As part of its alignment with Trump’s plan for Gaza, and thanks to its close ties with the United States, Qatar has received another security-related concession from Washington.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently met with his Qatari counterpart, thanked him for Doha’s involvement in the ongoing talks, and announced that the United States would establish a fighter jet training facility at the Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho for Qatari pilots and fighter jets. This announcement comes shortly after the signing of a presidential order granting Qatar, possibly subject to congressional approval, a US commitment to defend it in the event of an attack by a foreign entity.
The significance of this step should be understood in light of Doha’s considerable investments in recent years in modernizing its air force as part of a broader policy aimed at strengthening its military capabilities. The small emirate is known less for its military might and more for its immense wealth, given its status as a key player in the global gas market, its vast investments in infrastructure and assets abroad, and its deep penetration into Western academia and economies.
At the same time, Qatar is acutely aware of the volatile security environment in the Middle East and the growing need for both defensive and offensive capabilities – a need that intensified following Israel’s attempted assassination of senior Hamas officials in Doha.
Accordingly, Qatar has focused its efforts on upgrading its air force, which has expanded dramatically over the past decade.
A monitoring report published by the Middle East Media Research Institute shows that in 2014, Doha’s air fleet included only 12 fighter jets (nine of them operational) – a modest force compared to its regional competitors. Today, following an accelerated armament strategy, the fleet numbers roughly 100 combat aircraft, including US-made F-15QA jets, French Rafales, and Eurofighter Typhoons produced by a European consortium (a joint venture of the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, and France).
Israel views these developments with concern, and justifiably so. While the Qataris are unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to use their fighter jets for a direct attack on Israel, the trend of acquiring advanced offensive air capabilities could undermine Israeli interests in other forms.
Given that the United States and European countries remain Qatar’s principal suppliers of defense technology and equipment, experts warn that Doha could serve as a conduit for the transfer of advanced Western technologies and tactics to actors hostile to Israel. This concern is heightened by the Qatari air force’s occasional participation in joint exercises with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, as well as by its proximity to Iran.
Moreover, the West appears increasingly willing to normalize Qatar’s presence in the international security arena, including through its participation in joint exercises with Western nations. This trend risks obscuring the potential harm inherent in Qatar’s emerging military relationships.
In May of this year, the Qatari air force took part in Anatolian Phoenix, a combined air exercise held twice annually since 2012 under Turkish auspices, attended by the United States, Germany, Italy, and others. A month earlier, Doha participated in the international Iniochos 2025 exercise in Greece, focused on air combat training, strike missions, and operational coordination –  an exercise in which an Israel Air Force delegation also participated.
While enhanced defense cooperation with Qatar through arms deals and international forums has already become a fait accompli in both Europe and the United States, Israel would be wise to carefully examine the ways in which it may, directly or indirectly, be contributing to this process – whether through tacit acceptance and willingness to take part in such forums attended by Doha or by refraining from defining Qatar as a hostile state and the strategic implications such a designation entails.
Finally, Israel must consider the potential erosion of its qualitative military edge in the region. Thus far, Qatar’s requests to acquire F-35 aircraft from the United States have been denied. However, if the current trend of deepening US-Qatari relations continues, driven by economic interests, among others, such a scenario cannot be ruled out in the future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, Octiber 20, 2025.

Arguments pointing to the incoherence and lack of logic in Emmanuel Macron’s move and those of his partners to recognize a Palestinian state could fill many pages, and still not be exhaustive. As President Donald Trump said in his UN speech, this is a reward to Hamas and the greatest achievement the terrorist organization can claim for the atrocities it carried out on October 7. Hamas spokesmen were quick to boast about it in media interviews, but they need not try hard. Even without them, the Palestinian public will not see it any other way.

Moreover, the recognition move gives backing not only to Hamas and not only within the Palestinian issue, but to Islamist terrorism in all its forms, precisely at a moment when Israel, in its war against parts of those forces, is managing to dent their capabilities through this approach.

Furthermore, the declaration that Macron and his partners intend to improve the standing of the Palestinian Authority and what remains of Fatah will politically strengthen Hamas and its allies. The move will paint the Palestinian streets in Judea and Samaria green, Hamas’ color, an area where support for the terrorist organization is already trending upward.

And another point: the recognition initiative, which Macron and his partners say is meant to help establish calm and stability, not only fails to achieve that, it is already increasing tensions that will probably escalate further as a result of the countermeasures Israel will be forced to take. The next wave of terror and violence, heaven forbid it comes, already has a name: “Macron escalation”.

Anyone impressed by the conditions some leaders attached to their declaration has probably not closely examined the real condition of the Palestinian Authority and how it operates. This applies not only to its involvement in financial support for terrorists and their families, the glorification of attackers and turning them into role models for Palestinian youth, but also to the corruption that has spread within it and the way it is perceived by parts of its own people. The sheikhs of Hebron proposing to detach from the Authority and join the Abraham Accords as an autonomous area is evidence of how it is perceived, at least by some of the public. The fine words about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinian Authority are nothing more than lip service, pretence or at best naïveté.

And we have not yet addressed feasibility: in his speech this week at the UN “Two-State Solution” conference, Mahmoud Abbas said that “Hamas will not have a part in the government. Hamas and its partners must hand over their weapons to the Authority.” As the old saying goes, words do not pay the customs duties.

Can that same Palestinian Authority, which cannot cope on its own with phenomena of terror, the proliferation of weapons, anarchy and lack of governance in whole areas that are already under its responsibility, sustain itself at all? Countless IDF operations in the field and the thousands of arrests the Shin Bet carries out each year to rein in trends of terror are a sign of the magnitude of the security challenge it faces, and of course that is not the only challenge before it.

In fact, do Macron and his partners in the initiative recall that the Palestinian Authority they speak of in their speeches is the same “Authority” that in 2007 lost control of the Gaza Strip to Hamas? Mahmoud Abbas is the same Mahmoud Abbas, only older, and he will turn 90 in a month.

In Gaza’s previous iteration of the Authority, heavy pressure was exerted on Israel to grant measures to Abbas and expand his powers to improve his electoral chances against Hamas. Those gestures were given, Hamas won, and we all remember the aftermath. Of course, that does not prevent Macron and his colleagues from reviving the same ideas.

While leaders continue to wax lyrical about the importance of their initiative, security reports bring us back down to earth: another rocket was located, this time in Tulkarm, days after a terror cell from the Ramallah area was exposed producing rockets intended for launch from Judea and Samaria. This comes about two weeks after the attack at the Ramat Junction in Jerusalem that claimed six civilian lives, which was also carried out by perpetrators from the Ramallah area.

The Macron, Keir Starmer and partners initiative to recognize a Palestinian state is initiative for the sake of initiative. Once, when an idea like this came up, Hamas leaders might have suspected some hidden trick and tried to decipher the sophistication. Today such a possibility does not even cross their minds. Hamas understands that this is a step meant to signal “we are here too,” and that domestic politics and international competition were important motives in its crafting, and that its consequences were not seriously examined. All they have to do is stand aside and enjoy the gains. Evildoers, their work is done by the naïve.

Anyone who links this step to the start of an IDF operation to conquer the city of Gaza is invited to listen to the interview Macron gave back in April of this year, in which he spoke about the recognition initiative he is promoting, long before Israel’s cabinet decided on the conquest of Gaza. Save the self-flagellation for other occasions.

How should Israel respond?

On the diplomatic level, although the immediate significance of recognition is mainly declaratory, it must not be taken lightly, because it gives substantial reinforcement to the standing of the Palestinian Authority in international legal proceedings against Israel. It also creates a foundation for decisions and measures against moves that Israel will carry out in Judea and Samaria.

There is no need to confront Macron head-on now, but under no circumstances should Israel turn the other cheek. There is also no reason to continue treating him with deference. Those who initiated and led this move cannot be accepted as mediators, partners or observers in any process in which Israel is involved.

Despite sympathy with the call to apply sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria, one should question the advisability of such a step. First, because taking it as a reactive or provocative measure weakens the claim of its justice. Second, because it is a divisive act during wartime that requires as broad a consensus as possible, and even without it internal tension is high. It seems that a balanced step that enjoys broad internal agreement and has a good chance of securing backing from the Trump administration would be a decision to apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

Regarding security, Israel’s general approach should convey the message that its activity for its security will continue as usual and will not take any political recognition of the Palestinians into account. Furthermore, against the backdrop of terror trends, it is correct to make clear that an area that chooses to behave like Gaza will end up like Gaza.

The security establishment must prepare on the assumption that we are facing another rise in tension in Judea and Samaria. The offensive approach adopted at the beginning of the war should continue, including the use of focused preventive measures, and monitoring and security along the seam line must be tightened. Given the independent manufacturing capabilities for weapons and explosives in that area, it is right to stop entirely the entry into Palestinian Authority areas of dual-use items that terrorist elements use in production processes.

An umbrella that will allow Hamas to preserve its power and capabilities

Several media outlets have reported an American plan formulated for the Gaza Strip that is supposed to include, among other things, the release of all the hostages, a permanent ceasefire, the end of the war and the establishment of a civilian governing mechanism with the involvement of moderate Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

This idea is not new. In the Arab world and within Hamas there has for some time been discussion of formulas that would allow ending the war and reaching the “day after,” without IDF rule in the Strip and without implementing Trump’s transfer plan.

Hamas spokesmen have repeatedly declared their readiness to vacate their role in managing Gaza’s civilian affairs and hand them over to other actors. In previous statements they emphasized that Hamas’s position on the Strip’s future rests on two principles: first, that managing the Strip is an internal Palestinian affair that requires a “national consensus” — a code name that brings the Palestinian Authority into the equation and allows Hamas to set conditions and demands. The second principle is that “armed resistance to the Israeli occupation is the right of the entire Palestinian people over all Palestinian land, and not only the right of Hamas.” This implies opposition to the disarmament of military capabilities.

The civilian mechanism and rehabilitation efforts in Gaza are the main channel for building Hamas’s military capabilities. Everything that enters Gaza for civilian purposes will be used by Hamas to build its military power, from engineering equipment brought in to clear rubble that will be used to prepare tunnels, to cement and rebar brought in for construction that will be used for tunneling, to glues, resins and fertilizers that, although entering for civilian uses, will be diverted to the manufacture of explosives. As long as Hamas is the dominant force in the Strip, it will effectively control everything brought into its territory, even if it is not formally a partner in the civilian governing mechanism.

Moreover, a plan that transfers civilian management away from Hamas but leaves it as the significant power broker could lead to the Hezbollahization of Gaza. Under the cover of a “management committee,” or whatever name is chosen for that governing body, Hamas would rebuild its military strength and pull the strings behind the scenes in the management of all its affairs. The organization could funnel the energies it regains into increasing terror efforts both in Judea and Samaria and in other regions. Arab and international involvement in implementing such a scheme would only complicate matters for Israel and hinder its ability to confront Hamas’s maneuvers.

Therefore, Israel must make clear that it will not compromise on its demand for the demilitarization of the Strip from military capabilities, in addition to the collapse of Hamas’s rule — and not in its place. Israel cannot allow civilian control to be placed in a framework that in practice serves as an umbrella for preserving Hamas’s power and rebuilding it.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said a few months ago: “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” He was referring to Israel’s strike against Iran as part of Operation With the Lion, but his words are also true regarding Israel’s war in Gaza. Alongside continued fighting to destroy Hamas’s capabilities, the real answer to Gaza’s problems is implementing Trump’s initiative. This is a rare opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the situation, purchased at a terrible human cost. It must not be missed.

Published in Israel Hayom, on September 28, 2025.

Executive Summary
• The Palestinians, divided and chronically rejectionist, have neither built viable institutions nor embraced peace. They must bear responsibility for their actions and poor decisions over the past century, prioritizing violent opposition to Israel over numerous offers for statehood.
• The PA is corrupt, unpopular, and financially dysfunctional, and continues to promote incitement and terror incentives and to educate the next generation in hatred and opposition toward Israel.
• The October 7 atrocities underscored that Palestinian statehood poses an existential danger to Israel. Given Judea and Samaria’s strategic terrain, ceding security control would invite an even more extreme replay of October 7 and a severe rocket threat.
• A Palestinian state would constitute a first-order geopolitical disaster for moderate Arab states in the region, and for free nations around the world. It would align itself with America’s greatest adversaries worldwide, would be an easy target for takeover by Islamist movements, and would destabilize U.S.-aligned Arab states in the region, including Jordan and Egypt.
• The most prudent alternative is localized self-governance for Palestinians as a permanent arrangement. Not an independent state with centralized authority, but a decentralization of control and self-administration at the municipal level. Local self-governance is the alternative to the failed model of the Oslo era, would increase accountability, and offer the best chance for Israeli security alongside a freer, more prosperous Palestinian society.

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Main Points:

• Alongside cultivating its strategic alliance with the United States, Qatar maintains a profound alliance with Iran and strengthens it economically, ideologically, and diplomatically.
• The Qatari network Al Jazeera refrained from covering the protests in Iran in 2009 and in 2022–2023; during the 2022 World Cup, Qatar acceded to Tehran’s requests to block opposition elements and to monitor them.
• Various reports and media publications ascribe to Qatar the provision of indirect financial support and diplomatic cover for Hezbollah; moreover, the 2008 ‘Doha Agreement’ conferred veto power upon Hezbollah and further entrenched Iran’s influence in Lebanon.
• The “Swords of Iron” conflict revealed close Hamas–Al Jazeera collaboration, casting doubt on Qatar’s ability to mediate fairly between Israel and Hamas due to its ties with Iran.
• It is recommended that Israel prefer Egypt as mediator; to launch a proactive campaign vis-à-vis Washington emphasizing the depth of the Qatar–Iran alliance; and to caution the Sunni partners in the region against reliance on Qatar.

Introduction

The discourse in Israel regarding Qatar, since Israel’s unprecedented strike against the Hamas leadership in Doha, has focused on the double game managed by the emirate. Within this framework, emphasis was placed on Qatar’s role as mediator between Israel and Hamas on the one hand, and on the other, on the role of the Qatari Al Jazeera network as the principal mouthpiece of Hamas propaganda during the “Swords of Iron” war.

Much has also been said regarding Qatar’s duplicity vis-à-vis the United States. On the one hand, it is a principal ally of the United States, though not a NATO member, and hosts the largest American base in the Middle East, Al-Udeid. At the same time, it was Al Jazeera that exclusively published al-Qaeda’s messages following the September 11 attacks, and which was accused by the governments of Jordan, Egypt, and Bahrain—also important partners of the United States in the region—of promoting extremism and inciting unrest within their territories.

Alongside Qatar’s mediation efforts in the current war, the close cooperation between Al Jazeera and Hamas was exposed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In this context, the IDF revealed that a number of Al Jazeera journalists in Gaza, some of whom were targeted by the IDF, were in fact operatives of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad; some were even local commanders. The IDF also presented captured documents indicating that Hamas prohibited Al Jazeera from criticizing it, instructed it to conceal failed rocket launches that resulted in Palestinian casualties, and even established a secure communication line between the parties.

This document seeks to shed light on Iran’s alliance with Qatar from an economic, diplomatic, and propaganda perspective. In this framework, Qatar provided financial assistance to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, in violation of U.S. sanctions; offered mediation services for Hezbollah in 2008 that guaranteed and even deepened Hezbollah’s control in Lebanon, thereby granting Iran a significant diplomatic achievement; reported minimally on protests in Iran since 2009; and cooperated with Iran’s demands in its coverage of the 2022 World Cup on its territory, in order to assist the Iranian regime in overcoming challenges to its stability.

Cultivating Strategic Relations with the United States

Qatar gradually cultivated relations with successive American administrations since the early 1990s. Since 2003 it has hosted American forces at the Al-Udeid base, into which it has invested more than 8 billion USD (as of January 2025) in order to develop it and transform it into the principal base of American forces in the Middle East.

In 2017, Qatar and the administration of Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding whereby Qatar would combat terrorism and cease financial support for terrorist organizations. The background to this was the unprecedented crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, which severed their relations with Doha and imposed upon it (until 2021) a diplomatic and economic boycott, on the grounds that it funded and supported Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, and even elements connected to al-Qaeda.

In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a “strategic dialogue,” one of its central anchors being a joint struggle against terrorism, in order to institutionalize joint discussions on security and stability in the region. As emerges from official American governmental documents, foremost among the United States’ concerns was Qatar’s partnership in the global coalition against ISIS, which had been established in 2014. Relations with the United States culminated in the strategic alliance of 2022 under the Biden administration.

The Alliance with Iran

Simultaneously, Qatar maintains extensive ties with Iran. Their intelligence and security cooperation, including Qatar’s efforts to help safeguard Iran’s regime stability, became especially visible during the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The period was sensitive, as the Iranian regime faced widespread protests following Mahsa Amini’s death at the hands of security forces in Tehran over her negligent wearing of a hijab.

It was a priority for the Iranian authorities to prevent the opposition from using the World Cup to amplify protests within Iran and garner Western support. At Tehran’s request, Qatar detained Iranian fans who attempted to bring flags of the Pahlavi monarchy and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement into the stadiums. Simultaneously, Qatar provided Iranian authorities with information on ticket purchasers and, upon Iran’s request, barred journalists from the leading opposition outlet, Iran International, from entering Qatar during the tournament.

Already earlier, Qatar had proven its cooperation with Iran during the crisis that erupted in Tehran following the extensive protests after allegations of election fraud in 2009. As was leaked in WikiLeaks documents, the American Embassy in Doha assessed in November 2009 (about half a year after the outbreak of the disturbances in Iran) that the Al Jazeera network was acting in service of the interests of the Qatari government, which maintained close relations with Iran, and therefore devoted scant coverage to the widespread protest that had broken out in Iran.

WikiLeaks documents indicate that in July 2009, U.S. Ambassador in Doha Joseph LeBaron sought clarification from Al Jazeera’s director-general at the time, Wadah Khanfar, regarding the network’s limited coverage of the protests about ten days after their outbreak. Khanfar replied that the format reflected “the difficult environment for journalists operating in Iran.” Despite the restrained reporting on the Iranian election crisis, Al Jazeera’s activities became a point of dispute between Iran and Qatar, as Iran viewed the network’s coverage of Iraq as advancing the Sunni agenda, its regional opponents.

The WikiLeaks documents also revealed that in their December 2009 meeting, Qatar’s then prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani, rejected the American ambassador’s claims regarding Qatar’s close relations with Iran, saying: “They lie to us, and we lie to them.” Nonetheless, the clear political bias in favor of Iran in Al Jazeera’s broadcasts was evident to all in the intensive, inciting, and sympathetic coverage that Al Jazeera devoted to the events of the “Arab Spring” against the regimes of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt in 2011.

Iran and Qatar diverged significantly regarding the uprising in Syria. Iranian officials publicly criticized Al Jazeera’s sympathetic coverage of the uprising and Qatar’s support for the rebels. Nevertheless, the sparse coverage of the protests that broke out in Iran even after the 2009 crisis—contrasting with the intensive coverage of the “Arab Spring” protests—raises suspicion that the two states had at the very least understandings on the matter, if not an actual comprehensive agreement.

The clear political bias in favor of the Iranian regime in Al Jazeera during the Mahsa Amini protest (September 2022–March 2023) provoked criticism from intellectuals in the Arab world. They accused the network of ignoring the protest and of promoting the regime’s narrative in Tehran. Coverage of events in Iran had changed since 2009, after a few years earlier, in 2005, Tehran revoked Al Jazeera’s operating license in Iran. This move stemmed from Al Jazeera’s coverage of the Ahvaz protests, which, according to Tehran, destabilized the Khuzestan province in southern Iran.

Further indications point to the alliance between Iran and Qatar: in 2019, Fox News reported that Qatar had prior knowledge of Iranian attacks on tankers and a fuel supply vessel near the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates; in a podcast it broadcast in May 2020, Al Jazeera referred to Qasem Soleimani, who was commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards until his elimination earlier that year, as “a hero who walked in the path of God.”

In 2021, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin shared intelligence with the White House indicating Qatar’s financial support for the Revolutionary Guards. Although the United States initiated an investigation, it did not proceed. This demonstrates that, despite pledges to the U.S. to end terrorism financing, Qatar still aided the world’s principal state sponsor of terrorism.

After the Iranian attack on the American Al-Udeid base in Qatar on June 23 of this year, Qatar dispatched a letter to the Security Council and to the UN Secretary-General, in which it expressed sharp condemnation of the Iranian missile attack. In the letter, Qatar stated that it regarded the attack as a blatant violation of its sovereignty and of its airspace, as well as of international law and the UN Charter, and even emphasized that it reserved for itself the right to respond directly. Yet in practice, in accordance with the alliance between the two states, Iran had notified Qatar (as well as the United States) in advance before it attacked the American base, in response to the earlier American strike against the Iranian nuclear program. Qatar’s letter to the UN was thus a mere pretense.

Support for Hezbollah

Qatar maintained close relations with Hezbollah until the outbreak of disagreements between them with the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The positive relationship with Hezbollah was evident in the “Doha Agreement” of May 2008, in which Qatar succeeded in mediating between the warring Lebanese sides. The agreement indeed led to the election of Michel Suleiman as president of Lebanon, but it granted Hezbollah veto power in the government, as the latter had demanded.

In July 2010, Qatar’s then-emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, received a warm popular reception in southern Lebanon during the first-ever visit by an Arab ruler to the region. During his tour, he lauded Hezbollah, noting that the 2006 Second Lebanon War had “raised the heads of Lebanon and of the Arabs,” and expressed his gratitude “to the fighters who sacrificed themselves for the defense of the homeland.”

There are also reports that link Qatar to the funding of Hezbollah and of the Quds Force. In 2017, the Jerusalem Post revealed, citing a security adviser connected to Western intelligence services, that Qatar was involved in providing financial assistance to Hezbollah through diplomatic cover mechanisms and charitable associations operating from Doha. According to the report, Qatar’s ambassador to Belgium attempted to conceal the affair and even offered a payment of 750,000 euros in order to prevent its exposure. This testimony of the adviser, which was at the time corroborated by senior officials in the German intelligence establishment, indicates that Qatar acted behind the scenes in order to support a terrorist organization subject to international sanctions.

Qatar’s alignment with Hezbollah was also clearly demonstrated in late 2024, when it opposed the American initiative to exploit Hezbollah’s defeat at the hands of Israel in order to bring about the election of a new president in Lebanon. Since the end of Michel Aoun’s term in 2022, Lebanon remained without a president due to the political crisis into which it had fallen. The American initiative was intended to free Lebanon from Hezbollah’s grip. However, in the talks that then–Secretary of State Antony Blinken conducted with Qatar in October 2024, the latter expressed opposition to the initiative, claiming that it was “a dangerous gamble.”

Summary and Recommendations

The alliance between Iran and Qatar, and the strategic relations between Qatar and the United States, form part of the double game that Qatar conducts. In accordance with its adaptive character, it appears that the Israeli strike against it does not close the path to mediation efforts on the part of Qatar in the future. To the extent that it perceives that contacts with Israel will serve its interests, it will demonstrate willingness to return to mediating between Israel and Hamas, and to establish additional contacts with Israel in other spheres. However, the alliance with Iran deepens the significant doubt regarding Qatar’s ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas, with which it maintains close cooperation. Therefore, it is preferable for Israel to suffice with Egypt as mediator.

In addition, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs should launch a comprehensive campaign against Qatar, focusing on its alliance with Iran. It is recommended to reveal relevant pieces of information that will deepen the understanding of the alliance’s depth, and that will assist in bringing Washington to reconsider its relations with Qatar.

Such a campaign could also help counter Iran’s effort to exploit the Israeli strike in Qatar to advance Ali Khamenei’s initiative for a diplomatic and economic boycott of Israel. Israel must convey unequivocally to the Trump administration—and, through it, to the Sunni states in the region—that they should avoid falling into the trap set by Iran and Qatar, as the latter’s support for terrorism could, in the future, directly affect them if the two states perceive it as the most effective means to pursue their strategic objectives.

Published in ALMA, September 18, 2025.

When US Navy Seals flew deep into Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden in 2011, the world cheered and President Obama was rightly lauded for defending America, after the worst terror attack on US soil. Few, if any, stopped to ask whether Pakistan had consented, or the strike violated its sovereignty.

Yet when Israel takes out Hamas leaders in Doha, who were responsible for orchestrating the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, those same Western voices rush to castigate Jerusalem. The hypocrisy is absolutely astounding. What was deemed legitimate self-defence by the West for the United States, is suddenly branded “reckless” or “unlawful” when it is the Jewish state.

Just as the attack that took out Bin Laden was just, necessary and entirely lawful under international law, so too was the Israeli strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar.

First, it needs to be underscored that the Hamas terrorists that were targeted, were not “political leaders”. They were terror masterminds, involved in the planning, execution and direction of every facet of the war that Hamas launched on October 7, including the ongoing captivity of hostages.

Those responsible for the October 7 attacks, were not confined to Gaza. They were also directing the war, and the refusal to end it, from the luxury of their five-star hotels in Doha.

That made them legitimate military targets under international law, including Article 51 of the UN Charter, which enshrines every state’s inherent right to self-defence against an armed attack. Under the laws of armed conflict, states must also adhere to the principles of distinction, necessity and proportionality. Israel did precisely that.

Distinction requires that military force be directed only against combatants and military objectives. Hamas’s leaders, whether in Gaza or the ones targeted in Doha, are not neutral civilians; they are the architects of terror and the ongoing war. Their luxury suites in Doha functioned not merely as residences, but command centres, making them lawful military targets.

Meanwhile, proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause excessive civilian harm compared to the concrete military advantage gained. By striking Hamas leaders with precision, Israel removed the masterminds of October 7, while avoiding widespread civilian casualties.

Israel was also left with no alternative. Only early this week, the United States put forward to the most comprehensive proposal to end this war once and for all, and release all the hostages, with President Trump calling on Hamas to accept the plan, cautioning “This is my last warning, there will not be another one!”

Like clockwork, Hamas rejected the deal, refusing to accept any terms that would require them to disarm. It should come therefore as absolutely no surprise that Israel carried out the strike in Doha. Faced with an enemy that refuses to end the war and release the hostages, Israel had no choice but to strike them militarily.

But many in the West have rushed to the defence of Doha. Qatar is no Mother Theresa here. They have continued to play the duplicitous role of both pyromaniac and firefighter, trying to fool the world.

Under the Hague Convention V of 1907, neutral states must not permit belligerents (or terrorists) to use their territory as a base of operations, but Qatar has done precisely the opposite. For years, Doha has perfected a cynical double game. On the one hand, it hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East and postures as an honest mediator in hostage talks. On the other, it grants sanctuary to Hamas leaders, peddles propaganda through Al Jazeera and allows its territory to be used to plan attacks against Israel and the ongoing captivity of the remaining 48 hostages in the dungeons of Gaza.

Its delay tactics in the hostage negotiations have not been about saving lives, but an entirely self-serving attempt to buy leverage and polish its own image in the West. Therefore, by failing to uphold its duties as a supposed neutral party, Qatar has allowed its territory to become complicit in Hamas’s war against Israel.

Critics of Israel argue that operations like the Doha strike undermine international order. However, the opposite is true. What undermines the rule of law is the selective application of its principles: applauding US self-defence while denying it to Israel.

Western governments that once celebrated the killing of bin Laden should reflect on their hypocrisy and direct their outrage not at Israel for striking the masterminds of Oct 7, but at Qatar for providing them safe harbour enabling them to operate from their territory.

Published in The Telegraph,   September 10, 2025.

The surprise Israeli Air Force strike in Doha, Qatar’s capital, which precisely targeted the building where Hamas’ external leadership was meeting, is the kind of event usually described as a game changer. Israel finally made the decision that should have been made back on October 8, when the war aims were first defined. In that sense, better late than never.

Without a major blow to Hamas’ leadership, there is no way to dismantle the terrorist organization as a military and governing entity or to make recovery difficult. This is especially true following the elimination of Hamas’ leadership in Gaza, which left Izz al-Din al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade who succeeded Mohammed Sinwar (himself replacing his brother, Yahya Sinwar), as the top military leader and effectively the most senior Hamas figure remaining in the Gaza Strip. The eliminations in Gaza shifted the terrorist organization’s center of gravity to the external leadership outside Gaza, most of which enjoyed safety and comfort in Doha.

Beyond the impressive intelligence and operational capabilities displayed by Israel, far from the first time, and beyond the fact that this is Israel’s fifth decapitation strike against hostile leaderships (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis), this action projects strength and determination. The Doha strike sends a message about Israel’s seriousness in ending the war and achieving the objectives defined by the government. If the remnants of Hamas leadership in Gaza and its support circles dismissed threats about an invasion of Gaza City as empty bluster aimed at pressuring Hamas in negotiations, the Qatar strike may well change their assessment.

If the operation succeeded and Israel indeed managed to eliminate most of Hamas’ external leadership, or at least its most senior figures, it would be a devastating blow to the organization, stripping it of critical organizational capabilities. Hamas’ external leadership was responsible for fundraising and managing ties with states and groups that supported it. With their removal, even partially, the group faces paralysis and severe functional difficulties that could threaten its survival as a meaningful entity and make any recovery far harder.

Even if most Hamas leaders managed to escape the strike, its importance remains enormous. It instantly changed the rules of the game and completely undermined Hamas leaders’ sense of security. From now on, they will have to devote enormous effort to evasion, protection, and hiding, knowing they have lost their immunity and are vulnerable to immediate elimination anywhere.

The strike also creates an opportunity for new momentum in negotiations, if and when they resume. Israel seems unlikely to wait long, even if it slows down the pace of its operation to capture Gaza City in order to facilitate talks and conclude them within a short time frame, under the terms outlined in President Trump’s proposal. If Israel has succeeded in removing much of Hamas’ hardline external leadership, the result could leave al-Haddad in a stronger position with the potential for a more pragmatic approach.

Victor’s generosity 

With the confidence of victory and under the shadow of this dramatic success, Israel could declare triumph, secure the release of hostages, and reshape Gaza’s security reality by dismantling Hamas as a military and governing force. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called on Gaza’s residents to expel the remnants of Hamas and declared that there would be no obstacle to a shared future and new relations between Gaza and Israel under an alternative civilian administration once Hamas is dismantled as the ruling authority.

If, however, most of Hamas’ external leadership survived, the organization may harden its stance and push negotiations into deadlock, forcing Israel back to its plan for capturing Gaza City and the entire Gaza Strip.

Despite the troubling delay of nearly two years since the war began, the operation’s execution helps cut Qatar back down to size, or at least sidelines it from negotiations and Gaza’s reconstruction process. Qatar was never an honest mediator. Beyond being a state sponsor of terrorism and a clear supporter of Hamas, it manipulated Israel and other mediators, exploiting the horrors of the war to entrench itself as a regional diplomatic powerhouse. It turned mediation into a major tool of soft power, alongside corrupt use of its vast wealth to buy influence, cultural assets, and powerful lobbying networks that swayed decision-making in states and organizations. Qatar used negotiations to smear Israel, undermine Egypt and its relations with Israel, and maneuver toward a war-ending arrangement that would keep Hamas in power and allow it to regroup for a future takeover of the Palestinian matter. Meanwhile, Doha tightened ties with the US, which amplified Qatar’s importance by highlighting its role in negotiations and its broader utility to American interests.

It is hard to believe Israel carried out the strike without prior coordination with Washington, which maintains the largest American military base in the Middle East on Qatari soil. Even if the US government insists it was not informed or gave no green light, many in the region and beyond assume otherwise. In practice, it means that the US ultimately prioritized its commitments to Israel and its vital interests over Qatar’s, a move of enormous symbolic weight, projecting Israeli strength across the region.

President Trump’s social media posts can be read two ways: as expressing dissatisfaction over a unilateral Israeli strike against a close American ally, but also as acknowledging the legitimacy of the target. Claims of friction between Trump and Netanyahu may reflect an American attempt to soften what Qatar perceives as betrayal. Rumors of quiet Qatari consent to the strike, similar to its tacit approval for Iran’s attack on a US base during Operation With the Lion, should not be taken too seriously. Even if partially true, they do not change the fact that Qatar suffered a humiliating blow that exposed its vulnerability and total reliance on American security guarantees.

Qatari officials have said they are investigating the incident and pledged action against Israel, which they labeled a terrorist state. A military response, however, is implausible, given Doha’s lack of such capabilities. Any attempt would invite a devastating Israeli counterstrike, regardless of American reassurances. Qatar’s retaliation is expected to focus on diplomatic and legal spheres, alongside intensified delegitimization campaigns against Israel. Its decision to suspend active mediation between Israel and Hamas is no threat, if anything, it is a blessing.

Let Turkey and Egypt frown

Israel’s decision to target Hamas leadership on Qatari soil, officially not an enemy state, does have precedents, such as the 1985 Israeli strike on the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis. Still, this is a dramatic move, reshaping regional dynamics and, to some extent, global ones. Israel has once again set world-class intelligence and military standards, reinforcing its position as the most powerful and influential force in the Middle East. It is a significant achievement, even if Turkey, Egypt, and other states wrinkle their noses at Israel’s growing dominance and determination to wield it across the MIddle East.

Make no mistake: Arab leaders will rush to condemn Israel and embrace Qatar with soothing words. But it is lip service. Behind closed doors, they are rubbing their hands in delight, smiling broadly at Qatar’s humiliation. For many of them, Qatar is not just a rival but a dangerous adversary, thanks to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadist terrorist groups, and destabilization efforts through its Al Jazeera network. They will be pleased to see Qatar weakened, just as they would welcome Hamas’ destruction.

Once Israel finishes the job, in time, these sentiments will likely be expressed openly, or at least become evident through regional realignments.

This is Israel’s moment to combine statesmanship and military strategy to achieve decisive victory: ending the war, freeing the hostages, and reshaping Gaza’s security reality as a key step in building a new regional order. When that happens, Israel will be able to speak of total victory.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 10, 2025.

At the time of writing, the results of the Israeli strike in Doha on the gathering place of senior Hamas political bureau members have yet to be clarified, but the operation itself is already creating shockwaves within Hamas and among all regional players. After the severe blow to the organization’s leaders in the Gaza Strip, the leadership abroad became the most significant power center carrying the Hamas movement on its shoulders with all its components.

This leadership’s activity served as a force multiplier for the terror organization and bridged gaps created in the functioning of some of its other mechanisms, following restrictions on them in the Gaza Strip or Judea and Samaria.

While its leaders in Gaza operate underground, struggle to function, and their voice is not heard, those “political leadership” figures whose life centers outside the region fill their place in presenting the movement’s policy and advancing its interests: in Turkey, Qatar, Lebanon, or other countries.

They replace the hiding leadership, also in media appearances, on social networks, in conferences, and in political conversations. They are the organization’s headquarters body, responsible for formulating its policy and explaining it, as well as bearing the burden of mobilizing the necessary political support and resources to build the organization’s capabilities and activities in various areas.

Some fulfill operational roles, ranging from inter-regional coordination for terrorist purposes to directing concrete activities in different arenas. Saleh Arouri, remembered infamously, was among the activists known to the public, but like hi,m there are about thirty activists: Khaled Mashaal, Khalil al-Hayya, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Nizar Awadallah, Bassem Naim, Sami Abu Zuhri, Izzat Rishq, Osama Hamadan, Mahmoud Mardawi, Taher Nono, Zaher Jabarin, and others. It appears some of these were the strike’s target.

In the October 7 context, the publicized thanksgiving prayer of the organization’s leaders, who were in Turkey at the time, is well remembered. And not only that, Israeli media also highlighted statements made after the massacre by Ghazi Hamad, a senior organization member in Gaza who relocated to Qatar, who clarified: Israel is “a state we want to bring down”, “‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ is only the first time. There will also be a second, third, and fourth time. We have the resilience and ability to fight and pay the price.” Regarding Israel’s demand for Hamas to disarm, he ruled, “The resistance’s weapons are the essence of the Palestinian issue, we (in Hamas) are committed to this and will not hand over even one empty bullet.”

This headquarters is also the natural address that would take upon itself the task of rehabilitating the beaten terror organization, the moment this becomes possible. It is the one that will also make the connection to Iran and its proxies, to other supporting states, to the network of Islamic organizations spread throughout the world and identified with the “Muslim Brotherhood,” to money, to media, and to other resources that will be required for this purpose.

Given this leadership’s central role and its deep involvement in efforts to drag Israel into a multi-arena regional war, Israel could not afford to leave it standing. Refraining from striking it until now cast doubt among some players about Israel’s threats of total war against Hamas, and created the impression that staying in Turkey or Qatar guarantees immunity from it.

After disproving past assumptions about its ability to conduct prolonged or multi-arena warfare, Israel, in its recent operations, is challenging everything perceived by its enemies as “rules of the game.”

Doha’s announcement about suspending its involvement in mediation regarding Gaza matters is an expected step following the Israeli operation. Qatari anger will also find expression in incitement on Al-Jazeera, and expressions of rage and protest from Turkey should also be expected. The fact that Washington did not prevent Israel from operating in Doha will restrain their response.

On the ground, an escalation should be expected in attempts by Hamas activists in Judea and Samaria and Gaza to avenge the strike on the leadership. Attention must also be given to developments on the Temple Mount and in east Jerusalem.

The great unknown is the impact on the hostages’ situation and chances of resuming negotiations. On the face of it, it appears Hamas has a basic interest in preserving the hostages’ lives as they are the only insurance policy for the activists’ survival. However, it is difficult to predict the emotional reactions from the hostages’ captors and the red lines they have set for themselves. One matter needs no concern: if Hamas wants to return to negotiations, the issue of the mediator will not be an obstacle.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 10, 2025.

Last Friday, Turkey’s foreign minister announced that Ankara would sever its economic ties with Israel and close its airspace to Israeli aircraft. A dramatic statement but one that is hardly surprising. Since October 7, Turkey has steadily escalated its rhetoric against Jerusalem, taking a series of confrontational steps: adopting a distinctly pro-Hamas stance, joining South Africa’s case at The Hague, vetoing Israeli participation in a NATO emergency drill, and threatening an economic boycott.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is determined to isolate Israel on the international stage. Yet even he understands that the rope cannot be pulled indefinitely. Overly drastic moves risk harming Turkey’s fragile economy more than Israel’s. In fact, while bilateral trade has declined, the data show no acute disruption.
Ankara has been careful to circumvent its own proclamations, whether by redirecting goods through third countries or labeling them as destined for the Palestinian Authority. The truth is that Turkish exporters would be the real losers from a full trade cutoff. Energy supplies from Azerbaijan to Israel, routed through Turkey, have also continued without interruption.
So when Turkey announced the closure of its airspace, Israel was hardly rattled. Similar declarations have been made before, without concrete impact. Indeed, Israeli military aircraft are barred from Turkish skies, but civilian airlines have continued flying through its airspace to destinations such as Georgia, Eastern Europe, and the Far East, maintaining regular coordination with Turkish authorities. Within days, Turkish officials clarified that the ban applied only to official government flights and weapons shipments, not commercial traffic.
Still, Israel cannot afford to dance to the tune of a mercurial Turkish president. Strategic steps are needed, first and foremost, to diversify sources of imports and reduce dependency on Ankara.
At the same time, Israel must look northward: Turkey’s deepening presence in Syria and its growing influence over Damascus’s security and governance mechanisms may soon pose new constraints. Until now, Israel has largely maintained freedom of action in Syrian skies. In the near future, Erdogan may well try to tighten the rope there as well.
In light of the friendly ties between US President Donald Trump and Erdogan, it is crucial for Israel to engage in dialogue with the US administration to curb Turkey and its regional ambitions. Washington must be made to understand that Ankara’s moves, though they may appear relatively harmless and, at times, be dismissed as Erdogan’s characteristic rhetoric, could foreshadow more troubling developments and must therefore be contained before it is too late.
This need becomes even more urgent in light of Turkey’s growing efforts to undermine Israel’s strategic position. Ankara has attempted to erode Jerusalem’s competitive edge by pressing Washington for access to F-35 fighter jets, meddled in the war in Gaza while seeking to shape the “day after,” and has been quietly pushing to reduce Israel’s military presence required for safeguarding its vital interests.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, September 4, 2025.

A day after the official confirmation of the death of Prime Minister Ahmad al-Rahawi and several of his ministers in the Israeli Air Force strike in Yemen, Mohammad al-Bukhaiti, a senior member of the Houthis’ political bureau, accused that “Israel has crossed all the red lines in this campaign” – and he was not wrong.

In this war, the State of Israel has indeed crossed what, in the eyes of Iran and the terror organizations, were supposed to be “red lines” in its policy. After the “decapitation operations” of Hezbollah’s leadership and the heads of Iran’s security system, the day of the Houthi leaders has also come.

But the struggle with the Houthis is far from over. In the same interview with Al-Mayadeen, the Lebanese channel identified with Hezbollah, al-Bukhaiti boasted that his movement “succeeded in imposing discipline on Britain and the US,” and promised that “it will do the same to the Zionist enemy.”

If, before the Israeli strike, the war in Gaza was the main stated reason for the continuation of the struggle, now the motivation for revenge over the elimination of the leadership and the severe humiliation of the Zaidi movement has been added to it. This in no way raises doubts about the course of action Israel chose – on the contrary, this is the way to demonstrate, and not only to the Houthis, the change that has occurred in Israel’s approach following the October 7 attack, and this is the line that should characterize its policy in the other arenas where it is contending as well.

The common denominator for all of them is the instability that allows rapid fluctuation between extreme states. Israel’s dramatic achievements have indeed created a new reality, but it is still in formation. Discussing the need for a “political act” to complement the “military act” is premature, if it is even equally applicable to all arenas. Attempting to cut corners through questionable arrangements or premature agreements could prove too costly.

Maintaining freedom of action

Under no circumstances should tangible achievements be traded for political ideas that may stir the imagination, but their chances of materializing are doubtful. Thus, one can welcome the Lebanese government’s decision to task the Lebanese army with formulating a plan to disarm Hezbollah, but also assume – with a sober look – that the likelihood of this happening is slim.

Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem made clear that the weapons issue is a red line and that his organization will never agree to disarm, and therefore one should not be tempted by the “discourse of gestures” – it is not right to reduce IDF strikes in Lebanon or reduce the Israeli military presence in order to “give President Aoun a chance and encourage him in his policy.”

Israel needs to maintain its hold on all five points in Lebanon where the IDF controls, not allow the reconstruction of Shiite villages that threaten our communities in the north, enforce decisively, and act firmly against any attempt to arm and strengthen. If and when Hezbollah is disarmed, then it will be possible to show openness to other ideas as well.

The same applies to Syria: we need to wake up from the dreams about hummus in Damascus. The refined jihadist ruler indeed spoke positively about the possibility of peace relations with Israel, and this should not be dismissed, but meanwhile, these are just words. The barbaric attacks by regime supporters against the Druze illustrated the complex internal challenges in this divided country. They reminded us and the rest of the world what the base of the new president looks like, who, next month, will stand on the UN General Assembly podium.

Even those who believe that Ahmed al-Sharaa has exhausted the jihad chapter in his life and seen the light on the path of statesmanship now understand what his power base looks like. It is hard to assume that the gang of jihadists surrounding him has abandoned the vision of establishing an extreme Sunni religious state in Greater Syria, and that it will allow action in complete opposition to this vision. Therefore, we must maintain our military presence on Mount Hermon’s peak and in the buffer zone in Syria, forcefully prevent empowerment moves that will challenge the freedom of action of our forces, and assist the Druze.

And for those who claim that Israel’s actions could undermine political opportunities: first, past experience teaches that the opposite is true – military moves may actually help clarify red lines, and, by themselves, serve as leverage for advancing political arrangements. Second, and more importantly, security without political arrangements is preferable to arrangements without security. These lessons must be remembered, especially ahead of a political month, full of initiatives and ideas.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 01, 2025.