Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey on Aug. 7. The first ministerial-level defense pact between the three parties, a Saudi official called it “comprehensive, all military means”; Pakistan’s foreign minister said it was “purely defensive” and open to any state willing to join; while his Turkish counterpart said the pact is not aimed at any other country.

In April, when a “Sunni NATO” label first got attached to the Riyadh-Ankara-Islamabad grouping, I argued that the framing of the alignment as the formation of a regional axis was mistaken. The Iran war had already proven it.

Indeed, Pakistan’s response when Iran struck Saudi Arabia showed the limits of the pact. Islamabad deployed around 16 jets, nearly 8,000 troops and an air-defense battery to Saudi soil in April under a 2025 bilateral agreement, but these were confined to an advisory role.

Moreover, all three parties are still operating under the American security architecture. One of them is even a member of NATO. They are simply maneuvering to serve their own independent interests.

• For Saudi Arabia, the pact came just weeks after a civil nuclear deal with the United States was stalled because of U.S. President Donald Trump’s precondition of normalizing relations with Israel, which the Saudis declined.
• For Pakistan, the agreement is a play aimed at developing global reach and a global image while trying to contain India’s influence in the Middle East and the international arena. Pakistan’s close relations with China are also a factor.
• For Turkey, the pact serves its aspiration to become the dominant Muslim power in the Middle East by taking advantage of Iran’s weakened position. It must be noted that, in doing so, Turkey presents a growing threat to Israel’s national security.

The pact was tested just hours after the signing when the Houthis struck Saudi-backed positions in Yemen’s Marib province, killing eight. A Saudi Aramco facility in Jazan was hit within two days. There was no sign that Turkey or Pakistan was preparing to enter the Yemen war directly. Although the agreement defines an attack on one as an attack on all, no one has defined what response such an attack would trigger. Clearly, the first attack after the signing didn’t visibly trigger anything.

Behind the optics, the most concerning aspect of the pact is the potential strengthening of military ties between Turkey and Pakistan. The Israeli government should closely monitor developments in this regard and ensure that the issue remains on the security agenda following the upcoming Israeli elections.

Some argue that Israel-India-United Arab Emirates relations were the driving force behind the Mecca agreement; however, those relations were already rooted in place years before anyone in Riyadh, Ankara or Islamabad was thinking about a formal pact. In fact, Riyadh was closer to joining the Abraham Accords than any agreement with Turkey and Pakistan.

Unlike the Mecca pact, which is driven by self-interest, Israel-UAE-India cooperation is natural and has proven resilient in challenging times. During the Iran war, Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery, interceptors and Israel Defense Forces personnel to the UAE, while the Emiratis reportedly joined Israel and the United States in striking Iran. India continued to supply defense shipments to Israel during the Gaza war despite domestic criticism, and Israel assisted India during Operation Sindoor, in which Turkey supported Pakistan.

Furthermore, the artificial and fragile connections between the members of the Mecca pact create an inherent conflict between Turkey and Saudi Arabia over who should lead the Middle East’s Muslims. This conflict is only a matter of time and could eventually bring the Saudis closer to Israel.

One major issue for the Saudis is the ongoing conflict in Gaza. At an Aug. 17 meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called progress on the administration’s 15-point Gaza framework “politically problematic” ahead of Israel’s upcoming Oct. 27 election and insisted Hamas make the first move. Hamas, however, is refusing to disarm before any Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This remains a serious obstacle to any normalization with the Saudis.

On Aug. 18, in a Fox News interview, Kushner stated that “Israeli politics in an election are very complicated. Hopefully, when we get after the Israeli election, there will be some opportunities for expansion.”

This means normalization is still on the table. In response, the Israeli political system should show unity on security matters. It ought to insist on disarming Hamas, preventing a Turkish military buildup in Syria and containing growing Pakistani-Chinese involvement in the Middle East.

With that unity, Israel can keep the possibility of normalization alive. Saudi Arabia is still negotiating its own civil nuclear deal with Washington, and that lever will stay on the table after Israel’s election and the U.S. midterms that follow. Neither Jerusalem nor Riyadh has any incentive to act before then.

Published in JNS, on August 31, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

An old Arabic proverb expresses a practical approach to life: al-af‘al ablagh min al-aqwal –actions are more persuasive than words. Israel has been putting that principle into practice in recent days in the Gaza Strip and Syria, after the diplomatic discourse surrounding both arenas created confusion and ambiguity about its current policy toward them.

Following Israel’s unusual strike in northern Syria, the prime minister explained the rationale in simple terms: “We will not tolerate Turkish military entrenchment moving south (toward Israel), because it threatens us, and we made that clear in general terms. We saw that Turkey intended to establish itself at an airfield south of its border, near Aleppo, and we sent a ‘don’t’ message. The message got through, but apparently they did not hear it, so we made sure they understood.”

The target of the Israeli strike was the Abu al-Duhur military airfield in Idlib province, about 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. A Turkish delegation had visited the site a week earlier, apparently as part of Ankara’s reconstruction efforts.

Through the strike, Israel sought to signal to Turkey and Syria that it would not allow the deployment there of various weapons systems, from air-defense systems to drones. One need not be a military expert to understand that the struggle between the countries also concerns control of, and freedom of movement through, the airspace.

The Israeli strike came at an early stage before weapons and personnel had been deployed whose subsequent targeting could have significantly increased friction and risk.

Turkey, more than any other country, has demonstrated an ability to exploit global great-power competition and the changing Middle East to establish itself as a dominant regional power. It “dances at every wedding,” extracting political dividends from every player.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime and the forced withdrawal of Iran’s military presence, Turkey became the dominant player in Syria. Turkish involvement has evolved from localized territorial control in northern Syria into broad influence across the country. Today, Turkey is a principal patron of the new government in Damascus, assisting with infrastructure reconstruction and the development of the Syrian air force and military.

Turkey is expanding and deepening its grip on its southern neighbor in numerous ways: developing energy infrastructure, opening trade corridors, building transportation infrastructure, mining phosphates, and establishing chemical industries. Its involvement extends even to influencing municipal administration in certain areas and providing healthcare, education, higher education, banking, and financial services.

Syria may be central to Erdoğan’s strategic vision, but it is only one component of his broader conception of “neo-Ottomanism.” His openly stated ambition is to restore Turkey to the status of a regional superpower and extend its influence far beyond its formal borders. This vision was evident recently in Turkey’s signing of the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” (MJDA) with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but even earlier in its efforts to open intercontinental trade corridors, its deep involvement in Africa, and its adoption of the “Blue Homeland”—Mavi Vatan—doctrine, which articulates its ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean.

Add to these trends Erdoğan’s overt hostility toward Israel, and it becomes difficult to ignore the potential for strategic friction and confrontation with him—even without mentioning the Palestinian issue and his support for Hamas.

A year ago, Turkey allowed the “World Union of Muslim Scholars” conference to take place in Ankara. During the gathering, a consensus was formulated granting religious legitimacy to the October 7 attack and declaring that “the existence of the Zionist entity lacks religious legitimacy.” Turkey continues to host senior Hamas leaders, some of whom are involved in directing terrorism in Judea and Samaria directly from Turkish territory. In addition, it is waging a legal and public-relations campaign accusing Israel of war crimes.

Indeed, Turkey is not Iran. It is a NATO member, Erdoğan has a close relationship with Trump, and despite the profound crisis, diplomatic relations with Israel have not been severed. Precisely in order to prevent rivalry from turning into military confrontation, it is important to make the red lines clear—and that is exactly what Israel sought to accomplish with the airstrike in northern Syria.

Nukhba Terrorists at a Café

The clearest illustration of how Hamas viewed Kushner’s visit came through reports of one of the counterterrorism operations carried out shortly after his meeting with Netanyahu. Buoyed by the diplomatic discourse surrounding the “15-point framework,” Hamas terrorists felt secure enough to venture into the streets and sit in a café without fear.

In another case, involving terrorists targeted in central Gaza City, the IDF spokesman stated that they had been “planning to carry out terrorist attacks against IDF forces operating in the Gaza Strip.”

A day earlier, reports emerged of Hamas detonating an explosive device and terrorists opening fire in the area of the Yellow Line in northern Gaza.

The connection between these developments requires no great leap of imagination. A great deal of talk, considerable ambiguity, strange mechanisms, and the introduction of the idea of a Palestinian state through the gates of Gaza—that is a framework that gives Hamas precisely what it needs most: security, freedom, and hope. And if that were not enough, the framework offers Hamas an additional prize: a declaration of intent regarding a path that would ultimately lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Once people begin speaking about “violations by Hamas,” a perception takes shape of a conflict in which both sides have grievances about the other’s violations and the mediators’ role is to bring the parties toward a compromise. Kushner’s meeting with Hamas commander Khalil al-Hayya reinforces that impression.

But from Israel’s perspective, there is no symmetry whatsoever. There is no shared objective or common interest. Israel has one objective in Gaza: to destroy Hamas.

Complacency must be avoided. It is reasonable to assume that the enemy is using every spare minute to rebuild its capabilities and devise new schemes. The possibility of a kidnapping attack must remain at the forefront of our soldiers’ minds, at every level and at all times.

Counterterrorism operations must continue—not only against immediate threats or those who participated in the massacre. The senior Hamas leadership that remains alive must feel the sword of counterterrorism hanging over it. The same applies to Hamas government officials, infrastructure operatives, logistical facilitators, and anyone connected to Hamas.

“Everyone understands that developments in the Gaza Strip are unfolding at an especially sensitive time for Netanyahu, who is guided by electoral calculations above all else,” Hamas’s Al-Resalah website wrote in an editorial following Israel’s resumption of counterterrorism operations in Gaza.

One can guess where they get their arguments. There is no need to debate the point with them—or with others who hold the same assessment. Our actions will speak louder than our words—in Gaza, and not only there.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Key Points

• The Mecca Pact, combining Turkey’s military power, Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, and Saudi Arabia’s resources, could restrict Israel’s freedom of action and project its influence toward Israel’s northern border.
• Past experience shows that defense alliances in the Middle East often struggle to fulfill their commitments. Nevertheless, Israel cannot assume that the Mecca Pact will also remain an empty declaration and must prepare for the potential military threat.
• Alongside its military response, Israel should initiate a regional organization for security and prosperity based on shared economic and infrastructural interests, linking India, the Persian Gulf, Israel, and Europe.
• The IMEC corridor through Israel would provide an alternative to the routes promoted by Turkey, limit Ankara’s ability to become the indispensable gateway between Asia and Europe, and strengthen Israel’s strategic position.
• The initiative is not intended to create an anti-Turkish alliance, but to ensure alternatives, redundancy, and freedom of movement – and to prevent any single state from concentrating enough power to exert political and economic pressure.

Introduction

On August 7, 2026, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement in Mecca under which an armed attack on one would be considered an attack on all three. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan even compared its central provision to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The new alliance is to establish a ministerial committee and a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, and has been presented as open to additional members.

The agreement developed out of the Saudi–Pakistani defense pact and Turkey’s efforts to expand it into a broader trilateral framework. It appears, first and foremost, to be a response to the danger Iran poses to the region and to growing doubts about the reliability of the American security umbrella. Yet Ankara’s assurances that the alliance is not directed against any particular country cannot reassure Israel. The Erdoğan government’s overt hostility toward Israel, its support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, its activities in Syria, and Ankara’s ambition to establish hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean all require Israel to assume that this new concentration of power could also be directed against it, whether directly or indirectly.

The agreement did not originate in the regional war that erupted on February 28, 2026. Talks on a trilateral pact had been underway for many months. The war, however, accelerated its development and gave it new urgency. Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, together with the disruption of shipping and energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrated to Riyadh that it could pay a heavy price for a conflict it had not initiated. The Mecca Pact is therefore both a product of doubts about the credibility of the American security umbrella and a response to the regional consequences of the war with Iran.

At first glance, this appears to be a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power. Turkey brings a large military, a growing defense industry, and NATO membership; Pakistan brings a large army and nuclear capability; and Saudi Arabia brings economic resources, standing in the Muslim world, and a strategic location astride key energy and trade routes. But before concluding that a “Muslim NATO” has been born, it is worth recalling the history of defense alliances in the Middle East.

The Graveyard of Defense Alliances

Following the failure of the Arab armies in the 1948 war, the Arab League states signed the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation in 1950. The treaty declared that aggression against one member would be considered aggression against them all, and established a Joint Defense Council and a military committee. On paper, an Arab alliance had been created. In practice, there was no unified command, no common doctrine, no permanent allocation of forces, and no demonstrated willingness by member states to subordinate their separate interests to the defense of another member.

The Baghdad Pact was established in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. It was intended to form a “northern tier” containing the Soviet Union. After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, Baghdad withdrew and the pact became CENTO. Pakistan sought help from its allies in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 – and received none, because the other members maintained that the alliance had been created to contain Moscow, not to fight India. The Iranian Revolution brought about its final dissolution in 1979.

An Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alignment arose in the 1950s as a counterweight to the Baghdad Pact, but inter-Arab rivalries proved stronger than declarations of unity. The United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria collapsed after three years. The Unified Arab Command, proclaimed in 1964, never created a genuine joint war command. The Arab coalitions of 1948, 1967, and 1973 managed to concentrate forces for particular wars, but they were ad hoc coalitions – not regional defense alliances with enduring institutions, plans, and commitments.

The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981, followed by the Peninsula Shield Force in 1984. This has been the region’s most durable security framework, yet it failed to prevent Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait in 1990; Kuwait was liberated only by an international coalition led by the United States. Peninsula Shield was deployed to Bahrain in 2011, but to protect the regime and critical infrastructure against an internal threat believed to enjoy external support – not to fulfill the classic purpose of joining a war against a state that had attacked an alliance member.

The 1991 Damascus Declaration, intended to connect the six Gulf states with Egypt and Syria in an Arab security system, likewise became an empty shell. The proposed Joint Arab Force of 2015 never materialized. The American-backed Middle East Strategic Alliance – MESA, or the “Arab NATO” – proposed after 2017 was never established. The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition maintains a headquarters in Riyadh, but it is neither a mutual defense alliance nor a joint Muslim army.

The lesson is not that alliances are worthless. It is that proclaiming an alliance does not create one. The region has never lacked treaties. What it has lacked is an agreed enemy, a unified command, operational planning, forces assigned in advance, and above all a willingness to go to war on behalf of another member. None of the region’s defense alliances has consistently fulfilled the purpose for which it was created: coming to the aid of a member under attack, or establishing a permanent mechanism through which a coalition could jointly remove an existential threat to one of its members. The Mecca Pact may repeat that history. Israel, however, cannot afford to assume that it will.

What the Pact Means for Israel: National Defense

From the standpoint of national defense, the Mecca Pact creates a potential direct and indirect threat to Israel. This does not mean that the Turkish, Saudi, and Pakistani armies will stand together against Israel tomorrow morning. Nor does it mean that Pakistan has automatically extended a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia or Turkey. But Israel must plan on the basis of potential capabilities, not reassuring declarations.

The danger is particularly complex because Turkey is a member of NATO. Article 5 does not apply to Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, and they do not inherit its protection through Ankara. A Turkish-Israeli confrontation, however, could produce a chain reaction: Israel might be compelled to neutralize a Turkish threat; Turkey could portray Israel’s action as aggression; Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could then be called upon to act under the Mecca agreement; and Ankara could seek to activate NATO’s consultation and defense mechanisms. Even if the United States and European governments prevented a NATO war with Israel, the mere possibility would restrict Israel’s freedom of action and give Turkey a dangerous sense of immunity.

Growing Turkish influence in Syria compounds the risk even without formal Syrian membership in the alliance. Ankara’s political, economic, and military support for Damascus could extend Turkish power – and, in a crisis, the weight of the Mecca Pact – toward Israel’s northern border. This scenario must now be incorporated into Israeli planning.

The IDF and Israel’s defense establishment must therefore incorporate the new alliance into their strategic assessments, force design, intelligence collection, home-front defense, infrastructure protection, and operational planning. Israel’s historic policy has not been to wait until an existential threat had fully developed and was turned against it. It has sought to remove threats while they were still in their infancy, when they could still be eliminated through a short, decisive war beyond Israel’s borders rather than through a prolonged war of attrition within them.

This is not an automatic call for preventive war. It is a demand to maintain a ready capacity for decisive action – and the freedom to use it – when a threat becomes real, grave, and imminent, and when waiting for the first blow could deprive Israel of the ability to defend itself. Israel cannot allow Turkey’s NATO membership, combined with the Mecca Pact, to shield an emerging threat from an Israeli response.

The threat therefore requires two distinct responses at two different levels. The first, at the level of national defense, is military: the IDF must possess the capacity to thwart threats originating in Turkey, whether directly or through an escalation chain activated by the Mecca Pact. This response cannot be made contingent on the success of any diplomatic initiative. The second response, at the level of national security, is intended not merely to remove a threat after it has matured, but to reshape over time the conditions and incentives that allow it to emerge. This is less obvious – and more important.

Not a Counter-Alliance, but an Organization That Builds Security

A military response is essential but insufficient. It can stop threats as they mature; it does not change Turkey’s incentive to generate them in the first place. The automatic response might be to create a countervailing defense alliance – and that would be a mistake. India is reluctant to enter alliances that obligate it to go to war; Greece is a member of NATO alongside Turkey; Cyprus is geographically important but militarily limited; and Arab states will not want to join a framework defined from the outset by its opposition to Turkey.

Instead of a defense alliance, Israel should initiate an organization for security and prosperity. The distinction is not semantic. Military defense asks how we will fight after war has broken out. National security asks how to create the diplomatic, military, economic, energy, scientific, and technological conditions that deny an adversary the ability – or the desire – to start one.

The proposal must confront an obvious difficulty. If the lesson of the historical graveyard is that declarations do not create alliances, what would prevent the proposed organization from joining the list of failures – MESA, the Damascus Declaration, and the Joint Arab Force? The answer must be structural, not rhetorical. Those initiatives failed because they sought to secure advance commitments to fight without a shared, everyday interest that justified their existence in peacetime. The organization proposed here would reverse that order. It would be built around functioning economic infrastructure – IMEC, ports, data cables, and energy networks – that provides a reason to exist even in the absence of an immediate threat. Membership would be valuable in its own right, not merely as insurance against a future war. This is the difference between an alliance that attempts to invent solidarity out of nothing and a framework that anchors an existing common interest.

The organization’s core membership could include India, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and the United Arab Emirates. Jordan is essential for land continuity; France and Italy can serve as European gateways; the United States can provide external backing in a format similar to the 3+1 framework; and Egypt can contribute the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and its weight in the Eastern Mediterranean. Saudi membership should also be welcomed – even though Riyadh is a member of the Mecca Pact. Its inclusion would demonstrate that the organization is directed neither against Islam, nor against Sunni states, nor even against Turkey, but in favor of freedom of transit, diversified centers of power, and resistance to regional coercion.

The organization could operate in seven complementary fields: diplomatic coordination; intelligence and infrastructure protection; freedom of navigation; railways, ports, and logistics centers; electricity, gas, hydrogen, and energy storage; data cables and cybersecurity; and joint research in water, agriculture, space, health, and artificial intelligence. It does not need a clause declaring that an attack on one is an attack on all. It would be sufficient to establish that a deliberate attack on the infrastructure, port, cable, pipeline, or freedom of movement of one member constitutes a threat to the security and prosperity of all – and will be met by coordinated diplomatic, economic, technological, and, where necessary, security measures.

Turkey and Pakistan may read the proposed configuration – India, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – as a counter-alliance in practice, just as Turkey itself insists that the Mecca Pact is directed against no one. That suspicion cannot be dispelled by a declaration. It can be reduced by keeping the door genuinely open to Saudi Arabia and other states, and by allowing limited Turkish participation in civilian projects in which Ankara has no veto over the corridor as a whole. This would preserve the distinction between an open organization that builds security and a confrontational military bloc.

The Mecca Pact begins with a promise to go to war and hopes that partnership will grow from it. The proposed organization would begin with a real partnership, from which the ability to prevent war – and to confront it if imposed – would grow.

Two Alignments, Two Corridors

Two economic initiatives – the western IMEC route through Israel and the Turkish routes through Iraq and Syria – are competing to shape one of the century’s most important projects: connecting the Indian Ocean basin with the Atlantic basin. The Mecca Pact did not create this competition, but it gives Turkey additional regional standing and instruments of influence that may help it tip the balance toward routes passing through its territory. This is the connection between the two alignments: not a military alliance confronting another military alliance, but growing Turkish diplomatic and military power confronting a security-economic organization that would guarantee an alternative Ankara cannot block.

The original route of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is intended to link Indian ports to the Gulf, and from there by rail through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to Israel. From Israeli ports, cargo would continue by sea to Cyprus, Greece, and Europe. This is not merely a freight route. The plan has the potential to carry electricity and energy, clean hydrogen, data, and communications, and to create joint production and research chains.

Turkey, by contrast, is advancing several alternative and complementary routes united by one principle: there can be no corridor without Turkey. The Development Road is intended to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra through Iraq to Turkey and Europe. Rail, gas, and oil links through Syria are also being promoted, together with revived routes reaching Syrian or Lebanese ports and from there, directly or through Turkey, to the European market. These plans have not yet coalesced into a single defined corridor, but they express one strategy: to make Turkey the indispensable gateway between the Gulf, Asia, and Europe, and to push Israel out of the intercontinental link. Such routes would increase Ankara’s power of coercion over Europe – not only through potential control over migration flows, but also by turning Turkey into a central gateway for energy and trade.

Here the profound difference between the two visions becomes clear. The route through Israel rests largely on stable states and existing partnerships. At its two strategic ends stand democratic bridgeheads: India in the east and Israel in the west. Between them lie the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, whose governments control their territory and are capable of protecting long-term infrastructure. Beyond Israel lie Cyprus and Greece, members of the European Union or closely tied to it and to the West.

The routes promoted by Turkey pass, at least in part, through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – weak or failed states where terrorist organizations, militias, and foreign forces operate. They terminate in Turkey, a democracy on paper in which the separation of powers, freedom of the press, and the rule of law have been eroded. Turkey is already a major transit hub for energy flowing to Europe. Increasing Europe’s dependence on it would further concentrate power in Ankara’s hands – power that could be converted into diplomatic and security pressure.

One of IMEC’s strategic advantages is that it would provide an additional route between the Indian and Atlantic Ocean basins without increasing dependence on Russia, China, Iran, or Turkey. This does not mean that the Israeli route is immune to disruption. It is exposed to risks in Jordan, the Red Sea, the Gulf, and Israel itself; without diplomatic arrangements and enormous investment, it will remain a line on a map. The Iraqi-Turkish route also enjoys the advantage of overland continuity.

A central lesson of the war with Iran is the need to avoid dependence on a single route or source. Even if a decision is made to develop an eastern route through Turkey, Israel must persuade the partners – above all Europe, the United States, and India – to establish the western alternative in parallel. Precisely because no corridor is invulnerable, Europe and India must not depend on a single gateway. Security in the twenty-first century is built through alternatives, redundancy, and diversification – not by handing the key to a single transit state.

Not Against Turkey – Against Its Capacity to Coerce

The proposed organization should not define Turkey as an enemy. Such a definition would drive away India, the UAE, Egypt, and perhaps Greece as well; strengthen Ankara’s claim that it is being encircled; and turn the corridor from an international enterprise into an instrument of regional confrontation.

The organization’s purpose should be positive and clear: connecting India to Europe; ensuring freedom of navigation and trade; diversifying energy sources and routes; protecting infrastructure; advancing science and technology; and preventing any single state from acquiring the power to block the link between the two ocean basins or condition its use on political submission.

For precisely this reason, the door should remain open to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh should not have to choose between a defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan and participation in an economic-security system with India, Israel, and Europe. On the contrary, membership in both frameworks could prevent the Mecca Pact from becoming an anti-Israel alliance and ensure that the original corridor is not displaced from its planned route. It would allow Saudi Arabia to diversify its strategic partnerships rather than replace dependence on the United States with dependence on Turkey.

Europe, too, must understand its interest. The Mecca Pact could one day confront it with the task it finds most difficult of all: war. A Turkish-Israeli confrontation could draw NATO into a crisis it did not choose. A multidimensional security organization, by contrast, would provide Europe with alternative energy and trade routes, reduce its dependence on Ankara, and create consultation and deconfliction mechanisms before a crisis becomes a war.

An Israeli National-Security Response

Israel must prepare a military response to the Mecca Pact. That is a state’s first duty to its citizens. But if it confines itself to building another squadron, another interceptor system, or another contingency plan, it will answer the challenge only at the level of national defense and forfeit the opportunity it creates at the level of national security.

The Mecca Pact seeks to combine Turkish military power, Pakistani capability, and Saudi resources. Israel’s proper response is to connect Indian power, Israeli innovation, the Greek-Cypriot position, Gulf capital and infrastructure, and European and American backing. The purpose is not to create one bloc that goes to war against another, but to build a regional order in which Turkey, Iran, or any other power cannot impose its will on its neighbors or on Europe.

This is the difference between a state that merely reacts to threats and one that changes the agenda. Against an alliance intended – at least ostensibly – to defend its members after war breaks out, Israel should initiate an organization that builds security before war begins. Against the attempt to divert the India–Europe connection toward Turkey, Israel should transform IMEC from a transportation project into the infrastructure of a new regional order.

If the national-security response succeeds – if the IMEC route through Israel is built, strengthened, and proves its value – it may also alter the Mecca Pact’s role over time. An alliance that cannot serve as an instrument for bypassing Israel or exerting pressure on it may be confined to its declared purpose: defending its members against Iran and its proxies. That is the desired strategic end state – not defeating or dismantling the alliance, but preventing it from becoming an anti-Israel pact. If a genuine convergence of interests regarding Iran emerges in the future, Israel could consider limited cooperation with its members, without joining the alliance or entrusting its security to it.

The defense alliances established in the Middle East disappeared because they promised to fight together without building a shared life. The new organization must proceed in the reverse order: build shared interests, infrastructure, knowledge, and power – and from them generate security. If it does, the Mecca Pact will not merely be another threat born in the Middle East. It will become the catalyst for Israel to regain the initiative in shaping the region.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is scheduled to host NATO leaders in Ankara next week. Unbelievably, American and European leaders are revving up their engines to coddle, cradle, and embrace this radical, antisemitic, viciously anti-Western and anti-Israeli dictator.

Washington just announced that it will ship to Ankara eighty engines worth more than $700 million for Turkey’s homegrown fighter jet, and it is positively considering letting Turkey back into the F-35 jet program (from which it was expelled in 2019 over its purchases of Russian S-400 air defense systems).

The EU is begging Turkey for a series of major economic and energy contracts, including central Turkish roles in overland energy networks that will bypass the Arabian Gulf, Russia, and Israel.

This is astonishingly unwise and infuriating because Turkey under Erdogan openly seeks to undermine the values and long-term interests of the West, and to obliterate Israel.

Erdogan seems to have no problem regularly branding the US a declining hegemon and an “imperialist sponsor of terrorism,” siding with Russia against the West in defense of Iran and in support of the Iranian economy and Iranian war effort, and hosting Hamas military headquarters – while lobbying his friend US President Donald Trump and gullible Europeans for goodies.

A series of well-documented reports this month from the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum show how Erdogan is seeking strategic autonomy and regional primacy in a post-American Middle East. His fiery language and aggressive actions (including expansion into Syria and Iraq and across the eastern Mediterranean) drive toward a Turkish-led regional order with clearly expressed Ottoman and Islamist-jihadist aspirations.

“Turkey is an adversary that occasionally cooperates, and the US is now preparing to subsidize the machine built to replace it,” writes MEF director Gregg Roman. This makes no sense. Washington is financing its own containment and calling the down-payment an alliance, he warns.

“American hardware is the rented ladder Turkey needs to climb out of its current vulnerability. The new Turkey is using the hegemon’s tools to build the machine that will one day render the hegemon irrelevant.”

Turkey also is building a Sunni alliance with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Qatar that has a malodourous anti-American scent. My Misgav Institute colleague Noa Lazimi has been tracking this, and she warns that Ankara even has drafted a model constitution for an Islamic confederation meant to replace NATO.

NATO cannot afford at the moment a complete rupture with a country that controls the Turkish Straits and hosts US nuclear weapons. But at the very least, a “reciprocity standard” should be applied to Turkey. Contracts with that country must be tied to its conduct.

It is time to confront Erdogan about his much-too-close alignment with Russia, China, and Iran; his military occupation of northern Cyprus and northern Syria; and the actual war he wages against Israel.

WHEN IT COMES to Jews, Erdogan is a true-blue believing anti-Semite of the old school, who considers classic antisemitic myths like the Protocols of the Elder of Zion (where Jews control the global banking and media conglomerates) as truth. He honestly hates Jews and Israelis, and his preference is to lead a pan-Islamic coalition to crush Israel.

For a moment, back in 2022 when he hosted Israeli President Isaac Herzog in Turkey, Erdogan seemed to welcome an improvement of ties with Israel. He managed to mutter something about opportunities for regional and bilateral cooperation.

Indeed, an Ankara-Jerusalem détente would enhance regional stability. But since October 2023, Erdogan has reverted to his default annihilationist slant on Israel.

In 2025, he publicly prayed that “Allah make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated.” Just this week, he repeated the wild claim that the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey was organized by “the genocidal, occupying, and expansionist ideology called Zionism.”

Erdogan: “When we fight Zionism, we are not conducting a personal struggle for ourselves. We are conducting this struggle for our own survival and for the collective survival of our nation. Zionism threatens not only me, not only our party, and not only our alliance, but everyone.”

Then he hit back at Israel for formally recognizing the Armenian genocide by escalating his oft-repeated false accusations of Israeli genocide: Israel being “a country that has the blood of 73,000 innocent Gazans, most of them children and women, on its hands.”

At this week, he didn’t explicitly refer to Israeli leaders as “Hitlerites” or Prime Minister Netanyahu as the “Fuhrer of our day” (as he did in 2023 and 2024), nor did he libel Israel with torture of Palestinian children “like the concentration camps during World War II, with methods that would put Nazis to shame” (as he did at a summit in Istanbul of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation).

But speaking in his playacting parliament, the Turkish tyrant said Israel’s military actions in Syria and Lebanon have escalated to a level that could endanger Turkey, warning that Israeli “aggression” poses a threat to the entire world and must be stopped.

And apparently, according to President Trump, Erdogan’s military was prepped to join Iran’s war against Israel this year until Trump “asked Erdogan not to do so.” But that has not stopped Erdogan from threatening Israel repeatedly with war over gas fields in the Mediterranean.

Last week, the IDF revealed yet another Hamas terrorist network directed from Turkish soil which recruited operatives to carry out terror attacks and which transferred weapons and funds into Judea and Samaria. Turkey has hosted a Hamas headquarters since 2012, and has given full backing to the Palestinian terror group since its 2023 assault into Israel and subsequent massacres and kidnappings.

Furthermore, Erdogan has led a Turkish invasion of Jerusalem. He is investing tens of millions of dollars per year in Islamic missionary (dawa) activities, renovation of Moslem institutions, holiday handouts, and social networking in eastern Jerusalem – glorifying terrorists and explicitly calling for violent resistance to Israel. Turkish-backed clerics and other radical Islamist actors have led troublemaking on the Temple Mount and other subversive activities.

The Turkish consulate in Jerusalem and two Turkish quasi-governmental agencies are directly implicated in this activity; by their own admission, to the tune of over $40 million a year. As a result, Turkish flags today fly everywhere in eastern Jerusalem and prominently on the Temple Mount too.

The Turkish purpose is not at all innocuous. It is to weaken Israel’s hold in the holy city, and to bolster Erdogan’s claim to leadership of the Moslem world on a path to a global Islamic sultanate.

And at home, Erdogan has jailed more journalists, judges, generals and academics than any other country in the world, including China. He is building 40,000 new jail cells to handle the overload. He is creating an authoritarian system to suit his imperial purposes.

So, Erdogan needs to be cut down to size, and his madly ambitious-ferocious foreign and defense policies put in a box. How can it be that American and European leaders don’t see this?

How can they knowingly ignore Erdogan’s smearing of the West and concrete undermining of Western interests, as well as his demonizing talk and dangerous moves against Israel? How can they waltz into Ankara next week to hug, kiss, and reward Erdogan without demanding that he back off his belligerence?

Published in The Jerusalem Post 03.07.2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The restrictions imposed on IDF activity in Lebanon and the halt to strikes in Beirut are allowing Hezbollah to continue violating the ceasefire without fearing that the price it will pay will be unbearable. They leave the Lebanese terrorist organization in control of the location, timing, frequency and means by which it clashes with Israel, as well as control over the intensity of the escalation. In practice, this also gives Hezbollah the ability to set new rules and shape the equations of response against Israel.

President Donald Trump sought to restrain Israel in order to pave the way for diplomatic dialogue between Jerusalem and President Joseph Aoun’s government. In practice, he has denied Israel part of the freedom of action it had until two months ago and allowed it to continue operating with one hand tied behind its back.

In the US president’s view, a process that leads to a diplomatic agreement could push Hezbollah into a corner, strip it of legitimacy to continue fighting and thereby weaken its grip on Lebanon. In Washington, as in Riyadh, the belief is that a US agreement with Iran, together with an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, would force Hezbollah to stop fighting and perhaps even place its heavy weapons under international supervision. Happy is he who believes.

Given Lebanon’s complex reality, Trump may discover that the restraint he imposed actually serves Hezbollah, the main opponent of the diplomatic process and the primary proxy arm of the Iranian enemy.

Disproportionate response

Too many players, domestic and foreign, are stirring the Lebanese pot. It is difficult to untangle the web of tensions, and there is no point in delving into its depths. The main question that should guide Israel’s policy is how to remove the security threat posed to it by Hezbollah. If Gen. Aoun were capable of providing that, perhaps there would be room to discuss the price with him. But he comes to the negotiations with a different expectation: to stop Israel’s military activity and establish a process that will lead to the IDF’s withdrawal and restrict Israeli activity in his country.

Aoun and his people would indeed like to see Hezbollah disarmed, but even they do not pretend to present this as a realistic goal they can achieve on their own, and they have no intention of entering confrontations that would return Lebanon to the era of car bombs and civil war. When these are the starting assumptions for the talks, Israel should not pay the price.

It is possible that Israel had no choice but to accept Trump’s invitation to negotiations. We have tried the ceasefire that was required in exchange. The task of Israel’s political echelon now is to convince Trump that the chances of weakening Hezbollah through diplomatic means are slim.

It must make clear that the restrictions on Israel’s activity in Lebanon not only fail to strengthen Aoun’s government against Hezbollah, but also entrench Iran’s grip on this arena and encourage the regime in Tehran, contrary to the Americans’ clear interest.

Israel should not play by the rules Hezbollah sets. Nor should it play by Gen. Aoun’s rules. Its responses to ceasefire violations should be disproportionate in order to shake Hezbollah’s basic assumptions as it plans operations against us.

Hamas digs in

Almost a month has passed since the Peace Council, headed by Nikolay Mladenov, delivered to Hamas its proposal for a process to disarm the terrorist organization. Hamas leaders said they were holding in-depth consultations on the matter. They have yet to deliver their official position. In the meantime, they have sufficed with a list of Israeli violations and a demand that Israel fulfill all its obligations as a condition for any further move.

There is no need to wait with bated breath for the official answer. Hamas spokespeople have repeatedly stated their position rejecting any compromise on the issue of weapons. On the mediators’ advice, they have lowered the media volume on this issue, but their position has not changed. When the final official wording arrives, it may not include the word “no,” but that will be its meaning.

Last week, it was reported that in an intelligence document submitted to the political echelon, IDF officials warned that Hamas was rebuilding significantly during the ceasefire. We did not need that to understand that this is the situation. Quite a few columns and articles on this issue, based on open-source information, have also been published in the pages of this newspaper. A large part of Hamas’ moves is carried out openly and without efforts at concealment, also with the intention of making clear who the sovereign is here. If this is what is happening above ground, one can only estimate what is happening below it.

Mladenov and the Peace Council members are sincere in their efforts, but they, too, would admit that their ability to influence Hamas on the weapons issue is quite limited.

It is time for cunning in Gaza

Two significant constraints shape Israeli policy in Gaza. The first is diplomatic: the commitment to the 20-point plan and the desire not to be seen as having torpedoed Trump’s initiative. The second constraint is resources. The Gaza Strip is a secondary arena. The opportunity vis-a-vis Iran requires placing it at the center of efforts and not allowing any other arena to divert attention and focus from it. Nevertheless, the impression is that there remains considerable room for action by our forces within existing resources and without undermining the diplomatic understandings.

This is not only about efforts to thwart smuggling and weapons production and to strike Hamas’ takeover of resources intended for Gaza’s population. It can be assumed that one possibility will also be low-profile initiated operations, including strikes on operatives, infrastructure, weapons stockpiles, tunnels, governing facilities and the like. Such operations, carried out with the resources available to the Shin Bet security agency and Southern Command, would force Hamas to invest in defending its assets instead of rebuilding or attacking our forces. The cunning operations attributed to the Mossad in other arenas can serve as inspiration for the type of activity needed in Gaza. Without that, terrorist attacks and assaults by this enemy against us are only a matter of time.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 27, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Strategic discussions about Iran typically revolve around two main approaches: containing its nuclear program or pursuing regime change. Both, however, focus primarily on leadership while overlooking a deeper and more decisive factor, the structure of the state itself, particularly its degree of centralization. Historical experience suggests that highly centralized states can preserve and even rebuild their strategic capabilities over time, despite significant political upheavals.

Libya under Muammar Gaddafi provides a useful illustration. Following the 1969 coup that overthrew King Idris, Libya transitioned from a weak, decentralized monarchy into a highly centralized regime. Gaddafi consolidated power by eliminating rival centers of authority, nationalizing oil resources, and building loyal security institutions. This centralization enabled Libya to act assertively on the international stage and project influence disproportionate to its size.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Libya became a prominent actor in the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, supporting Palestinian organizations, revolutionary movements in Africa, and militant groups in Europe. Despite sustained external pressure, including US airstrikes in 1986, the regime’s centralized structure proved resilient and did not immediately alter its behavior.

In the early 2000s, Libya shifted course, abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and seeking rapprochement with the West. While this improved its international standing, the internal structure of the state remained highly centralized. The decisive turning point came in 2011, when internal uprisings combined with NATO intervention led to the collapse of the regime. Crucially, the centralized system disintegrated without being replaced by a stable alternative, resulting in fragmentation into rival militias and competing centers of power.

The consequences became starkly evident in 2012 with the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, which symbolized the loss of central authority and the rise of decentralized instability. In classical strategic terms, post-2011 Libya ceased to pose a significant state-based threat: it no longer maintained a nuclear program, coherent foreign policy, or capacity for power projection. However, it became a locus of chronic instability, characterized by militia rule and external interference.

The Libyan case highlights a fundamental strategic dilemma: is it preferable to confront a centralized state capable of posing an existential threat, or to contend with a fragmented environment that lacks unified strategic capabilities but generates persistent, low-level risks? Centralization facilitates the development of advanced capabilities and coordinated power projection, whereas fragmentation constrains these capabilities while producing enduring instability.

Applying this insight to Iran suggests that current debates are incomplete if they focus solely on regime change or nuclear containment. Iran combines strong centralization, ideological motivation, and advanced capabilities, making it a formidable strategic challenge.

Under these circumstances, it may be worth considering whether sustained external pressure could weaken Iran’s central authority. Such a process might embolden ethnic and religious minorities to challenge the regime, potentially leading to fragmentation akin to the Libyan case. In such a scenario, Iran could lose its capacity to function as a coherent strategic actor, thereby reducing the scale of the threat it poses. However, this outcome would likely come at the cost of prolonged instability and uncertainty.

Strategic thinking about Iran must therefore move beyond leadership-focused approaches and address the underlying structure of the state. The Libyan example demonstrates that dismantling centralization can eliminate a coherent state threat—but it also creates new, complex, and enduring risks that must be carefully weighed.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 16, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

So far, Turkey has reported three separate incidents involving ballistic missiles launched from the direction of Iran toward Turkish airspace. Ankara’s restrained response thus far largely reflects its complex interests vis-à-vis Tehran. The prevailing narrative in Turkish media and in statements by officials is that the missiles fired from Iran toward Turkish airspace – intercepted by NATO – were not intended for Ankara. According to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, the matter is currently under diplomatic clarification: Turkey has requested an explanation from Iran while reserving the right, if necessary, to defend its security.

The statement by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli that an uncontrolled weakening of Iran (as well as the collapse of Lebanon) could trigger a wave of instability spreading across the region reflects, to some extent, the cautious position Turkey has adopted in light of the war in Iran and the potential risk of its collapse.

Ankara may welcome the weakening of its long-standing rival, one with which it competes for regional influence and leadership of the Muslim world. At the same time, however, it fears the consequences of chaos emerging in the wake of war, the possible spillover of the conflict into its own territory, and the strengthening of Israel’s regional position.

The risks are numerous: a massive influx of refugees, popular unrest in Iran that could serve as a model for Turkey’s domestic opposition, the strengthening of Kurdish groups that Ankara views as hostile, and even the potential groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Kurdish state. Against this backdrop, a scenario in which the ayatollah regime is replaced by a pro-Western government aligned with Israel would also be viewed unfavorably in Ankara.

Yet alongside cautious declarations about the desire to renew negotiations that could end the war and restore regional stability – and warnings against the fragmentation of Iran into ethnic entities – Turkey may also be preparing a contingency plan for what it would define as an emergency requiring intervention. It is conceivable that if refugee flows expand significantly, or if Kurdish autonomy or independence is declared in Iran, Turkey could move to establish a buffer zone along the border inside Iranian territory, which it would present as a necessary step to contain the threats emanating from escalating instability in the neighboring state.

There are precedents for such a move. During the 1991 Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees, fearing the Iraqi army, fled toward the northern border with Turkey. Ankara succeeded in preventing their permanent settlement by establishing a protected zone in northern Iraq as part of an international operation.

In the Syrian case, Turkey explicitly promoted the idea of a “security zone” designed not only to push hostile Kurdish forces away from the border but also to resettle Syrian refugees there. In practice, since 2019, as part of Operation Peace Spring, a de facto Turkish-controlled area has existed in northern Syria, including not only Turkish military presence, but also civilian infrastructure such as schools and municipal services, and even Turkish currency.

This pattern could, under certain conditions, be replicated in the Iranian arena if Ankara concludes that the collapse of order along the border poses a direct threat to its security. Such a move would not be without constraints. Foremost among them are restraining factors in the international arena, particularly the United States, which could use its influence to oppose a deep Turkish military operation inside Iranian territory.

For now, Ankara appears to prefer maintaining a cautious, moderate tone, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, however, a narrative is taking shape in Turkish political and media discourse emphasizing the dangers of instability, refugee flows, and the Kurdish threat. If the crisis intensifies, this narrative could help lay the groundwork for a possible Turkish intervention.

From Israel’s perspective, the primary strategic objective at this stage remains the downfall of the Iranian regime, while recognizing that such a process could also bring about greater Turkish involvement in the regional arena and prompt Ankara to leverage the situation for significant strategic gains. Israel will not be able to control all the dynamics that may emerge following a substantial weakening – or even collapse – of the regime in Iran. It must therefore take into account that such a development could also strengthen Turkey’s regional position, a challenge it will likely need to address sooner or later.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 18, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Hezbollah’s decision to join the war “resembles the dilemma of a patient forced to choose between a dangerous emergency operation and quietly waiting for certain death.” This is how a commentator on the Lebanese channel Al-Mayadeen, which is aligned with Hezbollah, described the choice facing the organization’s leadership about whether to enter the war.

This self-justifying description was aimed mainly at Lebanese ears. It was meant to soothe the anger over the price the Land of the Cedars is paying – and is still expected to pay – because of the dubious service the proxy organization provides to its Iranian patron. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Naim Qassem, who is under heavy domestic pressure, quickly rejected the criticism. The war is not for Iran, he claimed. According to him, Hezbollah’s actions merely accelerated an attack that Israel had already planned.

In any case, Hezbollah’s response does not fit the description of a gravely ill patient, certainly not a terminal one. In its attacks on the Israeli home front, mainly in the north, it is succeeding in providing what Iran expected from it: an active second front. Every minute of attention by Israel’s political-security leadership that is directed toward Hezbollah rather than Iran is a gain for its sponsors. The same applies to the diversion of military resources, especially those that could otherwise be used to fight Iran. The division of attention naturally also influences the character of Israel’s operations against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena.

Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign did provide Israel with the opportunity it had been awaiting to deal with the Shiite terrorist organization, but it came at a time when Israel is striving to fully exploit the larger opportunity: the joint war with the United States against Iran, which is also Hezbollah’s main sponsor.

The impression so far is that Israel is dividing its attention and resources between the two arenas optimally. The focus on Iran as the primary theater reflects the magnitude and rarity of the opportunity, while the Lebanese challenge is currently receiving only the essential response. The time for a systematic campaign will come. The end of the war with Iran will by no means mark the end of the fighting with Hezbollah; quite the opposite. It will enable the concentration of the bulk of forces and attention on that front when the Iranian patron is battered and bleeding.

Meanwhile, under the constraint of divided resources, and when Israel cannot continue absorbing Hezbollah’s attacks, it is entitled, and perhaps even obliged, to adopt a more aggressive approach in Lebanon. Alongside active defense, retaliatory steps should follow the principle of inflicting maximum damage with minimal resources and risks.

As for the fundamental response, the possible courses of action are well known. Some are even discussed in the media, and there is no need to detail them again here. At the base of this response should stand three assumptions: Hezbollah will not relinquish its military capabilities; the Lebanese government will not disarm it; and diplomatic agreements will not prevent its entrenchment and military buildup.

Reports about the achievements of the IDF and the US military in striking Iran usually focus on quantitative data about “what we have taken” from the enemy. No less interesting, however, is “what remains” – the residual capabilities still in its hands.

One can understand the difficulty in providing such information. Sometimes it stems from gaps in knowledge and intelligence; sometimes from the need to protect sources; and sometimes from the desire to prevent the enemy from understanding what we know. All of these are legitimate considerations when information is presented to the general public, but decision-makers must receive detailed and up-to-date answers to these questions.

The fact that Israel finds itself fighting Iran and Hezbollah not long after the previous rounds of confrontation with them ended illustrates the danger of settling for limited achievements against a determined enemy that retains residual capabilities and conditions enabling its recovery. Sometimes that is the lesser evil. That is not the case when there exists an opportunity to bring about a fundamental change, as in the case of Iran.

Many of the messages in the speeches of President Donald Trump and his associates are intended to create a perception of victory, not based on general impressions and feelings, but on detailed quantitative achievements relative to the objectives defined.

The avoidance of declaring regime change as an official objective of the war does not necessarily reflect the real aspirations regarding that outcome. It can be assumed that this stems from the difficulty of assessing the likelihood of achieving such a goal, which depends on internal Iranian factors, as well as from a desire to avoid a burdensome controversy in light of past disappointments from wars that failed to deliver such ambitions. The objective has therefore been defined as “creating enabling conditions.”

The achievements of the war so far are dramatic. Through an orderly and systematic process, Iran is being stripped not only of its military capabilities – missiles, the nuclear program, naval forces, air capabilities, and the like—but also of its infrastructure and economic assets. In the internal struggle that awaits it over the survival of the regime, Iran will face the challenge with a command-and-control system functioning only partially, battered institutions, a deep economic hole, and a regime whose legitimacy is at a low point.

The deeper, broader, and more prolonged the damage, the greater the challenge the regime will face in ensuring its survival, especially if it finds no hope for resolving the fundamental problems it suffered from before the war and that will worsen as a result of it. There is no way of knowing whether the terrorist regime will ultimately fall, but the opportunity that has emerged to achieve this must not be missed. As long as it exists, it will continue to cast a threatening shadow over Israel and the entire region. Its survival would inspire extremist Islamist forces everywhere.

From an Iranian perspective, the most significant advantage the regime brings to its confrontation with the West is patience. The sensitivity of Western societies to casualties, economic costs, and disruptions to everyday life sustains Tehran’s hope.

President Trump understands this. He is clearly aware of the rare opportunity and is concerned that it might be missed because of impatience. “We don’t want to leave early,” he said. “We have to finish this.” “We don’t want to have to go back there every two years.”

His remarks accurately reflect the prevailing sentiment in Israel as well.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 15, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The joint US-Israeli operation against Iran has produced a development few could have imagined on the eve of the attack: the Islamic Republic of Iran has launched about 3,000 missiles and drones at Arab countries. No fewer than 1,668 launches were directed at the United Arab Emirates, a number far higher than the total fired at Israel.

Abu Dhabi has firmly denied Israeli reports that it struck an Iranian desalination facility in retaliation. Yet the questions now echoing across the Middle East remain unchanged: Why is Iran attacking its neighbors with such intensity? And are those countries about to respond militarily?

Iran’s assault on the Gulf is not irrational. Rather, it is part of a calculated strategy aimed at coping with the combined power of the US and Israel and surviving the conflict. Leaders in Tehran understand that the country’s defense systems are incapable of fully stopping the blows being dealt to them. Their hope, therefore, is to pressure US President Donald Trump into halting the war before the regime weakens to the point that domestic opponents might topple it.

To create that pressure, Iran is trying to undermine the foundations of what could be called the “Gulf model”: the image of Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates, as islands of stability, prosperity and energy wealth. By disrupting oil flows and targeting major business hubs, the ayatollahs are betting that Gulf governments will pressure Washington to end the war prematurely.

This strategy of pressing Trump to halt the operation is also evident in other fronts. For example, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has begun echoing rhetoric that sounds as though it were lifted from the monologues of Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens, claiming that Trump is being “misled” by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and that this is a war of “Israel first” rather than “America first.” The aim is clear: to stir opposition to the war among Trump’s Republican base.

For now, however, Iran appears to be failing on both fronts. Polls in the US show that between 77% and 84% of Republicans support the operation. In the Gulf, despite the economic damage, air defense systems have recorded impressive successes. The United Arab Emirates has reported an extraordinary interception rate of 99% for missiles and 94% for drones.

That success has fueled national pride in the Emirates and strengthened confidence in the country’s military capabilities and national resilience. Public opinion across Gulf states has also hardened significantly against Iran.

The major question now is under what circumstances, if any, the United Arab Emirates will respond directly with military force. Abu Dhabi has remained cautious, wary of being dragged into a broader confrontation and uncertain whether the ayatollah regime might ultimately survive.

As Anwar Gargash, senior adviser to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, put it: “The Emirates is in a state of self-defense. Any defensive step taken will be public and clear. Our goal is to stop this ongoing aggression, not to be drawn into escalation.”

Still, there are signs that Emirati patience is running out. President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed sent a pointed message yesterday: “The United Arab Emirates has thick skin and bitter flesh. We are not easy prey.”

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess advanced and well-trained air forces. If it becomes clear that the US and Israel are indeed determined to go all the way and bring down the rule of the ayatollahs, and if that determination is backed by sustained strikes against Iran’s governing, military and internal security targets, the Emirates may decide to actively join the campaign.

The likelihood of such a move increases for one reason: even if the US and Israel destroy most of Iran’s missile launch infrastructure, it will be far more difficult to eliminate Tehran’s drone-launch capabilities entirely. That threat will continue to provoke the anger of Gulf states. In such a scenario, the United Arab Emirates would likely strike clearly defined military targets while seeking to minimize civilian casualties.

Such a step would cement Abu Dhabi’s standing not only as a global economic and energy power but also as a regional military force capable of defending its sovereignty with offensive tools.

For Israel, this represents a historic opportunity to deepen security cooperation and advance the vision of a Middle Eastern strategic alliance that could reshape the region for generations to come.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 08, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The joint Israeli-American strike on Iran has thrown Tehran into turmoil. The extensive scale of launches and strikes across the Gulf states underscored its willingness to exact a regional price. By expanding its attacks beyond military infrastructure to include civilian targets and oil facilities, Tehran overstepped and crossed yet another threshold in the conflict. Yet, the desperate move to restore its lost honor and to exert regional and global pressure on Washington to retreat only worsened its position.

After years of restraint, the region’s states are now being compelled to recognize that standing aside is no longer tenable and that Tehran must be made to pay a price. Following Iran’s escalating attacks, the time for a forceful response has arrived: Doha shot down two Iranian fighter jets and, according to reports, carried out strikes on Iranian soil. In Riyadh, preparations are underway for a possible entry into the conflict, and a similar option is reportedly under consideration in Abu Dhabi.

It must be acknowledged that Gulf states have long been aware of the Iranian threat but most of them chose to rely on Israel and the United States to address it on their behalf, while maintaining distance from Israel and at times even hostility toward it. Fearing Iranian retaliation and the consequences of regional escalation for their oil reserves, these states took care to appease Tehran and preserve normal—even close—relations with it, even as they quietly hoped for Iran’s weakening, particularly the halting of its nuclear and missile programs.

While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain opted for overt ties and cooperation with Israel, others—foremost among them Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—condemned Israel even as it acted against the Iranian axis that threatens them as well. They tended to favor accommodation and the preservation of dialogue with Tehran over escalation, even though the diplomatic track proved ineffective in curbing the threats emanating from it. This choice carried practical consequences: it weakened the deterrent effect and signaled to Tehran that its policies would not entail a tangible cost.

As for Saudi Arabia, the picture appears somewhat more complex. According to a report in The Washington Post, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman held several conversations with President Trump in recent months to advance an attack against the Islamic Republic, in stark contrast to the public stance he projected, including refusal to allow American strikes from Saudi territory. If accurate, this disclosure somewhat mitigates the criticism directed at Riyadh, alongside indications that the Saudis likely provided assistance in the defensive envelope, even if not in the offensive campaign, both in this and previous rounds. At the same time, this does not absolve the kingdom of having permitted—or turned a blind eye to—the recent anti-Israel campaign that spread through Saudi media, nor of regional moves suggesting rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Turkey, rather than strengthening the camp of moderation led by Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Ultimately, the risk-management policy that relied on maintaining an open channel with Tehran, coupled with public criticism of Israel and the assumption that Washington and Jerusalem would shoulder the burden of containing the threat, did not deliver the level of strategic immunity it was intended to secure. In the end, Iran did not distinguish between those who actively acted against it and those who avoided direct confrontation and confined themselves to balanced statements.

It is possible that had some regional states aligned themselves at an earlier stage with Israel, and advanced a coordinated regional framework to curb Iran’s growing power, they might have been able to establish joint deterrence and defense mechanisms and promote security measures capable of arresting the threat at an earlier phase — before the conflict reached the gates of their own capitals.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, March  03, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.