For decades now, common wisdom has been that the only solution to the hundred-year conflict between Israel and its neighbors is to establish an independent Arab-Palestinian state alongside Israel. So engrained has this thinking become that many have been unable to fathom an alternative response to the Palestinian Hamas massacre of October 7^th than to double down on promoting such a state.

However, even those who strongly oppose the idea that the result of such horrendous behavior should be an award of independence, have mainly couched their opposition in terms of the timing and not necessarily the essence of the matter. Though the ‘a state now would be a prize for terror’ argument is correct and in a saner world perhaps suffice to put the issue to rest for the foreseeable future, it does not address the real issue at hand. In fact, the October 7^th massacre is only the most recent and grave symptom of the abject failure of the Palestinian national movement to demonstrate that it is capable and deserving of an independent state.

With the re-inauguration of President Donald Trump, there is a historic opportunity to move beyond the tried and failed policies of previous administrations, Republican and Democrat alike. We must recognize the truth, that the idea of a State of Palestine is one of the most unjust initiatives of the latter half of the 20^th century and if ever established would constitute a geopolitical disaster of the highest order; for Israel, for moderate Arab States in the region, and for the United States. Any moral and straight-thinking person should abandon it and start considering alternative arrangements for self-rule for Palestinians, conditioned on civilized behavior and demand an end to the idea of perpetual Palestinian refugeedom. Here’s why.

Published in Times of Israel, January 19, 2025. 

There is a spurt of great optimism on both sides of the political spectrum in the United States, and even Israel, that the Lebanese government, now that it has installed Joseph Aoun as its president, will finally leverage Israel’s devastating victory over Hizballah to assert Lebanon’s sovereignty.

In this optimistic view, the Lebanese government will uphold the November ceasefire between Hizballah and Israel. It will do so by executing both U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, a 2006 measure under which Hizballah was to be removed from south of the Litani River, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, a 2005 measure under which all armed factions are to be disarmed and the monopoly of power be returned to the Lebanese government. Moreover, for the first time in five decades, powerful regional forces seem held at bay; the PLO is weakened and Iran and Hizballah are laid waste. Lebanon is back in Lebanese hands. And indeed, the optimists assert, the speech Aoun gave upon assuming office contained language that lends substance to this promise: “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.”

Mark me down as highly skeptical of that view. And not only because of the jadedness and curmudgeonly essence that can come with an analyst’s age and experience, but because of the underlying reality. Lebanon likely is far from out of the woods, far from adequately executing its obligations under the ceasefire plan, and certainly far from emerging as a calm state at peace with Israel.

The problem is because Lebanon’s instability arises not from the external array of forces, but from the foundations of the Lebanese state, which are then leveraged by external forces.

The quote that never was

Let’s start, first, with the most obvious. President Aoun was reported to have said that line about how “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.” He was even praised for it by President Trump’s incoming national security adviser. The problem is he did not say that, not in the text of the speech or as it was delivered in Arabic. He actually said:

“My mandate begins today, and I pledge to serve all Lebanese, wherever they are, as the first servant of the country, upholding the national pact and practicing the full powers of the presidency as an impartial mediator between institutions … Interference in the judiciary is forbidden, and there will be no immunity for criminals or corrupt individuals. There is no place for mafias, drug trafficking, or money laundering in Lebanon.”

He raised this in the context of the judiciary, not the military. Regarding the disbanding of the Hizballah militia as a military force, he was careful in his words and suggested it would be subsumed into the state rather than outright eliminated. Such an integration of Hizballah into the Lebanese Armed Forces is one of Israel’s greatest fears, because it could put Israel into a war not with a militia but with a sovereign country on its own border. Aoun said:

“The Lebanese state – I repeat the Lebanese state – will get rid of the Israeli occupation … My era will include the discussion of our defensive strategy to enable the Lebanese state to get rid of the Israeli occupation and to retaliate against its aggression.”

The structure that cannot reform

Words in the Middle East mean only so much. Some might therefore dismiss as inconsequential this episode of “the quote that never was.” Yet it reflects something significant and far deeper. The Lebanese state — the “National Pact” to which Aoun refers — cannot develop into what the optimists hope it will, because its structure is not aligned with the only form of Lebanon that potentially justifies its existence as an independent state, let alone one at peace with Israel.

Understanding why requires dipping into the history of Lebanon. There’s a popular misconception that Lebanon exists only as a result of a colonial gift to a Christian community by the French at the end of World War I. Actually, Lebanon has an older and more defined reason to exist than almost any other state in the region but Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. The colonial definition of Lebanon established at the end of World War I unwittingly and out of the best intentions to the Lebanese Christians undermined that essence.

Lebanon embodies the result of a major event: the Battle of Ayn Dera in 1711, where the powerful Chehab clan converted to Christianity from Sunni Islam, aligned with the powerful Khazen Maronite clan, and unified the remaining non-Greek Orthodox Christians into a powerful force, all aligned with half of the Druze under the Jumblatt, Talhuq, Imad and Abd al-Malik clans. This Maronite-Druze coalition won against their premier enemy — the Ottoman empire and its governors of Sidon and Damascus — and expelled the Ottoman proxies, the Arslan, Alam al-Din, and Sawaf Druze clans from Mount Lebanon to the east in what today is the area of Jebel Druze/Suweida in Syria. The key enemy around which the Lebanese state was formed in 1711 was the Ottoman threat from Damascus and the area of Sidon. Ousting the Turks was a Christian and Druze project. The Shiites were not even a factor, although they too held as their nemesis the Ottoman specter, of which the Sunni Arabs was a mere instrument.

Aoun’s remarks are a reminder of the problem with the present Lebanese structure. The military and its government are fundamentally anchored to the National Pact. That National Pact is a concept of a multi-confessional equilibrium among four communities, rather than the idea of Lebanon as established as a result of the battle of Ayn Dara in 1711 around a Maronite-Druze core. This multi-confessional concept divorced Lebanon from its only reason for existence: to be a homeland for a Christian state aligned with the Druze ally. Lebanon as constructed embodies the multi-confessionalism, rather than the alliance of the 1711 Battle of Ayn Dera and its results.

At first, this was a moot point: the Maronites and the Druze were a strong majority, and thus dominated the state. But the Greek Orthodox were never fully on board with the idea, and over the 20^th century, the Sunni populations grew, largely through immigration, as did the Shiite, to the point at which the Christians were no longer the majority. The multi-confessional equilibrium thus shifted from being a cover for Maronite dominance to being a genuinely rickety, artificial coalition of forces that could not manage to overpower each other. Any attempt by any faction to overpower the other resulted in a breakdown of the equilibrium, a collapse of civic order, and violent conflict.

The current structure of the Lebanese government and its premier manifestation, the armed forces, are manifestations of this equilibrium of forces. A more coherent, peaceful, and successful Lebanon would reject the National Pact and return to its original and only raison d’être as a regional Christian nation that gathers the various nearby Christian communities into a homeland offering hope for regional survival.

Strategic forces at work

The looming threats from the outside push the fragile artificial institution of the Lebanese state and army to hedge yet further rather than move decisively to extirpate the remains of Hizballah. The inherent instability and misalignment with the 1711 purpose invite those external interventions.

Lebanon has a neighbor next door — Syria — that essentially has never recognized Lebanon‘s existence as a valid state. Syria was also established as an Arab state with large minorities — a multi-ethnic, confessional quilt, and as such is not easily distinguished from a multi-confessional Lebanon. The mix is different; Syria has a much larger Sunni Arab community, with large Alawite minorities. And the Christians in Syria were largely Greek Orthodox who had made their peace with Arab nationalism because it allowed them to transform the irreconcilable and potentially mortal Turkish nemesis into a digestible Arab one. If Lebanon remains a multi-confessional state rather than narrowly a Maronite state with a Druze entity, then its digestion by Syria is conceivable.

Most concerning for Lebanon is that what is emerging in Syria is not a multi-confessional nation with enough of its own problems to leave Lebanon alone, but rather a Sunni-Arab state under Turkish influence and possible suzerainty. Turks are flooding the new Syria as well. The Ottoman nemesis that was defeated in Ayn Dara in 1711 is on the move to reverse that verdict — this time without their Druze allies but with the natural affinity of the sizeable Sunni Arab populations of northern Lebanon.

At the moment, the Lebanese government is more worried about what will threaten them from Damascus. A Sunni Lebanese alliance with the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham entity emerging in Damascus and led by Ahmad ash-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) could subvert Lebanese independence and subjugate it to the neo-Ottoman project led by Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan. Compared to that risk, Hizballah — which Israel has diminished — seems like a distant concern rather than an acute problem that needs immediate and urgent attention from the central Lebanese government and its multi-confessional military. Indeed, the Lebanese government may even entertain husbanding the remaining forces of Hizballah as an asset to mobilize against the Sunni threat emerging from Ankara and Damascus.

Any current Lebanese government is likely to view an energetic push to confront what remains of Hizballah as a prescription for civil war and an invasion by the new Syrians and their Turkish overlords. This would be tantamount to willfully inviting the apocalypse.

As a result, it is unlikely that the Lebanese government —an artificial institution anchored to a false equilibrium—will risk its existence by trying to rearrange the power structures. It is far more worried about maintaining sufficient stability to prevent Syria from interfering and entering, effectively ending Lebanon as a country.

Lebanon’s path to long-term survival lies not with this equilibrium, but through returning to the essence of what Lebanon was meant to be, the spirit of Ayn Dara and 1711. It could establish a protective strategic umbrella with other regional forces, such as Israel and the West. For Israel, an alliance with Lebanon may be the most effective way to secure its northern border. And for the West, Lebanon offers an opportunity to preserve the oldest churches in the cradle of Christianity.

But that would involve an upheaval that the Lebanese people now appear unwilling to entertain. After decades of civil war, even a bad equilibrium may appear better than intercommunal strife. It is in this conflict-averse context that President Aoun’s call for integration of all militias — essentially a re-manifestation of the national pact and integration of Hizballah into it — needs to be understood. It is something other than a clean call to disarm and erase Hizballah as expected and demanded by the EU, U.S., and Israel.

As a result, peace with Israel and a strategic reorganization of the coastal Levant will have to wait until the Syrian cauldron again comes to visit, Lebanon’s Sunnis align with it, and the neo-Ottoman empire threatens. That is likely to happen, and in a turbulent enough way that it would force Lebanon’s leadership to resort, for survival, to rediscovering the approach of 1711. Only in that framework will there be a realignment of Lebanon and likely strategic cooperation and even peace with Israel. A new era is coming to Lebanon eventually, but things may get worse before they get better.

Published in The Editors, January 13, 2025.

First, the strongest arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, has been significantly weakened, having lost almost its entire leadership and the vast majority of its massive arsenal in Lebanon. Worse still, Iran’s most convenient smuggling route to Hezbollah in Lebanon, across Syria, is now closed.

Following the victory of Abu Mohammed al-Julani’s jihadist army, Syria has turned from Iran’s playground into Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s backyard. The latter is reluctant to allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the region.

The magnificent tunnel network discovered along the Syrian-Lebanese border, which Iran used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, has become inaccessible, and the airspace over Syria has also been closed to Iran. This has heightened the ayatollah’s panic, due to the lack of alternative routes to continue arming Hezbollah.

Shi’ite militias in Iraq have declared their refusal to continue fighting for the axis, and Hamas is now at an unprecedented low in terms of its power in the Gaza Strip.

Despite this, Tehran still maintains convoluted ways to negatively influence the region.

Two significant arenas of influence remain for the ayatollah’s regime: the Jordanian kingdom and the West Bank. In both these arenas, there is a significant population of frustrated Palestinians who have, over the years, been convinced that the existing leadership – regardless of who it is – is not right for them and should be overthrown to gain what they currently lack: land, wealth, and national pride.

In the Jordanian arena, Tehran has long exploited the kingdom’s weakness, poor economic conditions, and inherent divisions among Jordan’s Bedouin tribes. It encouraged the Palestinian masses to support Islamist groups, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, to undermine King Abdullah and prepare for an invasion and attack against Israel from Jordanian territory.

Simultaneously, Iran uses Jordanian land as a convenient transit for smuggling Captagon drugs, which until recently funded Assad’s regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, Iran has treated Jordanian territory as its own and smuggled a huge number of weapons through it to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank.

Now, with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the presence of rebel forces along the Syrian-Jordanian border, Iran faces new competitors for influence in Jordan. Still, as a wounded beast with its back to the wall, it might act in a far less calculated manner than before.

In the West Bank, Iran maintains its influence through Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which it has armed for years to undermine the rule of  Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

The current skirmishes between his Fatah fighters and Hamas are not about sporadic outbreaks of local rivalry but the calculated results of Iran’s long-standing cultivation efforts, aimed at replacing Abbas’s corrupt regime and the Palestinian Authority with governance effectively controlled by Tehran. This would grant Iran almost direct access to Israel’s border.

The Houthis are also not idle, reminding the world that they exist and are a force to be reckoned with. However, the connection between them and Iran seems less tight than Tehran might wish for. The arming of the Houthis so far, coupled with the leniency shown by the Biden administration when it removed them from the blacklist of terrorist organizations, has artificially inflated the group’s self-confidence. It is crucial to bring them back to their natural proportions.

Iran’s long-standing involvement in the African arena, for example, in Sudan, is also significant and should not be forgotten. By acting there, Tehran has effectively prepared the ground for using this devastated and battered state as a transit point for smuggling weapons to its desired targets.

IN ADDITION to these three arenas, Tehran is racing to achieve its ultimate goal: nuclear capability. Such capability would immensely enhance its bargaining power with regional competitors like Turkey and global powers such as the US. Hence, it is of utmost importance to curb these capabilities now before Iran reaches the point of no return.

An arms race

A nuclear Iran would likely drag the region into an arms race, with other countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia aspiring – and in some cases already working toward, the same goal.

Moreover, the Iranians, who view Sunni rebels in Syria as bitter enemies and have recently even begun publicly declaring so, are reluctant to label Turkey and its Turkish “sultan,” Erdogan, as an adversary, even though the rivalry between them is evident and ominous.

Erdogan, the big winner in Syria’s current situation, has become the central figure attracting regional actors to negotiate for their slice of the regional pie. That is, owing to the fact that he has gained control over an energy transport route bypassing the China-Iran-Europe route.

Erdogan is now able to transport energy through the bloc of Turkic nations (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, etc.), Syria (now effectively under Ankara’s control), and Saudi Arabia to Europe. This route is shorter and cheaper than the former, thereby granting Erdogan substantial power and influence in the region.

Consequently, we might see Tehran swallow its pride and approach Erdogan to negotiate its share. It is also likely that Iran will attempt to “buy” or bribe its way back into the Syrian-Lebanese smuggling tunnels to continue arming Hezbollah. All of this, of course, will undoubtedly come at the expense of Iranian citizens, who have been suffering for years due to the lack of resources diverted by the regime to achieve its imperial ambitions.

As the world examines the consequences of the jihadist uprising in Syria and how to deal with it, it is crucial to understand that a defeated enemy is often a most dangerous one. The Iranian threat remains alive and present in the region and must not be ignored.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 11, 2025

In the last week, there has been intense discussion focused on Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza, reportedly one of the last functioning hospitals in the area. This has been part of a broader ongoing debate in the war between Hamas and Israel, on the status of hospitals in wartime and under what circumstances they might become objects of legitimate military operations.

Under International Humanitarian Law, it is a foundational principle that hospitals receive special protected status. For example, Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute prohibits “intentionally directing attacks against” hospitals provided “they are not military objectives.” Article 11 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions provides that medical units shall be “protected at all times.”

However, this protection ceases if they are “used to commit hostile acts.”

These rules of international law are recognized by Israel and implemented during its conflict with Hamas in Gaza.

Hamas, a ruthless terrorist organization, operates without any regard to the norms of international law or value of human life, with a longstanding practice of systematically embedding their operations in hospitals, using civilians as human shields and building military tunnels underneath hospitals.

Fifteen months into the war initiated by Hamas, there is hardly a hospital or medical facility in Gaza the terror group has not turned into a military command center, including the Kamal Adwan Hospital. There, Israel has detained over 240 Hamas terrorists, including some disguised as patients, and found caches of weapons, including guns and explosives. Each of these acts is an undisputed violation of the law of armed conflict.

The sustained rocket launches from Gaza into Israel, the elimination of the Nukhba unit commander who orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023 assault on kibbutz Nir Oz and continued operating against us from within the humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis, alongside hundreds of Hamas fighters who engaged in combat, were captured, or eliminated in the Jabaliya sector last week – these directly counter assertions that “we have nothing left to accomplish in the Gaza Strip.”

The blow Hamas sustained from Israel during the war is severe and painful, yet neither fatal nor irreversible. The murderous terror organization maintains its position as the central power force in the Gaza Strip. It commands thousands of fighters and operatives who, while not currently operating within organized military frameworks, maintain their potential to do so, awaiting “the day after” while inflicting damage and casualties on our forces through localized guerrilla operations.

Following the impressive achievements in IDF operations, estimates suggest Hamas still possesses many miles of unaddressed tunnels, substantial weaponry, and potentially some capacity for manufacturing bombs and ammunition. Its operatives control all areas lacking Israeli military presence, as well as a significant portion of humanitarian aid entering Gaza.

The organization’s command structure maintains coordination, at least at a basic level, across all components. Their approach to hostage deal negotiations demonstrates effective leadership coordination between external and internal elements.

 Israel’s dilemma

The terror organization’s remaining capabilities, combined with its deep-rooted control over Gaza’s governing mechanisms and life systems, plus substantial Palestinian public support, reinforces its leadership’s conviction that Hamas’ era in Gaza persists. They pin their greatest hopes on concessions they aim to secure through the hostage agreement: war termination, IDF force withdrawal from Gaza, the population’s return to evacuated areas, commitment to civilian reconstruction, and release of hundreds of terrorists from Israeli prisons. Hamas leadership views these conditions as a launching point for restoring the organization’s position. Without internal competition threatening Hamas’ monopoly, and with support from Qatar and Turkey – key players in the emerging regional Sunni axis – this process might unfold more rapidly than anticipated.

This encapsulates Israel’s dilemma: the hostage situation strengthens Hamas’ aspirations to maintain central power in Gaza post-conflict. This hope aids their survival and hardens their negotiating stance. To advance both hostage return and Hamas’ collapse, Israel needs to apply maximum pressure simultaneously through three parallel tracks: military operations, civilian infrastructure control, and diplomatic negotiations. Donald Trump’s influence already looms in the region, promising support for this approach.

The five-point strategy

What’s the correct course of action? First, intensify IDF operations within Gaza. This is essential, primarily to reduce future security threats to Israel. Beyond eliminating Nukhba operatives, we must target their commanders, facilitators, and trainees – along with weapons stockpiles and military equipment. The operation to clear Beit Hanoun of terrorists is crucial for protecting nearby Israeli residents.

Second, eliminate commanders and senior officials, both in Gaza and abroad. While the senior command structure has thinned, several effective brigade commanders, replacements, deputies, and numerous political bureau officials continue managing operations unimpeded.

Third, wrest humanitarian aid control from Hamas. This represents a critical governance resource. Alternative approaches exist and warrant decisive implementation rather than endless deliberation.

Fourth, target Hamas-controlled governmental mechanisms and capabilities. The “Sahm” (“Arrow”) unit within Hamas’ Interior Ministry and their Government Communications Bureau exemplify how the terror organization shapes Gaza’s civilian landscape. Disrupting these elements is essential for achieving the war’s stated objective of dismantling Hamas’ governmental infrastructure.

Fifth, maximize American influence over negotiation mediators. While Egypt and Qatar’s influence over Hamas has limits, it remains significant. Given Donald Trump’s statements regarding hostages, these mediators should be expected to leverage all available resources to achieve results with Hamas.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 02, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Alongside the satisfaction at seeing the Iranian “axis of resistance” collapse in what appears to be a domino effect (Gaza-Lebanon-Syria), concerns are now rising about the nature of the future regime taking shape in Damascus. This is especially true regarding the question of the new Syrian regime’s approach toward Israel, particularly in light of Turkey’s establishment as the dominant player in the Syrian arena.

Assad’s fall served Ankara well, paving the way for it to expand its foothold in Syria without having to get its hands too dirty. The victory of the rebels it trained and armed for over a decade helps improve its position regarding its core interests in Syria, which mainly include weakening Kurdish autonomy in the country and returning millions of Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey since the civil war, causing much domestic frustration. Under the pretext of fighting Kurdish terrorism, Turkey has created a de facto security zone on the northern border with Syria, including areas like Afrin and others. The zone functions as an independent Turkish-speaking province with civilian infrastructure like roads and hospitals.

Now, Turkey is doing everything in its power to establish a pro-Turkish governing alternative that aligns with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman aspirations to transform Syria into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under its patronage. Ankara isn’t wasting time, and in an effort to expand its influence, has already declared its commitment to help Syria build a “new structure” and its intentions to strengthen trade, security, and energy ties with Damascus. It even offered to train the military forces that will form under the new government led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Recently, it went further by threatening military invasion in what appeared to be a signal to the Americans to withdraw their support from the YPG – a Syrian-Kurdish militia associated with the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the European Union.

Given Erdogan’s militant approach toward Israel, which reached a low point after the Oct. 7 massacre, and his standing alongside Hamas, both in words and actions, certain circles in Israel advocate that Jerusalem would do well to repay Erdogan in kind by aiding his Kurdish enemies in the Syrian arena. Supporters of this position argue that beyond moral logic, this approach has practical rationale. Strengthening Kurdish autonomies and other forces hostile to pro-Turkish militias will weaken the influence of Turkish-backed forces and prevent their establishment on Syria’s border with Israel. Such a move, they argue, would make it clear to Erdogan that Israel won’t overlook the Turkish president’s attempts to promote anti-Israeli moves in the regional and global arena. More importantly, it would cause him to hesitate in implementing his threat of invasion into Israel through support for jihadist groups operating in the area. In this view, Israel should provide military assistance to Kurdish groups already receiving significant American backing, thus improving their ground presence and even expanding their hold in northern and eastern Syria.

On the other hand, some warn that following this path could escalate the conflict with the Turks and endanger Israeli interests. Support for the Kurds would be interpreted in Ankara as backing the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and as a worrying advance toward fulfilling the national aspirations of the Kurdish region in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey itself. It’s important to understand that the Turks hold a monolithic view of the Kurds, meaning that support for the YPG is equivalent to support for the PKK – both are terrorists in their view.

Ankara’s current hostile approach toward Israel, severe as it is, could worsen further, and it wouldn’t be wise to push Erdogan in this direction. For example, Turkey could choose not to allow the passage of oil coming from Azerbaijan and destined for Israel through its territory – a move that hasn’t been implemented despite the Turkish boycott. Moreover, if Turkey deepens its influence in Syria, not to mention if it launches another military operation to dismantle Kurdish autonomies according to its recent threat, the chances of the Kurds emerging victorious are very low. In such a scenario, what seems like Israel seizing opportunities could prove to be betting on the wrong horse.

According to this approach, one shouldn’t act comprehensively regarding the range of challenges with Ankara, and instead should provide specific and unique responses that align with Israeli interests vis-à-vis Turkey according to each issue. Despite periods of tension between Israel and Turkey surrounding the Palestinian problem, Erdogan typically prioritized economic considerations over Islamist ideology, even while remaining its ardent supporter. In fact, until the deterioration that characterized the past year, Turkey cultivated close trade relations and considered cooperation with Israel in additional areas like energy.

Therefore, given wise conduct that integrates the vital interests of both sides, Israel and Turkey might reach understandings in Syria just as Israel managed to coordinate its actions with Russia over the past decade and maintain relative stability in the region. In an optimistic forecast, together they could even turn Syria into a buffer zone, similar to Jordan serving as a buffer between Israel and Iraq (and incidentally – Iran).

It seems that at this stage it’s still too early to determine the nature of the new regime taking shape in Damascus, the extent of its reliance on Ankara, and its position toward Israel. Israel would do well to refrain for now from taking a public stance and/or providing overt material support to the Kurds in Syria. Despite the benefit inherent in establishing a strong Kurdish presence as a player blocking the spread of extreme Sunni Islamism in the space hostile to Israel, this could open a new, close, and dangerous front with the Turks. Thus, a move intended to strengthen Israel’s security through effective deterrence against Ankara could bring upon it exactly the escalation it fears, in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It should be remembered that in the conflict between Ankara and the Kurds, the balance of power favors the former unless the Kurds are provided with game-changing means – a development that doesn’t seem realistic in the foreseeable future, neither for the Americans nor for Israel. Trump is not expected to deepen the American military presence in Syria, and if anything, is more likely to thin out the forces as he did during his first term as president. As for Israel, most attention and resources are directed to other arenas, particularly Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon, and at this stage it doesn’t seem it can afford to direct more resources than those already invested today in securing the Syrian Golan.

In conclusion, unless it can be done covertly, Israel should be careful about meddling in the Syrian cauldron and suspend support for the Kurds, at least until timing when it becomes clear that betting on them will prove worthwhile, if the balance of power tilts in their favor. This does not apply to other minorities in Syria like Christians and especially the Druze who, unlike the Kurds, are geographically much closer to the border with Israel. They should and can be supported without it being done as a finger in Erdogan’s eye while risking escalation of the situation to Israel’s detriment.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 30, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

To many researchers, journalists, leaders, and citizens in the West, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is perceived as a pragmatic figure. However, this belief, rooted in Western perspectives, reflects the cultural biases of the West more than the realities of the Middle East. To understand why, we must examine how Western culture shapes the perception of leaders in the Middle East and how the role Julani himself plays in this sophisticated diplomatic game.

Westerners are logically constrained by their cultural bias in understanding the Middle East due to fundamental cultural differences between the two regions. Westerners are the cultural product of over a century of devastating wars in Europe – conflicts that reshaped the global order and led to the adoption of values such as peace, prosperity, and cooperation among nations. After two world wars resulting in tens of millions dead and immense suffering, Western culture became centered around aspirations for economic stability, human rights, and international harmony.

In contrast, the Middle East has evolved over millennia as a desert tribal culture shaped by territorial conflicts and religious wars that continue to define the region.

While religious wars in the West ended centuries ago, in the Middle East, the Sunni-Shia conflict and ethnic struggles remain central to ongoing conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Iran’s Shi’ite hegemony dominated the Middle East through coalitions and threats. Today, however, the Sunni coalition, led by Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, is gaining strength, particularly after the removal of Assad and the conquest of Syria.

Cognitive bias in the Western view of Julani

The gap between Western values and Middle Eastern realities creates a significant cognitive dissonance for Western leaders, journalists, and researchers. They struggle to reconcile how a jihadist leader such as Julani seized power in Syria and rebranded himself as pragmatic leader to the world. How does the Western mind bridge this gap? Through a mechanism of cognitive distortion.

This mechanism operates as follows: to reconcile their expectations with reality, Western observers interpret Julani’s actions as signaling change. His adoption of Western attire, his avoidance of excessive violence against local populations, and his diplomatic language are seen as proof of pragmatism. However, the truth is that Julani’s actions do not reflect Western values but rather a distinctly Islamic strategy known as taqiyya.

What is taqiyya?

Taqiyya is a doctrine designed to protect Islamic believers from harm or persecution. The Quran permits Muslims to conceal their faith when faced with “disbelievers” (enemies of Islam) if necessary to protect themselves (Quran, Surah 28:3). It even allows Muslims to declare disbelief when under duress, provided that faith remains intact in their hearts. Even the Prophet Muhammad himself employed taqiyya in certain situations.

One famous example of Muhammad’s use of taqiyya was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh tribe. Many scholars view this treaty as strategic taqiyya, as Muhammad agreed to a ceasefire with the intention of later conquering Mecca – a goal he eventually achieved.

Julani’s strategic sophistication recalls that of the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat. In a speech in Johannesburg on May 10, 1994, Arafat compared the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah before it was broken. History has shown that Arafat meant what he said – those who doubt it can review the Second Intifada and the Karine A weapons ship incident. In 2002, I had the privilege of interrogating that ship’s crew, an investigation that traced the operation back to Arafat and his finance minister, Fuad Shubaki.

The influence of Turkey’s Erdogan

Julani has a masterful mentor in Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His cooperation with this Turkish director explains much of Julani’s success in deceiving the West. As a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey excels in diplomatic manipulation of Western perceptions. Through Erdogan’s mentorship, Turkey has taught Julani how to adopt a pragmatic facade that serves his ideological and political goals.

The strategy of ‘hudna’

A key tactic in Julani’s playbook is the concept of hudna – a temporary cessation of hostilities – rooted in Islamic history. According to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, hudna is permitted when Muslims are in a position of weakness, allowing them to regroup and grow stronger before resuming conflict. When asked about relations with Israel or future wars, Julani does not rule out fighting.

Instead, he frames the situation in terms of “the weakness of the believers” and “the good of the ummah” (nation). This approach avoids committing to genuine peace and instead cloaks itself in religiously sanctioned postponement.

The Western illusion vs the simple truth

Political researchers, politicians, and journalists in the West who lack an understanding of the cultural and religious context interpret Julani’s words and actions as progress toward Islamic modernization. The simple truth is that Julani remains an ideological jihadist whose long-term goals exclude peace or prosperity in Western terms. A fundamentalist Muslim willing to make peace with Israel is, in a cultural-religious sense, as unlikely as an ultra-Orthodox Jew willing to eat non-kosher meat.

Conclusion: Realism in perception

Having spent over 30 years in interrogation rooms with some of the most notorious Arab terrorists and spies, my conclusion is clear: The West must view the Middle East and its leaders through a realistic lens. Julani is not pragmatic in the Western sense but a sophisticated strategist who uses diplomacy, religious history, and Western misconceptions to achieve his goals. Only by understanding the cultural and religious context can the West formulate a realistic and informed policy toward leaders such as Julani and his mentor, Erdogan.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 25, 2024.

Israel’s strategic objective, which has become increasingly evident over the past few months, aims to fundamentally reshape the regional landscape by targeting Iran and the axis it leads, thereby weakening its influence. This strategy unfolds across two parallel tracks.

On the military front, Israel has targeted Iran’s key proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Iran itself, exposing its vulnerabilities and undermining its prestige. On the diplomatic front, Israel is working to establish a new regional framework centered on expanding the Abraham Accords through normalization with Saudi Arabia, a plan backed by the United States. This new regional framework is intended to serve as a counterbalance to the Iranian axis, further weakening it and potentially destabilizing the Iranian regime to the point of collapse, thereby reducing regional risks.

Israel’s actions have left Iran strategically cornered, facing distress and embarrassment. The regime in Tehran is overshadowed by threats. It fears the imminent return of President Trump, the strength of Israel’s military, the loss of strategic assets, and its exposed vulnerabilities, all of which compound its domestic challenges. Indeed, the collapse of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Hezbollah, and the removal of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the Shiite axis have left Iran in a state of strategic confusion. While its rhetoric remains aggressive, Iran must now decide its next steps, particularly as Trump’s return to power looms.

Iran faces a strategic dilemma:  Pursue a new agreement with the international community, led by the U.S. and a determined president. Such an agreement could allow Iran to focus on economic and security recovery, and perhaps even rebuild the Shiite axis. Or it could accelerate its nuclear ambitions, securing military nuclear capabilities as a safeguard for the regime and a foundation for revitalizing the Shiite axis under a nuclear umbrella.

Despite this dilemma, Iran continues its efforts to rehabilitate Hezbollah, though this task has become increasingly difficult under the new conditions following Assad’s fall in Syria. Concurrently, Iran seeks to destabilize Jordan, turning it into a front against Israel, while smuggling advanced weaponry into the West Bank via Jordan to maintain a foothold against Israel and compensate for its other losses in the Palestinian arena. Additionally, Iran may attempt to secure agreements with the new Syrian regime in exchange for investments, though the chances of such agreements succeeding are slim.

If Iran opts for a new nuclear deal, it will likely rely on its signature tactic: prolonged and sophisticated negotiations. Such a deal would likely require Iran to halt its nuclear program, abandon its regional hegemonic ambitions through proxies and terrorism, and scale back the Shiite axis. In return, sanctions would be lifted, and the Ayatollah regime would remain in power. However, it must be considered that in spite of any such deal, Iran would almost certainly seek to undermine it and resume its subversive activities behind the scenes.

As for Iran’s allies, the country is increasingly isolated. Russia is likely to focus on negotiating with the U.S. over Ukraine, while China – who prioritizes its economic interests – will support Iran only to the extent that it aligns with its economic and technological dominance strategy. In any case, Iran’s current status is problematic: Rebuilding the Shiite axis, meanwhile, would require massive investments, and Iran remains concerned about any activity of insurgents from Syria in Iraq, that would threaten its sphere of influence.

The underlining assumption is that Iran will continue to pose a severe threat to Israel and regional stability regardless of its chosen path. True regional transformation cannot occur without neutralizing the Iranian threat, weakening its influence, and dismantling its regional infrastructure. Achieving this would require destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, targeting its military and governmental symbols, and crippling its economy to render it weak, vulnerable, and focused on internal recovery.

In light of these conditions, Israel must determine the best way to achieve its goals. These include two main components: Completing the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and pursuing a diplomatic initiative to establish a new regional framework that further weakens the Shiite axis.

It is still unclear how Trump will approach Iran, but Israel cannot accept any deal that leaves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure intact. With Iran currently weakened, Syria’s air defenses neutralized, and Trump seemingly supportive of Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel must act swiftly to target Iran’s nuclear program and all its components – assuming the IDF can achieve this goal, and the Americans will back it with the needed weapons and intelligence aid.

Simultaneously with targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israel should aim to destabilize the Iranian regime by striking symbolic targets, disrupting its internal energy economy, and reducing its ability to provide basic resources like fuel and electricity. These measures would harm Iran’s economy without significantly affecting the global economy, potentially empowering domestic opposition movements.

Of course, the risks of an Israeli operation must be considered. A single strike is unlikely to suffice, requiring multiple rounds of deep strikes in Iran. There is also the possibility of a significant Iranian response, including large-scale missile attacks on Israel. Even with regional and international coalition support led by the U.S., Israel may not always intercept such attacks as successfully as it has in the past year. However, the opportunity to decisively weaken Iran and dismantle its nuclear program is rare and crucial. This window of opportunity would also serve to establish a new regional framework and solidify Israel’s position as a key regional power.

Timing is critical. Delaying until Trump takes office may complicate an Israeli strike. Israel should seize this moment to launch its first strike on Iran before Trump’s inauguration, even in the face of opposition from the Biden administration. Such action would demonstrate Israel’s resolve to prevent Iran’s nuclear advancement. As subsequent strikes would take place under Trump’s administration, Israel would likely benefit from greater American support, advancing its strategic goals for regional transformation and ensuring its security.

In light of the rebels’ success and the fall of Assad’s regime, is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to make good on his threat to invade Israel?

Since October 7, Turkey has hardened its stance toward Israel, including severing trade relations with Israel in solidarity with Hamas. In July, Erdogan escalated further, threatening, “Just as we entered Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya, we will do the same to Israel.”

What initially seemed like an empty threat is now becoming a more plausible scenario following the rebels’ astonishing victory in Syria, where many factions supported by Ankara toppled the Assad regime in just 11 days.

Turkey’s role in these developments is significant, though attributing the coup solely to Ankara would be premature. While Turkey trains and arms some rebel groups, it remains unclear if it directly commands Tahrir al-Sham, the organization spearheading the surprise attack. It is also doubtful that Erdogan himself anticipated such swift and decisive rebel gains.

Surely, Erdogan stands to benefit greatly from dismantling a Shiite regime supported by Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah and replacing it with a Sunni-led government. His key interests in Syria include weakening Kurdish autonomy and facilitating the return of millions of Syrian refugees who have fled to Turkey since the civil war.

The rebels’ victory can help Ankara achieve its goals on both fronts.

Erdogan to exacerbate the situation?

However, this achievement does not shield Turkey from the potential spillover of war into its own territory. The rebel factions are a fragmented mixture of militias, often in conflict with one another. Erdogan likely understands that the path to a pro-Turkish government in Syria is fraught with challenges and could take years, if it materializes at all.

Meanwhile, the extensive operational freedom granted to rebel groups could backfire, entangling Turkey in Syria’s internal strife. It may also reignite tensions at home should the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) launch retaliatory attacks against Turkish forces targeting Kurds in Syria.

And what of Israel? Could Erdogan leverage a friendly regime in Syria to position troops and weaponry on Israel’s border? Turkey’s growing influence in Syria aligns with Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision for the Middle East, as part of which Syria could transform into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under Ankara’s auspices. 

This would intensify Turkey’s adversarial stance toward Israel, particularly as there is no end to the “Swords of Iron” war in sight.

Thus, it is plausible that Erdogan either directly orders jihadist groups operating on the Israeli border to attack Israel or, at the very least, supports them in doing so. 

That said, Turkey must weigh the consequences of opening such a front against Israel. Any escalation would risk straining its relationships with the United States and NATO, especially under a new US administration unlikely to tolerate such aggression. 

Considering these dynamics, Erdogan would be well advised to play his cards cautiously and avoid exacerbating the Syrian conflict, particularly with regard to Israel.

Regardless of Erdogan’s calculations, Israel was wise to mobilize tanks and infantry across the border for the first time in 50 years. Israel must continue leveraging this momentum to strike targets in Syria to diminish Iran’s and Hezbollah’s capabilities. 

Moreover, it is crucial for Israel to insist on a robust and expanded American military presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan triangle. 

This strategy will not only curb the influence of pro-Turkish Islamists but also preempt other hostile forces from gaining a foothold in neighboring Jordan—a country already under threat from Iran’s ambitions to destabilize its regime and launch attacks on Israel from the east.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Since Oct. 7, Israel has faced numerous internal and external challenges, yet appears to have succeeded in creating a new regional reality. However, security forces and political leadership had to advance these changes amid significant difficulties and at a heavy cost, operating across multiple fronts after failing to foresee and prepare for various developments.

The recent rapid developments in Syria should serve as another reminder of the importance of maintaining a healthy dose of pessimism. Such an approach helps prepare for worse scenarios – and allows for relief when they don’t materialize.

According to reports, even Israeli intelligence was caught off guard by Bashar Assad’s fall in Syria within days. Their overly optimistic assessment led political leadership to implement what hindsight reveals as flawed policy. Israel believed Damascus’ ruler’s position was stable, and based on this, diplomatic moves were made with Russia, including regarding the end of the Lebanon war. In practice, the Syrian lion proved to be nothing more than a paper tiger.

Excessive optimism was also evident regarding Iran during the war. Before the April missile attack, experts claimed Iran wouldn’t dare launch a direct attack on Israel from its territory, an assessment reportedly shared by US intelligence. The outcome, as we all know, was entirely different: Iran attacked Israel directly not once but twice – launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and UAVs.

This adds to the misconception held by Israeli security forces before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack: many worked under the assumption that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in confrontation with Israel. Senior IDF officials displayed complacency and dismissiveness, leading to the Gaza war that remains ongoing.

Conversely, regarding the war with Hezbollah, Israel heard exaggerated assessments of the Shiite terror organization’s capabilities. Doomsday scenarios of thousands of daily missiles and rockets striking Israel, hundreds of casualties, and prolonged power grid failures circulated – but ultimately proved baseless. Israel fought Hezbollah with considerable success, and these nightmare scenarios proved false and misleading. The prices paid, heavy as they were, weren’t close to the numbers cited by many commentators and professionals.

So which approach should national assessors take – those tasked with predicting reality based on available information – optimistic or pessimistic? Seemingly, an optimistic approach or operational concept that relies somewhat on intelligence about enemy intentions becomes necessary when dealing with budget constraints. The numerous missions facing Israel’s security forces require prioritization and preparation accordingly.

Yet this was also part of the Oct. 7 error. Had commanders in the field based their military deployment along the Gaza Strip on the enemy’s capabilities rather than their analysis of Hamas’ intentions, we might be in a different place today. While budget and manpower certainly play a role, it’s worth remembering that optimistic scenarios sometimes lead to faulty preparation – and the price we ultimately pay proves exponentially higher.

Is this merely hindsight wisdom? Can we draw future lessons from such thinking? In my view, two conclusions emerge: First, the way to manage budget constraints against mission allocation is simply to increase the budget. Clearly, a jump in defense spending will come at the expense of other matters and affect our quality of life and welfare. However, in recent years, we’ve grown accustomed to living in great comfort, each under their own vine and fig tree. A clear-eyed look at reality reveals that Israel likely needs a larger defense budget. In the long run, maintaining stability and security here is worth significant investment across other areas of life.

The second lesson concerns future assessments of our regional situation, particularly regarding Jordan and Egypt. While the Syrian government’s fall doesn’t mean other neighboring regimes will collapse tomorrow, we must seriously consider and prepare for this possibility. If the regime in Egypt, which maintains war readiness against Israel even in peacetime, collapses, we could find ourselves surprised again on the southern front, potentially at an especially heavy cost. Similarly, if Iran succeeds in gaining control over Jordan, it would somewhat compensate for its loss in Syria while gaining easier direct access to act against Israel and promote terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

One derivative of such thinking emerged in discussions about keeping IDF forces along the Philadelphi Corridor after our troops captured it during the war. Although senior military officials, including the Chief of Staff, indicated that Israel could handle Hamas terrorism without controlling this route – many noted that the military had expressed similar optimistic positions before, yet failed to fulfill the mission.

The economic cost of pessimistic thinking is substantial and burdensome, sometimes proving unnecessary in hindsight. However, the price paid for overly optimistic and incorrect forecasts too often comes in blood, ultimately proving far costlier than any price we would have paid for acting according to pessimistic assessments.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 09, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**