Let’s start with a fact many likely missed: Ankara announced that it is recruiting 2,000 Turkish soldiers and training them as a Turkish brigade that will join the International Stabilization Force, slated to deploy in the Gaza Strip as part of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan. This step dovetails with another Turkish move revealed a few days ago, the issuance of 37 arrest warrants against senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on allegations of war crimes and genocide.

These developments come as Ankara invests heavily in increasing Turkish visibility in Gaza via Turkish and Palestinian aid organizations. Turkish posters and flags are flying across the Strip, including on bulldozers clearing debris and searching for deceased hostages.

Trump has enlisted Turkey, alongside Qatar, as a lead partner in his initiative and views Ankara as the most effective lever over the Hamas terrorist organization. Erdogan has thrown himself into the task. He credits Turkey with persuading Hamas to accept, and begin implementing, the plan’s first phase, and he wants what he considers proper payment for that achievement: a deeper Turkish presence, involvement and influence in Gaza.

Turkey’s interest, and Hamas’s

For Erdogan, that payoff serves two strategic aims. First, to elevate Turkey’s status as a leading regional power that is actively shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. Second, to hem in Israel, erode its regional standing and blunt its ability to advance Israeli priorities over Turkish ones. A clear example is the Israel–Greece–Cyprus strategic alliance, which Turkey see as threatening key Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara regards Israel as its most challenging regional competitor, chiefly in military terms but also in technology, and economically through the potential opened by expanding the Abraham Accords, including IMEC, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor linking India and East Asia through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel and on to Europe. Diplomatically, Israel’s widening ties in the region and its special relationship with the US also come into play.

Backing Hamas and political Islam is one of Turkey’s levers for asserting leadership of Sunni Islam in the Middle East. That logic drives Ankara’s Hamas policy and its insistence that Hamas retain its standing as a relevant and influential political actor, not only in Gaza but in Palestinian politics more broadly. A significant Turkish presence in Gaza would allow Ankara to safeguard Hamas’s vital interests, which by definition are also vital Turkish interests.

A winning combination

Influence in Gaza, coupled with Erdogan’s closeness to Trump and the favor the US president shows the Turkish leader, creates what Ankara sees as a winning combination. Erdogan believes, and hopes, that this mix will enable Turkey to force a broad military presence in Gaza as a central pillar of the ISF. A Turkish military footprint in the Strip, reinforced by the growing dominance of Turkish civilian aid groups, could, in Erdogan’s view, narrow Israel’s room to maneuver and its operational freedom in Gaza, and thus its ability to act consistently, deeply and effectively against Hamas’s reconstruction efforts.

Israel’s understandable caution about harming Turks, together with Erdogan’s sway over Trump to restrain Israel, gives the Turkish Armed Forces a chance to clamp Israel in a pincer, via Gaza in the south and Syria in the north. That is how the Turkish president could carve out and stabilize a strategic comfort zone that works to Israel’s detriment.

Given these moves, and in light of Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel and his open antisemitism, Israel would do well to keep firmly opposing any Turkish military presence in Gaza. It should act creatively and in close coordination with Washington, working with the Egypt–Saudi Arabia–UAE axis to minimize Turkey’s role in the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, Israel should push to prioritize deeper involvement, military presence and influence by that counter-axis, which also sees Turkey and its maneuvers as a threat and a challenge. Above all, Israel needs to internalize the implications: if Erdogan succeeds in executing his broader strategy, Israel could find itself in a Turkish stranglehold, where Ankara sets the rules.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 11, 2025.

As part of its alignment with Trump’s plan for Gaza, and thanks to its close ties with the United States, Qatar has received another security-related concession from Washington.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently met with his Qatari counterpart, thanked him for Doha’s involvement in the ongoing talks, and announced that the United States would establish a fighter jet training facility at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho for Qatari pilots and fighter jets. This announcement comes shortly after the signing of a presidential order granting Qatar, possibly subject to congressional approval, a US commitment to defend it in the event of an attack by a foreign entity.
The significance of this step should be understood in light of Doha’s considerable investments in recent years in modernizing its air force as part of a broader policy aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The small emirate is known less for its military might and more for its immense wealth, given its status as a key player in the global gas market, its vast investments in infrastructure and assets abroad, and its deep penetration into Western academia and economies.
At the same time, Qatar is acutely aware of the volatile security environment in the Middle East and the growing need for both defensive and offensive capabilities – a need that intensified following Israel’s attempted assassination of senior Hamas officials in Doha.
Accordingly, Qatar has focused its efforts on upgrading its air force, which has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
A monitoring report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute shows that in 2014, Doha’s air fleet included only 12 fighter jets (nine of them operational) – a modest force compared to its regional competitors. Today, following an accelerated armament strategy, the fleet numbers roughly 100 combat aircraft, including US-made F-15QA jets, French Rafales, and Eurofighter Typhoons produced by a European consortium (a joint venture of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France).
Israel views these developments with concern, and justifiably so. While the Qataris are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to use their fighter jets for a direct attack on Israel, the trend of acquiring advanced offensive air capabilities could undermine Israeli interests in other forms.
Given that the United States and European countries remain Qatar’s principal suppliers of defense technology and equipment, experts warn that Doha could serve as a conduit for the transfer of advanced Western technologies and tactics to actors hostile to Israel. This concern is heightened by the Qatari air force’s occasional participation in joint exercises with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, as well as by its proximity to Iran.
Moreover, the West appears increasingly willing to normalize Qatar’s presence in the international security arena, including through its participation in joint exercises with Western nations. This trend risks obscuring the potential harm inherent in Qatar’s emerging military relationships.
In May of this year, the Qatari air force took part in Anatolian Phoenix, a combined air exercise held twice annually since 2012 under Turkish auspices, attended by the United States, Germany, Italy, and others. A month earlier, Doha participated in the international Iniochos 2025 exercise in Greece, focused on air combat training, strike missions, and operational coordination –  an exercise in which an Israel Air Force delegation also participated.
While enhanced defense cooperation with Qatar through arms deals and international forums has already become a fait accompli in both Europe and the United States, Israel would be wise to carefully examine the ways in which it may, directly or indirectly, be contributing to this process – whether through tacit acceptance and willingness to take part in such forums attended by Doha or by refraining from defining Qatar as a hostile state and the strategic implications such a designation entails.
Finally, Israel must consider the potential erosion of its qualitative military edge in the region. Thus far, Qatar’s requests to acquire F-35 aircraft from the United States have been denied. However, if the current trend of deepening US-Qatari relations continues, driven by economic interests, among others, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, Octiber 20, 2025.

Arguments pointing to the incoherence and lack of logic in Emmanuel Macron’s move and those of his partners to recognize a Palestinian state could fill many pages, and still not be exhaustive. As President Donald Trump said in his UN speech, this is a reward to Hamas and the greatest achievement the terrorist organization can claim for the atrocities it carried out on October 7. Hamas spokesmen were quick to boast about it in media interviews, but they need not try hard. Even without them, the Palestinian public will not see it any other way.

Moreover, the recognition move gives backing not only to Hamas and not only within the Palestinian issue, but to Islamist terrorism in all its forms, precisely at a moment when Israel, in its war against parts of those forces, is managing to dent their capabilities through this approach.

Furthermore, the declaration that Macron and his partners intend to improve the standing of the Palestinian Authority and what remains of Fatah will politically strengthen Hamas and its allies. The move will paint the Palestinian streets in Judea and Samaria green, Hamas’ color, an area where support for the terrorist organization is already trending upward.

And another point: the recognition initiative, which Macron and his partners say is meant to help establish calm and stability, not only fails to achieve that, it is already increasing tensions that will probably escalate further as a result of the countermeasures Israel will be forced to take. The next wave of terror and violence, heaven forbid it comes, already has a name: “Macron escalation”.

Anyone impressed by the conditions some leaders attached to their declaration has probably not closely examined the real condition of the Palestinian Authority and how it operates. This applies not only to its involvement in financial support for terrorists and their families, the glorification of attackers and turning them into role models for Palestinian youth, but also to the corruption that has spread within it and the way it is perceived by parts of its own people. The sheikhs of Hebron proposing to detach from the Authority and join the Abraham Accords as an autonomous area is evidence of how it is perceived, at least by some of the public. The fine words about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinian Authority are nothing more than lip service, pretence or at best naïveté.

And we have not yet addressed feasibility: in his speech this week at the UN “Two-State Solution” conference, Mahmoud Abbas said that “Hamas will not have a part in the government. Hamas and its partners must hand over their weapons to the Authority.” As the old saying goes, words do not pay the customs duties.

Can that same Palestinian Authority, which cannot cope on its own with phenomena of terror, the proliferation of weapons, anarchy and lack of governance in whole areas that are already under its responsibility, sustain itself at all? Countless IDF operations in the field and the thousands of arrests the Shin Bet carries out each year to rein in trends of terror are a sign of the magnitude of the security challenge it faces, and of course that is not the only challenge before it.

In fact, do Macron and his partners in the initiative recall that the Palestinian Authority they speak of in their speeches is the same “Authority” that in 2007 lost control of the Gaza Strip to Hamas? Mahmoud Abbas is the same Mahmoud Abbas, only older, and he will turn 90 in a month.

In Gaza’s previous iteration of the Authority, heavy pressure was exerted on Israel to grant measures to Abbas and expand his powers to improve his electoral chances against Hamas. Those gestures were given, Hamas won, and we all remember the aftermath. Of course, that does not prevent Macron and his colleagues from reviving the same ideas.

While leaders continue to wax lyrical about the importance of their initiative, security reports bring us back down to earth: another rocket was located, this time in Tulkarm, days after a terror cell from the Ramallah area was exposed producing rockets intended for launch from Judea and Samaria. This comes about two weeks after the attack at the Ramat Junction in Jerusalem that claimed six civilian lives, which was also carried out by perpetrators from the Ramallah area.

The Macron, Keir Starmer and partners initiative to recognize a Palestinian state is initiative for the sake of initiative. Once, when an idea like this came up, Hamas leaders might have suspected some hidden trick and tried to decipher the sophistication. Today such a possibility does not even cross their minds. Hamas understands that this is a step meant to signal “we are here too,” and that domestic politics and international competition were important motives in its crafting, and that its consequences were not seriously examined. All they have to do is stand aside and enjoy the gains. Evildoers, their work is done by the naïve.

Anyone who links this step to the start of an IDF operation to conquer the city of Gaza is invited to listen to the interview Macron gave back in April of this year, in which he spoke about the recognition initiative he is promoting, long before Israel’s cabinet decided on the conquest of Gaza. Save the self-flagellation for other occasions.

How should Israel respond?

On the diplomatic level, although the immediate significance of recognition is mainly declaratory, it must not be taken lightly, because it gives substantial reinforcement to the standing of the Palestinian Authority in international legal proceedings against Israel. It also creates a foundation for decisions and measures against moves that Israel will carry out in Judea and Samaria.

There is no need to confront Macron head-on now, but under no circumstances should Israel turn the other cheek. There is also no reason to continue treating him with deference. Those who initiated and led this move cannot be accepted as mediators, partners or observers in any process in which Israel is involved.

Despite sympathy with the call to apply sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria, one should question the advisability of such a step. First, because taking it as a reactive or provocative measure weakens the claim of its justice. Second, because it is a divisive act during wartime that requires as broad a consensus as possible, and even without it internal tension is high. It seems that a balanced step that enjoys broad internal agreement and has a good chance of securing backing from the Trump administration would be a decision to apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

Regarding security, Israel’s general approach should convey the message that its activity for its security will continue as usual and will not take any political recognition of the Palestinians into account. Furthermore, against the backdrop of terror trends, it is correct to make clear that an area that chooses to behave like Gaza will end up like Gaza.

The security establishment must prepare on the assumption that we are facing another rise in tension in Judea and Samaria. The offensive approach adopted at the beginning of the war should continue, including the use of focused preventive measures, and monitoring and security along the seam line must be tightened. Given the independent manufacturing capabilities for weapons and explosives in that area, it is right to stop entirely the entry into Palestinian Authority areas of dual-use items that terrorist elements use in production processes.

An umbrella that will allow Hamas to preserve its power and capabilities

Several media outlets have reported an American plan formulated for the Gaza Strip that is supposed to include, among other things, the release of all the hostages, a permanent ceasefire, the end of the war and the establishment of a civilian governing mechanism with the involvement of moderate Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

This idea is not new. In the Arab world and within Hamas there has for some time been discussion of formulas that would allow ending the war and reaching the “day after,” without IDF rule in the Strip and without implementing Trump’s transfer plan.

Hamas spokesmen have repeatedly declared their readiness to vacate their role in managing Gaza’s civilian affairs and hand them over to other actors. In previous statements they emphasized that Hamas’s position on the Strip’s future rests on two principles: first, that managing the Strip is an internal Palestinian affair that requires a “national consensus” — a code name that brings the Palestinian Authority into the equation and allows Hamas to set conditions and demands. The second principle is that “armed resistance to the Israeli occupation is the right of the entire Palestinian people over all Palestinian land, and not only the right of Hamas.” This implies opposition to the disarmament of military capabilities.

The civilian mechanism and rehabilitation efforts in Gaza are the main channel for building Hamas’s military capabilities. Everything that enters Gaza for civilian purposes will be used by Hamas to build its military power, from engineering equipment brought in to clear rubble that will be used to prepare tunnels, to cement and rebar brought in for construction that will be used for tunneling, to glues, resins and fertilizers that, although entering for civilian uses, will be diverted to the manufacture of explosives. As long as Hamas is the dominant force in the Strip, it will effectively control everything brought into its territory, even if it is not formally a partner in the civilian governing mechanism.

Moreover, a plan that transfers civilian management away from Hamas but leaves it as the significant power broker could lead to the Hezbollahization of Gaza. Under the cover of a “management committee,” or whatever name is chosen for that governing body, Hamas would rebuild its military strength and pull the strings behind the scenes in the management of all its affairs. The organization could funnel the energies it regains into increasing terror efforts both in Judea and Samaria and in other regions. Arab and international involvement in implementing such a scheme would only complicate matters for Israel and hinder its ability to confront Hamas’s maneuvers.

Therefore, Israel must make clear that it will not compromise on its demand for the demilitarization of the Strip from military capabilities, in addition to the collapse of Hamas’s rule — and not in its place. Israel cannot allow civilian control to be placed in a framework that in practice serves as an umbrella for preserving Hamas’s power and rebuilding it.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said a few months ago: “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” He was referring to Israel’s strike against Iran as part of Operation With the Lion, but his words are also true regarding Israel’s war in Gaza. Alongside continued fighting to destroy Hamas’s capabilities, the real answer to Gaza’s problems is implementing Trump’s initiative. This is a rare opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the situation, purchased at a terrible human cost. It must not be missed.

Published in Israel Hayom, on September 28, 2025.

Executive Summary
• The Palestinians, divided and chronically rejectionist, have neither built viable institutions nor embraced peace. They must bear responsibility for their actions and poor decisions over the past century, prioritizing violent opposition to Israel over numerous offers for statehood.
• The PA is corrupt, unpopular, and financially dysfunctional, and continues to promote incitement and terror incentives and to educate the next generation in hatred and opposition toward Israel.
• The October 7 atrocities underscored that Palestinian statehood poses an existential danger to Israel. Given Judea and Samaria’s strategic terrain, ceding security control would invite an even more extreme replay of October 7 and a severe rocket threat.
• A Palestinian state would constitute a first-order geopolitical disaster for moderate Arab states in the region, and for free nations around the world. It would align itself with America’s greatest adversaries worldwide, would be an easy target for takeover by Islamist movements, and would destabilize U.S.-aligned Arab states in the region, including Jordan and Egypt.
• The most prudent alternative is localized self-governance for Palestinians as a permanent arrangement. Not an independent state with centralized authority, but a decentralization of control and self-administration at the municipal level. Local self-governance is the alternative to the failed model of the Oslo era, would increase accountability, and offer the best chance for Israeli security alongside a freer, more prosperous Palestinian society.

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Main Points:

• Alongside cultivating its strategic alliance with the United States, Qatar maintains a profound alliance with Iran and strengthens it economically, ideologically, and diplomatically.
• The Qatari network Al Jazeera refrained from covering the protests in Iran in 2009 and in 2022–2023; during the 2022 World Cup, Qatar acceded to Tehran’s requests to block opposition elements and to monitor them.
• Various reports and media publications ascribe to Qatar the provision of indirect financial support and diplomatic cover for Hezbollah; moreover, the 2008 ‘Doha Agreement’ conferred veto power upon Hezbollah and further entrenched Iran’s influence in Lebanon.
• The “Swords of Iron” conflict revealed close Hamas–Al Jazeera collaboration, casting doubt on Qatar’s ability to mediate fairly between Israel and Hamas due to its ties with Iran.
• It is recommended that Israel prefer Egypt as mediator; to launch a proactive campaign vis-à-vis Washington emphasizing the depth of the Qatar–Iran alliance; and to caution the Sunni partners in the region against reliance on Qatar.

Introduction

The discourse in Israel regarding Qatar, since Israel’s unprecedented strike against the Hamas leadership in Doha, has focused on the double game managed by the emirate. Within this framework, emphasis was placed on Qatar’s role as mediator between Israel and Hamas on the one hand, and on the other, on the role of the Qatari Al Jazeera network as the principal mouthpiece of Hamas propaganda during the “Swords of Iron” war.

Much has also been said regarding Qatar’s duplicity vis-à-vis the United States. On the one hand, it is a principal ally of the United States, though not a NATO member, and hosts the largest American base in the Middle East, Al-Udeid. At the same time, it was Al Jazeera that exclusively published al-Qaeda’s messages following the September 11 attacks, and which was accused by the governments of Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain—also important partners of the United States in the region—of promoting extremism and inciting unrest within their territories.

Alongside Qatar’s mediation efforts in the current war, the close cooperation between Al Jazeera and Hamas was exposed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In this context, the IDF revealed that a number of Al Jazeera journalists in Gaza, some of whom were targeted by the IDF, were in fact operatives of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad; some were even local commanders. The IDF also presented captured documents indicating that Hamas prohibited Al Jazeera from criticizing it, instructed it to conceal failed rocket launches that resulted in Palestinian casualties, and even established a secure communication line between the parties.

This document seeks to shed light on Iran’s alliance with Qatar from an economic, diplomatic, and propaganda perspective. In this framework, Qatar provided financial assistance to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, in violation of U.S. sanctions; offered mediation services for Hezbollah in 2008 that guaranteed and even deepened Hezbollah’s control in Lebanon, thereby granting Iran a significant diplomatic achievement; reported minimally on protests in Iran since 2009; and cooperated with Iran’s demands in its coverage of the 2022 World Cup on its territory, in order to assist the Iranian regime in overcoming challenges to its stability.

Cultivating Strategic Relations with the United States

Qatar gradually cultivated relations with successive American administrations since the early 1990s. Since 2003 it has hosted American forces at the Al-Udeid base, into which it has invested more than 8 billion USD (as of January 2025) in order to develop it and transform it into the principal base of American forces in the Middle East.

In 2017, Qatar and the administration of Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding whereby Qatar would combat terrorism and cease financial support for terrorist organizations. The background to this was the unprecedented crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, which severed their relations with Doha and imposed upon it (until 2021) a diplomatic and economic boycott, on the grounds that it funded and supported Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, and even elements connected to al-Qaeda.

In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “strategic dialogue,” one of its central anchors being a joint struggle against terrorism, in order to institutionalize joint discussions on security and stability in the region. As emerges from official American governmental documents, foremost among the United States’ concerns was Qatar’s partnership in the global coalition against ISIS, which had been established in 2014. Relations with the United States culminated in the strategic alliance of 2022 under the Biden administration.

The Alliance with Iran

Simultaneously, Qatar maintains extensive ties with Iran. Their intelligence and security cooperation, including Qatar’s efforts to help safeguard Iran’s regime stability, became especially visible during the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The period was sensitive, as the Iranian regime faced widespread protests following Mahsa Amini’s death at the hands of security forces in Tehran over her negligent wearing of a hijab.

It was a priority for the Iranian authorities to prevent the opposition from using the World Cup to amplify protests within Iran and garner Western support. At Tehran’s request, Qatar detained Iranian fans who attempted to bring flags of the Pahlavi monarchy and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement into the stadiums. Simultaneously, Qatar provided Iranian authorities with information on ticket purchasers and, upon Iran’s request, barred journalists from the leading opposition outlet, Iran International, from entering Qatar during the tournament.

Already earlier, Qatar had proven its cooperation with Iran during the crisis that erupted in Tehran following the extensive protests after allegations of election fraud in 2009. As was leaked in WikiLeaks documents, the American Embassy in Doha assessed in November 2009 (about half a year after the outbreak of the disturbances in Iran) that the Al Jazeera network was acting in service of the interests of the Qatari government, which maintained close relations with Iran, and therefore devoted scant coverage to the widespread protest that had broken out in Iran.

WikiLeaks documents indicate that in July 2009, U.S. Ambassador in Doha Joseph LeBaron sought clarification from Al Jazeera’s director-general at the time, Wadah Khanfar, regarding the network’s limited coverage of the protests about ten days after their outbreak. Khanfar replied that the format reflected “the difficult environment for journalists operating in Iran.” Despite the restrained reporting on the Iranian election crisis, Al Jazeera’s activities became a point of dispute between Iran and Qatar, as Iran viewed the network’s coverage of Iraq as advancing the Sunni agenda, its regional opponents.

The WikiLeaks documents also revealed that in their December 2009 meeting, Qatar’s then prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani, rejected the American ambassador’s claims regarding Qatar’s close relations with Iran, saying: “They lie to us, and we lie to them.” Nonetheless, the clear political bias in favor of Iran in Al Jazeera’s broadcasts was evident to all in the intensive, inciting, and sympathetic coverage that Al Jazeera devoted to the events of the “Arab Spring” against the regimes of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt in 2011.

Iran and Qatar diverged significantly regarding the uprising in Syria. Iranian officials publicly criticized Al Jazeera’s sympathetic coverage of the uprising and Qatar’s support for the rebels. Nevertheless, the sparse coverage of the protests that broke out in Iran even after the 2009 crisis—contrasting with the intensive coverage of the “Arab Spring” protests—raises suspicion that the two states had at the very least understandings on the matter, if not an actual comprehensive agreement.

The clear political bias in favor of the Iranian regime in Al Jazeera during the Mahsa Amini protest (September 2022–March 2023) provoked criticism from intellectuals in the Arab world. They accused the network of ignoring the protest and of promoting the regime’s narrative in Tehran. Coverage of events in Iran had changed since 2009, after a few years earlier, in 2005, Tehran revoked Al Jazeera’s operating license in Iran. This move stemmed from Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Ahvaz protests, which, according to Tehran, destabilized the Khuzestan province in southern Iran.

Further indications point to the alliance between Iran and Qatar: in 2019, Fox News reported that Qatar had prior knowledge of Iranian attacks on tankers and a fuel supply vessel near the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates; in a podcast it broadcast in May 2020, Al Jazeera referred to Qasem Soleimani, who was commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards until his elimination earlier that year, as “a hero who walked in the path of God.”

In 2021, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin shared intelligence with the White House indicating Qatar’s financial support for the Revolutionary Guards. Although the United States initiated an investigation, it did not proceed. This demonstrates that, despite pledges to the U.S. to end terrorism financing, Qatar still aided the world’s principal state sponsor of terrorism.

After the Iranian attack on the American Al-Udeid base in Qatar on June 23 of this year, Qatar dispatched a letter to the Security Council and to the UN Secretary-General, in which it expressed sharp condemnation of the Iranian missile attack. In the letter, Qatar stated that it regarded the attack as a blatant violation of its sovereignty and of its airspace, as well as of international law and the UN Charter, and even emphasized that it reserved for itself the right to respond directly. Yet in practice, in accordance with the alliance between the two states, Iran had notified Qatar (as well as the United States) in advance before it attacked the American base, in response to the earlier American strike against the Iranian nuclear program. Qatar’s letter to the UN was thus a mere pretense.

Support for Hezbollah

Qatar maintained close relations with Hezbollah until the outbreak of disagreements between them with the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The positive relationship with Hezbollah was evident in the “Doha Agreement” of May 2008, in which Qatar succeeded in mediating between the warring Lebanese sides. The agreement indeed led to the election of Michel Suleiman as president of Lebanon, but it granted Hezbollah veto power in the government, as the latter had demanded.

In July 2010, Qatar’s then-emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, received a warm popular reception in southern Lebanon during the first-ever visit by an Arab ruler to the region. During his tour, he lauded Hezbollah, noting that the 2006 Second Lebanon War had “raised the heads of Lebanon and of the Arabs,” and expressed his gratitude “to the fighters who sacrificed themselves for the defense of the homeland.”

There are also reports that link Qatar to the funding of Hezbollah and of the Quds Force. In 2017, the Jerusalem Post revealed, citing a security adviser connected to Western intelligence services, that Qatar was involved in providing financial assistance to Hezbollah through diplomatic cover mechanisms and charitable associations operating from Doha. According to the report, Qatar’s ambassador to Belgium attempted to conceal the affair and even offered a payment of 750,000 euros in order to prevent its exposure. This testimony of the adviser, which was at the time corroborated by senior officials in the German intelligence establishment, indicates that Qatar acted behind the scenes in order to support a terrorist organization subject to international sanctions.

Qatar’s alignment with Hezbollah was also clearly demonstrated in late 2024, when it opposed the American initiative to exploit Hezbollah’s defeat at the hands of Israel in order to bring about the election of a new president in Lebanon. Since the end of Michel Aoun’s term in 2022, Lebanon remained without a president due to the political crisis into which it had fallen. The American initiative was intended to free Lebanon from Hezbollah’s grip. However, in the talks that then–Secretary of State Antony Blinken conducted with Qatar in October 2024, the latter expressed opposition to the initiative, claiming that it was “a dangerous gamble.”

Summary and Recommendations

The alliance between Iran and Qatar, and the strategic relations between Qatar and the United States, form part of the double game that Qatar conducts. In accordance with its adaptive character, it appears that the Israeli strike against it does not close the path to mediation efforts on the part of Qatar in the future. To the extent that it perceives that contacts with Israel will serve its interests, it will demonstrate willingness to return to mediating between Israel and Hamas, and to establish additional contacts with Israel in other spheres. However, the alliance with Iran deepens the significant doubt regarding Qatar’s ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas, with which it maintains close cooperation. Therefore, it is preferable for Israel to suffice with Egypt as mediator.

In addition, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs should launch a comprehensive campaign against Qatar, focusing on its alliance with Iran. It is recommended to reveal relevant pieces of information that will deepen the understanding of the alliance’s depth, and that will assist in bringing Washington to reconsider its relations with Qatar.

Such a campaign could also help counter Iran’s effort to exploit the Israeli strike in Qatar to advance Ali Khamenei’s initiative for a diplomatic and economic boycott of Israel. Israel must convey unequivocally to the Trump administration—and, through it, to the Sunni states in the region—that they should avoid falling into the trap set by Iran and Qatar, as the latter’s support for terrorism could, in the future, directly affect them if the two states perceive it as the most effective means to pursue their strategic objectives.

Published in ALMA, September 18, 2025.