The restrictions imposed on IDF activity in Lebanon and the halt to strikes in Beirut are allowing Hezbollah to continue violating the ceasefire without fearing that the price it will pay will be unbearable. They leave the Lebanese terrorist organization in control of the location, timing, frequency and means by which it clashes with Israel, as well as control over the intensity of the escalation. In practice, this also gives Hezbollah the ability to set new rules and shape the equations of response against Israel.

President Donald Trump sought to restrain Israel in order to pave the way for diplomatic dialogue between Jerusalem and President Joseph Aoun’s government. In practice, he has denied Israel part of the freedom of action it had until two months ago and allowed it to continue operating with one hand tied behind its back.

In the US president’s view, a process that leads to a diplomatic agreement could push Hezbollah into a corner, strip it of legitimacy to continue fighting and thereby weaken its grip on Lebanon. In Washington, as in Riyadh, the belief is that a US agreement with Iran, together with an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, would force Hezbollah to stop fighting and perhaps even place its heavy weapons under international supervision. Happy is he who believes.

Given Lebanon’s complex reality, Trump may discover that the restraint he imposed actually serves Hezbollah, the main opponent of the diplomatic process and the primary proxy arm of the Iranian enemy.

Disproportionate response

Too many players, domestic and foreign, are stirring the Lebanese pot. It is difficult to untangle the web of tensions, and there is no point in delving into its depths. The main question that should guide Israel’s policy is how to remove the security threat posed to it by Hezbollah. If Gen. Aoun were capable of providing that, perhaps there would be room to discuss the price with him. But he comes to the negotiations with a different expectation: to stop Israel’s military activity and establish a process that will lead to the IDF’s withdrawal and restrict Israeli activity in his country.

Aoun and his people would indeed like to see Hezbollah disarmed, but even they do not pretend to present this as a realistic goal they can achieve on their own, and they have no intention of entering confrontations that would return Lebanon to the era of car bombs and civil war. When these are the starting assumptions for the talks, Israel should not pay the price.

It is possible that Israel had no choice but to accept Trump’s invitation to negotiations. We have tried the ceasefire that was required in exchange. The task of Israel’s political echelon now is to convince Trump that the chances of weakening Hezbollah through diplomatic means are slim.

It must make clear that the restrictions on Israel’s activity in Lebanon not only fail to strengthen Aoun’s government against Hezbollah, but also entrench Iran’s grip on this arena and encourage the regime in Tehran, contrary to the Americans’ clear interest.

Israel should not play by the rules Hezbollah sets. Nor should it play by Gen. Aoun’s rules. Its responses to ceasefire violations should be disproportionate in order to shake Hezbollah’s basic assumptions as it plans operations against us.

Hamas digs in

Almost a month has passed since the Peace Council, headed by Nikolay Mladenov, delivered to Hamas its proposal for a process to disarm the terrorist organization. Hamas leaders said they were holding in-depth consultations on the matter. They have yet to deliver their official position. In the meantime, they have sufficed with a list of Israeli violations and a demand that Israel fulfill all its obligations as a condition for any further move.

There is no need to wait with bated breath for the official answer. Hamas spokespeople have repeatedly stated their position rejecting any compromise on the issue of weapons. On the mediators’ advice, they have lowered the media volume on this issue, but their position has not changed. When the final official wording arrives, it may not include the word “no,” but that will be its meaning.

Last week, it was reported that in an intelligence document submitted to the political echelon, IDF officials warned that Hamas was rebuilding significantly during the ceasefire. We did not need that to understand that this is the situation. Quite a few columns and articles on this issue, based on open-source information, have also been published in the pages of this newspaper. A large part of Hamas’ moves is carried out openly and without efforts at concealment, also with the intention of making clear who the sovereign is here. If this is what is happening above ground, one can only estimate what is happening below it.

Mladenov and the Peace Council members are sincere in their efforts, but they, too, would admit that their ability to influence Hamas on the weapons issue is quite limited.

It is time for cunning in Gaza

Two significant constraints shape Israeli policy in Gaza. The first is diplomatic: the commitment to the 20-point plan and the desire not to be seen as having torpedoed Trump’s initiative. The second constraint is resources. The Gaza Strip is a secondary arena. The opportunity vis-a-vis Iran requires placing it at the center of efforts and not allowing any other arena to divert attention and focus from it. Nevertheless, the impression is that there remains considerable room for action by our forces within existing resources and without undermining the diplomatic understandings.

This is not only about efforts to thwart smuggling and weapons production and to strike Hamas’ takeover of resources intended for Gaza’s population. It can be assumed that one possibility will also be low-profile initiated operations, including strikes on operatives, infrastructure, weapons stockpiles, tunnels, governing facilities and the like. Such operations, carried out with the resources available to the Shin Bet security agency and Southern Command, would force Hamas to invest in defending its assets instead of rebuilding or attacking our forces. The cunning operations attributed to the Mossad in other arenas can serve as inspiration for the type of activity needed in Gaza. Without that, terrorist attacks and assaults by this enemy against us are only a matter of time.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 27, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Strategic discussions about Iran typically revolve around two main approaches: containing its nuclear program or pursuing regime change. Both, however, focus primarily on leadership while overlooking a deeper and more decisive factor, the structure of the state itself, particularly its degree of centralization. Historical experience suggests that highly centralized states can preserve and even rebuild their strategic capabilities over time, despite significant political upheavals.

Libya under Muammar Gaddafi provides a useful illustration. Following the 1969 coup that overthrew King Idris, Libya transitioned from a weak, decentralized monarchy into a highly centralized regime. Gaddafi consolidated power by eliminating rival centers of authority, nationalizing oil resources, and building loyal security institutions. This centralization enabled Libya to act assertively on the international stage and project influence disproportionate to its size.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Libya became a prominent actor in the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, supporting Palestinian organizations, revolutionary movements in Africa, and militant groups in Europe. Despite sustained external pressure, including US airstrikes in 1986, the regime’s centralized structure proved resilient and did not immediately alter its behavior.

In the early 2000s, Libya shifted course, abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and seeking rapprochement with the West. While this improved its international standing, the internal structure of the state remained highly centralized. The decisive turning point came in 2011, when internal uprisings combined with NATO intervention led to the collapse of the regime. Crucially, the centralized system disintegrated without being replaced by a stable alternative, resulting in fragmentation into rival militias and competing centers of power.

The consequences became starkly evident in 2012 with the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, which symbolized the loss of central authority and the rise of decentralized instability. In classical strategic terms, post-2011 Libya ceased to pose a significant state-based threat: it no longer maintained a nuclear program, coherent foreign policy, or capacity for power projection. However, it became a locus of chronic instability, characterized by militia rule and external interference.

The Libyan case highlights a fundamental strategic dilemma: is it preferable to confront a centralized state capable of posing an existential threat, or to contend with a fragmented environment that lacks unified strategic capabilities but generates persistent, low-level risks? Centralization facilitates the development of advanced capabilities and coordinated power projection, whereas fragmentation constrains these capabilities while producing enduring instability.

Applying this insight to Iran suggests that current debates are incomplete if they focus solely on regime change or nuclear containment. Iran combines strong centralization, ideological motivation, and advanced capabilities, making it a formidable strategic challenge.

Under these circumstances, it may be worth considering whether sustained external pressure could weaken Iran’s central authority. Such a process might embolden ethnic and religious minorities to challenge the regime, potentially leading to fragmentation akin to the Libyan case. In such a scenario, Iran could lose its capacity to function as a coherent strategic actor, thereby reducing the scale of the threat it poses. However, this outcome would likely come at the cost of prolonged instability and uncertainty.

Strategic thinking about Iran must therefore move beyond leadership-focused approaches and address the underlying structure of the state. The Libyan example demonstrates that dismantling centralization can eliminate a coherent state threat—but it also creates new, complex, and enduring risks that must be carefully weighed.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 16, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

So far, Turkey has reported three separate incidents involving ballistic missiles launched from the direction of Iran toward Turkish airspace. Ankara’s restrained response thus far largely reflects its complex interests vis-à-vis Tehran. The prevailing narrative in Turkish media and in statements by officials is that the missiles fired from Iran toward Turkish airspace – intercepted by NATO – were not intended for Ankara. According to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, the matter is currently under diplomatic clarification: Turkey has requested an explanation from Iran while reserving the right, if necessary, to defend its security.

The statement by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli that an uncontrolled weakening of Iran (as well as the collapse of Lebanon) could trigger a wave of instability spreading across the region reflects, to some extent, the cautious position Turkey has adopted in light of the war in Iran and the potential risk of its collapse.

Ankara may welcome the weakening of its long-standing rival, one with which it competes for regional influence and leadership of the Muslim world. At the same time, however, it fears the consequences of chaos emerging in the wake of war, the possible spillover of the conflict into its own territory, and the strengthening of Israel’s regional position.

The risks are numerous: a massive influx of refugees, popular unrest in Iran that could serve as a model for Turkey’s domestic opposition, the strengthening of Kurdish groups that Ankara views as hostile, and even the potential groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Kurdish state. Against this backdrop, a scenario in which the ayatollah regime is replaced by a pro-Western government aligned with Israel would also be viewed unfavorably in Ankara.

Yet alongside cautious declarations about the desire to renew negotiations that could end the war and restore regional stability – and warnings against the fragmentation of Iran into ethnic entities – Turkey may also be preparing a contingency plan for what it would define as an emergency requiring intervention. It is conceivable that if refugee flows expand significantly, or if Kurdish autonomy or independence is declared in Iran, Turkey could move to establish a buffer zone along the border inside Iranian territory, which it would present as a necessary step to contain the threats emanating from escalating instability in the neighboring state.

There are precedents for such a move. During the 1991 Gulf War, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees, fearing the Iraqi army, fled toward the northern border with Turkey. Ankara succeeded in preventing their permanent settlement by establishing a protected zone in northern Iraq as part of an international operation.

In the Syrian case, Turkey explicitly promoted the idea of a “security zone” designed not only to push hostile Kurdish forces away from the border but also to resettle Syrian refugees there. In practice, since 2019, as part of Operation Peace Spring, a de facto Turkish-controlled area has existed in northern Syria, including not only Turkish military presence, but also civilian infrastructure such as schools and municipal services, and even Turkish currency.

This pattern could, under certain conditions, be replicated in the Iranian arena if Ankara concludes that the collapse of order along the border poses a direct threat to its security. Such a move would not be without constraints. Foremost among them are restraining factors in the international arena, particularly the United States, which could use its influence to oppose a deep Turkish military operation inside Iranian territory.

For now, Ankara appears to prefer maintaining a cautious, moderate tone, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, however, a narrative is taking shape in Turkish political and media discourse emphasizing the dangers of instability, refugee flows, and the Kurdish threat. If the crisis intensifies, this narrative could help lay the groundwork for a possible Turkish intervention.

From Israel’s perspective, the primary strategic objective at this stage remains the downfall of the Iranian regime, while recognizing that such a process could also bring about greater Turkish involvement in the regional arena and prompt Ankara to leverage the situation for significant strategic gains. Israel will not be able to control all the dynamics that may emerge following a substantial weakening – or even collapse – of the regime in Iran. It must therefore take into account that such a development could also strengthen Turkey’s regional position, a challenge it will likely need to address sooner or later.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 18, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Hezbollah’s decision to join the war “resembles the dilemma of a patient forced to choose between a dangerous emergency operation and quietly waiting for certain death.” This is how a commentator on the Lebanese channel Al-Mayadeen, which is aligned with Hezbollah, described the choice facing the organization’s leadership about whether to enter the war.

This self-justifying description was aimed mainly at Lebanese ears. It was meant to soothe the anger over the price the Land of the Cedars is paying – and is still expected to pay – because of the dubious service the proxy organization provides to its Iranian patron. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Naim Qassem, who is under heavy domestic pressure, quickly rejected the criticism. The war is not for Iran, he claimed. According to him, Hezbollah’s actions merely accelerated an attack that Israel had already planned.

In any case, Hezbollah’s response does not fit the description of a gravely ill patient, certainly not a terminal one. In its attacks on the Israeli home front, mainly in the north, it is succeeding in providing what Iran expected from it: an active second front. Every minute of attention by Israel’s political-security leadership that is directed toward Hezbollah rather than Iran is a gain for its sponsors. The same applies to the diversion of military resources, especially those that could otherwise be used to fight Iran. The division of attention naturally also influences the character of Israel’s operations against Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena.

Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign did provide Israel with the opportunity it had been awaiting to deal with the Shiite terrorist organization, but it came at a time when Israel is striving to fully exploit the larger opportunity: the joint war with the United States against Iran, which is also Hezbollah’s main sponsor.

The impression so far is that Israel is dividing its attention and resources between the two arenas optimally. The focus on Iran as the primary theater reflects the magnitude and rarity of the opportunity, while the Lebanese challenge is currently receiving only the essential response. The time for a systematic campaign will come. The end of the war with Iran will by no means mark the end of the fighting with Hezbollah; quite the opposite. It will enable the concentration of the bulk of forces and attention on that front when the Iranian patron is battered and bleeding.

Meanwhile, under the constraint of divided resources, and when Israel cannot continue absorbing Hezbollah’s attacks, it is entitled, and perhaps even obliged, to adopt a more aggressive approach in Lebanon. Alongside active defense, retaliatory steps should follow the principle of inflicting maximum damage with minimal resources and risks.

As for the fundamental response, the possible courses of action are well known. Some are even discussed in the media, and there is no need to detail them again here. At the base of this response should stand three assumptions: Hezbollah will not relinquish its military capabilities; the Lebanese government will not disarm it; and diplomatic agreements will not prevent its entrenchment and military buildup.

Reports about the achievements of the IDF and the US military in striking Iran usually focus on quantitative data about “what we have taken” from the enemy. No less interesting, however, is “what remains” – the residual capabilities still in its hands.

One can understand the difficulty in providing such information. Sometimes it stems from gaps in knowledge and intelligence; sometimes from the need to protect sources; and sometimes from the desire to prevent the enemy from understanding what we know. All of these are legitimate considerations when information is presented to the general public, but decision-makers must receive detailed and up-to-date answers to these questions.

The fact that Israel finds itself fighting Iran and Hezbollah not long after the previous rounds of confrontation with them ended illustrates the danger of settling for limited achievements against a determined enemy that retains residual capabilities and conditions enabling its recovery. Sometimes that is the lesser evil. That is not the case when there exists an opportunity to bring about a fundamental change, as in the case of Iran.

Many of the messages in the speeches of President Donald Trump and his associates are intended to create a perception of victory, not based on general impressions and feelings, but on detailed quantitative achievements relative to the objectives defined.

The avoidance of declaring regime change as an official objective of the war does not necessarily reflect the real aspirations regarding that outcome. It can be assumed that this stems from the difficulty of assessing the likelihood of achieving such a goal, which depends on internal Iranian factors, as well as from a desire to avoid a burdensome controversy in light of past disappointments from wars that failed to deliver such ambitions. The objective has therefore been defined as “creating enabling conditions.”

The achievements of the war so far are dramatic. Through an orderly and systematic process, Iran is being stripped not only of its military capabilities – missiles, the nuclear program, naval forces, air capabilities, and the like—but also of its infrastructure and economic assets. In the internal struggle that awaits it over the survival of the regime, Iran will face the challenge with a command-and-control system functioning only partially, battered institutions, a deep economic hole, and a regime whose legitimacy is at a low point.

The deeper, broader, and more prolonged the damage, the greater the challenge the regime will face in ensuring its survival, especially if it finds no hope for resolving the fundamental problems it suffered from before the war and that will worsen as a result of it. There is no way of knowing whether the terrorist regime will ultimately fall, but the opportunity that has emerged to achieve this must not be missed. As long as it exists, it will continue to cast a threatening shadow over Israel and the entire region. Its survival would inspire extremist Islamist forces everywhere.

From an Iranian perspective, the most significant advantage the regime brings to its confrontation with the West is patience. The sensitivity of Western societies to casualties, economic costs, and disruptions to everyday life sustains Tehran’s hope.

President Trump understands this. He is clearly aware of the rare opportunity and is concerned that it might be missed because of impatience. “We don’t want to leave early,” he said. “We have to finish this.” “We don’t want to have to go back there every two years.”

His remarks accurately reflect the prevailing sentiment in Israel as well.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 15, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The joint US-Israeli operation against Iran has produced a development few could have imagined on the eve of the attack: the Islamic Republic of Iran has launched about 3,000 missiles and drones at Arab countries. No fewer than 1,668 launches were directed at the United Arab Emirates, a number far higher than the total fired at Israel.

Abu Dhabi has firmly denied Israeli reports that it struck an Iranian desalination facility in retaliation. Yet the questions now echoing across the Middle East remain unchanged: Why is Iran attacking its neighbors with such intensity? And are those countries about to respond militarily?

Iran’s assault on the Gulf is not irrational. Rather, it is part of a calculated strategy aimed at coping with the combined power of the US and Israel and surviving the conflict. Leaders in Tehran understand that the country’s defense systems are incapable of fully stopping the blows being dealt to them. Their hope, therefore, is to pressure US President Donald Trump into halting the war before the regime weakens to the point that domestic opponents might topple it.

To create that pressure, Iran is trying to undermine the foundations of what could be called the “Gulf model”: the image of Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates, as islands of stability, prosperity and energy wealth. By disrupting oil flows and targeting major business hubs, the ayatollahs are betting that Gulf governments will pressure Washington to end the war prematurely.

This strategy of pressing Trump to halt the operation is also evident in other fronts. For example, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has begun echoing rhetoric that sounds as though it were lifted from the monologues of Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens, claiming that Trump is being “misled” by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and that this is a war of “Israel first” rather than “America first.” The aim is clear: to stir opposition to the war among Trump’s Republican base.

For now, however, Iran appears to be failing on both fronts. Polls in the US show that between 77% and 84% of Republicans support the operation. In the Gulf, despite the economic damage, air defense systems have recorded impressive successes. The United Arab Emirates has reported an extraordinary interception rate of 99% for missiles and 94% for drones.

That success has fueled national pride in the Emirates and strengthened confidence in the country’s military capabilities and national resilience. Public opinion across Gulf states has also hardened significantly against Iran.

The major question now is under what circumstances, if any, the United Arab Emirates will respond directly with military force. Abu Dhabi has remained cautious, wary of being dragged into a broader confrontation and uncertain whether the ayatollah regime might ultimately survive.

As Anwar Gargash, senior adviser to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, put it: “The Emirates is in a state of self-defense. Any defensive step taken will be public and clear. Our goal is to stop this ongoing aggression, not to be drawn into escalation.”

Still, there are signs that Emirati patience is running out. President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed sent a pointed message yesterday: “The United Arab Emirates has thick skin and bitter flesh. We are not easy prey.”

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess advanced and well-trained air forces. If it becomes clear that the US and Israel are indeed determined to go all the way and bring down the rule of the ayatollahs, and if that determination is backed by sustained strikes against Iran’s governing, military and internal security targets, the Emirates may decide to actively join the campaign.

The likelihood of such a move increases for one reason: even if the US and Israel destroy most of Iran’s missile launch infrastructure, it will be far more difficult to eliminate Tehran’s drone-launch capabilities entirely. That threat will continue to provoke the anger of Gulf states. In such a scenario, the United Arab Emirates would likely strike clearly defined military targets while seeking to minimize civilian casualties.

Such a step would cement Abu Dhabi’s standing not only as a global economic and energy power but also as a regional military force capable of defending its sovereignty with offensive tools.

For Israel, this represents a historic opportunity to deepen security cooperation and advance the vision of a Middle Eastern strategic alliance that could reshape the region for generations to come.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 08, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The joint Israeli-American strike on Iran has thrown Tehran into turmoil. The extensive scale of launches and strikes across the Gulf states underscored its willingness to exact a regional price. By expanding its attacks beyond military infrastructure to include civilian targets and oil facilities, Tehran overstepped and crossed yet another threshold in the conflict. Yet, the desperate move to restore its lost honor and to exert regional and global pressure on Washington to retreat only worsened its position.

After years of restraint, the region’s states are now being compelled to recognize that standing aside is no longer tenable and that Tehran must be made to pay a price. Following Iran’s escalating attacks, the time for a forceful response has arrived: Doha shot down two Iranian fighter jets and, according to reports, carried out strikes on Iranian soil. In Riyadh, preparations are underway for a possible entry into the conflict, and a similar option is reportedly under consideration in Abu Dhabi.

It must be acknowledged that Gulf states have long been aware of the Iranian threat but most of them chose to rely on Israel and the United States to address it on their behalf, while maintaining distance from Israel and at times even hostility toward it. Fearing Iranian retaliation and the consequences of regional escalation for their oil reserves, these states took care to appease Tehran and preserve normal—even close—relations with it, even as they quietly hoped for Iran’s weakening, particularly the halting of its nuclear and missile programs.

While the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain opted for overt ties and cooperation with Israel, others—foremost among them Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman—condemned Israel even as it acted against the Iranian axis that threatens them as well. They tended to favor accommodation and the preservation of dialogue with Tehran over escalation, even though the diplomatic track proved ineffective in curbing the threats emanating from it. This choice carried practical consequences: it weakened the deterrent effect and signaled to Tehran that its policies would not entail a tangible cost.

As for Saudi Arabia, the picture appears somewhat more complex. According to a report in The Washington Post, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman held several conversations with President Trump in recent months to advance an attack against the Islamic Republic, in stark contrast to the public stance he projected, including refusal to allow American strikes from Saudi territory. If accurate, this disclosure somewhat mitigates the criticism directed at Riyadh, alongside indications that the Saudis likely provided assistance in the defensive envelope, even if not in the offensive campaign, both in this and previous rounds. At the same time, this does not absolve the kingdom of having permitted—or turned a blind eye to—the recent anti-Israel campaign that spread through Saudi media, nor of regional moves suggesting rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Turkey, rather than strengthening the camp of moderation led by Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Ultimately, the risk-management policy that relied on maintaining an open channel with Tehran, coupled with public criticism of Israel and the assumption that Washington and Jerusalem would shoulder the burden of containing the threat, did not deliver the level of strategic immunity it was intended to secure. In the end, Iran did not distinguish between those who actively acted against it and those who avoided direct confrontation and confined themselves to balanced statements.

It is possible that had some regional states aligned themselves at an earlier stage with Israel, and advanced a coordinated regional framework to curb Iran’s growing power, they might have been able to establish joint deterrence and defense mechanisms and promote security measures capable of arresting the threat at an earlier phase — before the conflict reached the gates of their own capitals.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, March  03, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

So far, the Houthis have not directly joined the confrontation between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other. The central question is whether this restraint will endure, or whether it is likely to shift in the near future, depending on the duration of the combined campaign and the depth of its impact on the Iranian regime and the broader regional environment.

Several indicators suggest that escalation remains a possibility. According to reports, Iran has instructed the Houthis to operate in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea—an especially sensitive maritime corridor of global strategic importance. From Tehran’s perspective, this constitutes a significant pressure tool which could bear consequences for the entire region. For their part, the Houthis could resume attacks on commercial vessels en route to or associated with Israel, without necessarily being drawn into a direct clash with the United States, in line with the May 2025 ceasefire agreement, under which they clarified that the arrangement did not include Israel.

In a recent speech, the group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, declared that his movement stands in full solidarity with Iran and is “fully prepared for any developments”, calling on supporters to stage mass rallies in Sanaa and other provinces. Given the longstanding strategic partnership between Tehran and Sanaa—through which the Houthis have benefited from Iranian expertise and the supply of advanced weaponry—the organization’s leadership may find it difficult to refrain from demonstrating tangible support. Even if it avoids large-scale engagement, it may opt for a symbolic or limited move designed to signal commitment.

Some argue that the Houthis may seek to leverage the current confrontation to return to center stage and will not settle for symbolic backing alone. The Yemeni militia has demonstrated boldness in the past and views itself as a leading actor within Iran’s “axis of resistance”—a status it may seek to reinforce in light of Hezbollah’s entry into the campaign last night and the immediate, albeit relatively limited scope of engagement, by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq alongside Tehran.

Against this backdrop, security experts caution that since the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis have used the lull to significantly bolster their capabilities and conduct military preparations, including ground exercises. Although their intermittent rocket fire in previous rounds with Israel largely failed—most missiles were successfully intercepted—there are signs of growing sophistication in their weaponry, including the unprecedented use of surface-to-surface missiles equipped with a dispersal warhead.

At the same time, the Houthis face restraining considerations. Launching attacks against Israel or disrupting international shipping in the Red Sea could provoke a particularly forceful Israeli—and potentially American—response, especially if Houthi aggression targets U.S. assets and bases in the region. The organization’s leadership is well aware of American capabilities, as demonstrated in the large-scale U.S. air and naval operation (“Rough Rider”) conducted against Houthi targets in Yemen in March 2025 in response to Red Sea attacks, and is unlikely to seek a repeat experience.

Israel, too, represents a significant deterrent factor, based on past operations that included severe strikes on ports and infrastructure and the targeted killing of senior figures. The elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the combined campaign against Iran may also likely to resonate. Such a message would not be lost on al-Houthi, who is unlikely to wish to have a similar fate.

The Houthis therefore face a clear dilemma: strategic loyalty to Iran and the projection of regional power versus a fundamental interest in survival. If they choose to join the campaign, their move will likely be measured and limited—designed to signal solidarity and project strength without being drawn into a prolonged confrontation that could exact a heavy price. At the same time, Israel must prepare for the more severe scenario in which the Houthis decide to assume significant risk and enter the conflict as a leading actor within the axis of resistance.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 06, 2026.  

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

“The president is curious why they haven’t surrendered. Why under this kind of pressure with the amount of naval power we have there, why haven’t they come to us and said ‘we declare we don’t want weapons, and this is what we’re willing to do.'” Those remarks were made by Steve Witkoff, US President Donald Trump’s envoy, in an interview with Fox News.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could hardly have hoped for a better acknowledgment of his steadfastness in the face of American pressure. Witkoff’s statement will almost certainly be presented in Iran as clear proof that Washington’s military moves are intended merely to intimidate, threaten and pressure Tehran into accepting the framework the Americans are offering for a diplomatic agreement.

Although President Trump himself has said the military threat is meant to reinforce diplomatic efforts, he has also left room to suspect that such statements are part of a negotiating tactic rather than a reflection of his true intentions. Witkoff’s comments from within the administration leave little space for that possibility.

From the perspective of Iran’s leadership, as long as it believes the option of a deal remains open and preferable in Trump’s eyes, it will view that as an insurance policy for the regime’s survival, which it values above all else.

Any deal would be bad

From Israel’s standpoint, the more appropriate way to confront the Iranian regime’s threats is to work toward its downfall. Even before the current security tensions, developments had strengthened optimism about that prospect. The achievements of Operation Rising Lion and the success of the sanctions policy have placed the regime under existential strain. The widespread killing of protesters, aimed at swiftly crushing unrest, demonstrated how seriously the regime viewed the threat.

Recent reports of renewed protests at universities suggest that the spirit of the regime’s opponents has not been broken, despite harsh repression and despite disappointment over the absence of meaningful external support.

Ultimately, Tehran’s leadership cannot resolve the country’s fundamental problems and will struggle to offer its citizens a better future. On the contrary, conditions are likely to worsen as sanctions expand and intensify, and as Iran’s allies grapple with their own crises. Such a reality ensures continued potential for sustained unrest within the Islamic Republic.

Under these circumstances, any deal with Tehran would serve as a lifeline for the regime. Ending the crisis without one, while tightening sanctions to hasten its collapse, is preferable to an agreement that might temporarily curb its ambitions but ultimately ensure its survival.

Even if President Trump continues to seek only “a better nuclear deal,” he will struggle to achieve it as long as Iran’s leadership believes it holds the switch that can halt the war machine. He should set a declared deadline for the conclusion of talks and make clear that once hostilities erupt, the only relevant agreement with Iran will be a surrender agreement.

Such an approach would also dispel reports that the US might carry out a limited strike and then give Iran another opportunity to return to the negotiating table. There must be no option that conveys the message: There is no need to hurry; there will be a second chance.

Defining the goals of military action

In any case, once operational conditions for military action are met, the likelihood of such action increases. The most important decision Trump would face is defining the objectives of the war. He would need to choose between two primary alternatives.

The first would be a military operation designed to compel the regime to accept a deal that meets US demands. Regime change would remain a desirable outcome that might result from weakening the leadership, but it would not be defined as a direct objective.

The second alternative would be a powerful and prolonged campaign aimed at creating conditions for replacing the regime. Such a campaign would seek to destroy all the regime’s vital centers of gravity, including the political leadership, military command and senior intelligence officials, as well as its strategic capabilities at sea, in the air and on land. It would also target dual-use infrastructure that serves the military arms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 23, 2026.

As speculation swirls over the likelihood of a strike against Iran and regional tensions reach a boiling point, US President Donald Trump continues to keep everyone guessing. Speaking with reporters in Davos on Wednesday, he voiced hope that no further military steps would be taken against Iran. In the same breath, he stressed that the US would act if Tehran resumed advancing its nuclear program.

The implication is that as long as the current situation in Iran holds, military action would be taken only if it renews its nuclear activity. On Thursday, at the launch of what he termed a “Board of Peace,” Trump added: “Iran wants to talk to us, and we’ll talk.”

Is he planning to send US forces on a punitive mission against the regime? That seems doubtful. His softened rhetoric does not point in that direction. Had that been his intention, one would expect him to amplify reports about the scale of the casualties and atrocities involved in the regime’s crackdown, using them to bolster the legitimacy of an attack.

Has Trump returned to the path of accommodation and abandoned the idea of regime change? That too is unclear. Trump understands well that as long as the clerical regime in Tehran remains in power, it will not relinquish its ambitions. Any achievement against such a regime would therefore be temporary and limited. Still, public and diplomatic discourse in recent days has cast doubt on the feasibility of achieving regime change quickly, as Trump would prefer. Instead, assessments point to a prolonged interim period of chaos. These assessments, together with the relative lull in protests inside Iran, may have curbed ambitions in the White House, at least for now.

What, then, is the purpose of the US military buildup and deployment in the region? First and foremost, readiness for a range of possible scenarios. The situation is fragile, and it is difficult to predict how events will unfold. Force availability signals deterrence, shortens response times, and projects reassurance to US partners.

Second, the buildup enables preparedness for the next opportunity. Given Iran’s persistent structural problems, the assumption is that a renewal of protests is only a matter of time. Moreover, the deployment itself could help encourage such unrest. Trump wants to be in a position to make good on his promise that “help is on the way” when that moment arrives.

Third, the forces are meant to deter Iran from resuming its nuclear program. Fourth, they provide readiness for the possibility that Iran will seek to retaliate for any military action taken against it in response to its armament efforts. As a reminder, this was one of the key issues discussed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump at their meeting in Mar-a-Lago in Florida less than two months ago, before the wave of protests in Iran came to dominate the agenda.

From Israel’s perspective, developments regarding Iran largely reflect a positive trend. Tehran is mired in diplomatic, military and economic distress. Its allies and proxies are unable to come to its rescue. The “maximum pressure” campaign and secondary sanctions are taking their toll. There is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Still, Israel cannot afford to stand aside and let events run their course. It must do everything in its power to ensure that the US is not tempted to enter negotiations with the Iranian regime. The mere existence of political dialogue would provide the regime with a lifeline vis-à-vis its protesting citizens, signaling the possibility of agreements that could ease conditions.

Political negotiations would seriously undermine the prospects for regime change precisely at a moment when that possibility is becoming tangible, even before considering the additional gains the regime could extract from such talks. Past experience offers little basis for optimism regarding what negotiations with the Iranian regime can deliver.

A second issue that Israel’s political leadership must advance with Washington concerns Iran’s rehabilitation and rearmament. Amid warnings about nuclear activity and the killing of protesters, the threat posed by ballistic missiles has been conspicuously absent. Despite some discussion of the issue, it appears this threat has yet to receive appropriate attention in Washington. One can assume that Israel’s leadership continues its diplomatic and security efforts on this front, mindful as well of the window of opportunity at its disposal.

Presence and freedom of action matter more than an agreement

Events this week in the Kurdish region of northeastern Syria illustrate the depth of change in the region and its moral implications. The Kurds, who played a significant role in the fight against jihadist terrorism emanating from the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and other extremist groups, have now become a target of the regime in Damascus, led by the jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, known as the hardline al-Julani, and his partner, the “good friend” Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Accounts from Kurdish sources depict ethnic cleansing and a genuine attempt to eradicate the Kurdish people. They also convey undisguised disappointment with the US stance, alongside an expectation that Israel will extend a helping hand.

Given Israel’s renewed standing as a regional power and against the backdrop of Turkish ambitions in the area, Israel’s leadership in Jerusalem cannot remain silent in the face of shifting balances of power in regions of strategic importance to it. Nor can it ignore such cries for help from those who see themselves as aligned with Israel. Conduct in these tests will shape Israel’s standing, particularly in the old-new Middle East in which we live.

From the specific case of the Kurds to the broader picture, Syria itself: the sequence of events since Julani rose to power underscores the instability of this arena and the rapid swings between extremes. In some ways, this mirrors the challenge present in other open fronts. The dramatic achievements of the war have created a new reality, but one that is still taking shape. The old order has been dismantled; a new order has yet to solidify.

The challenge in such a reality is to secure achievements and thwart the enemy’s efforts to rebuild strength and erode them. This stretches the attention and capabilities of the defense establishment and political leadership to the limit, demands flexibility and rapid response, and runs counter to the natural desire for stable routine. Yet this stage is unavoidable. Attempts to shorten the path through dubious arrangements or premature agreements could prove far too costly. This applies as well to pressures to establish an Israeli-Syrian security arrangement.

In Washington, this is viewed as another layer of the Abraham Accords and an opportunity to shape a new regional order. But Israel, having been burned before, must adopt a cautious and skeptical approach. It is entitled, and indeed obliged, to assume that the ruler’s friendliness toward the West is merely a survival tactic. Even if he himself were to change, he remains bound by commitments to a base whose behavior can be seen in clashes with Druze, Alawites and now also Kurds.

Israel must preserve freedom of action, both aerial and ground, in Syria. This will allow it to continue proactive operations against hostile elements entrenching themselves in the area, prevent weapons smuggling and terrorist intentions, and safeguard additional interests. Under no circumstances should Israel relinquish security control of the buffer zone or its hold on the Mount Hermon crest, a vital observation point for blocking linkages between Syria, Hezbollah and Iran.

A situation in which Israeli forces are forced into friction with the Turkish military in southern Syria cannot be acceptable to Israel, even if formal diplomatic relations exist between the two countries. The Golan Heights constitute Israel’s strategic defensive line on its eastern border, and their status is not open for discussion.

It is hard to believe that Julani would be willing to reach arrangements with Israel under these conditions. That does not mean Israel should compromise. Tangible assets and freedom of security action are preferable to dubious arrangements, even if they are formalized.

The gates of hell

Ali Shaat, head of the “Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip,” announced from Davos that the Rafah crossing would reopen next week. It remains unclear whether this will happen on the stated date and whether the crossing will be used for goods as well as for people. In any case, once the statement has been made, the direction is clear.

As if the existing openings and crossings through which dual-use items flow to the benefit of the Hamas terrorist organization were not enough, this route is now set to open as well, with oversight that evokes tales of Chelm. Confronting our enemies’ rearmament efforts on all fronts, and in the Gaza Strip in particular, requires an unconventional organizational response: a joint effort by the Israel Defense Forces, the Shin Bet security agency, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the police, the Tax Authority, the crossings authority, the State Attorney’s Office and others.

For this to happen, political direction is required, as are resources and, above all, an understanding of the processes involved. Because of their complexity, these processes demand a level of sustained attention that is not always present among decision-makers and senior officials. That is what our enemies are counting on. It is time to bring about change here as well.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 25, 2025.