“What the brave Yemeni people are doing today is the right step in confronting the crimes of the Zionist entity, which is now the most hated in the world. All routes of support for this entity must be cut off,” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in a speech earlier this week.

Although Khamenei’s comments referred mainly to the so-called naval blockade announced by the Houthis against Israel and the terrorism they are waging to prevent ships linked to Israel from crossing the Red Sea, his words also hinted at threats toward Western countries. He suggested Iran could impose restrictions on the passage of “hostile vessels” through the Strait of Hormuz if the West fails to reach understandings with Tehran.

Regardless, the latest wave of Israeli Air Force strikes over Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, has disrupted the momentum the Houthis had been drawing from Iran’s backing.

As Israel continues preparing for a ground takeover of Gaza City, and as the ripple effects of the Shiite axis’ defeat are felt in Syria and Lebanon, rocket and drone launches from Yemen persist. The Houthis’ ongoing fire, and the Israeli retaliatory strikes, have created a daily rhythm of attacks and counterattacks that, without prior intention, have solidified into a “response equation.”

Tehran traditionally claims that the Houthis act according to their own worldview and interests, and therefore Iran should not be held accountable for their actions. The same line is taken regarding other organizations that Israel and much of the international community see as Iranian proxy forces, extensions of the Islamic Republic’s “octopus.”

Even if there were some truth in these denials, Tehran’s officials would struggle to hide Iran’s role in arming the Houthis with the very ballistic missiles and drones they use to target Israel. Iran’s missile industry, whose dangers were clearly demonstrated in recent years, remains a strategic threat not only to Israel but also beyond. Just in the past few days, Iran’s new defense minister openly declared that Tehran continues to produce weapons and missiles “even right now.”

Iran’s attempt to separate the Houthis’ campaign from its own role, just as it seeks to separate the nuclear issue from its ballistic missile program, serves its double aim: preserving the use of proxy warfare while avoiding restrictions on its missile production and proliferation.

Israel still has military options against the Houthis that it has not fully employed. These could significantly raise the cost of continued attacks, target wider economic interests, eliminate leaders, and increase their sense of vulnerability from more than just airstrikes. Yet it is important to remember that Yemen is a secondary arena, and its geographic distance gives Israel advantages as well. Excessive focus there could inadvertently serve Israel’s other enemies.

Alongside military operations to break the “response equation,” Israel must now focus directly on Iran as the critical timeframe approaches to reimpose sanctions lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal. That agreement included a unique “snapback” clause allowing the renewal of international sanctions with the support of a majority of the signatory states. This clause is set to expire on October 18, and to invoke it requires 30 days’ advance notice. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already declared that Iran is not honoring its commitments.

The E3 countries – Germany, France, and Britain – hold the ability to trigger the snapback. They have warned that if Iran does not shift its stance in the nuclear talks by the end of August, they will be forced to act. Such a move would reinstate a global arms embargo and restrictions on missile production and distribution. Talks on this issue are set to continue tomorrow in Vienna at the deputy foreign ministers’ level.

Israel must press the US administration to influence the E3 decisively. Iran’s conduct provides full justification for renewing sanctions. It would be a grave mistake to use this leverage merely as a negotiating tool to push Iran toward an agreement, after it has repeatedly violated past commitments.

Instead, it is time to bring the whip down directly on the regime. After the military setback it suffered in the recent 12-day war, and amid the severe domestic crises battering it, the reimposition of crippling sanctions could, if not immediately, then eventually, bring the most significant achievement in Israel’s struggle with Iran: destabilizing the radical regime itself.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 25, 2025.

Israel’s recent intervention to assist the Druze community in Syria through airstrikes targeting their assailants and regime-related sites reinforced Israel’s credibility as a reliable protector of its allies and as an actor capable of maintaining effective military control in a demilitarized zone that it has defined. This operation also contributed to Israel’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis the Syrian regime and bolstered its regional standing in a “violent neighborhood.”

At the same time, Israel’s forceful response raises important questions about the broader implications of using significant, and arguably excessive, military force in the Syrian arena. This is particularly sensitive given Israel’s interest in maintaining regime stability in Damascus, expanding its security coordination and laying the groundwork for Syria’s potential future integration into the Abraham Accords. Israel must also preserve close alignment with the United States, which appears uneasy with the forcefulness of Israel’s actions and its potential impact on American interests in Syria.

With the potential for renewed clashes between Bedouin and Druze communities in southern Syria, Israel’s strategic dilemma becomes even more acute. It must determine an approach that effectively advances its interests in three dimensions—security, diplomacy and values—while managing inherent tensions between them.

Israel stands at a strategic fork in the road. Alongside its clear security interests—securing the buffer zone along the northern border, keeping the area south of Damascus demilitarized and ensuring the safety of the Druze community—it must maintain open channels of communication with the Syrian regime. These channels are critical to enabling future understandings between Israel and Syria under American auspices and through sustained coordination with Washington.

In essence, Israel needs to strike a careful balance between maintaining its essential military presence and advancing its diplomatic and political objectives, while honoring its moral and historical commitment to the Druze citizens of Israel and the Druze minority in the broader region.

Looking ahead, Israel must adopt an integrated strategic approach to achieving its goals. Military force will remain a central element of its policy, especially for enforcing demilitarization requirements, but any consideration of strikes against regime symbols must be weighed with caution, based on careful risk-benefit analysis.

Simultaneously, Israel should constantly examine opportunities for stabilizing and calming the Syrian arena and integrating it into a new regional architecture, without trading away core security assets for theoretical promises or short-term achievements.

Another important element is the use of diplomatic levers. This includes exerting political pressure on the Syrian regime through closer coordination with the United States and leveraging the influence of key regional allies, chief among them Saudi Arabia. Enhancing Saudi Arabia’s role in the Syrian arena, particularly through its economic and political contributions to reconstruction efforts in Damascus, could serve as a powerful lever for nudging the regime toward a more moderate path, thereby reducing the influence of extremist actors and counterbalancing the emerging Turkey-Qatar axis, which operates as a destabilizing force.

Regarding the Druze, Israel must make clear that its commitment is not unlimited. Domestically, Israeli society must reshape its relationship with the Druze community based on a clear civic principle: Druze citizens are full and equal members of Israeli society, enjoying the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities as all citizens. Accordingly, Israel will not turn a blind eye to violations of law and order, especially dangerous and irresponsible actions like crossing the border into Syria, even if done in solidarity.

Externally, Israel should define clear and limited boundaries to its responsibilities toward the Druze outside its territory. A prudent policy would involve enabling the Druze to defend themselves through measured assistance, while avoiding Israeli entanglement in Syria’s civil war, an entanglement that could jeopardize broader Israeli security interests.

Ultimately, the strategic mix that Israel must pursue should serve a range of vital interests alongside value-based commitments. The interworkings between these elements require a delicate blend of statesmanship and military strategy, woven together into a coherent and effective Israeli policy capable of reshaping the regional landscape.

Published in JNS, August 05, 2025.

Syria brought back many to the horrors of the Islamic State in 2014-2017, and some Israelis and Druze among them to the horrors of October 7. The rivalry and hostility between the Sunni Bedouin tribes in the region and the Druze date back to the days of the Assad regime.

The Druze, who by virtue of their religious faith show absolute loyalty to the government in the country in which they live and impose a ban on their own independent state, were also loyal to the Assad regime in Syria. Many Druze served in senior positions in the army and security apparatuses of the Assad regime, which showed great hostility towards the Sunni majority in Syria.

During the long civil war, the Syrian regime massacred religious and ethnic groups that were not Alawites or Shiites, especially the Sunni majority. Its actions led to a huge wave of refugees, about six million Syrians who fled their country, the vast majority of whom are Sunni. Many others became displaced in their homeland, and many were brutally murdered by the Syrian army and its security forces.

The Druze, even if they did not take an active part in the atrocities, are identified by most Sunnis, who were oppressed by the regime, as part of the Assad regime and as accomplices in the regime’s atrocities against the Sunni majority.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime and the takeover of Syria by HTS, led by Ahmed al-Sharra (al-Julani), the wounds of the past were reopened and acts of revenge began against anyone identified as part of the Assad regime or its supporters. This is, in fact, the background to the attacks by Sunni Bedouin tribes in southern Syria on the Druze in the Druze Mountain and Sweida, as well as other Druze communities near Damascus.

Horrific massacres occurred both in the Latakia region, where the majority of the Alawite population lives, and in Damascus itself, against a Christian population also identified as having supported and collaborated with the Assad regime. The massacres were carried out by former ISIS members and other jihadists who had gathered in Syria over the years, whether in spontaneous organisations or as part of the new Syrian army.

Ahmed al-Sha’ar, the leader of Syria, who was once one of the senior operatives of al-Qaeda, left the organisation and later founded the coalition of Sunni jihadist organisations (the Front for the Liberation of al-Sham), HTS. He was previously arrested by the Americans for his murderous terrorist activities and was even imprisoned for several years. His hands are certainly stained with a great deal of blood, and it is not entirely clear whether the fact that he carefully shaved his beard and replaced his galabeya with a suit indeed symbolises the abandonment of his jihadist beliefs and methods.

This reality of murderous acts of revenge in the wake of a change in minority rule is not new or unique to Syria, where the Alawite minority ruled. We also saw it in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, which relied on the Sunni minority and suppressed the Shi’ite majority. Israel is encountering this reality after a traumatic event that was burned into the consciousness of the Jewish collective on October 7 and a difficult multi-front regional war in which it has been engaged ever since.

The Israeli strategic compass, which was recalibrated after October 7, led to the design of a strategy whose purpose is to change the entire regional system by collapsing or significantly weakening its most significant and problematic centre of gravity – Iran. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is a consequence of the Israeli strategy and came after a severe blow to Hezbollah and Iran.

The demise of the Assad regime opened up the possibility for Israel to significantly reshape the arena and remove a major threat from Syria. Indeed, Israel took advantage of the historical and strategic opportunity to destroy the Syrian army’s infrastructure in order to prevent these capabilities from falling into the hands of hostile jihadist elements, and to ensure an open land and, especially, air corridor on the way to Iran. In addition, Israel took control of the buffer zone established in the 1974 disengagement agreements in order to prevent the penetration of jihadist forces into the zone and to thwart terrorist attacks against Israel from the Golan Heights border.

Israel has no territorial interests in Syria, and the takeover of the buffer zone is based on a security need at this time and given the reality of governmental instability in Syria. Israel is prepared to negotiate with Syria in order to reach updated and effective security arrangements, and indeed, it has recently been reported on several occasions and by several sources that meetings have taken place between senior Israeli and Syrian officials to formulate agreements on these issues.

Within the buffer zone defined by Israel – larger than the buffer zone in which IDF forces are present and operating – is the Druze Mountain. It also includes the city of Sweida, the largest concentration of the Druze population in Syria. The presence of a large Druze population in this area helps to prevent the activity of Sunni jihadist militias and thus serves Israel’s security interests.

At the same time, the Druze population in the area has extensive family ties to Druze citizens of Israel. The Druze communities are known for maintaining close ties with each other, and their sense of persecution in the region (the Druze minority numbers only about a million people, scattered across four countries: Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) intensifies their sense of solidarity and mutual commitment. This is the main reason why the Druze population in Israel is demanding that Israel take action and come to the defence of their brothers in Sweida.

The roots of the historical alliance between the Druze population in Israel and the Jews date back to the days before the establishment of the State of Israel. The Druze minority in Israel numbers only about 150,000 people, but it is a deeply embedded and highly integrated minority within Israeli society. Their sons serve in the IDF and the Israeli security services, and many have reached senior positions and ranks.

The State of Israel is deeply grateful to its Druze citizens for their commitment to the national security effort and is highly sensitive to their feelings and concerns regarding their family members across the border. Since many Druze have sacrificed their lives for the Jewish state – and continue to be willing to do so – while demonstrating absolute loyalty to the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and considering themselves an integral part of it, the State of Israel cannot ignore their call to protect their brothers in distress, who are being massacred by the Sunnis with the backing of the Syrian regime.

Furthermore, Israel has a historical, strategic and moral obligation to protect minorities in the region by virtue of the Jews being a minority in the region. In this sense, there is a shared fate among religious and ethnic minorities. This was the case with the Kurds in Iraq, with the Christians in Lebanon, and with the Druze in Syria. This alliance of minorities, even if not formalised, is important to Israel as a religious and national minority state in the region, and in the case of Syria, it also serves clear security interests. Israel, as the state of the Jews who were persecuted and massacred throughout the generations, also feels a historical and moral obligation to protect those minorities.

At the same time, Israel and the Syrian regime led by al-Sharra have common strategic interests. The Syrian regime is working to push Iran out of Syria, is acting against Hezbollah, and does not permit Palestinian terrorist activity from Syrian territory. The possibility of establishing security agreements with the current regime – which in turn could lead to cooperation in the fields of energy, water, infrastructure, and later perhaps to normalisation and Syria’s accession to the Abraham Accords— is highly important to Israel (and also to President Trump’s vision). It serves not only Israel’s security interests but also its broader interest in regional integration through the design of a new regional architecture in which Israel is an important and influential component.

Therefore, the Israeli dilemma boils down to the tension between the necessity of protecting the Druze minority in Syria and its security interests in the buffer zone on the one hand, and the need to preserve and advance the interests common to Israel and the Syrian regime on the other.

Israel must find a way to manoeuvre and balance its actions – ensuring that any blow it chooses to inflict on the Syrian regime, for its support of jihadist murderers slaughtering the Druze or for violating Israel’s demand to keep military forces out of the buffer zone, does not break the regime’s neck. Such blows must be proportionate: sufficient to convey the message and preserve deterrence, but not so severe as to sever channels of strategic dialogue and potential future cooperation.

Alongside Israeli determination, more creative thinking is required about the use of force in renewing and preserving deterrence. It is crucial to break free from the mindset that, because we have a big hammer in our hands, every problem must look like a nail.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, on July 20, 2025

Three days ago in Ashkelon, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu articulated a vision of unprecedented opportunity that Israel cannot afford to squander. “Our opportunities are massive, we’re not going to miss them. We won’t fail them, we won’t lose them, we won’t miss this thing – both to defeat our enemies and ensure our future economically, nationally, internationally and energetically,” Netanyahu declared with characteristic determination.

This message has echoed through Netanyahu’s recent engagements across Israel’s security establishment, from IDF general staff headquarters to the Shin Bet, from the Police College to Fire and Rescue headquarters, and in meetings with Magen David Adom personnel. The prime minister is systematically preparing for what could prove his most consequential diplomatic mission since returning to office.

Netanyahu’s upcoming Washington visit – his fourth since reclaiming the premiership – represents a dramatic departure from typical diplomatic expectations. Rather than tempering hopes or managing expectations downward, Netanyahu is deliberately elevating the stakes. “Exploiting success is no less important than achieving success,” he emphasized this week, a philosophy that will guide his approach to these critical talks.

President Donald Trump awaits Netanyahu as a leader basking in the glow of strategic triumph. Trump’s decision to authorize direct US participation in devastating strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure not only demonstrated unprecedented bilateral cooperation but also fulfilled his campaign promise to avoid prolonged regional conflicts. The American president successfully navigated between decisive action and escalation prevention – exactly the balance his critics said was impossible.

This diplomatic momentum propels Trump toward his broader Middle East objectives established before inauguration – comprehensive war termination and accelerated peace agreements. The convergence of military success and political opportunity creates a unique window for transformative regional arrangements.

The atmosphere surrounding next week’s meetings combines urgency with opportunity, pressure with potential. Time constraints intensify as regional dynamics shift rapidly, while multiple strategic openings demand immediate attention. The agenda will encompass both tactical decisions and strategic declarations, celebrating shared victory while charting future cooperation.

American involvement in Iran operations has fundamentally transformed US-Israel relations, elevating the partnership to unprecedented levels. This development’s impact on Israel’s regional standing cannot be overstated, particularly given how it complements rather than replaces Israel’s independent military achievements. The enhanced partnership promises expanded political dividends alongside military cooperation.

Yet enhanced partnership brings corresponding obligations, especially when American intervention appears to address existential threats through significant risk assumption. Trump’s directive requiring Israeli aircraft recall from Iran missions following ceasefire violations illustrates these new dynamics. Such incidents preview potential friction points ahead.

Israeli accommodation on issues that might complicate Trump’s agenda becomes increasingly reasonable given the transformed relationship structure. The principled response to such requests should remain positive, provided they don’t conflict with Israel’s fundamental interests.

However, forthcoming discussions could address core issues including Iran enforcement mechanisms, potential Palestinian Authority negotiations as Arab normalization prerequisites, Syrian security arrangements within broader political frameworks, and Gaza war continuation parameters. Trump’s declaration that he will “be very tough with Netanyahu regarding ending the Gaza war” signals these complex negotiations ahead.

Netanyahu’s primary challenge involves ensuring that reciprocal discussions remain within acceptable policy parameters while preparing for arguments that existing or future concessions enable greater flexibility on difficult decisions.

Gaza combat operations and hostage recovery

Current media reporting suggests meaningful progress toward a “limited arrangement” with Hamas facilitating ten living hostages’ return alongside 18 bodies. The proposed exchange involves 60-day ceasefire implementation, IDF combat zone withdrawals, expanded Gaza supply operations, and terrorist releases according to predetermined formulas. While specific details remain unclear, the arrangement’s most significant element appears to be American guarantees linking the ceasefire to complete war termination.

The American-envisioned conclusion encompasses several key components. First, comprehensive fighting cessation across all dimensions, with Israeli forces maintaining border positions and security perimeters. Second, complete hostage return – both living and deceased. Third, Gaza Strip governance through technocratic structures guided by Egypt, additional nations, and potentially the Palestinian Authority. Fourth, Hamas – though severely degraded – would lose official governmental control while maintaining substantial Strip influence. Finally, portions of Hamas leadership would face exile from Gaza.

Concurrently, voluntary emigration opportunities would become available for interested Gaza residents across multiple countries providing US commitments. Strip reconstruction would proceed contingent upon complete military capability dismantlement.

This framework appears theoretically sound for addressing Israel’s primary concerns. However, considering Hamas’s residual capabilities, continued high popular support levels, overseas leadership’s resource mobilization capacity, and demonstrated recovery patterns, such arrangements would likely enable rapid organizational rehabilitation. These factors become more problematic when considering Hamas’s leverage through remaining living hostages and Israel’s constrained military options.

Assumptions that civilian governance transfer to internationally-guided mechanisms would prevent Hamas rehabilitation ignore existing Strip power dynamics. Such frameworks would more likely provide Hamas cover rather than confrontation from international oversight bodies.

Given these scenarios, political leadership should maintain complete war objective achievement while pressing Washington counterparts to target Hamas leadership operating from Qatar and Turkey, simultaneously advancing voluntary emigration initiatives.

Iran conflict’s expanding scope

The Iranian confrontation has entered its opening phase rather than reaching conclusion. Operation Rising Lion successfully achieved all designated objectives, optimally accomplishing every feasible military goal within its operational parameters.

Iran emerges wounded, humiliated, and revenge-driven. Assumptions about Iranian passivity would be strategically dangerous. Alongside capability reconstruction efforts and operational lessons learned, Iranian leadership will pursue Israeli retaliation opportunities regardless of timeline requirements. Intelligence and security officials must operate assuming Iranian surprise attempts without restraint considerations.

The first issue requiring Israeli-American agreement is enforcement of Iran’s activities. Israel must clarify that enforcement without agreement is preferable to agreement without enforcement.

President Trump has repeatedly declared that Iran will not have military nuclear capability. From Israel’s perspective this is extremely important, but not sufficient. We must also talk about limiting ballistic missiles and precision weapons, through which Iran planned to achieve against Israel influence similar to that of non-conventional weapons.

Iran must not receive any relief or benefit to convince it to sit at the negotiating table. The international community still has the option to impose sanctions on Tehran through the snapback mechanism, and this should be activated.

Syrian strategic calculations

Syrian developments exemplify new reality dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers. Israel confronts delicate strategic choices requiring careful balance between opportunity and risk. Excessive threat focus could eliminate rare opportunities for northern border reshaping and regional influence expansion. Conversely, “Oslo process” style concessions might enable dangerous Islamist threats in critical areas.

Israeli experience demands cautious approaches, particularly regarding security deployment modifications for various scenarios. This caution becomes essential when engaging regimes led by jihadist figures whose Western-friendly presentations lack authentic testing and may represent survival tactics rather than genuine transformation.

Golan Heights status discussions remain completely unacceptable. The only acceptable modification involves Syrian regime de jure recognition of existing arrangements. The Golan Heights constitutes Israel’s strategic eastern defense line. Golan Heights retention without peace agreements surpasses peace agreements without Golan Heights control.

Any agreements must guarantee Israeli aerial and ground operational freedom throughout Syria for minimum decade-long periods, including proactive operations against hostile establishment attempts. Syrian regime limitations must prevent agreements or alliance participation enabling hostile elements’ Syrian establishment or operational bases across territorial, maritime, and aerial domains. These restrictions prevent Syrian transformation into corridors or focal points for threats against Israel from regional or extra-regional sources. Syria must also face restrictions on developing, producing, or acquiring strategic threat weapons including nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, and precision capabilities.

Israeli demands should include Druze community security guarantees while positioning Syria as potential Palestinian Gaza emigrant destination following Trump initiatives. Syria’s suitability stems from Arab identity, regional proximity, and historical connections. Given expected extensive reconstruction requirements for millions of Syrian citizens, Palestinian Gaza integration wouldn’t create exceptional burdens. These arrangements should integrate Israeli, American, and Syrian coordination frameworks.

Effective enforcement mechanisms must anchor all agreements. Accumulated experience demonstrates that agreements without enforcement lack meaningful value.

Strategic partnerships with conditions

Saudi Arabian peace agreement opportunities – representing the Arab world’s most significant player – reach unprecedented accessibility levels. Iranian nuclear program strikes and “axis” dismantlement, including Hezbollah collapse and Assad regime disintegration, create new Middle Eastern realities where moderate Arab states recognize Israel as solution rather than problem against extremist Islam. Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 provides foundation for demonstrating this transformation.

However, Saudi-Israeli relationship establishment must never be conditioned on Palestinian Authority status improvements. Post-October 7 Israel cannot afford questionable adventure engagement. Abraham Accords removed Palestinian Authority veto power over Arab-Israeli relationship establishment, and this authority must not be restored. Palestinian statehood, regardless of border limitations, constitutes Israeli security threats.

Agreement, alliance, or economic profit considerations must not override strategic judgment. Saudi Arabian peace agreement significance cannot be exaggerated, yet not every price justifies such achievements.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 06, 2025.

The successful targeting of Hamas’s strategic tunnel and the destruction of the command and control center in which Hamas leader Mohammad Sinwar was hiding is not only a blow to Hamas, but also to Iran. The Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet security agency demonstrated significant intelligence capabilities in their pursuit of the head of Hamas’s military wing, and the Israeli Air Force proved its ability to effectively destroy a strategic underground facility built with Iranian assistance.

As his brother, late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, himself previously acknowledged, the Quds Force played a central role in the development of Hamas’s underground infrastructure. In a previous statement, Sinwar declared:

“We have hundreds of kilometers of tunnels and thousands of rockets. If it weren’t for Iran, we would not have reached this point. Unlike our Arab brothers, Iran gave us money, weapons, and expertise. The Arab governments shut their doors to us and told us: ‘Talk to the Americans first.'”

As emphasized by senior officials and propagandists of the Iranian regime, Tehran has been a key partner in the advancement of Hamas’s tunneling network in Gaza. The Quds Force, under the leadership of Qassem Soleimani, provided Hamas with ongoing assistance and expertise over the years to develop the tunnel infrastructure into a strategic weapon.

The successful detection of this strategic tunnel, the intelligence tracking of its use, and its destruction, while housing the top Hamas commander in Gaza, is, therefore, a significant achievement for Israel and a blow to both Hamas and Iran.

Of course, this is not the end of the story. Israel must continue to crush Hamas and strive for the release of the 58 hostages still held by the group. However, the destruction of the strategic tunnel at the very moment Sinwar chose to flee into it may indicate that Israel possesses additional valuable intelligence and is waiting for the right moment to act upon it.

A key figure now in Israel’s sights is another Hamas leader, Ezz al-Din al-Haddad, who, according to reports, has already survived four targeted killing attempts since 2008. According to an Al Jazeera investigation, on the eve of the October 7 massacre, al-Haddad secretly gathered the commanders of the six battalions under his command and handed them operational orders for the attack.

In recent speeches, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed that Israeli assassinations of resistance axis leaders do not signify Israeli victory, arguing instead that these leaders leave behind a proud legacy, with many operatives trained to take their place, and even more who will join the organization in response to “Israeli crimes.” However, as seen in Hezbollah after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the elimination of the leader and top command constitutes a historic rupture. The organization must now rebuild itself, with Nasrallah’s successor, Naim Qassem, struggling to fill his predecessor’s shoes, facing difficulties in decision-making, charisma, and projecting authority both within Hezbollah and externally.

As a guerrilla organization, Hamas is prepared to continue fighting for many more months, even without a structured leadership. The group recently released footage showcasing its ability to manufacture standardized explosives and booby-trap homes and roads in Gaza using explosive materials left behind by IDF troops. Still, the elimination of Mohammad Sinwar, alongside Rafah Brigade Commander Mohammad Shabana, is likely to severely disrupt Hamas’s operational capacity. Without the leading figures who directed the war effort from Hamas’s side, the group will struggle to function effectively, though it will likely continue to resist a comprehensive hostage deal, as the hostages remain Hamas’s key bargaining chip for survival.

Alongside this, the institutionalization of humanitarian aid zones is a strategically crucial development. If implemented properly, it can undermine Hamas by gradually severing Gaza’s civilian dependence on the organization.

It now remains to be seen how al-Haddad, poised to lead Hamas inside Gaza, and Khalil al-Hayya, expected to head Hamas’s external wing, will function, and how their leadership will impact Hamas’s decision-making, particularly regarding a potential hostage deal. Both men are meant to fill the vacuum left by the elimination of Mohammad Sinwar, while continuing their constant efforts to evade Israeli detection.

Published in I24, June 01, 2025.

US President Donald Trump’s stated Iran policy is the demand that the Islamic Republic completely dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, leaving it with no capacity to enrich uranium, a demand echoed by his top national security advisers and lead negotiator. This is a perfectly reasonable position – indeed, it was once the international consensus, enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolutions.

However, it is highly unlikely that such an outcome can be achieved through negotiations alone. While Iran has historically come to the table under credible threat of force, it is unrealistic to expect that the regime will surrender its nuclear facilities outright.

The only type of deal Iran might accept would essentially resemble the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – with all of its inherent flaws: the retention of enrichment capabilities, sunset clauses, weak inspection regimes, exclusion of ballistic missile and proxy warfare provisions, and broad sanctions relief.

Such a deal may offer short-term benefits – chief among them a temporary reduction in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, delaying its breakout time and easing immediate tensions.

Many hope it would allow the US to pivot more decisively toward East Asia. But the result of a JCPOA-redux would be the opposite. It would guarantee long-term US entanglement in the Middle East.

A deal of this nature would not resolve the fundamental threat posed by the Islamic Republic. On the contrary, it would strengthen Tehran by trading a temporary pause in its weapons development for economic relief and the opportunity to rebuild its regional proxy network and missile capabilities.

Within a few years, Iran could resume its nuclear ambitions – this time with a bolstered ballistic arsenal and possibly intercontinental capabilities, posing a direct threat to the United States.

A minimalist deal would not enable a genuine US disengagement from the Middle East because it would fail to address Iran’s ability to fund and coordinate proxy warfare against Arab monarchies and Israel. The result would be a repeat of the post-JCPOA landscape: a region increasingly dominated by Iran, culminating in open conflict with Israel and appeasement from neighboring states. In time, the US would be forced to return with greater force and expense.

The act of signing such a deal would itself undermine Trump’s credibility and foreign policy goals. After having withdrawn from the JCPOA and denouncing it as a disastrous agreement, signing a similar deal would discredit his reputation and grant retroactive legitimacy to the approach of former presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden.

The prospect of using force in the Middle East justifiably carries a negative connotation for many within the Trump administration. But no one is proposing a US invasion or occupation of Tehran. Quite the opposite.

By supporting Israel’s resolve to confront existential threats on its own, Trump can showcase the strategic logic of his alternative to the Obama-Biden model – one in which capable regional allies take the lead, with American backing reinforcing their actions.

Three concerns of deal

Opponents of this approach raise three key concerns: potential Iranian retaliation against US forces; the risk of broader escalation involving external powers; and disruptions to global oil supplies. While these risks are real, they have been greatly exaggerated.

First, Iranian retaliation: The Islamic Republic is currently in one of its weakest positions in years – economically crippled, internally unstable, and militarily diminished. Its proxies are depleted and its air defenses degraded. If Iran were to target US forces in response to an Israeli attack, it would invite devastating American retaliation – likely a regime-ending scenario.Tehran knows this.

More plausibly, it would target Israel, which is prepared to defend itself. A clear and credible warning from Trump that any attack on US forces would result in severe consequences could deter such actions entirely.

Second, the specter of great power involvement: While Russia and China have grown closer to Iran, neither is likely to risk a direct confrontation with the US to defend it. Public condemnation aside, they would likely remain on the sidelines.

Third, the economic impact. If Israeli strikes are limited to nuclear infrastructure, energy flows from the Persian Gulf may remain unaffected. Even if Iran retaliates in a way that causes supply disruptions, this may cause a short-term price spike, but the US would not suffer significantly – and could even benefit as an oil exporter.

By contrast, China remains highly vulnerable to disruptions in Middle Eastern oil. Roughly 15% of its imported crude oil comes from Iran alone. A sudden loss of access would strain its limited strategic reserves and force a scramble for alternatives. Economic pressure on China may, in fact, align with US interests in the current geopolitical climate, where Washington no longer views Chinese prosperity as beneficial.

The costs of a strike are real. But the potential benefits are far greater. A successful strike on Iran’s enrichment facilities would directly accomplish what diplomacy has not: eliminating Iran’s ability to enrich uranium.

Yes, Iran could theoretically rebuild, but after investing decades and vast resources only to see its program destroyed, doing so would be politically and economically fraught – especially with the demonstrated willingness of Israel to act.

Such action would also reinforce Trump’s credibility. Trump would be seen as a leader who set clear red lines, gave diplomacy a chance, and then acted decisively when those efforts failed. This would send a powerful message, not only to Tehran but to adversaries and allies around the world. Whether around Taiwan, Eastern Europe, or Greenland, American resolve would carry newfound weight.

Allowing Israel to carry out such a strike is not the opening of another “forever war” in the Middle East, which Trump rightly seeks to avoid, but a necessary and limited act that would serve US interests much more than the chimera of a new deal.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 14, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

The fall of the Assad regime and the partial takeover of Syria by Ankara-backed Islamist fronts has raised the spectre of confrontation between the region’s two most powerful countries: Turkey and Israel. It will fall to the United States to help avoid a military clash.

President Trump’s recent remarks alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were encouraging. As are reports about deconfliction talks between Turkish and Israel that took place in Azerbaijan. But avoiding conflict will not be easy.

In some ways, the possibility of conflict is surprising. Both Israel and Turkey oppose Iran’s regime, and it was the Israeli success against Hezbollah that contributed to Assad’s collapse – clearing the path for Al-Julani’s jihadists to rise. Sensing a historic opportunity, Ankara moved to cement its influence in Syria as part of Erdoğan’s broader ambition to resurrect something akin to the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey positions itself as leader of the Sunni axis, challenging both Iran’s Shiite axis and Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Sunni world. Qatar, a close Turkish ally governed by Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers, supports this bid as part of political Islam’s vision to revive the Caliphate. In response, Saudi and the UAE are trying to draw Al-Julani away from Turkey’s orbit. It’s a complex power struggle.

The Israeli concern is twofold. The first is from jihadist elements near its border that could carry out cross-border terror attacks. The second is the more strategic threat posed by the possibility of Turkey’s entrenchment in Syria, which could threaten Israel’s operational freedom – especially in countering Iranian threats. To counter the jihadis, Israel has seized control of a buffer zone in southern Syria and targeted Syrian military infrastructure to keep it from being used against it.

But Jerusalem increasingly views Turkish influence, not jihadi groups, as the greater threat. Turkish entrenchment would shrink Israel’s room to manoeuvre and jeopardise its air operations in the region. In response, Israel is aggressively targeting Syrian military infrastructure, such as airports, to keep them out of Turkey’s control and to set new red lines.

The Syrian arena is further complicated by the clashing interests of the US, Russia, and China. What’s more, the new regime in Damascus is still weak, lacking full control of all Syrian territory. It also lacks the trust of many ethnic groups, including Alawites, Druze, and Kurds – who still control a third of the country. This instability gives outside actors room for intervention, with Turkey and Israel emerging as the most decisive players. Iran’s influence, by contrast, is increasingly irrelevant. If Turkey succeeds in entrenching itself, it will not stop at Syria. Its expansionist drive, under the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological banner, could destabilise Jordan where the Brotherhood is gaining power. A Brotherhood takeover there would be catastrophic, opening another hostile front at Israel’s eastern flank.

Stability in Syria hinges on Israel and Turkey, whose relations have hit their lowest point since diplomatic ties began. Only the US, trusted by both sides, can broker an arrangement that secures their vital interests and outlines a shared future in Syria.

Such a deal could recalibrate Turkish ambitions, reassure the Gulf states, and potentially revive the Abraham Accords, leading maybe to the ultimate prize: Israeli-Saudi normalisation. If Syria stabilises and Al-Julani distances himself from jihadist ideology, reconstruction and eventual normalisation with Israel might even be possible. This would reshape the Middle East, ease tensions, and lay the groundwork for a new regional architecture aligned with President Trump’s vision – including a reformed Palestinian Authority in a post-Hamas landscape. The alternative? Regional chaos and rising danger for everyone.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, April  16, 2025.

The funeral of Nasrallah and his successor Hashem Safieddine – who managed to serve in his position for less than a month before being eliminated – was attended by masses in Lebanon (especially from the Shiite community) as well as delegations from Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and other countries. It was Hezbollah’s show of force, a way to project messages to its rivals and enemies in the shadow of the unprecedented blow it suffered from Israel.

At home in Lebanon, it seeks to convey to its Shi’ite support, which is its source of security and political power, that it is still the beloved organization despite criticism from its social base, due to the hardships of war. The massive funeral also signaled to Hezbollah’s political rivals that, irrespective of its political weakening, as reflected in the appointment of Lebanese Army commander Joseph Aoun to the presidency, the group remains a significant factor in politics.

To its enemies outside Lebanon, mainly Israel and the United States, Hezbollah needs to demonstrate that it is still strong, regardless of its extensive loss of leaders and commanders and serious damage to its missile and rocket systems.

In its media and social network campaign entitled “I remain loyal to my covenant,” Hezbollah highlights the importance of the adherence of its social base. The organization needs masses of recruits from the Shi’ite community to fill the ranks left by thousands of commanders and activists eliminated during the war, whether by beeper attack, targeted assassination, or in the ongoing IDF attacks over 13 months of fighting.

The widespread use of Nasrallah’s figure since his assassination, especially in the funeral, symbolizes a transition from the Nasrallah era to an era of his legacy. In the absence of a figure with his abilities, as Tehran itself admitted, Hezbollah needs Nasrallah’s legacy to advance its aspiration to offset the military, economic, and intelligence blows it suffered. Nasrallah’s figure will now be used by the organization’s leadership to instill motivation in the Shi’ite youth and in the ranks of Hezbollah’s various arrays, to continue the fight despite unprecedented challenges and difficulties.

The fulcrum of Iranian action

One cannot undervalue Nasrallah’s importance in promoting Hezbollah and relations with Iran.

Nasrallah knew Persian and was educated for two years in religious seminaries in Iran’s Qom in the late 1980s, consequently developing intimate working relations with the Iranian regime’s leadership. While Qasem Soleimani commanded the Quds Force (1998-2020), he worked jointly and closely with Nasrallah in planning severe attacks against Israel and the US.

Their respective successors, Naim Qassem in the Hezbollah leadership and Esmail Qaani in the Quds Force do not come close to the abilities of their predecessors. The assassinations of Nasrallah and Soleimani served as a severe blow to the Khamenei resistance axis and accentuated the critical importance of targeted assassinations in the fight against terrorism.

With the weakening of its proxies, Iran’s first line of defense, the Iranian regime recognized that it must immediately strengthen and rebuild Hezbollah. Accordingly, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei emphasized that the participation of the high-ranking Iranian delegation (headed by Islamic Republic Guard Corps deputy commander Ali Fadavi and others) symbolizes Tehran’s commitment to continue its assistance to Hezbollah.

Adding this statement to Khamenei’s declaration that Hezbollah had won the war shows that both Hezbollah and Iran realize that the organization must not be perceived as weak and battered for fear of a slippery slope that could endanger its existence.

Israel’s operational and conscious activities during the funeral were important, [with its Air Force flying over the procession in Beirut]. They conveyed to the terrorist organization that Israel is determined not to allow it to be resurrected.

Having managed to force a ceasefire on Hezbollah, Israel is signaling that it does not intend to allow the organization to rearm, reactivate its money-smuggling operations from Iran, or reestablish itself in the area south of the Litani River.

Of course, alongside activity directed against Hezbollah, Israel must also act against the head of the snake, its Iranian patron.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 26, 2025.

The Gaza drama is putting Egypt’s peace with Israel under new strain. This is not the result of only events in the past weeks but is rather the culmination of much longer-term dynamics that cannot easily be mastered and reversed at this stage. The conflagration that Hamas began on October 7, 2023, may have triggered a chain of events that exposes these long-term trends and failures and brings them to a head — perhaps even including a broader war.

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and material to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability. Egypt tried to bury the legacy of its failure by focusing on Israel’s taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. The Egyptians claim, inaccurately, that Israel’s presence violated the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The Philadelphi diversion did not solve the basic problem, which was that, for Israel, October 7 had rendered obsolete the reemergence of a Gazan population under the control of either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. After October 7, for Israel to allow Palestinian agency so close to its heart became too dangerous, a threat to Israel’s existence. Resurrecting the status quo, even dressed in some modification, was no longer feasible. But this meant Cairo could no longer contain the Gazan problem across the border at arm’s length. So it began to reinforce its border — not to stop smuggling, but to stop the potential outflow of Palestinians. This, however, solved nothing, and again dumped the entire Gaza problem — a problem that Egypt had inflated by failing to control the border — on to Israel. Further complicating the situation, Cairo recently began to deploy armor and troops nearby, in violation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The demilitarization of the Sinai is the alpha and omega of the treaty. Its violation is itself a gravely serious affair.

What has unfolded since October 7, and is accelerating now, is no doubt a failure of immediate policy in the Biden presidency, as well as Obama’s. But it is a far greater failure that is indigenous to the region and dates back for most to the last century. Egypt’s policy on Gaza was just one manifestation of the typical regional pattern of dealing with problems emanating from ideological danger: indulge and reconcile with the problem by exporting it to others who will deal with it.

That pattern solves nothing. The problem returns, but having acquired a far more dangerous form. Egypt did that with the Gamaat al-Islami, and it returned. Saudi Arabia did that with bin Ladin, and it exploded back on 9/11. Syria mobilized the Palestinians in the camps in Tripoli, Lebanon in the 2000s to create Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaida Iraq (Musab al-Zarqawi). Both eventually returned to haunt them as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra/Haya at-Tahrir ash-Shams (HTS). The Arab world’s proclivity to export its problems outward for someone else to deal with rather than directly resolve or erase them consistently comes home to roost. Gaza, indeed the Palestinians as a whole, are no exception.

So, the Palestinian/Gaza problem returns to haunt Egypt. Egypt’s 75-year policy of appeasing and paying the Palestinian piper under the assumption it is Israel’s problem has finally come home for Egypt itself. Israel can no longer tolerate Palestinian agency in Gaza, and the destruction there will leave no real option for Israel other than the removal of the population of Gaza — perhaps temporarily, but more likely permanently. Both Jerusalem and Washington have now come to this conclusion, resulting in the Trump plan for Gaza. Egypt opposes the American plan to resettle Gazans to safer lands because doing so would import the problem it so desperately exported. It would move it inside the house.

Though this is a circumstance of Egypt’s own making, it places Egypt in a difficult position.

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts the Trump plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or “Nakba.” It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first Nakba in 1948. Any leader that fails to stop a second Nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Egyptian President El-Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

Ultimately, this could prove fatal. If Egypt buckles, El-Sisi would be seen as a wounded fish by the region’s sharks. Turkey, Qatar and Iran — Cairo’s true enemies — will gather around the limping Egyptian nation and incite the population against the government in an invigorated attempt to carry to power in Cairo the Islamist sweep that in December seized Damascus. That threat could topple the government.

On the other hand, refusing the Trump plan will drive a wedge in US-Egyptian relations, and likely will terminate the U.S. aid and weapons sales, which have totaled more than $80 billion since 1978. El-Sisi may figure that he can weather the U.S. opposition but cannot weather an upheaval from below fomented by Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. And indeed, if current reports coming out of Qatari news channels are true, El-Sisi already has made his choice and decided to postpone indefinitely the trip to Washington that had been scheduled for next week. In these circumstances, it is possible that Egyptian-U.S. relations may have already entered into a much deeper crisis than is widely appreciated.

How far can this go?

The context includes signs that Iran has made a decision to move toward confrontation. That means the Iranian proxies, Hizballah and the Houthis, will escalate. Within 48 hours of Hamas leaders visiting Tehran for consultations, Hamas announced it is suspending the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Ayatollah Khamenei slammed the door shut on negotiations with the US over its nuclear program. Then, during anniversary celebrations this week of the Islamic Revolution, billboards with facsimiles of a death notice for President Trump appeared, as well as a passion play of his trial and hanging. Iran has clearly decided to escalate against the United States. That pushes Hamas to return Gaza to war — the last thing Egypt needs right now.

While the current Egyptian threats, training, rhetoric, and deployments are increasingly belligerent to Israel, the assumption of most Western analysts and intelligence agencies is that it is chest-beating. Most in the West assume that an Egyptian-Israeli war is unthinkable. That assumption should be reexamined. Unfortunately, the idea that war is off the table for Egypt is not solid. There are scenarios in which Egypt would see it in its interest to go to war, even though it knows it would be devastating, that it would lose the Sinai, and that it would terminate the U.S. alliance and aid.

Brigadier General (Reserve) Amir Avivi, the founder and chairman of Israel’s Defense and Security Forum, said in a recent briefing that the Israel Defense Forces should be prepared for a war with either Egypt or Turkey in the next 20 years. “Look not at intentions, but capabilities,” he advised.

Why would Egypt see it in its interest to invite the destruction of its army and Air Force, alienate the Americans, and lose the Sinai? Losing assets and territory would damage the Egyptian regime deeply, but perhaps not as deeply as would El-Sisi’s evincing unmanly weakness. Regimes survive in the region on their ability to project ruthless, confident resolve to survive. Any sign of fear, weakness, or faltering confidence can quickly turn fatal almost immediately.

As painful as it would be for El-Sisi to lose a bit of his army and the Sinai, it may yet to him be viewed as preferable to the damage he would sustain in appearing to cower to Israel and accept, even participate in, a second Nakba. China and Russia can replace the materiel. Qatar can replace the funding.

But nobody can restore El-Sisi’s or his regime’s honor, and nobody in Egypt will forgive him for forfeiting it. Especially not Egypt’s real enemies — Turkey, Qatar, and Iran.

Under those circumstances, El-Sisi may decide to assert his manliness and make a stand, knowing that he would lose a good bit of the military as well as the Sinai. He may imagine he would emerge from this looking tough, willing to accept risk and inflict lots of losses, even on his own people, in order to survive and uphold the stature of the Egyptian military government.

Added to this is an unfortunate dynamic that has previously gripped Egyptian-Israeli relations, a pattern of actors whipping themselves into a frenzy over which they lose control and wind up in a war they may not have originally intended.

It would thus be wise for Western intelligence agencies and other interested observers to at least consider that there is a real potential for an Egyptian-Israeli war. If such an unfortunate turn of events is thrust onto Israel, then it is one from which Israel would need to emerge with a victory as decisive as 1967. It was that Israeli victory, after all, that eventually led Sadat, Begin, and Carter to the Camp David Accords and nearly half a century of uneasy peace.

Published in The Editors, February 12, 2025.