Calls to take revenge on US President Donald Trump, heard across Iran since the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are sometimes viewed in the West as tired rhetoric. For Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father as Iran’s supreme leader, however, carrying out that revenge could become a critical ideological, religious and political test.

The threats appear to be more than a declarative signal intended to show the world that Iran’s traditional hostility toward the American “Great Satan” will continue under its new leadership. Revenge is an ideological, religious and operational priority of the highest order.

The younger Khamenei, who inherited the supreme leadership and, according to senior Israeli and American officials, was wounded during the war and is operating from a hiding place, stressed in a message published Saturday that “this revenge is the will of our people, and it must be carried out in full.”

The online daily Seda-ye Iran, published by the supreme leader’s office, added in a commentary on his remarks that abandoning revenge would give Iran’s enemies a green light to commit “even more horrific crimes.”

Mohsen Rezaei, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, declared Monday that revenge was a serious matter that must be pursued. Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, a senior member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, went even further, calling for the establishment of an organized operational mechanism to eliminate the “American dog.”

In fact, as previously revealed by Iranian opposition media, Unit 840 of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force already has a branch responsible for directing terrorist activity on US soil.

The branch is headed by Mohsen Bozorgi, and occasional hints of its existence have appeared in statements by senior Iranian officials. As early as January 2021, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani warned that those responsible for killing Qassem Soleimani should know that they might be repaid in kind “even inside their own homes.” Similarly, the Friday prayer leader in Yasuj threatened in March 2022 that Iran had the operational ability to strike Washington directly.

The Quds Force’s subversive activity in the US was exposed publicly in 2011, when Iranian American citizen Mansour Arbabsiar was sent to Mexico to arrange the assassination of Saudi Ambassador to Washington Adel al-Jubeir. The plot was coordinated by senior Quds Force official Abdul Reza Shahlai, and Arbabsiar was arrested by the FBI. To carry out a plot of this magnitude, the Quds Force would need only one operation involving a lone assassin to succeed.

The systematic modus operandi of Iran’s intelligence and security services, as reflected in an analysis of their activities in different parts of the world, shows that Tehran relies on three main groups to carry out terrorist attacks and assassinations abroad, including in the US: Iranian or Lebanese expatriates with local citizenship, Muslim operatives with an ideological affinity for the regime and, increasingly, the cynical use of local criminal organizations and underworld figures.

A clandestine infrastructure has been built and cultivated in the US in cooperation with Hezbollah since the second half of the 2000s. In practice, persistent and determined FBI counterterrorism operations appear to have prevented Iran and Hezbollah from developing these networks into significant capabilities capable of carrying out mass-casualty attacks.

Statements praising Khamenei made by Shiite clerics at memorial ceremonies in recent days at Islamic centers in New York, Texas, Washington and Illinois could now provide fertile ground for efforts to recruit and activate extremists.

It would be a mistake, however, to become complacent or assume that Tehran’s operational failures have weakened its resolve. Statements and publications in Iran before the latest war clearly indicated that the country’s intelligence agencies had not abandoned their plans. Instead, they had been working assiduously to improve the technological and operational capabilities of these cells.

Given the regime’s current motivation, Tehran is now expected to intensify its efforts to find a breach in America’s defensive wall. Beyond ideological and operational considerations, Iran’s domestic politics are also driving an escalation in the rhetoric surrounding revenge.

The growing calls for retaliation are partly fueled by an intensifying political struggle between Iran’s rival camps. The ultraconservative Paydari faction is challenging the broader conservative establishment, outflanking it from the right by adopting a hawkish and uncompromising position.

As part of this effort, the Paydari camp and its supporters within the regime’s social base are demanding an end to negotiations with the Trump administration, arguing that “there can be no dialogue with Khamenei’s murderer.”

At the opposite end of Iran’s political spectrum, the reformist camp, whose influence within the regime is marginal, is warning of devastating consequences if the government moves forward with an attempt to take revenge on Trump.

Trump himself has said that he issued operational instructions outlining what should be done if an attempt on his life succeeds. His statement came after The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had shared intelligence with the US indicating that Iran was planning to assassinate him.

In this context, recent statements by Iranian members of parliament claiming that Tehran could have assassinated Trump while he attended the NATO summit in Turkey underscore the tangible nature of the threat and demonstrate that the Quds Force’s assassination efforts have a global reach.

An Iranian assassination of Trump would constitute an overwhelming victory for Tehran. That possibility highlights the need to confront the radical regime firmly and ensure that Trump receives adequate protection.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July  14, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has issued an unmistakable threat. Following his father’s funeral, he declared: “We pledge to avenge your pure blood and the blood of all the martyrs … by taking revenge against the criminal, disgraceful murderers. This vengeance is what our nation is demanding, and this must definitely be done.”

Khamenei’s pledge did not come in a vacuum. It joined a growing chorus of calls in Iran for revenge, alongside intelligence warnings of plans to assassinate U.S. President Donald Trump. The extraordinary security measures surrounding Trump’s visit to Ankara for the NATO summit reflected the seriousness of the threats against him.

Trump responded to these threats with a stark warning. He stated, “I’ve been on their list for a long time. … The only thing is, I’ve left instructions, if anything happens, to just literally bomb them at levels that they’ve never seen before.”

This was not the first time Trump issued such a warning. In February 2025, as he signed a presidential directive restoring the maximum-pressure campaign against the Iranian regime, he warned that, in the event of his assassination, “I’ve left instructions: If they do it, they get obliterated. There won’t be anything left.”

The purpose of these warnings is clear: to deter the Iranian regime.

The assumption is that the regime, in deciding whether to execute such an assassination attempt, would weigh the benefits against the price Iran can expect to pay. Once decision-makers in Tehran have understood the response they can expect from the United States, the thinking goes, they will hesitate before acting.

This assumption applies not only to an assassination attempt against Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or another leader, but also to other forms of Iranian aggression and destabilization in the nuclear, ballistic missile, drone, naval and terrorist arenas.

Yet this approach rests on a critical assumption: that the decision-makers in Tehran rationally weigh expected benefits against potential costs and that they fundamentally think like Western leaders.

It is far from certain that this is true in light of the Iranian regime’s radical Islamist ideology and worldview.

A document seized by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza, apparently written by Hamas senior leader Yahya Sinwar shortly before the terror organization invaded southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, revealed how he assessed the cost of the monstrous massacre he was planning.

According to researchers at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Sinwar expected Israel to respond with overwhelming force. He even believed that Israel might use a nuclear weapon against Hamas. “The enemy will not hesitate to use all the means and weapons at its disposal,” he wrote. “It may even use a nuclear bomb.”

Yet this belief did not deter him. He viewed Hamas’s campaign against Israel as “a battle of life or death” and was determined to carry it out even if it meant the devastation of Gaza.

Could the leadership in Tehran view its mission of revenge in the same way? The answer may well be yes.

Differences exist between Hamas and Iran. But both Hamas and Tehran’s leaders are inspired by extremist Islamist ideologies that regard terror and destruction as legitimate means of achieving political and religious goals. At least some members of the Iranian leadership likely see the world in a manner similar to Sinwar and Hamas.

Against enemies of this kind, deterrence cannot be relied upon. Only prevention and the denial of capabilities can provide real security.

The same principle applies not just to assassination attempts, but to Iran’s broader military and terror infrastructure. As long as Iran remains under its present revolutionary leadership, it cannot be safely permitted to retain or rebuild strategic capabilities: nuclear weapons; ballistic missiles; advanced drones and their production facilities; naval forces capable of threatening international shipping; proxy armies; and bodies used to commit terrorism and assassinations abroad.

In the face of these threats, the objective cannot be deterrence. It must be to deny capabilities.

“They’re sick people,” Trump said of the leaders in Tehran. To put it more precisely: They do not think as we do.

Whether in Tehran, Gaza, Lebanon or Yemen, the enemy must be confronted according to the way it actually thinks, not the way others would like it to think.

We must therefore not rely primarily on deterrence, but on the aforementioned denial of capabilities. If direct and sustained denial ultimately proves impossible, the only answer may be to create the conditions under which the Iranian people can transform the regime and build a better future for their nation.

Published in JNS, July 14, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

One of the loudest chants at the mass funeral for Iran’s slain supreme leader, Ali Khamenei – echoed by both the public and the leadership in Tehran – was “Death to the US.”

Even Mohammad Ghalibaf, the head of Iran’s negotiating team, vowed to avenge the leader’s death, as did state media and the government’s main intelligence office. Most notable were the calls to assassinate US President Donald Trump, accompanied by offers of a huge reward for whoever succeeds in this mission.

These calls contradict the way Trump depicts his current relations with the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Several weeks ago, he claimed that it includes “good people,” who are not as radical as their former colleagues, and that “we get along with them.” He repeated this claim several times, as if trying to convince not only us but also himself.

Trump isn’t naïve. Like every good salesman, he is trying to sell his deal and portray it as the best thing he could have achieved, despite the obstacles and challenges. He probably knows that Iran and its leaders have not suddenly become enlightened or turned into peace-loving fans of the US.

Quite the opposite. They are bloodthirsty and will wait for the opportune moment to seek revenge. Moreover, Trump probably also knows about the growing calls within the Iranian regime to preserve components of the “nuclear option” in order to deter any future attacks on the Islamic Republic.

Tehran’s message vs Washington’s view

One of Tehran’s main news outlets, Fars – which usually serves as a mouthpiece for the IRGC – published a lengthy article only a few days ago calling for the preservation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a guarantee against any attempt to topple the regime.

The American president, for his own reasons, is sticking to diplomacy again despite all the Iranian defiance. The White House is willing to pay what might seem like a reasonable price to calm global energy markets and to buy more time ahead of the midterm elections, while also getting through major events such as the 250th anniversary of the United States and the World Cup with relative ease.

Current polling in the United States, however, suggests that the deal with Iran doesn’t improve the Republican position. The governing party usually suffers setbacks in the midterms, and there’s no reason to believe it will be different this time.

This will only sharpen Trump’s dilemma before the deal’s 60-day deadline and will force the president to choose between increasingly narrow options that might not be to his liking. If the deadlock in the negotiations continues, his patience might end even sooner.

Given that the best Trump can hope for now with the Iranians is an Obama-style deal, he might realize soon that his legacy is on the line. He may not get what he wants from Tehran, and he may also be seen as the president who dared to fight Iran but couldn’t finish the job. In this case, he could face even fewer options than he had hoped for.

Either way, we must not fool ourselves. The Iranian leadership has not changed its goals or ideology, and the chants to kill Americans and Israelis are still what the public hears from its government. Once we realize this and know who we are dealing with, we may assess the situation in a more sober and rational manner.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, on July 8, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran is attempting to impose a new deterrence equation on Israel – one designed to restrict Israel’s freedom of action and restore Tehran’s regional standing. According to this equation, any significant Israeli action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut’s Dahiyeh district, would trigger a direct Iranian response against Israel. Simultaneously, Tehran seeks to broaden the equation by linking Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon to the risk of escalation.

These messages were conveyed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to foreign ambassadors in Tehran and reiterated by the statement of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarter. Their coordinated messaging reflects a unified effort to establish new red lines in Lebanon and deter Israeli operations. Iran seeks to position itself as the ultimate arbiter of the scope of Israeli military activity in Lebanon.

A recent map published by the IDF on June 18 regarding troop deployments within a 10 km zone in southern Lebanon, and the recent fatalities of the IDF soldiers, including a battalion commander, highlighted the ongoing friction between the IDF and Hezbollah. In Tehran’s view, any Israeli action in Lebanon that constrains Hezbollah’s freedom of movement provides a potential pretext for intervention.

From Tehran’s perspective, successfully imposing such an equation is vital for restoring deterrence. Since October 7, Iran and its proxies have suffered a series of setbacks. Hezbollah has lost senior commanders, military infrastructure, and weapons stockpiles, and its freedom of action has been increasingly constrained; its dire situation is reflected in Iran rushing to its defense against Israel. The Houthis have been hit, albeit to a limited extent. Hamas has suffered severe damage; and Iran’s status as the leader of the “Axis of Resistance” has been weakened. Against this backdrop, Tehran seeks to demonstrate that it can still dictate the rules of the game and impose limits on Israeli behavior.

History, however, suggests that accommodating Iranian threats does not moderate Tehran’s conduct; it encourages further demands. For years, the Islamic Republic has operated on the assumption that determined pressure can force adversaries to retreat. When confronted with concessions, it tends to interpret them as signs of weakness, increasing rather than reducing its demands.

The dispute is not merely about southern Lebanon or Dahiyeh. It is a contest over who sets the rules of engagement. If Israel accepts the principle that Iran may determine which targets it can strike and under what conditions, it will concede an additional layer of influence over its security policy. The issue extends far beyond Lebanon: Various senior Iranian officials have declared that their long-term strategic goal is the destruction of Israel via a multi-front invasion attack. To accomplish this, Iran knows it must establish precedents that can be leveraged in future fronts as well.

The re-establishment of Hezbollah along Israel’s northern border and the reconstitution of the Axis of Resistance should not be understood as an endpoint, but rather as a mechanism through which Iran seeks to restore its regional leverage. Such a trajectory would position Tehran and its proxies on a more favorable launching pad from which to resume their campaign against Israel once they assess that regional and military conditions have sufficiently matured.

Israel is therefore contending not merely with a local adversary but with a broader Iranian effort to reshape the regional balance of deterrence. Tehran’s strategic objective is to transform every significant Israeli military action into a decision that imposes direct costs from Iran, thereby progressively constraining Israel’s operational flexibility. Should this approach succeed, it would represent a substantial Iranian strategic gain even absent a direct military confrontation.

Accordingly, sustained military pressure on Hezbollah must be complemented by diplomatic engagement with the Trump administration to clarify that acquiescence to Iranian consolidation runs counter to American interests. Permitting Iran to reconstitute its deterrent architecture would strengthen the regime and advance its long-term objective of undermining Israeli security. Similarly, proposals to delegate management of Hezbollah to the Assad regime in Damascus carry significant risks, as they would effectively substitute the current Iranian-backed threat with a Sunni jihadist challenge underwritten by a major regional power—Turkey.

For these reasons, resisting Iranian efforts to impose new deterrence equations is a strategic imperative. This does not require uncontrolled escalation, but it does require rejecting attempts to constrain Israel’s freedom of action through threats. In the Middle East, and especially in Tehran, restraint driven by fear of escalation is often interpreted not as responsibility, but weakness.

Experience suggests that Iran’s ambitions are more likely to be curbed by resolve than by accommodation. The clearer Israel’s determination to defend its interests, the more difficult it becomes for Tehran to expand its influence and dictate the terms of confrontation. Conversely, hesitation risks encouraging further Iranian efforts to redefine the rules of engagement in its favor.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  21, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The dominant narrative about the US-Iran deal – in Israel, across the Middle East, and the Western press – is straightforward: Iran won, Israel lost, and the United States blinked. That narrative contains a grain of truth but it is also, in important ways, wrong. And at a moment when the real negotiations have not yet even begun, getting the analysis right matters enormously.

Let us start with what is often overlooked. Iran signed a document that includes terms it had previously refused outright. The Strait of Hormuz opens unconditionally – no tolls, no leverage. Tehran has agreed in principle to suspend uranium enrichment on its soil for an extended period, to forgo the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons, and to accept a rigorous inspection regime. These are not the terms of a victor. These are the concessions of a state that had been battered into accepting conditions it once called existential red lines.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been severely degraded. The Natanz enrichment facility was damaged by roughly 75 per cent. The hardened underground facility at Fordow, long considered the crown jewel of Iranian deterrence, took approximately 30 per cent damage. Iran currently has no operational enrichment capability. Its air defence systems have been destroyed, its navy has been eliminated, around 85 per cent of its defence industry has been demolished and its ballistic missile arsenal has been substantially reduced. The economic cost is staggering: IMF projections suggest a contraction of 7.2 percentage points, on top of an already fragile baseline, with reconstruction costs estimated between $400 billion and one trillion dollars.

Senior Iranian economists have warned their president that recovery will take a decade or more.

The claim that Israel failed strategically because it did not destroy Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is analytically flawed. That material remains buried under rubble, monitored continuously by American and Israeli satellites and intelligence. Any Iranian attempt to excavate it would trigger an immediate response. If the negotiations succeed on US terms – which President Trump has insisted must include zero Iranian military nuclear capability, whether independently produced or purchased – the enriched uranium will be removed from Iranian territory or diluted under strict supervision.

Similarly, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” has not survived intact as a deterrent instrument. Hamas has been devastated and no longer poses a meaningful conventional threat to Israel. Hezbollah’s long-range rocket arsenal has been reduced to approximately 8 per cent of what it held on October 7, 2023. Its command and control networks are shattered and its domestic political standing inside Lebanon has collapsed, with criticism now coming from even within the Shia community. The Houthis retain some ballistic capacity and control the Bab el-Mandeb strait, but they too have been significantly degraded. Iran built this ring of fire over two decades to deter Israeli strikes and provide strategic depth. It no longer performs either function.

One figure cuts against the doom narrative with particular clarity. During more than two years of intensive warfare, the Israeli shekel appreciated by 19 per cent against the dollar – breaking a 30-year record. Israel’s economic growth is running at 3.3 to 3.9 per cent. This does not diminish the human cost of the war, nor excuse strategic misjudgements that have real consequences but it is an important marker.

None of this justifies triumphalism, and it would be dishonest to present it as such. The incomplete neutralisation of Fordow is a genuine failure. Iran also retains the technological knowledge base for a nuclear programme while the precise location of some fissile material remains unknown – a serious and unresolved risk. The 60-day negotiating window that now opens is genuinely dangerous: Iran’s incentives to stall, to extract concessions, and to exploit US impatience are real. President Trump’s willingness to publicly humiliate Israel’s prime minister, to present him as a vassal rather than an ally, has done real damage to Israel’s international standing and its relationship with American Jewry and bipartisan Congressional support.

The Iran-Lebanon linkage that Tehran is trying to institutionalise through the ceasefire deal represents a direct threat to Israeli freedom of action. Iran wants any final agreement to obligate an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and to curtail Israel’s right to respond to Hezbollah violations. Israel is refusing, and rightly so. But sustaining that refusal while maintaining the relationship with Washington will require considerable diplomatic dexterity.

There is one dimension that Western commentary has largely ignored: what the deal means inside Iran. The Islamic Republic is signing an agreement that significant parts of its own ideological base regard as capitulation. That generates a political dynamic that could destabilise the regime more than any external pressure. A large segment of the Iranian public – people who have watched their savings evaporate, their infrastructure collapse, their relatives killed – sees the agreement not as a triumph but as evidence of the regime’s failure. If the negotiations drag on without delivering economic recovery, that disillusionment will deepen. The Supreme Leader, whose religious authority is widely considered weaker than his predecessor’s, has not appeared in public in weeks. The regime is not a unified actor.

History does not offer precise timelines for when mismanagement, popular discontent, and elite fracture converge into systemic collapse. But the conditions for such a trajectory are more present in Iran today than at any point since 1979.

The 60 days ahead are not merely a waiting period. They are an opportunity that Israeli strategy must actively exploit. Israel needs to be present in the negotiating room – not physically, but substantively. That means working through Washington to ensure that the final agreement includes the complete dismantlement of Fordow, the removal of all enriched uranium (not merely material enriched to 60 per cent), verifiable constraints on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, and a credible automatic sanctions snap-back mechanism. The weaknesses of the Obama Iran deal must not be repeated.

Israel must also formalise its understanding with Washington regarding what happens if the negotiations fail or if Iran violates its commitments. Joint planning for that contingency is not a provocation – it is the minimum prudence demands.

In parallel, Israel should accelerate its diplomatic engagement with Lebanon’s government, which has publicly distanced itself from Hezbollah and expressed willingness to negotiate a security arrangement. The ongoing talks represent a genuine strategic opportunity to institutionalise Israeli security requirements in the north and to isolate Hezbollah politically from the Lebanese state.

And Israel should deepen its strategic relationships with India, the UAE, and other partners in the emerging regional architecture – relationships that the current moment, paradoxically, may have strengthened.

The MOU is not a defeat for Israel, and it is not a victory for Iran – at least not the decisive strategic victory that Tehran’s propaganda machine is claiming. It is the result of a war in which both sides absorbed severe damage, in which the US chose accommodation over military maximalism and decisiveness, and in which the final accounting has not yet been made.

Iran enters the negotiating period weakened and wounded, economically devastated, and politically fragile. Israel enters it having achieved significant military objectives – though not all – with its core deterrence intact and, with unprecedented security cooperation with the US and Arab partners and much stronger than it was in 2023.

The appropriate response to this moment is neither complacency nor panic – it is clarity: about what was achieved, what remains undone, and what the next 60 days demand. The negotiations that are about to begin will shape the region for a generation. Israel’s influence over their outcome depends entirely on its willingness to engage seriously, strategically, and with a clear-eyed assessment of the balance of power as it actually stands – not as the competing narratives would have it.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, June  19, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

“Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation,” US President Donald Trump tweeted in January 2020, after the elimination of Qassem Soleimani. It was not the first time he had used that wording to urge Iran to prefer the negotiating track. The memorandum of understanding with it will likely serve as convincing proof of that.

The full details of the understandings reached by the sides have yet to become clear, but what has already been published is enough to substantiate the concerns in Jerusalem.

A preliminary hint of what lies ahead was provided last week by US Vice President JD Vance, who made clear that “the interests of the US in an agreement with Iran may be different from those of Israel.” He added, “Israel will like it or not like it, but this is the interest of the US.”

Survival, hope and rebuilding 

It should be said at once: Any deal with Iran is worse than the alternatives, because it establishes the legitimacy of the extremist regime and gives it the most important thing it needs: survival, hope and resources for rehabilitation.

According to reports, the memorandum of understanding offers the Iranians far more than that. It heralds the beginning of the end of the severe economic distress that sent masses of citizens into the streets in protest and fueled the internal threat to the regime’s survival. Opening the Strait of Hormuz to Iranian oil exports will allow Tehran to earn millions of dollars every day. Added to that are the billions expected to flow to Iran once the memorandum of understanding enters into force and during its implementation.

Including the Lebanese front in the framework of the deal is a gift to Iran. Not only will it ensure a space of immunity for Hezbollah, the most important proxy organization from Iran’s perspective, but it will also gain recognition of its status as a player in the Lebanese front. If the expectation was to dismantle Iran’s hold over the proxy organizations, this agreement actually tightens it. This is happening as the administration of Gen. Joseph Aoun is singing a different tune and desperately needs to remove the suffocating patronage of the ayatollahs’ regime.

And not only that. As far as is known, the deal makes no reference to the issue of ballistic missiles. Iran’s progress in this field created a strategic threat not only to its neighbors and the countries of the Middle East, but also to Europe.

The sequence set out in the memorandum of understanding means the US is paying Iran in cash and receiving in return a postdated check whose details are unclear and whose coverage is doubtful. According to the reports, the nuclear issues will be discussed only at a later stage, when the regime in Tehran is no longer in its current distress and when the effectiveness of the US levers of pressure, military and economic, will be lower, if they exist at all.

If today, four months before the midterm elections, Trump is avoiding a resumption of the fighting, it can be assumed that after 60 days, when the elections are even closer, he will hesitate sevenfold. They know this in Tehran as well, and therefore they will not rush to reach understandings on the nuclear issues, which are complicated in any case.

Trump entered the memorandum of understanding while being seen by the entire world as someone eager to reach an agreement, at almost any price. This is being seen both by America’s adversaries and by the leaders of the countries in the Middle East. Reports of certain countries in the region moving closer to Iran are evidence that their leaders understand that the US does not intend to finish the job, and that it is worth preparing with an alternative safety net.

There is no doubt that Washington’s conduct surrounding the agreement will project weakness and affect the US’ standing in the Middle East, and not only there.

To all this must be added the sense of betrayal among the regime’s opponents in Iran, who risked their lives, paid heavy prices and are still waiting for the same “green light” that they say was promised to them as part of the efforts to topple the regime. One can only imagine what this does to the Trump administration’s credibility.

The achievements of the current war against Iran should not be dismissed in any way. They are many and significant. It is precisely against this background that the frustration grows, because of the assumption that these achievements make it possible to achieve better results against Tehran.

As for Israel, the world and the countries of the region received a demonstration not only of its capabilities, but also of its daring, determination and unified mobilization in the sustained effort to remove an existential threat.

Israel does not need to issue declarations. Its enemies know very well that these characteristics will continue to exist even in a reality of an arrangement.

Israel is not a party to the deal. It must adhere to its traditional position, according to which it will do what is necessary to defend its security. This applies to all fronts, and certainly to the Lebanese one. It does not need to poke Trump in the eye, argue with him or defy him.

As Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir put it, our actions will speak.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  15, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s latest Hajj declaration reaffirms the “2040 doctrine” and illustrates that generational change in Tehran will not bring moderation. In the face of the US push for a delaying agreement that will funnel billions to Tehran, Israel must shift its paradigm and seek the active collapse of the Iranian octopus’ head.

While the Trump administration seeks to formulate a deal with the Iranian regime, its leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is openly declaring his intention to advance and cultivate the vision of Israel’s destruction.

In a message he published last Tuesday for the Hajj, Mojtaba validated his father’s 2015 declaration that Israel, the “cancerous tumor,” would not survive until 2040.

Mojtaba’s statement therefore serves as evidence of his commitment to the contract of annihilation decreed against Israel by the founder of the Islamic regime, Ruhollah Khomeini, in his famous speech of Aug. 15, 1979.

Accordingly, Palestine Square in Tehran was adorned with a banner showing an hourglass counting down to Israel’s end, stating that 5,218 days remain until its demise and that it will not survive the next 15 years.

Granted, “The Voice of Iran,” an online publication issued by the office of Iran’s leader, stated in an article published the next day that Israel would be destroyed on its own as a result of an accelerated process of internal collapse. However, Iran’s pattern of action shows that Tehran is pursuing the active destruction of Israel.

Operational plan went awry

In September 2015, as will be recalled, then-Iranian leader Ali Khamenei for the first time put an expiry date on Israel, declaring that it would be destroyed by 2040. Despite statements in Iran that Israel would be destroyed on its own as a result of a socioeconomic process and an internal political-security crisis, a rare remark by a senior Iranian official exposed Iranian preparations for Israel’s destruction.

It was at a conference in Tehran in February 2018, which dealt with the destruction of Israel, that Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, later foreign minister in President Ebrahim Raisi’s government, declared that Iran had a plan for how to implement Khamenei’s statement, but that he could not detail it in the media. In 2019, statements by then-Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Hossein Salami and the head of the IRGC Operations Division, Abbas Nilforoushan, revealed the progress of the Iranian plan to destroy Israel.

Salami explained that eliminating Israel had turned from a vision into an attainable goal. Nilforoushan declared that Iran had succeeded in encircling Israel from all sides and, hinting at the convergence of arenas, added that any Israeli aggression against one component of the axis of resistance would ignite a regional war against it.

As can be learned from documents captured by the IDF during Operation Swords of Iron in Gaza, the Quds Force drew on Khamenei’s vision of Israel’s destruction as the justification for allocating increased financial and military aid to Hamas’ military wing. This was done with the knowledge that the assistance would be directed toward carrying out especially large offensive initiatives against Israel.

At the same time, Hamas initiated increased coordination with Hezbollah and the Quds Force to advance a crushing multi-front attack aimed at eliminating Israel. But Sinwar was in a hurry. He launched the massacre without waiting for final coordination with Hezbollah and Iran, assuming that they would join him once they saw the attack begin.

A warning sign for Israel

Even after the Oct. 7 attack, senior officials in Iran’s security establishment called for advancing a multi-front attack, based on the lessons of Oct. 7, in order to eliminate Israel. Many of them were eliminated in Operations Rising and Roaring Lion.

In early May, Mehdi Mohammadi, a senior security analyst who also serves as an adviser to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Majlis and a member of the Supreme National Security Council, repeated his call from November 2025 and urged the regime to advance a “large collective operation against Israel” by the axis of resistance under Iran’s leadership, aimed at destroying Israel.

Mohammadi explained that the war had weakened Israel and that Iran had succeeded in pushing it into a corner. Against the backdrop of these remarks, which are still being heard in regime and media discourse about advancing the vision of Israel’s destruction through a multi-front axis attack, Mojtaba’s words appear to serve as a compass and a signal of direction.

Mojtaba’s Hajj message was translated into Arabic and also distributed to the broader public in the region. It therefore appears that he seeks to present himself as driven by religious fervor and highly motivated to double the regime’s efforts to export the revolution, thanks to the gains Iran accumulated in the war and despite the difficulties it suffered during it.

From his perspective, it seems, Iran is at the starting line for realizing the final victory over Israel that his father envisioned and promised for years. Therefore, the timeline Mojtaba set for Israel’s destruction, 2040, as a continuation of the vision of Israel’s destruction cultivated by his father, could give the Revolutionary Guards and the various players in the axis of resistance a timeframe for implementing an operational plan to achieve this goal.

Mojtaba also detailed his vision regarding the future of the US presence in the region. He expressed his commitment to the vision his father outlined for removing the US military presence from the region, and called on the countries of the region to cooperate with Iran’s efforts to lead a new regional order. Nevertheless, according to indications, Trump supports a deal that would focus on removing or postponing the nuclear threat posed by Iran, and does not intend to act to topple the regime or implement his promise to assist the Iranian opposition.

That contrasts with the Israeli approach, which supports toppling the regime, as reflected in the war objective, which was intended to weaken the regime and enable the Iranian people to overthrow it. The continuation of contacts between Tehran and Washington toward reaching an agreement despite Mojtaba’s declaration lends further validity to the difference between the Israeli and American strategies toward the Iranian regime.

The billions of dollars the Iranian regime would pocket as a result of any agreement reached would allow it, first, to ensure its continued existence and later to advance its vision of Israel’s destruction. Unlike the US, Israel cannot adopt a policy of delay in the face of the Iranian threat.

It was in mid-December 2022, at a ceremony in Gaza marking the 35th anniversary of Hamas’ founding, that Sinwar declared publicly, “We will come to you in a sweeping flood, and with countless rockets. We will come to you in a flood of soldiers without limit. We will come to you with millions from among the members of our nation, wave after wave.”

Israel cannot ignore the existential threat posed by the Iranian regime under Mojtaba. The expansion of the ground maneuver in Lebanon and the elimination of the heads of Hamas’ military wing, Izz al-Din Haddad and Mohammed Odeh, therefore also constitute important achievements in the broader picture vis-à-vis the Iranian plan to destroy Israel.

If Israel does not act to topple the Iranian regime through the Iranian people, it will resemble a boxer who, in a boxing match against his opponent, tries only to weaken him, while the opponent strikes him in order to knock him down.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  01, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The justification for the 40-days of war with Iran, in a large part, turns on the question of whether or not it will achieve a better result than the 2015 Iran deal, known as the JCPOA. If it does, Trump will have vindicated his decade-long position that he could make a better deal. If it doesn’t, he will have proven that Obama’s cautious and accommodating diplomacy was ultimately wiser and more realistic.

Many of the key details remain unclear but the answer to this question can be assessed by comparing the two situations as they currently stand.

The first critical question is what will become of Iran’s enriched uranium. The JCPOA saw Iran relinquish almost its entire stockpile of enriched uranium, essentially resetting the clock. This was the primary achievement of the 2015 deal. In the current deal, Trump is still insisting that Iran relinquish its entire stockpile of what is assessed to be the 440 kg of 60% enriched material. But what of the other 9 tons of 20% and 5% enriched uranium? This remains unclear.

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“Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation,” Donald Trump tweeted in January 2020, days after the elimination of Qassem Soleimani.

It was not the only time he expressed himself this way during the chapters of confrontation with the Islamic Republic. If the media reports accurately reflect the details of the deal now taking shape with Iran, it appears that history is repeating itself, and the Iranians, even after the severe blow they sustained, are managing to maneuver Washington into a framework that will save the regime.

Where are the problems?

Even before diving into the details, it is important to look at the broader picture: The deal will grant legitimacy to the extremist regime in Tehran and prove that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can survive even the immense pressure exerted by the global superpower. As a result, the regime will continue to cast its threatening shadow over the Middle East, while receiving renewed validation for its grip on the Strait of Hormuz as an effective pressure lever.

The resources that flow to the regime will enable it to rebuild its capabilities and, no less important, sell its citizens the very thing that drove them into the streets: hope for economic improvement. The deal will give the regime an insurance policy against a Western or Israeli military strike. But even without that, from the moment it is signed, the regime will no longer fear Washington. After all, which US president would want to become entangled in a confrontation with Iran when this is what the closing chord looks like in the campaign waged by the most confrontational president Tehran has ever known?

And now, the details

Nuclear program: Trump’s representatives sought a quick achievement in the form of reopening the Strait of Hormuz and calming the energy market. The price the Iranians demanded for this was postponing the nuclear issues to a later stage, when the pressure levers against them would already be less threatening and when the prestige of the US president would be held hostage in their hands. In such a situation, their approach in the nuclear talks will be minimum concessions for maximum returns. As they have done so far, they will delay their consent until the latest possible moment, and even then give it only after extracting additional concessions.

It can be assumed that in the time Trump has left until the end of his term, Iran will not provoke him and will not give him a pretext to attack it. It will use this period to regroup without deviating from the framework of the understandings, but in a way that will allow it to renew its nuclear efforts as soon as his term ends. The knowledge and production capabilities that remain in its possession under the deal will serve it in doing so. It can be assumed that the current campaign has strengthened Tehran’s drive to obtain nuclear weapons, after seeing that nothing else could prevent its enemies from striking it again.

The missile program: Judging by the media reports, the emerging deal completely ignores this threat. It does not impose effective restrictions, in terms of ranges or quantities, on the production of long-range ballistic missiles and UAV systems that directly threaten the Middle East and Europe.

It is true that the current campaign reduced Iran’s stockpiles and also damaged its production capabilities. However, in the current technological era, and especially against the backdrop of Iran’s ties with China, the pace of rehabilitation is faster than in the past. Israel and its neighbors, as well as Europe, could find themselves, before long, threatened by an advanced and sophisticated ballistic missile array.

The implications for the Lebanese front: If the reports are accurate that the deal to end the war is also supposed to include the Lebanese front, then it is expected to strengthen Iran’s influence there. If we add to this the funds Iran will be able to channel to Hezbollah, it amounts to a significant tailwind for the Lebanese Shiite organization and an upgrade in its regional status, after the difficult period it has gone through since November 2024.

Influence on Hamas, the Houthis and Islamic terrorist organizations: Ending the war with such an deal will provide encouragement and inspiration to all radical Islamist elements. The interpretation they will give this situation will be one thing: The global superpower leading the war against radical Islam is unable to impose its will on it.

And we have not yet spoken about the conclusions the countries of the region will draw regarding their relations with the Iranian regime, or about the effects of the sense of betrayal among Iranian citizens who are still waiting for the green light to go out and demonstrate against the regime.

The emerging deal does not erase the tremendous achievements made in the war with Iran. Certainly not Israel’s achievements. The sense of a missed opportunity is strengthened precisely because of this, given the assessment that the balance of power makes it possible to end the campaign with better results than those reflected in the deal.

Where do we go from here?

First, the picture regarding the talks has still not become clear. Even if it is close to what emerges from the media reports, this is still not the final word. The many issues that remain open provide Trump with countless footholds he can use to change the picture, should he wish to do so.

Either way, Israel must present its concerns in a substantive and non-defiant manner, while making clear that it reserves the right to defend its security against emerging threats on all front. Israel’s freedom of action must remain off limits in any agreement.

Published in Israel Hayom, on May 25, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The US Justice  Department’s announcement in recent days of a successful operation to arrest Mohammed Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi, a senior figure in Iran’s network of proxies, offers a chilling glimpse into the depth of Tehran’s octopus-like reach into the heart of both America and Europe.

Al-Saadi is not just another junior operative. He is a senior commander in Kata’ib Hezbollah, the spearhead of Iran’s proxy network in Iraq, who previously worked closely with Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, both of whom were eliminated by the US in 2020.

This time, however, it is not a counterterrorism operation limited to the Middle East, but the exposure of a transnational terror network that operated in Canada, the US and Europe. The indictment filed against him in a federal court in New York includes six counts of serious terrorism offenses and attributes to him direct involvement in nearly 20 attacks and attempted attacks in the West.

Al-Saadi, who was arrested in Turkey and extradited to the US, directed, according to FBI data, a sequence of 18 terrorist attacks across Europe over a period of just three months during the current year. The evidence reveals that in early April he was recorded instructing an undercover US agent to carry out a coordinated attack against a synagogue in New York and additional Jewish institutions in Los Angeles and Arizona.

The West hesitates in the face of the threat

The exposure of this network directly links al-Saadi to the activation of a new and secret Iranian proxy operating under the name Harakat Ashab al-Yamin. The organization was established by the Iranian regime as a subversive response to the military campaign launched by the US and Israel against the regime in Tehran.

The organization’s list of operations demonstrates its audacity: an attack against an American bank in Amsterdam in mid-March, the torching of a synagogue in Skopje in North Macedonia in mid-April, and a stabbing attack in London against two Jewish civilians in late April. This came alongside a series of explosions and arson attacks against Jewish targets in Belgium and the Netherlands.

This reality again proves the direct threat posed by the Iranian regime to national security in Europe. The European Union did cross a significant red line several months ago when it added the Revolutionary Guards to its list of terrorist organizations, but in the UK the picture is more complex.

In late March, the British Foreign Office reprimanded the Iranian ambassador over espionage targeting Jewish centers in the kingdom, but official London is still dragging its feet and refusing to apply a sweeping terrorist designation to the Revolutionary Guards. Against this backdrop, US members of Congress recently urged the British government to end its hesitation.

Europe’s division and weakness

The American pressure is bearing partial fruit: During a visit in late April by Prime Minister Keir Starmer to a London synagogue that had been attacked, he pledged to introduce a bill outlawing the organization in order to “ensure that the Jewish community feels safe.”

Al-Saadi’s arrest leaves no room for doubt: The Iranian regime represents a clear and immediate danger to the sovereignty of Western countries. This danger is worsening as Iran develops its ballistic missile program, whose operational range already covers large parts of the European continent.

The Iranian launch toward the British-American base at Diego Garcia in late March demonstrated a launch capability at a range of 3,800 kilometers. This is a direct threat that places major European cities, including London, Paris and Rome, within immediate striking range.

Yet precisely in the face of this growing threat, the West is exposing its weakness. While the US is acting to choke off Iranian aggression, key European countries are choosing a line of panicked appeasement. The peak of this trend was reflected in the refusal by France, Spain and Italy to allow US transport planes carrying critical weapons to Israel to pass through their airspace.

This policy only intensifies Iranian pressure. Those who refuse to assist their allies in wartime against Iranian aggression discover that Tehran’s terrorism does not stop in the Middle East, but is knocking at the gates of Europe and the US. The only way to ensure public safety is not to contain the proxies, but to eradicate the head of the snake in Tehran.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May  18, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.