Around 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) more or less, separate Israel from the sites of Iran’s nuclear program. These facilities are scattered across the distant enemy nation, fortified and protected. In recent weeks, reports have repeatedly surfaced that the nuclear program continues to progress: The International Atomic Energy Agency warned in late May that Iran possesses enough material to produce at least three nuclear warheads. On the other hand, senior Israeli officials assert that the IDF knows how to deal with this threat. The claim that Israel is capable of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has been heard for many years, including from the country’s prime ministers.

“A big clock is ticking over us,” said Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June 1981, during the cabinet meeting that approved the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Even today, a big clock is ticking over us. Military experts estimate that in recent years, the Israeli Air Force has been training for long-range missions, among other things, to prepare for traversing the vast distance; but from a technical and operational standpoint, it’s unclear whether an effective strike on the nuclear program is indeed a feasible mission. Destroying Iran’s nuclear program requires simultaneously hitting numerous fortified sites, an unparalleled complex challenge. Is there substance to Israel’s assertions? Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert estimated just four months ago that Israel cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear program because it lacks suitable bombs and aircraft with sufficient operational range.

The question of whether it is possible remains relevant, as the Iranians are also preparing for the US presidential election. In Tehran, they remember the tense relations with the Republican candidate Donald Trump during his presidency and understand that if he is elected, it may be more difficult for them to continue developing their nuclear program. Perhaps they will decide that now is the time to break out for the bomb. Experts estimate that the breakout time is a matter of just a few months or even weeks. If Tehran wants to present the next American president with a fait accompli, it may act now. Accordingly, if Israel wants to thwart the nuclear program, these very days could be the last opportunity.

Iran’s plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran’s vision of wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to war.

Much is hidden from view on this sensitive issue. Israel does not disclose its capabilities, so one can only assess the situation based on informed individuals, publicly available data, and analyses of the mission requirements. In a sense, one can also consult the Iranians: The IAEA chief reported in April, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on Israel, that fearing an Israeli response, Tehran had closed its nuclear facilities – an indication that from an Iranian perspective, Israel may be able to attack them, perhaps even successfully. One can always hope that Israel has a few cards up its sleeve that we don’t know about and that there are more surprises in store.

An Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, in any case, would not be the result of a spur-of-the-moment decision. It is reasonable to assume that all preparations for such a large-scale operation cannot be completed in a short time. Moreover, since such an attack could only be the opening salvo of a much larger war, Israel will likely want to improve its defenses ahead of the moment of truth. Perhaps precisely now, with the IDF already on high alert, is a good time for such an attack.

What might it look like? In general, one can assume that we will need to send dozens, perhaps hundreds, of aircraft into the air to successfully hit targets deep behind enemy lines. To do so, we must have accurate and up-to-date intelligence on all of Iran’s nuclear sites and the locations of equipment and materials; reach Iran undetected, without being shot down by other countries en route or having the attack exposed; deploy aircraft capable of making the entire distance or refueling them in the air and on the way back, and provide the pilots with a support and protection envelope; and also use bombs capable of causing damage deep underground. Such an operation would require coordination with several countries, including the United States, so that Israel does not receive a “Don’t” while the planes are in the air or a cold shoulder after the attack.

A senior officer who previously discussed the issue noted that preparations for such an operation require a high level of secrecy, and it’s unclear whether Israel’s security forces can indeed keep such a secret for an extended period.

The circle of those privy to the secret is relatively wide: the IDF and Mossad, members of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, cabinet members, and perhaps even the opposition leader. This was the case in the past with the attacks on the reactors in Iraq and Syria. The legitimacy challenge, both domestically and internationally, is also particularly significant: Most nations will not look favorably upon such an attack, and even some Israeli citizens may not support it. These days, everything is political; it’s hard to see how even this issue could escape being divided into “pro-Bibi” and “anti-Bibi” camps. Our strength lies in our unity, and our weakness in its absence. To prepare for such a major move, which could drag Israel into a protracted and difficult war, we must do much to increase our shared sense of destiny at home.

Bunkers inside the mountain

The targets Iran’s nuclear program, unlike Iraq’s reactor and Russia’s, is not located at a single facility. Iran has disclosed to the IAEA 21 sites related to the nuclear program, and there are also other sites where the agency has reported finding traces of highly enriched uranium. It is almost certain that there are additional sites that Iran does not declare. It is also possible that Iran has transferred some of the technology or materials to secret, fortified sites, which Israel needs to use its intelligence capabilities to uncover. Preserving some of the equipment and materials would allow Iran to restart the nuclear program at a relatively advanced stage, even if Israel achieves more success than anticipated.

The large number of sites raises the possibility that Israel may only be able to preemptively attack some of the most critical facilities, which form the core of Iran’s nuclear program and its nuclear strike capabilities. The best-known sites are Natanz and Fordow, and others that can be listed include the conversion facility in Isfahan, the heavy water reactor in Arak (ostensibly closed under the 2015 nuclear deal), and the testing site in Parchin.

Even if focusing solely on the most critical sites, attacking them is a formidable challenge. The facilities are located in fortified bunkers: Satellite imagery showed that in Natanz, an underground uranium storage facility was built at a depth of around 100 meters (320 feet) – a depth that even bunker-busting bombs may not be able to penetrate, it seems. Since the above-ground portion of the site was damaged in an explosion in 2021, Iran has accelerated the construction of the underground facility there. The enrichment center in Fordow was built from the outset into the side of a mountain to protect it from attack. At the Parchin research center too, concrete trenches and bunkers lead into the mountain’s side, where testing is conducted. This site, too, appears to be protected from a simple attack.

Getting there is also a complex matter. There are three main routes from Israel to Iran: through Turkey, through Jordan and then Iraq, or through Saudi Arabia. The last option would extend the route and fuel requirements. The first option does not seem feasible, given Turkey’s defense capabilities; the Turks would not cooperate with Israel on a security issue, even though Ankara, too, fears Iran’s ascendancy. A fourth possibility is to take off from Azerbaijan, which borders Iran. According to foreign reports, Baku cooperates with Israel in many areas, including intelligence and security, but the likelihood that it would allow a large-scale operation against its neighbor’s nuclear facilities from its territory is not high. It would not want to get embroiled in such an adventure, which would invite great Iranian wrath – and perhaps even the risk of war.

The aircraft not only need to reach the target but also return from it. In other words, they must exit Iran, even if not through the same route. Additionally, it is impossible to dispatch bombers alone on the mission. An escort envelope is required, including aircraft to attack Iran’s air defenses; fighter jets to accompany the bombers and protect them from airborne threats; jamming and electronic warfare aircraft; reconnaissance and signal intelligence, relay, and command aircraft; and of course, rescue forces in case of casualties. To attack just a few sites would require dozens to hundreds of aircraft, all operating at a distance of over a thousand kilometers from the State of Israel.

This entire operation must pass through or near the airspace of foreign countries or enemy states, and the entire force must return safely. The assessment is that the air force knows how to reach the target undetected, but it must still be vigilant.

Moreover, countries that are in direct contact with us (unlike Iraq, for example) would need to receive advance warning – even if brief – that Israel is using their airspace for an attack, to prevent severe diplomatic damage, and also to eliminate the possibility of our planes being shot down if detected. Even the US, Russia, and even Turkey have intelligence assets and radar stations across the Middle East, and they too could detect Israel and expose the attack prematurely.

Technical challenges: fuel, munitions, and defense

We have already mentioned the need for refueling. Except for taking off from Azerbaijan, any other flight path would require the Israeli Air Force aircraft to refuel in the air. The maximum weight limitation that a plane can carry would even force F-35s to refuel if they carry their full munitions load and take off with full fuel tanks, making the whole story much more complex. After considerable delays, Israel has acquired the KC-46 refueling tankers from the US, but they are only supposed to arrive in Israel next year. Israel has asked to expedite their delivery; it is unclear if this has indeed happened. In any case, the air force has older refueling tankers, and it can also use externally carried fuel tanks, but using them would make the already complex mission even more intricate and risky.

Upon reaching Iran, our pilots would encounter the air defense forces. Iran is not an air defense superpower, and according to foreign reports, Israel has managed to overcome its defenses in the past. Nevertheless, Iran does use the advanced Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which could make things difficult for the pilots and perhaps even down our planes. Iran is also seeking to acquire the more advanced S-400 systems from Russia, but for now it does not appear to have them, and their deployment would also require additional time.

The same applies to the Iranian air force. Currently, it has outdated aircraft such as the MiG-29 or F-14s purchased before the revolution, and it is unclear how successful it has been in maintaining their operational readiness given the international sanctions, the arms embargo, and the fact that this is aging technology suffering from a shortage of spare parts and technicians. A few weeks ago, Tehran announced that it had completed a deal to purchase advanced Sukhoi-35 jets from Russia: This would increase the airborne threat to our planes, but they would likely be able to overcome it, and in any case, it would take time to fully integrate the modern aircraft into operational service.

The most technically challenging component is the bombs. To strike sites like Fordow or Natanz, and especially the deep bunker that Iran has begun building there, Israel needs the most powerful bunker-busting bombs – and even those may not suffice. We are referring to the GBU-57 type bombs, which weigh over 13 tons and are capable of penetrating to a depth of up to 60 meters, according to the US military. Israel has other types of bunker-busting bombs, the GBU-72 and GBU-28, which are much lighter – around 2,000 to 2,500 kilograms (4,000 to 5511 lbs) – and have lower penetration capabilities. During the war, the US supplied some additional bombs, and Israel’s defense establishment has also developed its own bunker-busting bombs weighing hundreds of kilograms each, but it is unclear whether they would cause damage at great depth.

Another problem is that even if Israel had the heaviest bunker-busting bombs, it would be difficult to deliver them to the target. According to estimates, Israel may be able to modernize F-15s to carry GBU-57 bombs, along with additional fuel and munitions. This is a technically complex task, but sometimes even the impossible gets done. Other aircraft, in any case, would likely be unable to carry these large bombs, and the F-15s too would need aerial refueling to do so.

Even if we overcome all the obstacles mentioned here, it must be remembered that this is a high-risk mission for the lives of dozens or hundreds of pilots, and an unprecedented logistical challenge. The economic cost of such an operation would also be immense, although it would probably be just a fraction of the total cost of the war that could ensue.

In addition to an air strike, Israel is estimated to have other potential courses of action. According to foreign reports, Israel could use conventionally armed ballistic missiles like the Jericho 2, which can carry 750 kg (1650 lbs) warheads over a range of 2,500 km (1500 miles). These missiles are highly accurate. A Turkish researcher previously estimated that using several dozen such missiles could destroy or severely damage the above-ground facilities at Natanz, Arak, and Isfahan. The logistical and safety advantages are clear, but there are also downsides: The accuracy is not perfect, and it’s unclear whether the missiles can cause damage to the deeply buried sites.

Another possibility, according to a Financial Times report, is firing missiles from Israeli submarines or using drone swarms for the attack. It is unclear whether these vectors would achieve the objective, and it was previously noted that Israel may not have enough submarines for such an attack. Of course, an air strike, ballistic missile launches, submarine missile attacks, and drone swarms could be combined, but the bulk of the mission would fall on Israeli pilots’ shoulders. In any comprehensive attack of this nature, Israel would expose most of its strategic arsenal, depleting the element of surprise; on the other hand, if it is not used to neutralize the greatest threat facing us, what is its purpose?

Strategic Considerations: Failure risks, success, and inaction

Our military and political leadership is aware of all these considerations and is deeply familiar with the capabilities, advantages, and shortcomings. Even after the construction of the deep tunnels in Natanz was revealed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel would know how to deal with the threat. “We are confident and sure that we can deal with any threat on our own, and by other means as well,” he said exactly a year ago. Netanyahu has committed many times that Israel will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Since this seems to be of paramount importance to the prime minister, these statements should not be dismissed or taken lightly. Perhaps Israel will ultimately pull the rabbit out of the hat. But even if we succeed in the mission, before setting out we must add strategic dimensions to the tactical and operational considerations.

An Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would almost certainly mean a broad, regional all-out war. Hezbollah – Iran’s proxy – would undoubtedly attack with all its might in such a scenario, launching hundreds and thousands of missiles and rockets towards Israel daily, especially in areas adjacent to the Lebanese border, some 40 km away. And how would the world’s nations react? Would they defend Israel, or would it face even more severe international isolation? Would sanctions be imposed on it? Another possibility is that the “aggressive action” would grant legitimacy to Iran’s nuclear program, this time with approval rather than a wink.

The worst-case scenario is a failed attack. In such a case, Israel would not only expose its capabilities but also lose assets and lives while failing to achieve its objective. It would lose its deterrence, and could even provide the Iranians with justification to accelerate the program, saying that no one can stop them now. We would eat the rotten fish, get whipped, and be banished from the city.

Even a success would not necessarily achieve the ultimate goal of the attack. If Israel manages to destroy all facilities and fissile materials, the Iranian know-how would likely be preserved. The facilities would go up in flames, but the plans stored on numerous Iranian computers would remain intact, and many scientists (who have not been eliminated) could restart the program – with much more knowledge and experience. At most, Israel would delay the completion of Iran’s nuclear project by a few years; and next time, Iran would be more prepared and poised, building all capabilities with much higher security levels from the outset.

What is the point of such an attack?

One could consider the deterrent and psychological aspects. An attack would show that Israel is willing to go to the brink and do whatever it takes to prevent the threat. It is a statement of casus belli, a red line, an act that must not be committed. This is what Israel has declared for years would happen, and if at the moment of truth it does not act – it would be caught with its pants down. Its deterrence, already severely eroded these days, would be further damaged. It is even possible that the declarations were intended from the outset to entrap ourselves, leaving us no choice but to fulfill our statements, whatever may come.

On the other hand, one could argue that a successful strike on the nuclear sites would shift the international community’s attention to Iran’s actions, strengthen global recognition of Israel’s commitment to preventing an Iranian bomb, and of course bolster Israeli deterrence. The air force would demonstrate its capabilities and resolve, making absolutely clear what Israel’s red line is. In the Iranian attack on Israel on the night of April 13-14, Tehran spoke of a “new equation” it had created vis-a-vis Israel; a successful strike on the nuclear program would erase any other precedent and truly set a new equation regarding Iran and Israel’s tolerance for its actions.

There is also the matter of the alternative cost. If Israel does not attack, it is likely that within a few years it will face the existence of an Iranian bomb. This would ostensibly mean a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and perhaps the loss of Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Above all looms the existential threat to the State of Israel: A nuclear umbrella for the array of terrorist organizations that Iran supports in the region. It is important to remember that Iran’s plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran’s grand vision of war against Israel and the West, and an important part of that vision is wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces surrounding Israel, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. The more Israel waits and does not act, even out of fear of a regional war, the more it indirectly boosts the Iranians’ self-confidence, making them believe they are immune. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to the very regional war – at a time when Iran is getting ever closer to a rapid nuclear breakout.

It is clear that deciding to bomb is not easy. The implications are fateful, the demands enormous, the preparations extensive. It is no wonder that such an attack has not materialized so far. It poses a logistical, operational and diplomatic challenge of the highest order, and entails the risk of many lives. But if not now, when Israel’s leaders see this program as an existential threat to the State of Israel, then when?

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 16, 2024.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser: The Biden administration wants to avoid any confrontation with Iran. They are afraid that if they move into confrontation, confrontational Iran may actually move towards having a bomb. But maybe [Iran’s leaders] believe that Trump is going to become the next president. They might actually try to break out a bomb now. They have enough material to produce the fissile material that is necessary for three bombs within a month.

It was published on tps, June 6, 2024.

While the United States and Israel focus on threats from the Iranian-dominated Shia crescent stretching from Lebanon to Yemen, Tehran is quietly laying the groundwork for a second Iranian crescent that will soon pose a grave threat to U.S. interests. In Africa’s strategic Sahel region, Iran is taking advantage of Western weakness to deepen its economic and military influence, access critical materials, threaten moderate regimes, and undermine Israeli-Arab normalization.

The U.S., Israel, and their allies must take bold steps to counter this growing threat before it is too late.

The Sahel region has suffered widespread instability since 2020. Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Gabon, Chad and Sudan have all seen coups or the rise of military governments, driven by economic difficulties, governmental mismanagement, frustration over continued Islamist terror, and in some cases, growing hostility towards the West. The U.S. has distanced itself from these new governments, creating a void which Iran, Russia and China have been eager to fill.

In Sudan, for example, Iran is seeking to take advantage of the ongoing civil war in order to expand its military presence. Sudan, under the leadership of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, current chair of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, joined the Abraham Accords with Israel in October 2020, in return for U.S. promises of support. However, after al-Burhan dissolved Sudan’s governing council in 2021, the U.S. backtracked on its promises and pressured Israel not to upgrade its relations with Khartoum. This lack of Western support contributed to the eruption of the devastating Sudanese civil war in 2023.

Al-Burhan continues to desire to move Sudan closer to the West and has no illusions about the Iranian regime. However, in the absence of Western support, he has been left with little choice but to turn to Tehran for the security assistance and aid necessary to defeat the rebels. Iran was willing to quickly provide Sudan with military support, while asking to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Such a base, together with those of Iran’s Houthi proxy in Yemen, would give Iran far-reaching control over one of the world’s most vital waterways. To date, Sudan has resisted the Iranian request, but it is not clear how long Khartoum will be able to withstand Iranian pressure.

Iran is also seeking to expand its influence in Niger, home to 5 percent of the world’s uranium output, a vital resource which can serve Iran’s illicit nuclear program. There are indications that Iran has already taken steps towards acquiring Nigerian uranium. Similar efforts by Iran to deepen its ties are taking place in Mali, Burkina Faso, and other countries of the Sahel.

In addition, Iran has set its sights on Chad, which reestablished ties with Israel in 2019 but has since become disappointed by the lack of Western assistance, as well as on Mauritania, a vital gateway to Africa for Iran’s bitter rival, Morocco.

A crescent of Iranian influence in the Sahel would allow Tehran to destabilize Egypt and threaten Israel and Saudi Arabia in a pincer movement from the north and south. Just as Iran and its proxies have sown terror and destruction across the Shia crescent stretching through Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, a second Iranian crescent would enable Tehran to further spread instability and violence.

Of course, Iran is not the only threat to Western interests in the Sahel. Russia has been quickly filling voids created by the exit of Western troops, sending former Wagner fighters and other military personnel to assist the new governments. China, too, continues to offer ready economic assistance to the region’s leaders, who are desperately seeking solutions to their countries’ socioeconomic woes.

The U.S. and its allies now face a choice. They can continue to distance themselves from the governments of the Sahel, while reducing or cutting off economic and military support. The result will be greatly increased Iranian, Russian, and Chinese influence in the region. The ayatollahs in Tehran will expand their efforts to create a new Iranian crescent, which will pose a grave threat to U.S. allies such as Israel, Egypt and Morocco, while giving Iran access to critical resources and undermining the Abraham Accords.

Instead, the U.S. and its allies, including Israel, should find ways to work with the region’s governments and deliver on previous commitments, while continuing to urge these countries to improve their records on democracy and human rights. Such a strategic approach would help counter the expansion of Iran’s nefarious influence in the Sahel, and prevent disastrous consequences for Africa, the Middle East, and regional peace.

Published in Newsweek, May 28, 2024.

The presumed Israeli attack on Iran was a message that was delivered very precisely, in the exact strength that was necessary. It clarified to the Iranians that whereas we are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out but seems that it was in a creative manner. It is good that a question mark hovers over the question of what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The way it was executed was very professional. It has kept everybody satisfied. Nobody wants to see an escalation, so the strike was conducted in a way that doesn’t have to lead to escalation. That is not something our partners should be worried about, neither the Americans, Europeans or the Arab states.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and airforce was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel.

I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment. The main mission on our agenda is to finish the war in Gaza. We have hostages to release. We have Hamas to destroy. We must focus on that.

At the same time, however, the strike indicates that our option are open to take further action at the time of our choosing.

Published in The jewish Chronicle, April 19, 2024.

As Passover 2024 approaches, Israel confronts a daunting array of security and political challenges that will shape its standing and threat landscape for years to come. Overcoming these trials will be an immense test due to several compounding factors – the sheer number of threats, their geographic spread, the intricate connections between them, the grave consequences of missteps, and the lack of consensus on prioritization amidst urgent timelines.

Adding complexity, for the first time Israel must navigate this perilous environment while grappling with the plight of 133 captives held in Gaza and thousands displaced from the north. Withstanding this pivotal moment requires societal resilience mirroring the national unity after the October 7 attacks, coupled with robust military capabilities and deft statecraft.

The sweeping objectives Israel must secure across multiple fronts underscore the magnitude of the challenge:

Iran

Iran’s nuclear ambitions, long the paramount security imperative, take on heightened urgency after its brazen strike against Israel. Neutralizing Iran’s missiles, proliferation networks, and proxy forces is equally vital. With the nightmarish scenario of an atomic Iran inching toward reality, Israel aims to capitalize on this window to spur decisive American leadership against the Iranian regime’s nefarious pursuits, while preparing contingencies should that falter.

Syria

Syria: Israel must continue its operations to thwart Iran’s entrenchment in this arena, and not allow any change to the rules of the game that it has dictated until now.

Lebanon and Hezbollah

It is proper to set a target date for the return of residents of the northern communities to their homes, while physically distancing Hezbollah’s Radwan forces outside of the threat range, and until then – to continue the active defense strategy, strike at commanders and capabilities, and maintain freedom of operation in this arena.

The Gaza Strip

Israel needs to achieve the three ultimate objectives it defined for the war, which have not yet been accomplished: the release of the captives, the toppling of Hamas’ governance, and the dismantling of its military capabilities. A significant increase in pressure will serve all three. Beyond action in Rafah, which should also include the border crossing area and the Philadelphi Route, Israel must crush the committees and mechanisms that Hamas utilizes within the territory, and systematically eliminate Hamas’ leaders abroad.

Regarding the “day after” issue – as long as Hamas remains the central power in the Strip, any attempt to establish an alternative in its place, without its consent, is bound to fail. This reality will only change if Hamas is defeated, which is what should be focused on at this stage.

The West Bank and Palestinian Authority

Israel’s first objective is to prevent attacks and demolish terrorist networks, of any kind and from any element. It is proper to maintain the offensive approach displayed by the security establishment in this arena since October 7 and improve readiness for scenarios that could develop inspired by Hamas’ attacks. In a long-term view, the lessons of the reality that developed in Gaza should inform us as we counter any pressure or temptation to upgrade the Palestinian Authority’s status or limit Israel’s freedom of operation in this arena.

Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom understood the potential Iranian threat against it even before the attack from Tehran. The possible threat from the “Axis of Resistance” on the border between Israel and Jordan requires both sides to adopt an appropriate response while capitalizing on the advantages of security coordination.

The regional arena 

The success of the coalition of states in halting the Iranian attack presents an opportunity to consolidate and expand the partnership. The fact that the peace agreements continue to stand firm despite the war fosters optimism regarding the ability to broaden and deepen cooperation.

Saudi Arabia

Establishing relations with the kingdom will continue to be an important goal for Israel, but it is doubtful whether this can be achieved in the time remaining until the US elections. It is proper to continue down this path but not at the expense of pursuing the defeat of Hamas.

Sudan

Its rapprochement with Iran should worry Israel – especially given its past when it served as a transit point for arms smuggling to the Gaza Strip at the behest of Iran. Israel and the US can also curb this trend now.

Above all else, topping the list of Israel’s foreign policy objectives is cementing and strengthening relations with the US. President Joe Biden has again proved his commitment to Israel’s security, despite the disagreements and tensions. Beyond the appreciation he deserves for this, it is proper to confine the disputes to substantive issues and lower their public profile.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 20, 2024.

Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Iran’s unprecedented missile and drone attack against Israel last night is the pinnacle of a decades-long Iranian campaign that has been ongoing since the Islamic regime took power during the 1979 revolution. Over the years, Iran has gradually built a sophisticated proxy system and, with the exception of very few instances, has preferred to fight Israel via its proxies. Hiding behind them is part of Tehran’s calculated strategy, which strives to distance Iran from war or any punishment for acts of terror, despite the Islamic Republic’s key role in training, funding, directing, and, at times, actively dispatching its proxies.

Now, feeling obligated to restore its eroded deterrence vis-à-vis Israel following the targeted killings attributed to the latter in Damascus in early April, Iran has chosen to take a public stand and attack Israel directly using its advanced drones and missiles. This is not a comprehensive strategic shift on Iran’s part. As soon as the strike ended, and before its scope had even been confirmed, Tehran clearly signaled, via its UN embassy, that it wished to end this historical event and return to normal.

Israel cannot go back to October 6. It must not allow Iran to surround it with a tightening ring of fire while making intolerable threats of a potentially nuclear nature.

However, Israel does not operate in a vacuum either and is required to coordinate its actions with the Biden administration, both by virtue of the strategic alliance forged between the two countries and in view of the implications of an Israeli assault against Iran on local US forces and interests. Tehran seems to regard the United States as the weaker player in this arena, and therefore, since the Israel-Hamas War broke out, has instructed its proxies to carry out dozens of attacks against US interests in Iraq and Syria, in an effort to make President Biden pressure Israel to stop the war. The partial US response to the lethal drone strike in early January by Iran’s Iraqi proxy, Kataib Hizballah, killing 3 US troops, appears to have only partially and temporarily deterred Tehran. The United States had, once again, chosen to retaliate against the Iraqi proxy, instead of its Iranian master.

Thus, although Quds Force Commander, Ismail Qaani, has reportedly instructed Iraqi Shiite militia groups to desist attacks against US interests, and has probably attempted to convince the Houthis in Yemen to do the same, the Iraqi militias have renewed (albeit not significantly) their assaults against US forces in Syria, while the Houthis continue to attack US sea vessels. Tehran itself, during its strike against Israel last night, threatened to attack any US forces that would help Israel in its retaliation against Iran. It is therefore clear that Iran views the United States as the weakest link and more easily pressured player.

Israel must formulate a comprehensive strategy for a high-intensity campaign against Iran, that could include peaks during which Iran would attempt to take direct action against Israel. Otherwise, Tehran would probably prefer to go back to operating via its proxies, given that direct Iranian actions against Israel would help form a regional coalition against Tehran, composed primarily of Jordan and Egypt, and supported by the United States, United Kingdom, and France (as seen in action last night). Such a coalition could shift from defensive to offensive mode since Iran is threatening to take action against any country supportive of Israel’s defense efforts.

Israel appears to have certain latitude vis-à-vis Iran, despite US pressure. The Biden administration opposes broad conflict that would run the risk of regional war. At the same time, if Israel and the United States choose to restrain their response, Iran would interpret their inaction as permission to attack Israel, the United States’ ally, directly, as well as other US partners in the region (to which Iran poses a threat) without paying the price for doing so. Furthermore, war breaking out between Iran and Israel still seems a long way off, allowing Israel to take action against Iran without necessarily leading the region to war. For instance, Israel could utilize the unprecedented Iranian attack to strike Iran kinetically when it is most suitable and convenient, whereas Tehran, which suffers from an acute domestic legitimacy crisis and can still collectively recall the destruction and aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), would think twice before aggravating its conflict with Israel. The cyberattack weapons that Israel has developed over the years could also serve it to repay Iran by damaging its essential infrastructure in an arena where responsibility is not unequivocally assumed by anyone.

Israel’s updated security strategy should include various aspects, primary among which are: the desirable modus operandi vis-à-vis Iran; increased coordination with the United States on efforts to thwart the drone, missile, and terror infrastructure in Iran and the region; strengthening the IDF’s force buildup so that it would tally with the challenge posed by Iran; and closing the various gaps that enable Iran to carry out cyberattacks and influence campaigns in Israel.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Israel is simultaneously dealing with several fronts, but it is precisely those that appear to be quieter that are most worrisome, primarily the Jordanian arena. 

Since its foundation, the Kingdom comprised a high percentage of Palestinians, some of whom are citizens of the Jordanian state, while the rest have remained in “refugee” status for decades. 

To this, masses of Syrian refugees who fled from the massacre perpetrated by the Syrian president were added in recent years.

All this, while the Hashemite regime, that controls Jordan is not Palestinian and well understands the dangers inherent in the composition of the population to its survival and stability. 

It is doubtful if what was done against the coup attempt in “Black September” by the Jordanian regime in the 1970s will be feasible to emulate by the current regime, even at the cost of the Kingdom itself, both due to the weakness of the current rulers and to the fact that Queen Rania is Palestinian.

Despite the Jordanian understanding of the potential internal danger lurking at home, it sometimes appears that the regime acts almost against its own interests.

In fact, Jordan insists on continuing to adhere to an outdated syllabus, which encourages hatred and incites the Jordanian crowd against Israel and Jews. 

Anyone who understands anything about the Arab world knows that the blatant antisemitism, which unfortunately has become an integral part of the value system of every Jordanian, does indeed encourage the public to divert tensions and frustrations away from the economic situation and the ills of society and vent anger against the “Zionist enemy.”

 But violent demonstrations against Israel and Jews tend to turn into fierce opposition to the government itself.

This happened, more than once, in Egypt and in Jordan. Furthermore, Israel and the US are essential for the continued survival of the Jordanian regime, on the economic, military, and intelligence levels. 

Incitement against Israel and the US spurs the Jordanian public to attack the Jordanian regime, if and when it adopts a policy that reflects cooperation with one of them, even when this cooperation is necessary for the national security of the Kingdom.

AND THAT brings me to the second point – in preserving this incitement-ridden education system, the Jordanian regime obliges itself to adhere to a harsh anti-Israel rhetoric, which is often contrary to Jordan’s security interests. 

Thus, we have almost become accustomed to hearing, every year during the month of Ramadan, senior Jordanian officials compete with Hamas as to who is more radical in their hatred of the “Zionist entity,” in order to prove to their own public that they are, indeed, deserving of this public support.

According to Muslim tradition, the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, an asset that over the years has become one with the potential to enthuse the entire Muslim world. Therefore, the “ownership” or the “protection” thereof is desired by many groups in the Muslim world.

In recent years the Hamas movement – with Iranian encouragement – began to try and “seize ownership” of the Mosque, in order to create instability among the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of east Jerusalem, and Muslims throughout the world.

During Ramadan in recent years, the Hamas terrorist group has adopted inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, accusing it of trying to damage and/or occupy the Mosque, while the Jordanian regime intensified the tone against Israel, in a manner of competition for the same “ownership” over this holy site.

Parallel to the above, Iran began to advance – methodically and with endless patience, starting in 1979 – its policy of taking over the Arab region first, and the West. 

This, while sowing instability and chaos in every country that it could do that in and that is in order to gain a foothold and influence and to establish some kind of military presence there – at times in the form of Shia militias and at times via a local Arab proxy.

Thus, it leveraged Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, starting in 2006, to establish its position in the southern periphery of Israel. It also strengthened its hold in that region, via support of the Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups.

Furthermore, Tehran also operated over the years in Judea and Samaria by strengthening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Fatah rule, under the auspices of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), which advocates a secular ideology that is contrary to the religious view of Hamas and other Islamic movements.

In Lebanon, Iran strengthened Hamas above and beyond its unwavering support for Hezbollah as a voice in the region. All this, while undermining Lebanon on the economic and political levels to the core.

In Syria, Iran established an army of Shi’ite militias, and acted in the same manner in Iraq, which over the years and since the withdrawal of the United States, has become an Iranian stronghold on the borders of little Jordan.

BUT TEHRAN is yet unsatisfied and strives to create territorial continuity in the entire area up to the Jordanian border with Israel. Quietly and cunningly, Iran works to strengthen radical elements among the Palestinians in Jordan itself, and to strengthen the presence of Hamas in Jordanian territory.

The destabilization of the Kingdom is intended to further weaken the government in the country, and in due time cause masses of Palestinians to flock to the Jordanian-Israeli border, over 300 km. long – a situation that the IDF will have a hard time stopping.

Only in the last few weeks, the Kingdom seemingly “awakened” when King Abdullah II spoke out harshly against blatant attempts by the Hamas movement to “undermine the stability of the kingdom,” in his words.

When Israel recently hit a distinct Iranian target on Syrian soil, it actually targeted the Iranian Mullah regime’s world view, according to which a world-wide Sharia-based caliphate must control of the entire region and the West, by exploiting local extremist elements and without involving its own people and/or territory in the campaign.

All this, while Tehran continues almost uninterrupted, in equipping itself with unconventional weapons and nuclear capabilities for military purposes.

It is interesting to note that there were no overly harsh condemnations of the Israeli action from many Arab countries in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and more – since all of those countries, despite their difficult rhetoric against Israel, well understand the magnitude of the challenge that Iran poses to the entire world. 

Those who fail to understand this are in the West, whose democracies makes them more vulnerable to infiltration by hostile elements, such as Sunni Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand and Shi’ite Hezbollah cells and Iranian influence on the other.

MEANWHILE, IRAN does not stop at all from doing everything it possibly can, to destabilize Israel itself from within. 

Recognizing the existing political rifts in Israeli society, just as it recognized similar rifts in all the other countries which Iran had undermined and dismantled from within, Tehran is constantly at work to deepen the chasm inside Israel.

It does this by impersonating Israelis from different camps on social networks, pretending to take extreme positions on the Right and the Left. 

It does this through unceasing attempts to create Shi’ite cells also among Sunni Israeli Arabs in Arab cities in the country – although so far, with little success. It does this through incessant attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to elements of the Arab sector in Israel, belonging to the criminal network.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and quality of the hostile activity against Israel in each of the aforementioned arenas, one must understand the picture as a whole and stop burying one’s head in the sand. The West in general and Israel in particular – are at least for now at the forefront of the world struggle – do not have the privilege to ignore the scale of the issue. 

If Iran has already succeeded in disintegrating Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, significant parts of Yemen, and Sudan, is on its way to disintegrating Jordan and has literally “bought” the corrupt ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, by erasing the huge debt it had accumulated, then it will try with all its might, and may even succeed, to destabilize the State of Israel from within.

This is The Plan. All we have to do, is not cooperate with the plot and understand that unity is more than just a naive cliché, but a matter of national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2024.

Executive Summary

 Over the past two decades, Iran’s strategy of gaining influence through building proxy forces has transformed the political landscape of the Middle East in favor of Tehran’s overarching aim of regional hegemony. The current conflict with Israel is a direct result of this strategy, and has demonstrated the effectiveness of attacks coordinated between multiple Iranian proxies. After the initial Hamas attack, Hezbollah has begun a war of attrition with Israel in the north, the Houthis are threatening international shipping in the Red Sea and specifically targeting Israel, while over 100 attacks on US forces in Syria and Iraq have been launched by Iran-backed militias.

This research paper outlines the effect that Iran’s proxy strategy has had in each part of the region, from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon to Yemen, and how this strategy has brought the region to a crossroads embodied in the current war. It then outlines a number of policy avenues to be pursued in order to counter Iran’s strategy.

Iraq. Iraq is the first and most central focus of Iranian foreign activities, as it is the key gateway to broader influence to Iraq’s west and south. Iraq served as a proof-of-concept between 2003-2011 in which the IRGC empowered sympathetic third-parties with training and weapons. By the time of the withdrawal of the majority of US forces from Iraq in 2011, Iran had established significant levers of influence over Iraq’s political, security and media actors. The Iran-backed militias have become more politically active and are wealthier and more militarily capable than the other militias active in Iraq. Through all these efforts, Iran has prevented the Iraqi state from maintaining a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its territory, and as a result Tehran has become highly influential in Iraqi political, economic and security affairs.

Syria. When the period of instability began in Syria in 2011, Iran considered it a strategic imperative to intervene to keep the Assad regime in power. In 2012, Iran took active role in the Syrian civil war, beginning with small advisory teams and training units tasked with ensuring regime survival and control of major urban centers. These aims later grew to include the establishment of a network of militias in Syria loyal to Tehran designed to pursue Iranian interests and to pose a direct threat toward Israel by establishing a presence in Southern Syria. These steps served to strengthen Iran’s hold on Syria relative to its two rival regional axes: Sunni Islamism supported by Qatar and Turkey and Arab traditional monarchies led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

As part of its intervention, Iran established an air-transport corridor to Syria in which the IRGC flew civilian and military aircraft to bring in advisors, munitions, and UAVs to its militias. The turmoil of the 2000s in Iraq and the 2010s in Syria also presented the prospect to realize an Iranian land-corridor from Iran, crossing through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. Much of Iran’s opportunity was created by third-parties who have eroded the authorities of the previous regimes in Iraq and Syria, resulting in the expansion of Teheran’s strategic reach through the Arab world and into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Hezbollah. No other proxy is more important to Iran, or more closely aligned ideologically, than Hezbollah. Decades of Iranian investment have changed Hezbollah from a small guerilla force, to a non-state political actor with conventional military capabilities which include a vast rocket, missile and UAV arsenal as well as a network capable of conducting terror operations abroad. It has also become the dominant force in Lebanese politics and security policy and serves as mentor to additional Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. Thanks to Iran’s assistance, between 2006 and today, Hezbollah evolved along multiple dimensions. Its rocket and missile arsenal has grown from approximately 12,000 in 2006 to 150,000 today. The missiles in its arsenal are more precise and of much longer range. Hezbollah’s fighters have gained proper military experience through fighting in Syria. Its manpower grew with recruitment of tens of thousands of additional operatives. Finally, its regional influence has grown, as it has taken on a key role in training other terrorist militias.

Houthis. In the first decade of the 2000s, Iranian support for the Houthis was limited. As the Houthis’ success grew, so did Iran and Hezbollah’s support for the movement. This assistance began with small arms shipments and expanded into funding, weapons and training that played an important role in the Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014. Within a year, the Houthis controlled significant parts of Yemen, including multiple ports, and have since acquired extended range ballistic missile, UAVs, sea mines and more, which they have used to attack strategic infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, conduct targeted assassination attempts, and threaten Israeli shipping and international commerce in the Red Sea.

Hamas. The Iran-Hamas relationship is not based on shared theology, but arose for pragmatic reasons. The common goal of eradicating Israel has been sufficient for Iran to provide Hamas with approximately $70 million dollars per year, alongside training and weapons. Hamas would never have been able to undertake the atrocities of its attack on October 7, 2023 without the decades of assistance from Iran.

The aim of this research is to outline the depth and breadth of Iran’s malign influence and to clarify what can and should be done to reverse this trend. Allowing Iran to realize its vision is tantamount to enabling Iran to become the regional hegemon, placing it in control of a large amount of the world’s energy and critical waterways for international shipping, which would make it an invaluable strategic partner for China and Russia in their bid to upend the US-led order in East-Asia and Europe. This is the vision to which Iran is committed and to which it has made great strides toward achieving in the past two decades. Ultimately, Iran is the central actor in the anti-Western axis in the Middle East and a critical fixture in the great power struggle between the US, China and Russia.

Though Iran’s progress toward realizing the Shiite crescent of regional dominance has been great, its ultimate success is far from inevitable. It can be countered by a regional alliance led by Israel and the Gulf states and backed by the United States. This however, would require a decision on the part of Washington to abandon its attempts to come to a grand accommodation with Iran, and instead return to a policy of maximum pressure on all fronts. Actions to that end should include: Taking decisive military action against Hezbollah and Houthis; raising and enforcing macro-economic sanctions on Iran; targeting the IRGC and its sources of income directly; supporting Iran’s domestic opposition; and increasing military strikes against supply lines to proxies.

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