangerous ideology it espouses, and bolster Israel’s international legitimacy in countering Tehran.

At the same time, Kharazi’s statements may also suggest the regime’s growing weakness, and its attempt to ride the wave of global antisemitism to muster support, both globally and regionally. The lack of regional response to his call in May, the blow suffered by Iran and its proxies in the war, and the broader upheaval in the Middle East that followed, including the rise of an anti-Hezbollah government in Lebanon, have led Tehran to once again play the antisemitic card, in an effort to compensate for its strategic setbacks and weakening position.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 23, 2025.



Tehran’s Post-War Reset: Deterrence, Missiles, and Regional Ambitions

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026
With the end of the Gaza War, the Islamic Republic of Iran is summing up a tumultuous two-year period of warfare that drew it into the circle of fighting and fire, contrary to its pre-war strategy. As a result of the blow it received from Israel in the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran, and the severe damage to its network of operatives, Tehran is taking a series of actions in an attempt to strengthen its deterrence capability, which suffered an unprecedented setback, signalling its intention to renew the “ring of fire” around Israel. This is especially so in light of increasing threats against it, including the activation of the snapback (UN Security Council sanctions) and the trauma from being caught off guard by Israel.

Missile Program and Intercontinental Ambitions

First, Tehran is focusing on increasing the range of its ballistic missiles to intercontinental levels, i.e., 5,500 km and above. Parliament member Mohsen Zangeneh revealed in an interview (September 20) on Iranian television that the “unidentified lights” seen in Iranian skies two days earlier, which sparked public curiosity and attention, were a successful intercontinental missile test. It is possible that this was the Khorramshahr-5 ballistic missile, expected to reach a range of 12,000 km, which, according to Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh (August 21), has not yet entered operational service. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi denied Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim, following the test, that Tehran is developing intercontinental missiles capable of threatening Washington and New York. However, Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, confirmed the matter. In an interview with Iranian media, he stated that Khamenei had lifted the previous limit of 2,200 km on Iran’s missile range, and that Iran “is now developing its missile program as far as it wishes,” because it must “strengthen its most important military power factor, namely its missile program, without any limitation.”

Pressure for Nuclear Weapons Development

At the same time, pressure is growing from senior regime officials on Khamenei to approve nuclear weapons production. In this context, Ali Shamkhani, Khamenei’s senior advisor and formerly long-time head of Tehran’s nuclear program, called (October 12) for the regime to produce nuclear weapons, stating that it would have been better if Tehran had developed nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Earlier, on September 22, it was reported that 70 parliament members sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, the senior institution where strategic decisions are made in Iran, demanding authorisation for nuclear weapons development. The legislators emphasised that their request was to permit the development and possession of nuclear weapons, but not their use, for deterrence purposes. In addition, nuclear scientist Mahmoud-Reza Akhami, President of Beshtehi University in Tehran, which is under U.S. and European sanctions due to its links to Iran’s nuclear program, stated (October 15) that “if one day it is required to build an atomic bomb, we could do it in the best possible way.” He stressed that “we have the capability and resources to develop nuclear weapons, but we have no intention to do so.”

Rebuilding the Proxy Network

Furthermore, Tehran is signalling its determination to rebuild its network of proxies despite the significant changes in the geopolitical map following the war. As revealed (September 30) by the Mossad’s Persian-language account on X, Abdollah Saberi was appointed to replace Saeed Izadi, who was eliminated in the twelve-day war, as head of the Palestine branch in the Quds Force. In this role, Saberi will coordinate the reconstruction of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip (as well as in Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank), including the process of strengthening and building capabilities and transferring financial and military assistance. Saberi is expected to rely on various special units of the Quds Force, including Unit 840, responsible for special operations. Its advanced weapons smuggling and ‘reality-altering’ activities targeting terrorist elements in the West Bank have been repeatedly thwarted by the IDF and Shin Bet in recent years; Unit 340, the technological support unit providing knowledge and equipment for Iran’s regional operative network, engaged in technology projects related to weaponry; and Unit 190, responsible for smuggling weapons to the operative network, whose commander, Behnam Shahryari, was also eliminated in the war.

As stated (September 24) by Parliament Speaker and Supreme National Security Council member Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Tehran sees nurturing the “Resistance Axis” as a fundamental component of its national security. Qalibaf also expressed Iran’s ambition to renew the “ring of fire” around Israel, explaining that if Tehran does not fight Israel in the Golan Heights, it will fight it on its own borders. He also stressed that Iran’s channel for transferring assistance to Hezbollah remains open, even though it has become more difficult due to regional developments. This signals Iran’s extensive motivation to rebuild and restore Hezbollah. As part of its motivation to rebuild its network of proxies, on October 11, Commander of the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ali-Reza Tangasiri boasted of Tehran’s ability to export missiles, drones, and warships.

Continued Trauma and Alertness

At the same time, signs of nervousness and alertness are still evident in Tehran, arising from concerns that Iran may again be attacked by Israel unexpectedly. The insecurity felt by the regime’s leadership, due to its failure to read deep regional and external developments and thus the approaching Israeli strike, remains apparent. These signs were clearly reflected in the suspicion with which, in early October, Putin’s message from Netanyahu was received, stating that Israel does not intend to resume the war against Iran. In response, Foreign Minister Araghchi (October 11) said that Iran’s forces remain on alert for the possibility of renewed conflict, as it may be an Israeli deception operation.

At the same time, in an effort to mitigate the significant drop in the national currency and alleviate public fears that could spark protests, the regime is sending reassuring messages to the public. This is done through senior security officials who state in the media that “the enemy will not dare to resume the war” and therefore “the likelihood of renewed conflict is low.” The heads of the security apparatus, IDF Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi, and IRGC Commander Mohammad Pakpour, also emphasised in a media statement at the end of a joint working meeting (September 29) that Iranian forces are “fully prepared” for a powerful confrontation against any kind of threat or possible aggression. In addition, Pakpour conducts tours of operational IRGC units to examine their readiness for the possibility of renewed war.

The Challenge of Steering Iran’s Strategy

Khamenei extensively outlined in his televised speech on September 23 his concern that renewing negotiations with the U.S. would be a move whose harm outweighs its benefit, as it would symbolise surrender to Trump and trigger additional U.S. demands in missile development and more. Nevertheless, the moderate and reformist camps are questioning his policy, as evidenced by the sharp criticism over the rejection of President Pezeshkian’s invitation to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit chaired by Trump. In their view, participation could have opened the door to renewed U.S.-Iran negotiations and eased tensions between them. However, due to Khamenei’s deep suspicion and lack of trust toward Trump, it currently appears that he will continue to impose strict conditions on resuming negotiations and pursue a policy aimed at successfully navigating the Trump period.

Published in Midstone Centre, October 19, 2025.



Will Trump’s plan push Iran to attack Israel?

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026

Alongside examining the viability of Donald Trump’s plan to end the war in Gaza, it is worth considering its implications for Iran and, accordingly, Tehran’s expected response if the plan is implemented. On the surface, the proposal appears to improve Israel’s strategic position: it is supposed to secure the release of all hostages from Hamas, dismantle the terrorist organization’s weapons infrastructure, and seemingly eliminate the need for Israel to occupy the Strip.

Given Iran’s conspiratorial mindset and Khamenei’s deep suspicion of US actions, Tehran is likely to view the plan as a move aimed squarely at undermining the regime. The leadership may suspect that Trump’s plan is designed to complete the weakening of another arm of Iran’s regional proxy network—Hamas. This would add to Hezbollah’s current difficulties in Lebanon, the decline of Shiite militias in Iraq, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. In Tehran’s eyes, all this points toward the main goal of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump: toppling the Iranian regime.

Iran’s state media has already framed Trump’s proposal as an “imperialist plan designed to perpetuate the occupation of Palestine.” The plan threatens Iran because it explicitly weakens Hamas and its grip on Gaza. Should Hamas accept, control of the Strip would pass to a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day governance under the oversight of an international transitional body—”the Peace Council”—led by Trump and joined by figures such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The positive reception of the plan by Arab states and Israel undermines the regional policy Iran has tried to lead since Israel’s attack in Qatar. At the Islamic summit in Doha, Tehran pushed for a unified front against Israel, urging not only condemnations but also harsh action, including economic and diplomatic boycotts. Trump’s plan flips this strategy on its head. Now Israel and key Arab states appear to be aligned, not opposed. Moreover, if Hamas rejects the plan, as it is expected to, the tacit approval from the US and indirect backing from Arab states for Israel to occupy Gaza runs counter to Iran’s regional strategy.

How might Iran respond?

Several factors fuel Tehran’s opposition: Khamenei’s distrust of the Trump administration, Iran’s desire to block a US-led regional order, and its aim to leverage the Swords of Iron War, and the Israeli attack in Qatar in particular, to shape a pro-Iranian regional order. Tehran also fears that Israel seeks to renew direct confrontation with Iran, thereby pushing Arab states to avoid any cooperation with Jerusalem in such a scenario.

From Iran’s perspective, Trump’s plan could pose dangerous consequences for its national security. Tehran will likely attempt to pressure Arab states diplomatically to oppose the plan. It will also seek consultations with Hamas on how to exploit it, using the proposal to stall Israeli military action in Gaza and to prevent even temporary Palestinian displacement, while simultaneously blaming Israel for obstructing implementation or pushing for Hamas allies to infiltrate the proposed technocratic administration.

The requirement that all hostages be released before Israeli withdrawal prevents Iran and Hamas from pursuing a deception strategy, extracting concessions from Israel, such as avoiding a full occupation of Gaza, without Hamas delivering on its side. Tehran and Hamas are also expected to seek Qatari mediation for support in navigating the bind the Trump plan has created. Even if Hamas ultimately rejects the proposal, Iran will likely try to reassure its leaders of the necessity of resistance, offsetting Hamas’ concerns about the strong backing Arab states have shown for the plan.

Ultimately, Trump’s initiative appears to undercut Hamas’ most valuable leverage: it demands the release of hostages upfront while forcing disarmament. It also contradicts Hamas’ strategy of leveraging the October 7 attack as a long-term asset, even at the cost of losing control of Gaza. Despite mounting pressure from Arab leaders, Hamas is expected to reject the plan or, at the very least, turn to Qatar to negotiate changes that would hollow it out.

Israel, meanwhile, is already benefiting from the proposal. Even before implementation, the plan has thwarted Iran’s attempt to build a unified Islamic front against Israel. Still, it risks stoking Iranian fears that Israel and the US are preparing for war, this time aimed at a regime change. The danger of Iranian miscalculation, including the possibility of a sudden strike against Israel, is a scenario both Washington and Jerusalem must now take seriously.

Senior Iranian officials such as Yahya Rahim Safavi, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, have already called in mid-August for a surprise attack on Israel. Those calls could now gain momentum, particularly after the activation of the “snapback” mechanism, which increases the chances of Iranian miscalculation.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 01, 2025.



Staying alert: A new strategic phase in the Israel-Iran confrontation

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026
Iran emerged battered and humiliated from the recent “12 Day War,” as it is referred to in Tehran, after suffering a blow that included the elimination of many of its senior security officials, leading nuclear scientists, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities, security centers, regime symbols, and repression hubs.

Nevertheless, Iran also has a sense of achievement, due to the damage its missile strikes inflicted on Israel, and its success in maintaining functional continuity during the war. Tehran claims its main achievement is the preservation of the Islamic regime, based on the assumption that this was Israel’s primary goal by waging the war.

Since the war ended, Iran’s media has focused on two main issues. First, regarding the potential renewal of nuclear negotiations with the US, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is facing criticism from both conservative and radical-conservative factions. This stems from his desire to resume talks on the condition that Tehran receives guarantees from Washington that it will not be attacked again by the US, and from the implicit trust he still places in US President Donald Trump.

Second, in response to voices within Iran claiming that Tehran emerged victorious and therefore has no need to attack Israel, the radical-conservative daily Vatan-e Emrooz reported on Sunday that senior Iranian political and security officials are “seriously considering” launching a preemptive strike against Israel.

Growing anxiety in Tehran

The paper explained that this consideration comes in light of threats made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz to take enforcement action if Iran renews efforts to develop nuclear weapons or expands its ballistic missile program. In addition, with reports of US arms shipments to Israel since the war ended, the daily assessed that another Israeli strike is likely.

It therefore called on the Iranian regime to prepare for a preemptive attack “a day, a few hours, or even just one hour” before a potential Zionist strike, if Iranian security leaders conclude that such an attack is imminent. To prepare Iranian public opinion for this scenario, the daily argued that such a move could decisively end the issue of attacks on Iran and serve as a basis for long-term deterrence.
Meanwhile, signs of growing anxiety are evident in Tehran, due both to the consequences of the war and to threats from France, Britain, and Germany to support the reactivation of the UN Security Council’s snapback sanctions mechanism against Iran in mid-October 2025. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with French media (July 10) that, in Tehran’s view, the reactivation of snapback sanctions would be equivalent to a military attack.

In parallel, Mehdi Mohammadi – a strategic adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and a former member of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team between 2007 and 2013 – posted on Instagram (July 12) a story showing a simulated nuclear strike on Israel.

After the controversial post began attracting headlines and widespread attention, Mohammadi deleted it within minutes, explaining that it had been posted by his page administrator. He clarified that, in his view, a nuclear weapon would enhance Iran’s deterrence capabilities.

The beginning of a new phase

Israel and Iran stand on the threshold of a new phase in their strategic confrontation. Israel has demonstrated both its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and its advanced capabilities to support that policy.

Iran, for its part, remains suspicious, vengeful, and alert, as reflected in its senior officials’ statements. It is important to note that after the war ended, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on June 26 that Tehran had not agreed to a ceasefire, but only to halting attacks against Israel, and only if Israel did the same. This increases the likelihood of an Iranian miscalculation, and as a result, the possibility of a surprise missile strike on Israel.

Israel’s main challenge in this new phase is to combine heightened intelligence alertness with strategic coordination with the US, in order to block any Iranian attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, and to prevent a miscalculation that could trigger renewed war. Concurrently, Israel must reach the most accurate possible assessment of the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program so it can plan its next steps accordingly.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2025.



‘The protective wall of all civilization’

written by Dr. Raphael BenLevi | 01.02.2026

According to Iran researcher Dr. Raphael BenLevi, the blow that Israel dealt to Tehran not only thwarted a serious strategic threat, but heralds a profound change in the status and role of the Jewish state. The tendency to explain global conflicts solely in military and economic terms, he says, misses the ideological war between West and East and between oppression and freedom.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 04, 2025.

מללמת תרבות shutterstock - Joseph Sohm -



Crushed by Israel, Iran’s regime doubles down on fear, lies, and internal control

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026
In a pre-recorded televised speech aired on June 18, while Iran was under heavy and systematic attack by the Israel Air Force, Ali Khamenei instructed his men and supporters:

“Do not let the enemy sense that you fear him, that you feel weak. If the enemy senses that you are afraid of him, he will not let go of you. Continue the same behavior you have shown until now, and continue it with strength.”
In the coming days and weeks, the Iranian regime is expected to increase the repression of the Iranian people. It will conduct broad internal inquiries about Israel’s significant penetrations and the failure of the “Axis of Resistance,” mainly Hezbollah, to come to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s aid during the 12 days of fighting.
Tehran will work to restore its nuclear program and missile infrastructure, both of which were damaged during the war.
The regime will carry out in-depth investigations into how Israel managed to strike so intensively against nuclear facilities and so successfully against top regime officials, military bases, and symbols of authority. At the same time, it will strengthen its image and intensify its psychological warfare efforts, directed primarily toward the Iranian public, regional countries, and global powers.
The Iranian regime cannot afford to be perceived as weak; such a perception could encourage opponents of the regime to unite under a nationwide protest movement. In Khamenei’s view, any sign of frailty would be an admission of the Islamic Revolution’s failure and would embolden enemies in the West to help the Iranian people overthrow the government.
Khamenei, who is often credited with long-term strategic vision, insisted in his speech after the ceasefire reached between Israel and Hezbollah in November 2024 that the “Axis of Resistance” remained intact and that Iran’s regional standing was unaffected, even after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and other top Hezbollah leaders.
Khamenei misunderstood Middle Eastern shifts, Israel’s capability to tackle Tehran
Yet this statement masked a deeper failure: Khamenei misread the profound regional shifts underway and underestimated Israel’s resolve and capability to confront the Iranian threat head-on.
As part of its substantial psychological campaign to save its image, Khamenei’s regime is carrying out deceptive efforts aimed at convincing the Iranian public that the Islamic Revolution is still on track.
To this end, it has been pushing its supporters to the streets since Israel’s initial strike: On Saturday, June 14, the Shi’ite holiday of Ghadir – marking the Prophet Muhammad’s appointment of Ali as his successor; on June 20, in Friday sermons across Iran; and, most recently, last Tuesday evening during the “victory celebrations” in Tehran.
The regime is also stepping up propaganda efforts through its media apparatus: state television channels, newspapers, news websites, and social media propagandists, along with indoctrination campaigns within the security forces themselves.
To further the plan, regime institutions will attempt to obscure from public view the depth of damage and shock suffered by the regime at the hands of the Israelis, beyond what simply cannot be concealed: the elimination of senior figures and the destruction of military bases throughout the country.
Under Khamenei’s directive, the regime will strive to preserve and also project its (faltering) image as a victorious force.
Behind the boasts, however, lies a deep fear of what comes next. This anxiety will likely drive a dual strategy: intensifying domestic repression, while simultaneously offering economic incentives and populist gestures to mitigate the regime’s growing legitimacy crisis.
For now, having ended its war with Israel, the regime appears poised to turn inward – to wage a war of survival against its own people.
Published in The Jerusalem Post, June  29, 2025.


Shadmani, Nasrallah and the collapse of Iran’s Axis of Resistance

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 01.02.2026

Over the past year, the Iranian regime and Hezbollah have suffered unprecedented blows at the hands of Israel, which has severely damaged not only their military capabilities but also the nature of the strategic relationship between them.

Senior officials on both sides who were involved in security decision-making and managing the strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah were eliminated one after another. A newly released archive photo published in Iran on June 26 shows Ali Shadmani and then-Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah together, revealing another chapter in this strategic alliance, one that will likely never return.

According to reports from Iran, Shadmani was killed during the war, after being appointed as the successor to Gholam Reza Rashid, who was eliminated in Israel’s opening strike. Shadmani had served as head of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, the body responsible in routine times for threat assessment, force-building direction, and readiness assessment, and in wartime, for managing the entire military campaign under the direct authority of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

His death was officially reported in Iran only on June 25, following reports that he had been seriously wounded in a targeted strike about a week earlier and did not recover.

Shadmani had a long and distinguished military career. He joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) upon its founding in 1979 and commanded the Ansar al-Hossein Division during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988).

He went on to hold a series of senior positions, but the significance of the photo with Nasrallah lies in the period during which it was likely taken, after 2005. From 2005 to 2012, he held a senior role in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, including during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. From 2012 to 2016, he headed the directorate and later became the deputy coordinator of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters before ultimately taking command.

In this role, Shadmani oversaw the integration of all Iranian operational plans across the various arenas. Therefore, the very fact that a meeting between him and Nasrallah took place, now publicly revealed, adds another layer to the deep strategic relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah.

While it was known that Nasrallah regularly met with Quds Force commanders, Khamenei’s advisors and Iranian foreign ministers, it now emerges that he also held meetings with senior officials in the Operations Directorate of Iran’s General Staff. This connection underscores his elevated status within the Iranian regime’s decision-making processes and Tehran’s operational planning.

Nasrallah served as a strategic linchpin not only for Hezbollah but also for the Iranian regime and its management of relations with the organization. His assassination on September 27, 2024, marked a profound rupture for both Tehran and Hezbollah, which, in the current war, chose to remain on the sidelines.

In doing so, the organization made a historic decision that sharply contradicts Nasrallah’s past declarations that Hezbollah would join any war if Iran were attacked.

The Iranian regime must now undertake a complex process of rebuilding, not only of its military command structure, but also of its cooperation with Hezbollah.

The loss of Shadmani and other senior commanders who were eliminated by Israel, including Saeed Izadi, head of the Quds Force’s Palestinian branch (reportedly also responsible for facilitating Iranian support to Hezbollah), and Behnam Shahriyari, head of the Quds Force smuggling unit, presents a serious challenge.

Added to this are the deaths of Quds Force commanders for Lebanon and Syria, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and his successor, Abbas Nilforoushan, in previous months.

In such circumstances, reconstructing the Iran–Hezbollah “Axis of Resistance” appears especially daunting, particularly in light of Israel’s clear determination to prevent any attempt to rebuild Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the foreseeable future.

Published in JNS, June  30, 2025.