President Donald Trump’s conduct toward Iran has become predictable. He issues warnings, raises the prospect of extensive strikes against Iranian infrastructure, and moves military forces closer to the region. Then, at the edge of confrontation, he responds to appeals from mediating states—Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt—and grants Tehran time for negotiations.

In Israel, this conduct is often interpreted as vacillation or inconsistency. In my view, that interpretation is too simplistic. Trump is serious about his intentions. He believes in American military superiority and in using that power to compel Iran to submit and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear capability. At the same time, he is aware of constraints and risks that require caution.

The first is the danger of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. Strikes on power stations, water systems, bridges, railways, and energy infrastructure could produce images of darkened hospitals, water shortages, injured children, and waves of refugees. Even when the adversary is a brutal regime, American society would find it difficult to remain indifferent to such scenes.

A second consideration is the danger that American aircrew might fall into Iranian hands. In any campaign involving thousands of sorties, an aircraft may be brought down by air-defense fire or lost because of technical failure. A single image of a wounded American pilot on Iranian television could transform public opinion in the United States and restrict the president’s freedom of action. The memory of the Tehran hostage crisis and the failed rescue operation under President Jimmy Carter remains deeply embedded in American consciousness.

Third, a large-scale American attack launched after a cordial meeting between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could reinforce the impression that Israel persuaded the president to escalate the conflict. When Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz describes American aircraft and refueling planes taking off from Israel to strike Iran, while noting that Iran has attacked American bases elsewhere but has so far refrained from attacking Israel, such remarks may be interpreted in Tehran as provocation and public humiliation.

For Washington, this is a genuine risk. Iran’s leadership may conclude that it can no longer tolerate such humiliation and launch a direct attack on Israel. That would give Israel grounds for a broad counterattack and could draw the United States into precisely the escalation Trump has sought to avoid. Tehran could also claim that Israel deliberately tried to provoke an Iranian response in order to force Washington into an all-out war.

Another factor is uncertainty surrounding Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Even if an attack destroyed nuclear facilities, there is no guarantee that it would eliminate the uranium itself. The material may have been dispersed, concealed, or stored at an underground site whose location remains unknown. Centrifuges, tunnels, and buildings can be destroyed while the regime retains its most important nuclear asset.

Even if the uranium’s location were discovered, that would not necessarily mean it could be removed. If the material is buried deep underground, inside tunnels or fortified facilities, extracting it would require physical access, specialized equipment, security, technical expertise, and perhaps Iranian cooperation. An airstrike may destroy a site or block its entrance, but it cannot necessarily seize the material, remove it, or ensure that it will not be concealed elsewhere.

Finally, the overthrow or extreme weakening of the regime could produce chaos. Iran is a multiethnic country with minority communities. The collapse of central authority could trigger territorial struggles reminiscent of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. It could also produce a refugee flow toward Europe and the loss of control over weapons, uranium, and strategic infrastructure.

Trump’s conduct, therefore, need not be seen as weakness. He seeks to preserve a credible military threat, but would prefer economic pressure, blockade, and diplomatic isolation to compel Iran to make concessions without drawing the United States into a war whose outcome no one can foresee. This is not vacillation. It is a policy of power, tempered by a sober recognition of the potential costs and dangers of the day after.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 08, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Ahead of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s diplomatic visit to Washington, the Israeli defense establishment and decision-makers stand at a critical crossroads. Naturally, the strategic discussion with the American administration focuses on familiar issues – halting the Iranian nuclear program, preventing a renewed buildup of Iran’s proxy network, and finding a response to the threat posed by the Iranian missile program.

However, while Israeli and American eyes look toward the battlefields, the smuggling routes, and the nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordo, and Mount Mokhash, one must not ignore the most critical component that could tip the scales – the cumulative economic effect and deep internal fragility within Iran itself.

The reality in Tehran is far from stable. Beneath the regime’s shell of regional and global threats, the Iranian economy continues to bleed. The damages of war and the naval blockade, the sanctions, alongside structural corruption and the massive investment of state resources into funding regional terrorism – whether in Lebanon, Yemen, or advanced weapons systems from Russia and China – are pushing the regime against the wall. These consequences do not remain at the macroeconomic level alone. They trickle directly into the pocket of the average Iranian citizen, who is daily losing purchasing power and trust in the system.

The regime’s most significant vulnerability currently manifests in its plan to execute a sharp hike in fuel prices. This is a move it tried to avoid for years due to its immense public sensitivity. Raising fuel prices will create a dizzying effect in Iran, as it will also translate into price increases for transportation, basic commodities, and services. In doing so, it is expected to exacerbate the pressure on the Iranian public.

For the government in Tehran, the issue of fuel subsidies is not merely a budgetary question, but one of political life and death. The collective memory of the November 2019 events – when a sudden and drastic fuel price hike led to a nationwide wave of protests that was brutally suppressed through the killing of hundreds of citizens – still hovers over senior officials in the Iranian leadership.

The Iranian regime rightly fears that a similar step today, under conditions of extreme economic distress, surging unemployment, and memories of the massacre of thousands of demonstrators in the January 2026 protests, could reignite the fire in the streets. This could fuel a popular wave of protest that would take on massive proportions and destabilize the government in a manner completely different from any external pressure. Therefore, any Western strategy toward Tehran must take into account this internal boiling point.

The message that Israel must bring to Washington must be clear – applying heightened economic pressure and tightening sanctions are not merely punitive measures, but a primary strategic lever. The deeper the economic distress grows, forcing the regime to take steps dangerous to its own stability, such as raising fuel prices, the greater the internal pressure will be that forces regime leaders to turn their attention inward. The focus will shift to survival instead of exporting terror and regional subversion.

We must convince the American administration that the struggle against Iran must include intercepting the regime’s economic lifelines. Combining active containment of its regional proxies with a deepening of Tehran’s internal economic crisis – with all its explosive social implications – is the key to a genuine destabilization of the regime and the threat it poses to the entire Middle East.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 28, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Israel must seriously consider pre-emptive and, under exceptional circumstances, preventive action against Iran. It should coordinate closely with Washington, but no foreign government can be allowed to exercise a veto over Israel’s survival.

Israel’s defence doctrine was founded on a stark truth. A small state lacking strategic depth and facing persistent existential threats cannot allow its enemies to determine when and under what conditions war begins.

When hostile regimes repeatedly declare their intention to destroy Israel, the country has both the right and the duty to act before emerging threats become catastrophic. In certain circumstances, Israel must choose the timing, arena, and scale of military action, even when the enemy has not yet launched a direct attack.

The 1956 Sinai War demonstrated the logic of preventive action. Israel acted against the background of the massive Czechoslovak arms deal with Egypt and an impending shift in the regional balance of power. Although Egypt was not preparing an immediate offensive at that moment, Jerusalem regarded the developing threat as intolerable.

The 1967 Six-Day War was a more conventional case of pre-emption. Egypt had closed the Straits of Tiran, concentrated large forces in Sinai, and created a direct military crisis. On June 4, the Israeli Cabinet decided to go to war. The following morning, the Israeli Air Force struck enemy airfields and secured operational superiority.

In both cases, taking the initiative gave Israel decisive strategic and operational advantages. The consequences of surrendering that initiative became evident in 1973. Despite Chief of Staff David Elazar’s demand for a pre-emptive strike, Israel refrained from attacking Egyptian and Syrian air bases, partly because of intense American pressure.

The decision not to strike first was not the only cause of Israel’s initial failures in the Yom Kippur War. It did, however, demonstrate the danger of allowing the adversary to determine the opening conditions of war.

In later decades, a more restrained doctrine took root. It was shaped by diplomatic constraints, legal considerations, and changing IDF operational concepts. The pursuit of decisive victory – hachra’ah – gradually gave way to containment, limited attrition, and the degradation of enemy capabilities.

Israel increasingly relied on air power, long-range fire, intelligence, and advanced technology. This sometimes came at the expense of decisive ground operations and territorial control. Large-scale force was increasingly viewed as legitimate only after Israel had suffered substantial damage, faced a clear provocation, or obtained conclusive evidence of an imminent attack.

Such restraint can produce diplomatic benefits. It helps Israel gain international support and present itself as a defensive actor. Yet it also creates a serious vulnerability.

When Israel’s enemies believe it will not act until they cross a rigid threshold, they operate just below that threshold. They accumulate weapons, improve their strike capabilities, and gradually condition Israel to accept an increasingly dangerous reality. Over time, this process weakens deterrence, reduces sensitivity to warning signs, and erodes national resilience.

Recent statements by Israel’s political and military leaders concerning Iran reflect this reactive approach. They emphasise retaliation more than independent initiative.

Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that renewed war with Iran could occur if the United States decided to act and Israel joined it, or if Iran fired directly at Israel. He also said that Israel would respond forcefully to an Iranian missile attack and would act if it received clear intelligence regarding Iranian intentions.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned Tehran that any attack on Israel would provoke a far more powerful response. He has stressed that those who harm Israel will be struck with greater force.

IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir similarly stated, following Iranian missile fire toward Aqaba, that Israel was maintaining high readiness and was prepared to return immediately to combat against anyone who harmed it.

These declarations do not prove that Israel has ruled out pre-emptive or preventive action in classified discussions. Katz has also said that the IDF was instructed to prepare for an independent Israeli operation in Iran.

Nevertheless, the public rhetoric creates a restrictive impression. It suggests that Israel will act only if Washington initiates military action, Iran attacks Israel directly, or intelligence reveals an imminent Iranian barrage.

This framing weakens the political and conceptual legitimacy of an independent Israeli initiative. It encourages the public and the international community to regard prior Iranian aggression as a necessary condition for Israeli action.

Iranian missile launches toward the Jordanian port of Aqaba since July 19, 2026, illustrate the risks of this approach. Aqaba lies only a few kilometres from Eilat. American defence systems intercepted the missiles over Jordan, while fragments reportedly fell inside Israeli territory.

Even when Israel is not formally identified as the target, firing ballistic missiles near Eilat endangers Israeli lives. It also demonstrates Tehran’s willingness to expand the theatre of conflict and gamble on escalation.

Iranian decision-makers were aware that missiles could deviate from their intended course, interceptors could fail, and debris could fall inside Israel. Failure to respond strategically to such conduct may encourage Tehran and weaken Israeli deterrence.

This does not mean that Israel should immediately launch a comprehensive war. Diplomacy, international pressure, and alliance-building remain essential. Israel must, however, reject any formula under which it may act only after suffering a direct and serious attack.

Nor should Israel be required to wait until it detects the final operational preparations for an Iranian launch. By then, Israel may have lost the advantages of surprise, timing, and operational freedom.

The distinction between pre-emption and prevention is important. A pre-emptive strike is intended to thwart an imminent attack. Preventive action seeks to stop a dangerous future change in the balance of power.

Yet the boundary between them is not always clear when confronting a regime that openly threatens Israel, rebuilds missile and nuclear capabilities, and directs regional proxies. In either case, action must be based on reliable intelligence, operational feasibility, urgency, and a careful comparison between the costs of action and the risks of inaction.

Relations with the United States require a clear distinction between strategic coordination and existential dependence.

American strategy may emphasise limited counterstrikes, force protection, and diplomatic pressure designed to return Iran to negotiations. Israel’s objectives are broader. It must prevent an Iranian nuclear and ballistic breakthrough, weaken Tehran’s ability to rebuild its proxy network, and end a prolonged war of attrition.

Regime change in Tehran may serve Israel’s interests, but Israel cannot present it as a military objective that it can guarantee through unilateral action.

Israel must also resist any Iranian attempt to connect nuclear negotiations with Washington to regional ceasefires or Israeli withdrawals. Tehran must not be allowed to use negotiations over its nuclear programme to restrict Israeli action against Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Jerusalem should coordinate with the White House as closely as possible. But it must also state clearly that Israel retains the right to defend its essential security interests. No foreign power can hold a veto over the country’s survival.

Seeking a strategic decision does not justify attacks on civilians. Nor does it release Israel from international law or the ethical obligations of the IDF.

A campaign against Iran may nevertheless require strikes against dual-use infrastructure that directly supports military operations. Such targets could include energy systems supplying military bases, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps supply routes, command facilities, railways, bridges, and arms-production or missile-transport infrastructure.

Targets that make a direct and substantial contribution to enemy military operations may be lawful, subject to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Israel must make every reasonable effort to minimise civilian casualties. Yet no high-intensity war can be entirely free of collateral harm.

Time is now a central strategic consideration. Israel may still possess a window of operational freedom, reinforced by a degree of tacit alignment with Gulf states that also regard Iran as a major threat.

Such windows do not remain open indefinitely. Governments change, regional coalitions weaken, and diplomatic delay gives nuclear and missile programmes time to become more dispersed, protected, and difficult to destroy.

Israel’s leadership must therefore prepare the public for the possibility of independent action before Iran launches a direct attack. Public preparation is not a substitute for responsible decision-making. It is part of the political and strategic foundation required for it.

A doctrine of pre-emption is not a licence for unlimited war, nor does it make diplomacy irrelevant. It requires precise intelligence, a rigorous examination of alternatives, and a sober evaluation of risks and possible gains.

For Israel, however, waiting for a direct attack can be a dangerous gamble. It may force the country to confront an existential threat at a time and under conditions chosen by the enemy.

Restraint is not always synonymous with responsibility. At critical moments, excessive restraint may amount to a failure to neutralise a growing threat while effective action is still possible.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, July 24, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Calls to take revenge on US President Donald Trump, heard across Iran since the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are sometimes viewed in the West as tired rhetoric. For Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father as Iran’s supreme leader, however, carrying out that revenge could become a critical ideological, religious and political test.

The threats appear to be more than a declarative signal intended to show the world that Iran’s traditional hostility toward the American “Great Satan” will continue under its new leadership. Revenge is an ideological, religious and operational priority of the highest order.

The younger Khamenei, who inherited the supreme leadership and, according to senior Israeli and American officials, was wounded during the war and is operating from a hiding place, stressed in a message published Saturday that “this revenge is the will of our people, and it must be carried out in full.”

The online daily Seda-ye Iran, published by the supreme leader’s office, added in a commentary on his remarks that abandoning revenge would give Iran’s enemies a green light to commit “even more horrific crimes.”

Mohsen Rezaei, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, declared Monday that revenge was a serious matter that must be pursued. Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, a senior member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, went even further, calling for the establishment of an organized operational mechanism to eliminate the “American dog.”

In fact, as previously revealed by Iranian opposition media, Unit 840 of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force already has a branch responsible for directing terrorist activity on US soil.

The branch is headed by Mohsen Bozorgi, and occasional hints of its existence have appeared in statements by senior Iranian officials. As early as January 2021, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani warned that those responsible for killing Qassem Soleimani should know that they might be repaid in kind “even inside their own homes.” Similarly, the Friday prayer leader in Yasuj threatened in March 2022 that Iran had the operational ability to strike Washington directly.

The Quds Force’s subversive activity in the US was exposed publicly in 2011, when Iranian American citizen Mansour Arbabsiar was sent to Mexico to arrange the assassination of Saudi Ambassador to Washington Adel al-Jubeir. The plot was coordinated by senior Quds Force official Abdul Reza Shahlai, and Arbabsiar was arrested by the FBI. To carry out a plot of this magnitude, the Quds Force would need only one operation involving a lone assassin to succeed.

The systematic modus operandi of Iran’s intelligence and security services, as reflected in an analysis of their activities in different parts of the world, shows that Tehran relies on three main groups to carry out terrorist attacks and assassinations abroad, including in the US: Iranian or Lebanese expatriates with local citizenship, Muslim operatives with an ideological affinity for the regime and, increasingly, the cynical use of local criminal organizations and underworld figures.

A clandestine infrastructure has been built and cultivated in the US in cooperation with Hezbollah since the second half of the 2000s. In practice, persistent and determined FBI counterterrorism operations appear to have prevented Iran and Hezbollah from developing these networks into significant capabilities capable of carrying out mass-casualty attacks.

Statements praising Khamenei made by Shiite clerics at memorial ceremonies in recent days at Islamic centers in New York, Texas, Washington and Illinois could now provide fertile ground for efforts to recruit and activate extremists.

It would be a mistake, however, to become complacent or assume that Tehran’s operational failures have weakened its resolve. Statements and publications in Iran before the latest war clearly indicated that the country’s intelligence agencies had not abandoned their plans. Instead, they had been working assiduously to improve the technological and operational capabilities of these cells.

Given the regime’s current motivation, Tehran is now expected to intensify its efforts to find a breach in America’s defensive wall. Beyond ideological and operational considerations, Iran’s domestic politics are also driving an escalation in the rhetoric surrounding revenge.

The growing calls for retaliation are partly fueled by an intensifying political struggle between Iran’s rival camps. The ultraconservative Paydari faction is challenging the broader conservative establishment, outflanking it from the right by adopting a hawkish and uncompromising position.

As part of this effort, the Paydari camp and its supporters within the regime’s social base are demanding an end to negotiations with the Trump administration, arguing that “there can be no dialogue with Khamenei’s murderer.”

At the opposite end of Iran’s political spectrum, the reformist camp, whose influence within the regime is marginal, is warning of devastating consequences if the government moves forward with an attempt to take revenge on Trump.

Trump himself has said that he issued operational instructions outlining what should be done if an attempt on his life succeeds. His statement came after The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had shared intelligence with the US indicating that Iran was planning to assassinate him.

In this context, recent statements by Iranian members of parliament claiming that Tehran could have assassinated Trump while he attended the NATO summit in Turkey underscore the tangible nature of the threat and demonstrate that the Quds Force’s assassination efforts have a global reach.

An Iranian assassination of Trump would constitute an overwhelming victory for Tehran. That possibility highlights the need to confront the radical regime firmly and ensure that Trump receives adequate protection.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July  14, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has issued an unmistakable threat. Following his father’s funeral, he declared: “We pledge to avenge your pure blood and the blood of all the martyrs … by taking revenge against the criminal, disgraceful murderers. This vengeance is what our nation is demanding, and this must definitely be done.”

Khamenei’s pledge did not come in a vacuum. It joined a growing chorus of calls in Iran for revenge, alongside intelligence warnings of plans to assassinate U.S. President Donald Trump. The extraordinary security measures surrounding Trump’s visit to Ankara for the NATO summit reflected the seriousness of the threats against him.

Trump responded to these threats with a stark warning. He stated, “I’ve been on their list for a long time. … The only thing is, I’ve left instructions, if anything happens, to just literally bomb them at levels that they’ve never seen before.”

This was not the first time Trump issued such a warning. In February 2025, as he signed a presidential directive restoring the maximum-pressure campaign against the Iranian regime, he warned that, in the event of his assassination, “I’ve left instructions: If they do it, they get obliterated. There won’t be anything left.”

The purpose of these warnings is clear: to deter the Iranian regime.

The assumption is that the regime, in deciding whether to execute such an assassination attempt, would weigh the benefits against the price Iran can expect to pay. Once decision-makers in Tehran have understood the response they can expect from the United States, the thinking goes, they will hesitate before acting.

This assumption applies not only to an assassination attempt against Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or another leader, but also to other forms of Iranian aggression and destabilization in the nuclear, ballistic missile, drone, naval and terrorist arenas.

Yet this approach rests on a critical assumption: that the decision-makers in Tehran rationally weigh expected benefits against potential costs and that they fundamentally think like Western leaders.

It is far from certain that this is true in light of the Iranian regime’s radical Islamist ideology and worldview.

A document seized by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza, apparently written by Hamas senior leader Yahya Sinwar shortly before the terror organization invaded southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, revealed how he assessed the cost of the monstrous massacre he was planning.

According to researchers at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Sinwar expected Israel to respond with overwhelming force. He even believed that Israel might use a nuclear weapon against Hamas. “The enemy will not hesitate to use all the means and weapons at its disposal,” he wrote. “It may even use a nuclear bomb.”

Yet this belief did not deter him. He viewed Hamas’s campaign against Israel as “a battle of life or death” and was determined to carry it out even if it meant the devastation of Gaza.

Could the leadership in Tehran view its mission of revenge in the same way? The answer may well be yes.

Differences exist between Hamas and Iran. But both Hamas and Tehran’s leaders are inspired by extremist Islamist ideologies that regard terror and destruction as legitimate means of achieving political and religious goals. At least some members of the Iranian leadership likely see the world in a manner similar to Sinwar and Hamas.

Against enemies of this kind, deterrence cannot be relied upon. Only prevention and the denial of capabilities can provide real security.

The same principle applies not just to assassination attempts, but to Iran’s broader military and terror infrastructure. As long as Iran remains under its present revolutionary leadership, it cannot be safely permitted to retain or rebuild strategic capabilities: nuclear weapons; ballistic missiles; advanced drones and their production facilities; naval forces capable of threatening international shipping; proxy armies; and bodies used to commit terrorism and assassinations abroad.

In the face of these threats, the objective cannot be deterrence. It must be to deny capabilities.

“They’re sick people,” Trump said of the leaders in Tehran. To put it more precisely: They do not think as we do.

Whether in Tehran, Gaza, Lebanon or Yemen, the enemy must be confronted according to the way it actually thinks, not the way others would like it to think.

We must therefore not rely primarily on deterrence, but on the aforementioned denial of capabilities. If direct and sustained denial ultimately proves impossible, the only answer may be to create the conditions under which the Iranian people can transform the regime and build a better future for their nation.

Published in JNS, July 14, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

One of the loudest chants at the mass funeral for Iran’s slain supreme leader, Ali Khamenei – echoed by both the public and the leadership in Tehran – was “Death to the US.”

Even Mohammad Ghalibaf, the head of Iran’s negotiating team, vowed to avenge the leader’s death, as did state media and the government’s main intelligence office. Most notable were the calls to assassinate US President Donald Trump, accompanied by offers of a huge reward for whoever succeeds in this mission.

These calls contradict the way Trump depicts his current relations with the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Several weeks ago, he claimed that it includes “good people,” who are not as radical as their former colleagues, and that “we get along with them.” He repeated this claim several times, as if trying to convince not only us but also himself.

Trump isn’t naïve. Like every good salesman, he is trying to sell his deal and portray it as the best thing he could have achieved, despite the obstacles and challenges. He probably knows that Iran and its leaders have not suddenly become enlightened or turned into peace-loving fans of the US.

Quite the opposite. They are bloodthirsty and will wait for the opportune moment to seek revenge. Moreover, Trump probably also knows about the growing calls within the Iranian regime to preserve components of the “nuclear option” in order to deter any future attacks on the Islamic Republic.

Tehran’s message vs Washington’s view

One of Tehran’s main news outlets, Fars – which usually serves as a mouthpiece for the IRGC – published a lengthy article only a few days ago calling for the preservation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a guarantee against any attempt to topple the regime.

The American president, for his own reasons, is sticking to diplomacy again despite all the Iranian defiance. The White House is willing to pay what might seem like a reasonable price to calm global energy markets and to buy more time ahead of the midterm elections, while also getting through major events such as the 250th anniversary of the United States and the World Cup with relative ease.

Current polling in the United States, however, suggests that the deal with Iran doesn’t improve the Republican position. The governing party usually suffers setbacks in the midterms, and there’s no reason to believe it will be different this time.

This will only sharpen Trump’s dilemma before the deal’s 60-day deadline and will force the president to choose between increasingly narrow options that might not be to his liking. If the deadlock in the negotiations continues, his patience might end even sooner.

Given that the best Trump can hope for now with the Iranians is an Obama-style deal, he might realize soon that his legacy is on the line. He may not get what he wants from Tehran, and he may also be seen as the president who dared to fight Iran but couldn’t finish the job. In this case, he could face even fewer options than he had hoped for.

Either way, we must not fool ourselves. The Iranian leadership has not changed its goals or ideology, and the chants to kill Americans and Israelis are still what the public hears from its government. Once we realize this and know who we are dealing with, we may assess the situation in a more sober and rational manner.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, on July 8, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran is attempting to impose a new deterrence equation on Israel – one designed to restrict Israel’s freedom of action and restore Tehran’s regional standing. According to this equation, any significant Israeli action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut’s Dahiyeh district, would trigger a direct Iranian response against Israel. Simultaneously, Tehran seeks to broaden the equation by linking Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon to the risk of escalation.

These messages were conveyed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to foreign ambassadors in Tehran and reiterated by the statement of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarter. Their coordinated messaging reflects a unified effort to establish new red lines in Lebanon and deter Israeli operations. Iran seeks to position itself as the ultimate arbiter of the scope of Israeli military activity in Lebanon.

A recent map published by the IDF on June 18 regarding troop deployments within a 10 km zone in southern Lebanon, and the recent fatalities of the IDF soldiers, including a battalion commander, highlighted the ongoing friction between the IDF and Hezbollah. In Tehran’s view, any Israeli action in Lebanon that constrains Hezbollah’s freedom of movement provides a potential pretext for intervention.

From Tehran’s perspective, successfully imposing such an equation is vital for restoring deterrence. Since October 7, Iran and its proxies have suffered a series of setbacks. Hezbollah has lost senior commanders, military infrastructure, and weapons stockpiles, and its freedom of action has been increasingly constrained; its dire situation is reflected in Iran rushing to its defense against Israel. The Houthis have been hit, albeit to a limited extent. Hamas has suffered severe damage; and Iran’s status as the leader of the “Axis of Resistance” has been weakened. Against this backdrop, Tehran seeks to demonstrate that it can still dictate the rules of the game and impose limits on Israeli behavior.

History, however, suggests that accommodating Iranian threats does not moderate Tehran’s conduct; it encourages further demands. For years, the Islamic Republic has operated on the assumption that determined pressure can force adversaries to retreat. When confronted with concessions, it tends to interpret them as signs of weakness, increasing rather than reducing its demands.

The dispute is not merely about southern Lebanon or Dahiyeh. It is a contest over who sets the rules of engagement. If Israel accepts the principle that Iran may determine which targets it can strike and under what conditions, it will concede an additional layer of influence over its security policy. The issue extends far beyond Lebanon: Various senior Iranian officials have declared that their long-term strategic goal is the destruction of Israel via a multi-front invasion attack. To accomplish this, Iran knows it must establish precedents that can be leveraged in future fronts as well.

The re-establishment of Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border and the reconstitution of the Axis of Resistance should not be understood as an endpoint, but rather as a mechanism through which Iran seeks to restore its regional leverage. Such a trajectory would position Tehran and its proxies on a more favorable launching pad from which to resume their campaign against Israel once they assess that regional and military conditions have sufficiently matured.

Israel is therefore contending not merely with a local adversary but with a broader Iranian effort to reshape the regional balance of deterrence. Tehran’s strategic objective is to transform every significant Israeli military action into a decision that imposes direct costs from Iran, thereby progressively constraining Israel’s operational flexibility. Should this approach succeed, it would represent a substantial Iranian strategic gain even absent a direct military confrontation.

Accordingly, sustained military pressure on Hezbollah must be complemented by diplomatic engagement with the Trump administration to clarify that acquiescence to Iranian consolidation runs counter to American interests. Permitting Iran to reconstitute its deterrent architecture would strengthen the regime and advance its long-term objective of undermining Israeli security. Similarly, proposals to delegate management of Hezbollah to the Assad regime in Damascus carry significant risks, as they would effectively substitute the current Iranian-backed threat with a Sunni jihadist challenge underwritten by a major regional power—Turkey.

For these reasons, resisting Iranian efforts to impose new deterrence equations is a strategic imperative. This does not require uncontrolled escalation, but it does require rejecting attempts to constrain Israel’s freedom of action through threats. In the Middle East, and especially in Tehran, restraint driven by fear of escalation is often interpreted not as responsibility, but weakness.

Experience suggests that Iran’s ambitions are more likely to be curbed by resolve than by accommodation. The clearer Israel’s determination to defend its interests, the more difficult it becomes for Tehran to expand its influence and dictate the terms of confrontation. Conversely, hesitation risks encouraging further Iranian efforts to redefine the rules of engagement in its favor.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  21, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The dominant narrative about the US-Iran deal – in Israel, across the Middle East, and the Western press – is straightforward: Iran won, Israel lost, and the United States blinked. That narrative contains a grain of truth but it is also, in important ways, wrong. And at a moment when the real negotiations have not yet even begun, getting the analysis right matters enormously.

Let us start with what is often overlooked. Iran signed a document that includes terms it had previously refused outright. The Strait of Hormuz opens unconditionally – no tolls, no leverage. Tehran has agreed in principle to suspend uranium enrichment on its soil for an extended period, to forgo the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons, and to accept a rigorous inspection regime. These are not the terms of a victor. These are the concessions of a state that had been battered into accepting conditions it once called existential red lines.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been severely degraded. The Natanz enrichment facility was damaged by roughly 75 per cent. The hardened underground facility at Fordow, long considered the crown jewel of Iranian deterrence, took approximately 30 per cent damage. Iran currently has no operational enrichment capability. Its air defence systems have been destroyed, its navy has been eliminated, around 85 per cent of its defence industry has been demolished and its ballistic missile arsenal has been substantially reduced. The economic cost is staggering: IMF projections suggest a contraction of 7.2 percentage points, on top of an already fragile baseline, with reconstruction costs estimated between $400 billion and one trillion dollars.

Senior Iranian economists have warned their president that recovery will take a decade or more.

The claim that Israel failed strategically because it did not destroy Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is analytically flawed. That material remains buried under rubble, monitored continuously by American and Israeli satellites and intelligence. Any Iranian attempt to excavate it would trigger an immediate response. If the negotiations succeed on US terms – which President Trump has insisted must include zero Iranian military nuclear capability, whether independently produced or purchased – the enriched uranium will be removed from Iranian territory or diluted under strict supervision.

Similarly, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” has not survived intact as a deterrent instrument. Hamas has been devastated and no longer poses a meaningful conventional threat to Israel. Hezbollah’s long-range rocket arsenal has been reduced to approximately 8 per cent of what it held on October 7, 2023. Its command and control networks are shattered and its domestic political standing inside Lebanon has collapsed, with criticism now coming from even within the Shia community. The Houthis retain some ballistic capacity and control the Bab el-Mandeb strait, but they too have been significantly degraded. Iran built this ring of fire over two decades to deter Israeli strikes and provide strategic depth. It no longer performs either function.

One figure cuts against the doom narrative with particular clarity. During more than two years of intensive warfare, the Israeli shekel appreciated by 19 per cent against the dollar – breaking a 30-year record. Israel’s economic growth is running at 3.3 to 3.9 per cent. This does not diminish the human cost of the war, nor excuse strategic misjudgements that have real consequences but it is an important marker.

None of this justifies triumphalism, and it would be dishonest to present it as such. The incomplete neutralisation of Fordow is a genuine failure. Iran also retains the technological knowledge base for a nuclear programme while the precise location of some fissile material remains unknown – a serious and unresolved risk. The 60-day negotiating window that now opens is genuinely dangerous: Iran’s incentives to stall, to extract concessions, and to exploit US impatience are real. President Trump’s willingness to publicly humiliate Israel’s prime minister, to present him as a vassal rather than an ally, has done real damage to Israel’s international standing and its relationship with American Jewry and bipartisan Congressional support.

The Iran-Lebanon linkage that Tehran is trying to institutionalise through the ceasefire deal represents a direct threat to Israeli freedom of action. Iran wants any final agreement to obligate an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and to curtail Israel’s right to respond to Hezbollah violations. Israel is refusing, and rightly so. But sustaining that refusal while maintaining the relationship with Washington will require considerable diplomatic dexterity.

There is one dimension that Western commentary has largely ignored: what the deal means inside Iran. The Islamic Republic is signing an agreement that significant parts of its own ideological base regard as capitulation. That generates a political dynamic that could destabilise the regime more than any external pressure. A large segment of the Iranian public – people who have watched their savings evaporate, their infrastructure collapse, their relatives killed – sees the agreement not as a triumph but as evidence of the regime’s failure. If the negotiations drag on without delivering economic recovery, that disillusionment will deepen. The Supreme Leader, whose religious authority is widely considered weaker than his predecessor’s, has not appeared in public in weeks. The regime is not a unified actor.

History does not offer precise timelines for when mismanagement, popular discontent, and elite fracture converge into systemic collapse. But the conditions for such a trajectory are more present in Iran today than at any point since 1979.

The 60 days ahead are not merely a waiting period. They are an opportunity that Israeli strategy must actively exploit. Israel needs to be present in the negotiating room – not physically, but substantively. That means working through Washington to ensure that the final agreement includes the complete dismantlement of Fordow, the removal of all enriched uranium (not merely material enriched to 60 per cent), verifiable constraints on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, and a credible automatic sanctions snap-back mechanism. The weaknesses of the Obama Iran deal must not be repeated.

Israel must also formalise its understanding with Washington regarding what happens if the negotiations fail or if Iran violates its commitments. Joint planning for that contingency is not a provocation – it is the minimum prudence demands.

In parallel, Israel should accelerate its diplomatic engagement with Lebanon’s government, which has publicly distanced itself from Hezbollah and expressed willingness to negotiate a security arrangement. The ongoing talks represent a genuine strategic opportunity to institutionalise Israeli security requirements in the north and to isolate Hezbollah politically from the Lebanese state.

And Israel should deepen its strategic relationships with India, the UAE, and other partners in the emerging regional architecture – relationships that the current moment, paradoxically, may have strengthened.

The MOU is not a defeat for Israel, and it is not a victory for Iran – at least not the decisive strategic victory that Tehran’s propaganda machine is claiming. It is the result of a war in which both sides absorbed severe damage, in which the US chose accommodation over military maximalism and decisiveness, and in which the final accounting has not yet been made.

Iran enters the negotiating period weakened and wounded, economically devastated, and politically fragile. Israel enters it having achieved significant military objectives – though not all – with its core deterrence intact and, with unprecedented security cooperation with the US and Arab partners and much stronger than it was in 2023.

The appropriate response to this moment is neither complacency nor panic – it is clarity: about what was achieved, what remains undone, and what the next 60 days demand. The negotiations that are about to begin will shape the region for a generation. Israel’s influence over their outcome depends entirely on its willingness to engage seriously, strategically, and with a clear-eyed assessment of the balance of power as it actually stands – not as the competing narratives would have it.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, June  19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.