There is a spurt of great optimism on both sides of the political spectrum in the United States, and even Israel, that the Lebanese government, now that it has installed Joseph Aoun as its president, will finally leverage Israel’s devastating victory over Hizballah to assert Lebanon’s sovereignty.

In this optimistic view, the Lebanese government will uphold the November ceasefire between Hizballah and Israel. It will do so by executing both U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, a 2006 measure under which Hizballah was to be removed from south of the Litani River, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, a 2005 measure under which all armed factions are to be disarmed and the monopoly of power be returned to the Lebanese government. Moreover, for the first time in five decades, powerful regional forces seem held at bay; the PLO is weakened and Iran and Hizballah are laid waste. Lebanon is back in Lebanese hands. And indeed, the optimists assert, the speech Aoun gave upon assuming office contained language that lends substance to this promise: “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.”

Mark me down as highly skeptical of that view. And not only because of the jadedness and curmudgeonly essence that can come with an analyst’s age and experience, but because of the underlying reality. Lebanon likely is far from out of the woods, far from adequately executing its obligations under the ceasefire plan, and certainly far from emerging as a calm state at peace with Israel.

The problem is because Lebanon’s instability arises not from the external array of forces, but from the foundations of the Lebanese state, which are then leveraged by external forces.

The quote that never was

Let’s start, first, with the most obvious. President Aoun was reported to have said that line about how “The era of Hizballah is over; We will disarm all of them.” He was even praised for it by President Trump’s incoming national security adviser. The problem is he did not say that, not in the text of the speech or as it was delivered in Arabic. He actually said:

“My mandate begins today, and I pledge to serve all Lebanese, wherever they are, as the first servant of the country, upholding the national pact and practicing the full powers of the presidency as an impartial mediator between institutions … Interference in the judiciary is forbidden, and there will be no immunity for criminals or corrupt individuals. There is no place for mafias, drug trafficking, or money laundering in Lebanon.”

He raised this in the context of the judiciary, not the military. Regarding the disbanding of the Hizballah militia as a military force, he was careful in his words and suggested it would be subsumed into the state rather than outright eliminated. Such an integration of Hizballah into the Lebanese Armed Forces is one of Israel’s greatest fears, because it could put Israel into a war not with a militia but with a sovereign country on its own border. Aoun said:

“The Lebanese state – I repeat the Lebanese state – will get rid of the Israeli occupation … My era will include the discussion of our defensive strategy to enable the Lebanese state to get rid of the Israeli occupation and to retaliate against its aggression.”

The structure that cannot reform

Words in the Middle East mean only so much. Some might therefore dismiss as inconsequential this episode of “the quote that never was.” Yet it reflects something significant and far deeper. The Lebanese state — the “National Pact” to which Aoun refers — cannot develop into what the optimists hope it will, because its structure is not aligned with the only form of Lebanon that potentially justifies its existence as an independent state, let alone one at peace with Israel.

Understanding why requires dipping into the history of Lebanon. There’s a popular misconception that Lebanon exists only as a result of a colonial gift to a Christian community by the French at the end of World War I. Actually, Lebanon has an older and more defined reason to exist than almost any other state in the region but Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. The colonial definition of Lebanon established at the end of World War I unwittingly and out of the best intentions to the Lebanese Christians undermined that essence.

Lebanon embodies the result of a major event: the Battle of Ayn Dera in 1711, where the powerful Chehab clan converted to Christianity from Sunni Islam, aligned with the powerful Khazen Maronite clan, and unified the remaining non-Greek Orthodox Christians into a powerful force, all aligned with half of the Druze under the Jumblatt, Talhuq, Imad and Abd al-Malik clans. This Maronite-Druze coalition won against their premier enemy — the Ottoman empire and its governors of Sidon and Damascus — and expelled the Ottoman proxies, the Arslan, Alam al-Din, and Sawaf Druze clans from Mount Lebanon to the east in what today is the area of Jebel Druze/Suweida in Syria. The key enemy around which the Lebanese state was formed in 1711 was the Ottoman threat from Damascus and the area of Sidon. Ousting the Turks was a Christian and Druze project. The Shiites were not even a factor, although they too held as their nemesis the Ottoman specter, of which the Sunni Arabs was a mere instrument.

Aoun’s remarks are a reminder of the problem with the present Lebanese structure. The military and its government are fundamentally anchored to the National Pact. That National Pact is a concept of a multi-confessional equilibrium among four communities, rather than the idea of Lebanon as established as a result of the battle of Ayn Dara in 1711 around a Maronite-Druze core. This multi-confessional concept divorced Lebanon from its only reason for existence: to be a homeland for a Christian state aligned with the Druze ally. Lebanon as constructed embodies the multi-confessionalism, rather than the alliance of the 1711 Battle of Ayn Dera and its results.

At first, this was a moot point: the Maronites and the Druze were a strong majority, and thus dominated the state. But the Greek Orthodox were never fully on board with the idea, and over the 20^th century, the Sunni populations grew, largely through immigration, as did the Shiite, to the point at which the Christians were no longer the majority. The multi-confessional equilibrium thus shifted from being a cover for Maronite dominance to being a genuinely rickety, artificial coalition of forces that could not manage to overpower each other. Any attempt by any faction to overpower the other resulted in a breakdown of the equilibrium, a collapse of civic order, and violent conflict.

The current structure of the Lebanese government and its premier manifestation, the armed forces, are manifestations of this equilibrium of forces. A more coherent, peaceful, and successful Lebanon would reject the National Pact and return to its original and only raison d’être as a regional Christian nation that gathers the various nearby Christian communities into a homeland offering hope for regional survival.

Strategic forces at work

The looming threats from the outside push the fragile artificial institution of the Lebanese state and army to hedge yet further rather than move decisively to extirpate the remains of Hizballah. The inherent instability and misalignment with the 1711 purpose invite those external interventions.

Lebanon has a neighbor next door — Syria — that essentially has never recognized Lebanon‘s existence as a valid state. Syria was also established as an Arab state with large minorities — a multi-ethnic, confessional quilt, and as such is not easily distinguished from a multi-confessional Lebanon. The mix is different; Syria has a much larger Sunni Arab community, with large Alawite minorities. And the Christians in Syria were largely Greek Orthodox who had made their peace with Arab nationalism because it allowed them to transform the irreconcilable and potentially mortal Turkish nemesis into a digestible Arab one. If Lebanon remains a multi-confessional state rather than narrowly a Maronite state with a Druze entity, then its digestion by Syria is conceivable.

Most concerning for Lebanon is that what is emerging in Syria is not a multi-confessional nation with enough of its own problems to leave Lebanon alone, but rather a Sunni-Arab state under Turkish influence and possible suzerainty. Turks are flooding the new Syria as well. The Ottoman nemesis that was defeated in Ayn Dara in 1711 is on the move to reverse that verdict — this time without their Druze allies but with the natural affinity of the sizeable Sunni Arab populations of northern Lebanon.

At the moment, the Lebanese government is more worried about what will threaten them from Damascus. A Sunni Lebanese alliance with the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham entity emerging in Damascus and led by Ahmad ash-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Julani) could subvert Lebanese independence and subjugate it to the neo-Ottoman project led by Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan. Compared to that risk, Hizballah — which Israel has diminished — seems like a distant concern rather than an acute problem that needs immediate and urgent attention from the central Lebanese government and its multi-confessional military. Indeed, the Lebanese government may even entertain husbanding the remaining forces of Hizballah as an asset to mobilize against the Sunni threat emerging from Ankara and Damascus.

Any current Lebanese government is likely to view an energetic push to confront what remains of Hizballah as a prescription for civil war and an invasion by the new Syrians and their Turkish overlords. This would be tantamount to willfully inviting the apocalypse.

As a result, it is unlikely that the Lebanese government —an artificial institution anchored to a false equilibrium—will risk its existence by trying to rearrange the power structures. It is far more worried about maintaining sufficient stability to prevent Syria from interfering and entering, effectively ending Lebanon as a country.

Lebanon’s path to long-term survival lies not with this equilibrium, but through returning to the essence of what Lebanon was meant to be, the spirit of Ayn Dara and 1711. It could establish a protective strategic umbrella with other regional forces, such as Israel and the West. For Israel, an alliance with Lebanon may be the most effective way to secure its northern border. And for the West, Lebanon offers an opportunity to preserve the oldest churches in the cradle of Christianity.

But that would involve an upheaval that the Lebanese people now appear unwilling to entertain. After decades of civil war, even a bad equilibrium may appear better than intercommunal strife. It is in this conflict-averse context that President Aoun’s call for integration of all militias — essentially a re-manifestation of the national pact and integration of Hizballah into it — needs to be understood. It is something other than a clean call to disarm and erase Hizballah as expected and demanded by the EU, U.S., and Israel.

As a result, peace with Israel and a strategic reorganization of the coastal Levant will have to wait until the Syrian cauldron again comes to visit, Lebanon’s Sunnis align with it, and the neo-Ottoman empire threatens. That is likely to happen, and in a turbulent enough way that it would force Lebanon’s leadership to resort, for survival, to rediscovering the approach of 1711. Only in that framework will there be a realignment of Lebanon and likely strategic cooperation and even peace with Israel. A new era is coming to Lebanon eventually, but things may get worse before they get better.

Published in The Editors, January 13, 2025.

First, the strongest arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, has been significantly weakened, having lost almost its entire leadership and the vast majority of its massive arsenal in Lebanon. Worse still, Iran’s most convenient smuggling route to Hezbollah in Lebanon, across Syria, is now closed.

Following the victory of Abu Mohammed al-Julani’s jihadist army, Syria has turned from Iran’s playground into Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s backyard. The latter is reluctant to allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the region.

The magnificent tunnel network discovered along the Syrian-Lebanese border, which Iran used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah, has become inaccessible, and the airspace over Syria has also been closed to Iran. This has heightened the ayatollah’s panic, due to the lack of alternative routes to continue arming Hezbollah.

Shi’ite militias in Iraq have declared their refusal to continue fighting for the axis, and Hamas is now at an unprecedented low in terms of its power in the Gaza Strip.

Despite this, Tehran still maintains convoluted ways to negatively influence the region.

Two significant arenas of influence remain for the ayatollah’s regime: the Jordanian kingdom and the West Bank. In both these arenas, there is a significant population of frustrated Palestinians who have, over the years, been convinced that the existing leadership – regardless of who it is – is not right for them and should be overthrown to gain what they currently lack: land, wealth, and national pride.

In the Jordanian arena, Tehran has long exploited the kingdom’s weakness, poor economic conditions, and inherent divisions among Jordan’s Bedouin tribes. It encouraged the Palestinian masses to support Islamist groups, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others, to undermine King Abdullah and prepare for an invasion and attack against Israel from Jordanian territory.

Simultaneously, Iran uses Jordanian land as a convenient transit for smuggling Captagon drugs, which until recently funded Assad’s regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, Iran has treated Jordanian territory as its own and smuggled a huge number of weapons through it to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank.

Now, with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the presence of rebel forces along the Syrian-Jordanian border, Iran faces new competitors for influence in Jordan. Still, as a wounded beast with its back to the wall, it might act in a far less calculated manner than before.

In the West Bank, Iran maintains its influence through Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which it has armed for years to undermine the rule of  Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

The current skirmishes between his Fatah fighters and Hamas are not about sporadic outbreaks of local rivalry but the calculated results of Iran’s long-standing cultivation efforts, aimed at replacing Abbas’s corrupt regime and the Palestinian Authority with governance effectively controlled by Tehran. This would grant Iran almost direct access to Israel’s border.

The Houthis are also not idle, reminding the world that they exist and are a force to be reckoned with. However, the connection between them and Iran seems less tight than Tehran might wish for. The arming of the Houthis so far, coupled with the leniency shown by the Biden administration when it removed them from the blacklist of terrorist organizations, has artificially inflated the group’s self-confidence. It is crucial to bring them back to their natural proportions.

Iran’s long-standing involvement in the African arena, for example, in Sudan, is also significant and should not be forgotten. By acting there, Tehran has effectively prepared the ground for using this devastated and battered state as a transit point for smuggling weapons to its desired targets.

IN ADDITION to these three arenas, Tehran is racing to achieve its ultimate goal: nuclear capability. Such capability would immensely enhance its bargaining power with regional competitors like Turkey and global powers such as the US. Hence, it is of utmost importance to curb these capabilities now before Iran reaches the point of no return.

An arms race

A nuclear Iran would likely drag the region into an arms race, with other countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia aspiring – and in some cases already working toward, the same goal.

Moreover, the Iranians, who view Sunni rebels in Syria as bitter enemies and have recently even begun publicly declaring so, are reluctant to label Turkey and its Turkish “sultan,” Erdogan, as an adversary, even though the rivalry between them is evident and ominous.

Erdogan, the big winner in Syria’s current situation, has become the central figure attracting regional actors to negotiate for their slice of the regional pie. That is, owing to the fact that he has gained control over an energy transport route bypassing the China-Iran-Europe route.

Erdogan is now able to transport energy through the bloc of Turkic nations (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, etc.), Syria (now effectively under Ankara’s control), and Saudi Arabia to Europe. This route is shorter and cheaper than the former, thereby granting Erdogan substantial power and influence in the region.

Consequently, we might see Tehran swallow its pride and approach Erdogan to negotiate its share. It is also likely that Iran will attempt to “buy” or bribe its way back into the Syrian-Lebanese smuggling tunnels to continue arming Hezbollah. All of this, of course, will undoubtedly come at the expense of Iranian citizens, who have been suffering for years due to the lack of resources diverted by the regime to achieve its imperial ambitions.

As the world examines the consequences of the jihadist uprising in Syria and how to deal with it, it is crucial to understand that a defeated enemy is often a most dangerous one. The Iranian threat remains alive and present in the region and must not be ignored.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 11, 2025

In the last week, there has been intense discussion focused on Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza, reportedly one of the last functioning hospitals in the area. This has been part of a broader ongoing debate in the war between Hamas and Israel, on the status of hospitals in wartime and under what circumstances they might become objects of legitimate military operations.

Under International Humanitarian Law, it is a foundational principle that hospitals receive special protected status. For example, Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute prohibits “intentionally directing attacks against” hospitals provided “they are not military objectives.” Article 11 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions provides that medical units shall be “protected at all times.”

However, this protection ceases if they are “used to commit hostile acts.”

These rules of international law are recognized by Israel and implemented during its conflict with Hamas in Gaza.

Hamas, a ruthless terrorist organization, operates without any regard to the norms of international law or value of human life, with a longstanding practice of systematically embedding their operations in hospitals, using civilians as human shields and building military tunnels underneath hospitals.

Fifteen months into the war initiated by Hamas, there is hardly a hospital or medical facility in Gaza the terror group has not turned into a military command center, including the Kamal Adwan Hospital. There, Israel has detained over 240 Hamas terrorists, including some disguised as patients, and found caches of weapons, including guns and explosives. Each of these acts is an undisputed violation of the law of armed conflict.

The sustained rocket launches from Gaza into Israel, the elimination of the Nukhba unit commander who orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023 assault on kibbutz Nir Oz and continued operating against us from within the humanitarian zone in Khan Yunis, alongside hundreds of Hamas fighters who engaged in combat, were captured, or eliminated in the Jabaliya sector last week – these directly counter assertions that “we have nothing left to accomplish in the Gaza Strip.”

The blow Hamas sustained from Israel during the war is severe and painful, yet neither fatal nor irreversible. The murderous terror organization maintains its position as the central power force in the Gaza Strip. It commands thousands of fighters and operatives who, while not currently operating within organized military frameworks, maintain their potential to do so, awaiting “the day after” while inflicting damage and casualties on our forces through localized guerrilla operations.

Following the impressive achievements in IDF operations, estimates suggest Hamas still possesses many miles of unaddressed tunnels, substantial weaponry, and potentially some capacity for manufacturing bombs and ammunition. Its operatives control all areas lacking Israeli military presence, as well as a significant portion of humanitarian aid entering Gaza.

The organization’s command structure maintains coordination, at least at a basic level, across all components. Their approach to hostage deal negotiations demonstrates effective leadership coordination between external and internal elements.

 Israel’s dilemma

The terror organization’s remaining capabilities, combined with its deep-rooted control over Gaza’s governing mechanisms and life systems, plus substantial Palestinian public support, reinforces its leadership’s conviction that Hamas’ era in Gaza persists. They pin their greatest hopes on concessions they aim to secure through the hostage agreement: war termination, IDF force withdrawal from Gaza, the population’s return to evacuated areas, commitment to civilian reconstruction, and release of hundreds of terrorists from Israeli prisons. Hamas leadership views these conditions as a launching point for restoring the organization’s position. Without internal competition threatening Hamas’ monopoly, and with support from Qatar and Turkey – key players in the emerging regional Sunni axis – this process might unfold more rapidly than anticipated.

This encapsulates Israel’s dilemma: the hostage situation strengthens Hamas’ aspirations to maintain central power in Gaza post-conflict. This hope aids their survival and hardens their negotiating stance. To advance both hostage return and Hamas’ collapse, Israel needs to apply maximum pressure simultaneously through three parallel tracks: military operations, civilian infrastructure control, and diplomatic negotiations. Donald Trump’s influence already looms in the region, promising support for this approach.

The five-point strategy

What’s the correct course of action? First, intensify IDF operations within Gaza. This is essential, primarily to reduce future security threats to Israel. Beyond eliminating Nukhba operatives, we must target their commanders, facilitators, and trainees – along with weapons stockpiles and military equipment. The operation to clear Beit Hanoun of terrorists is crucial for protecting nearby Israeli residents.

Second, eliminate commanders and senior officials, both in Gaza and abroad. While the senior command structure has thinned, several effective brigade commanders, replacements, deputies, and numerous political bureau officials continue managing operations unimpeded.

Third, wrest humanitarian aid control from Hamas. This represents a critical governance resource. Alternative approaches exist and warrant decisive implementation rather than endless deliberation.

Fourth, target Hamas-controlled governmental mechanisms and capabilities. The “Sahm” (“Arrow”) unit within Hamas’ Interior Ministry and their Government Communications Bureau exemplify how the terror organization shapes Gaza’s civilian landscape. Disrupting these elements is essential for achieving the war’s stated objective of dismantling Hamas’ governmental infrastructure.

Fifth, maximize American influence over negotiation mediators. While Egypt and Qatar’s influence over Hamas has limits, it remains significant. Given Donald Trump’s statements regarding hostages, these mediators should be expected to leverage all available resources to achieve results with Hamas.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 02, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Alongside the satisfaction at seeing the Iranian “axis of resistance” collapse in what appears to be a domino effect (Gaza-Lebanon-Syria), concerns are now rising about the nature of the future regime taking shape in Damascus. This is especially true regarding the question of the new Syrian regime’s approach toward Israel, particularly in light of Turkey’s establishment as the dominant player in the Syrian arena.

Assad’s fall served Ankara well, paving the way for it to expand its foothold in Syria without having to get its hands too dirty. The victory of the rebels it trained and armed for over a decade helps improve its position regarding its core interests in Syria, which mainly include weakening Kurdish autonomy in the country and returning millions of Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey since the civil war, causing much domestic frustration. Under the pretext of fighting Kurdish terrorism, Turkey has created a de facto security zone on the northern border with Syria, including areas like Afrin and others. The zone functions as an independent Turkish-speaking province with civilian infrastructure like roads and hospitals.

Now, Turkey is doing everything in its power to establish a pro-Turkish governing alternative that aligns with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman aspirations to transform Syria into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under its patronage. Ankara isn’t wasting time, and in an effort to expand its influence, has already declared its commitment to help Syria build a “new structure” and its intentions to strengthen trade, security, and energy ties with Damascus. It even offered to train the military forces that will form under the new government led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani. Recently, it went further by threatening military invasion in what appeared to be a signal to the Americans to withdraw their support from the YPG – a Syrian-Kurdish militia associated with the “Kurdistan Workers’ Party” (PKK) which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the European Union.

Given Erdogan’s militant approach toward Israel, which reached a low point after the Oct. 7 massacre, and his standing alongside Hamas, both in words and actions, certain circles in Israel advocate that Jerusalem would do well to repay Erdogan in kind by aiding his Kurdish enemies in the Syrian arena. Supporters of this position argue that beyond moral logic, this approach has practical rationale. Strengthening Kurdish autonomies and other forces hostile to pro-Turkish militias will weaken the influence of Turkish-backed forces and prevent their establishment on Syria’s border with Israel. Such a move, they argue, would make it clear to Erdogan that Israel won’t overlook the Turkish president’s attempts to promote anti-Israeli moves in the regional and global arena. More importantly, it would cause him to hesitate in implementing his threat of invasion into Israel through support for jihadist groups operating in the area. In this view, Israel should provide military assistance to Kurdish groups already receiving significant American backing, thus improving their ground presence and even expanding their hold in northern and eastern Syria.

On the other hand, some warn that following this path could escalate the conflict with the Turks and endanger Israeli interests. Support for the Kurds would be interpreted in Ankara as backing the Kurdish threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and as a worrying advance toward fulfilling the national aspirations of the Kurdish region in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey itself. It’s important to understand that the Turks hold a monolithic view of the Kurds, meaning that support for the YPG is equivalent to support for the PKK – both are terrorists in their view.

Ankara’s current hostile approach toward Israel, severe as it is, could worsen further, and it wouldn’t be wise to push Erdogan in this direction. For example, Turkey could choose not to allow the passage of oil coming from Azerbaijan and destined for Israel through its territory – a move that hasn’t been implemented despite the Turkish boycott. Moreover, if Turkey deepens its influence in Syria, not to mention if it launches another military operation to dismantle Kurdish autonomies according to its recent threat, the chances of the Kurds emerging victorious are very low. In such a scenario, what seems like Israel seizing opportunities could prove to be betting on the wrong horse.

According to this approach, one shouldn’t act comprehensively regarding the range of challenges with Ankara, and instead should provide specific and unique responses that align with Israeli interests vis-à-vis Turkey according to each issue. Despite periods of tension between Israel and Turkey surrounding the Palestinian problem, Erdogan typically prioritized economic considerations over Islamist ideology, even while remaining its ardent supporter. In fact, until the deterioration that characterized the past year, Turkey cultivated close trade relations and considered cooperation with Israel in additional areas like energy.

Therefore, given wise conduct that integrates the vital interests of both sides, Israel and Turkey might reach understandings in Syria just as Israel managed to coordinate its actions with Russia over the past decade and maintain relative stability in the region. In an optimistic forecast, together they could even turn Syria into a buffer zone, similar to Jordan serving as a buffer between Israel and Iraq (and incidentally – Iran).

It seems that at this stage it’s still too early to determine the nature of the new regime taking shape in Damascus, the extent of its reliance on Ankara, and its position toward Israel. Israel would do well to refrain for now from taking a public stance and/or providing overt material support to the Kurds in Syria. Despite the benefit inherent in establishing a strong Kurdish presence as a player blocking the spread of extreme Sunni Islamism in the space hostile to Israel, this could open a new, close, and dangerous front with the Turks. Thus, a move intended to strengthen Israel’s security through effective deterrence against Ankara could bring upon it exactly the escalation it fears, in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It should be remembered that in the conflict between Ankara and the Kurds, the balance of power favors the former unless the Kurds are provided with game-changing means – a development that doesn’t seem realistic in the foreseeable future, neither for the Americans nor for Israel. Trump is not expected to deepen the American military presence in Syria, and if anything, is more likely to thin out the forces as he did during his first term as president. As for Israel, most attention and resources are directed to other arenas, particularly Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon, and at this stage it doesn’t seem it can afford to direct more resources than those already invested today in securing the Syrian Golan.

In conclusion, unless it can be done covertly, Israel should be careful about meddling in the Syrian cauldron and suspend support for the Kurds, at least until timing when it becomes clear that betting on them will prove worthwhile, if the balance of power tilts in their favor. This does not apply to other minorities in Syria like Christians and especially the Druze who, unlike the Kurds, are geographically much closer to the border with Israel. They should and can be supported without it being done as a finger in Erdogan’s eye while risking escalation of the situation to Israel’s detriment.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 30, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

To many researchers, journalists, leaders, and citizens in the West, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is perceived as a pragmatic figure. However, this belief, rooted in Western perspectives, reflects the cultural biases of the West more than the realities of the Middle East. To understand why, we must examine how Western culture shapes the perception of leaders in the Middle East and how the role Julani himself plays in this sophisticated diplomatic game.

Westerners are logically constrained by their cultural bias in understanding the Middle East due to fundamental cultural differences between the two regions. Westerners are the cultural product of over a century of devastating wars in Europe – conflicts that reshaped the global order and led to the adoption of values such as peace, prosperity, and cooperation among nations. After two world wars resulting in tens of millions dead and immense suffering, Western culture became centered around aspirations for economic stability, human rights, and international harmony.

In contrast, the Middle East has evolved over millennia as a desert tribal culture shaped by territorial conflicts and religious wars that continue to define the region.

While religious wars in the West ended centuries ago, in the Middle East, the Sunni-Shia conflict and ethnic struggles remain central to ongoing conflicts. Over the past 30 years, Iran’s Shi’ite hegemony dominated the Middle East through coalitions and threats. Today, however, the Sunni coalition, led by Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, is gaining strength, particularly after the removal of Assad and the conquest of Syria.

Cognitive bias in the Western view of Julani

The gap between Western values and Middle Eastern realities creates a significant cognitive dissonance for Western leaders, journalists, and researchers. They struggle to reconcile how a jihadist leader such as Julani seized power in Syria and rebranded himself as pragmatic leader to the world. How does the Western mind bridge this gap? Through a mechanism of cognitive distortion.

This mechanism operates as follows: to reconcile their expectations with reality, Western observers interpret Julani’s actions as signaling change. His adoption of Western attire, his avoidance of excessive violence against local populations, and his diplomatic language are seen as proof of pragmatism. However, the truth is that Julani’s actions do not reflect Western values but rather a distinctly Islamic strategy known as taqiyya.

What is taqiyya?

Taqiyya is a doctrine designed to protect Islamic believers from harm or persecution. The Quran permits Muslims to conceal their faith when faced with “disbelievers” (enemies of Islam) if necessary to protect themselves (Quran, Surah 28:3). It even allows Muslims to declare disbelief when under duress, provided that faith remains intact in their hearts. Even the Prophet Muhammad himself employed taqiyya in certain situations.

One famous example of Muhammad’s use of taqiyya was the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh tribe. Many scholars view this treaty as strategic taqiyya, as Muhammad agreed to a ceasefire with the intention of later conquering Mecca – a goal he eventually achieved.

Julani’s strategic sophistication recalls that of the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat. In a speech in Johannesburg on May 10, 1994, Arafat compared the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah before it was broken. History has shown that Arafat meant what he said – those who doubt it can review the Second Intifada and the Karine A weapons ship incident. In 2002, I had the privilege of interrogating that ship’s crew, an investigation that traced the operation back to Arafat and his finance minister, Fuad Shubaki.

The influence of Turkey’s Erdogan

Julani has a masterful mentor in Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His cooperation with this Turkish director explains much of Julani’s success in deceiving the West. As a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey excels in diplomatic manipulation of Western perceptions. Through Erdogan’s mentorship, Turkey has taught Julani how to adopt a pragmatic facade that serves his ideological and political goals.

The strategy of ‘hudna’

A key tactic in Julani’s playbook is the concept of hudna – a temporary cessation of hostilities – rooted in Islamic history. According to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, hudna is permitted when Muslims are in a position of weakness, allowing them to regroup and grow stronger before resuming conflict. When asked about relations with Israel or future wars, Julani does not rule out fighting.

Instead, he frames the situation in terms of “the weakness of the believers” and “the good of the ummah” (nation). This approach avoids committing to genuine peace and instead cloaks itself in religiously sanctioned postponement.

The Western illusion vs the simple truth

Political researchers, politicians, and journalists in the West who lack an understanding of the cultural and religious context interpret Julani’s words and actions as progress toward Islamic modernization. The simple truth is that Julani remains an ideological jihadist whose long-term goals exclude peace or prosperity in Western terms. A fundamentalist Muslim willing to make peace with Israel is, in a cultural-religious sense, as unlikely as an ultra-Orthodox Jew willing to eat non-kosher meat.

Conclusion: Realism in perception

Having spent over 30 years in interrogation rooms with some of the most notorious Arab terrorists and spies, my conclusion is clear: The West must view the Middle East and its leaders through a realistic lens. Julani is not pragmatic in the Western sense but a sophisticated strategist who uses diplomacy, religious history, and Western misconceptions to achieve his goals. Only by understanding the cultural and religious context can the West formulate a realistic and informed policy toward leaders such as Julani and his mentor, Erdogan.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 25, 2024.

Israel’s strategic objective, which has become increasingly evident over the past few months, aims to fundamentally reshape the regional landscape by targeting Iran and the axis it leads, thereby weakening its influence. This strategy unfolds across two parallel tracks.

On the military front, Israel has targeted Iran’s key proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Iran itself, exposing its vulnerabilities and undermining its prestige. On the diplomatic front, Israel is working to establish a new regional framework centered on expanding the Abraham Accords through normalization with Saudi Arabia, a plan backed by the United States. This new regional framework is intended to serve as a counterbalance to the Iranian axis, further weakening it and potentially destabilizing the Iranian regime to the point of collapse, thereby reducing regional risks.

Israel’s actions have left Iran strategically cornered, facing distress and embarrassment. The regime in Tehran is overshadowed by threats. It fears the imminent return of President Trump, the strength of Israel’s military, the loss of strategic assets, and its exposed vulnerabilities, all of which compound its domestic challenges. Indeed, the collapse of Assad’s regime, the weakening of Hezbollah, and the removal of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the Shiite axis have left Iran in a state of strategic confusion. While its rhetoric remains aggressive, Iran must now decide its next steps, particularly as Trump’s return to power looms.

Iran faces a strategic dilemma:  Pursue a new agreement with the international community, led by the U.S. and a determined president. Such an agreement could allow Iran to focus on economic and security recovery, and perhaps even rebuild the Shiite axis. Or it could accelerate its nuclear ambitions, securing military nuclear capabilities as a safeguard for the regime and a foundation for revitalizing the Shiite axis under a nuclear umbrella.

Despite this dilemma, Iran continues its efforts to rehabilitate Hezbollah, though this task has become increasingly difficult under the new conditions following Assad’s fall in Syria. Concurrently, Iran seeks to destabilize Jordan, turning it into a front against Israel, while smuggling advanced weaponry into the West Bank via Jordan to maintain a foothold against Israel and compensate for its other losses in the Palestinian arena. Additionally, Iran may attempt to secure agreements with the new Syrian regime in exchange for investments, though the chances of such agreements succeeding are slim.

If Iran opts for a new nuclear deal, it will likely rely on its signature tactic: prolonged and sophisticated negotiations. Such a deal would likely require Iran to halt its nuclear program, abandon its regional hegemonic ambitions through proxies and terrorism, and scale back the Shiite axis. In return, sanctions would be lifted, and the Ayatollah regime would remain in power. However, it must be considered that in spite of any such deal, Iran would almost certainly seek to undermine it and resume its subversive activities behind the scenes.

As for Iran’s allies, the country is increasingly isolated. Russia is likely to focus on negotiating with the U.S. over Ukraine, while China – who prioritizes its economic interests – will support Iran only to the extent that it aligns with its economic and technological dominance strategy. In any case, Iran’s current status is problematic: Rebuilding the Shiite axis, meanwhile, would require massive investments, and Iran remains concerned about any activity of insurgents from Syria in Iraq, that would threaten its sphere of influence.

The underlining assumption is that Iran will continue to pose a severe threat to Israel and regional stability regardless of its chosen path. True regional transformation cannot occur without neutralizing the Iranian threat, weakening its influence, and dismantling its regional infrastructure. Achieving this would require destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, targeting its military and governmental symbols, and crippling its economy to render it weak, vulnerable, and focused on internal recovery.

In light of these conditions, Israel must determine the best way to achieve its goals. These include two main components: Completing the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and pursuing a diplomatic initiative to establish a new regional framework that further weakens the Shiite axis.

It is still unclear how Trump will approach Iran, but Israel cannot accept any deal that leaves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure intact. With Iran currently weakened, Syria’s air defenses neutralized, and Trump seemingly supportive of Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel must act swiftly to target Iran’s nuclear program and all its components – assuming the IDF can achieve this goal, and the Americans will back it with the needed weapons and intelligence aid.

Simultaneously with targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israel should aim to destabilize the Iranian regime by striking symbolic targets, disrupting its internal energy economy, and reducing its ability to provide basic resources like fuel and electricity. These measures would harm Iran’s economy without significantly affecting the global economy, potentially empowering domestic opposition movements.

Of course, the risks of an Israeli operation must be considered. A single strike is unlikely to suffice, requiring multiple rounds of deep strikes in Iran. There is also the possibility of a significant Iranian response, including large-scale missile attacks on Israel. Even with regional and international coalition support led by the U.S., Israel may not always intercept such attacks as successfully as it has in the past year. However, the opportunity to decisively weaken Iran and dismantle its nuclear program is rare and crucial. This window of opportunity would also serve to establish a new regional framework and solidify Israel’s position as a key regional power.

Timing is critical. Delaying until Trump takes office may complicate an Israeli strike. Israel should seize this moment to launch its first strike on Iran before Trump’s inauguration, even in the face of opposition from the Biden administration. Such action would demonstrate Israel’s resolve to prevent Iran’s nuclear advancement. As subsequent strikes would take place under Trump’s administration, Israel would likely benefit from greater American support, advancing its strategic goals for regional transformation and ensuring its security.

In light of the rebels’ success and the fall of Assad’s regime, is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to make good on his threat to invade Israel?

Since October 7, Turkey has hardened its stance toward Israel, including severing trade relations with Israel in solidarity with Hamas. In July, Erdogan escalated further, threatening, “Just as we entered Nagorno-Karabakh and Libya, we will do the same to Israel.”

What initially seemed like an empty threat is now becoming a more plausible scenario following the rebels’ astonishing victory in Syria, where many factions supported by Ankara toppled the Assad regime in just 11 days.

Turkey’s role in these developments is significant, though attributing the coup solely to Ankara would be premature. While Turkey trains and arms some rebel groups, it remains unclear if it directly commands Tahrir al-Sham, the organization spearheading the surprise attack. It is also doubtful that Erdogan himself anticipated such swift and decisive rebel gains.

Surely, Erdogan stands to benefit greatly from dismantling a Shiite regime supported by Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah and replacing it with a Sunni-led government. His key interests in Syria include weakening Kurdish autonomy and facilitating the return of millions of Syrian refugees who have fled to Turkey since the civil war.

The rebels’ victory can help Ankara achieve its goals on both fronts.

Erdogan to exacerbate the situation?

However, this achievement does not shield Turkey from the potential spillover of war into its own territory. The rebel factions are a fragmented mixture of militias, often in conflict with one another. Erdogan likely understands that the path to a pro-Turkish government in Syria is fraught with challenges and could take years, if it materializes at all.

Meanwhile, the extensive operational freedom granted to rebel groups could backfire, entangling Turkey in Syria’s internal strife. It may also reignite tensions at home should the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) launch retaliatory attacks against Turkish forces targeting Kurds in Syria.

And what of Israel? Could Erdogan leverage a friendly regime in Syria to position troops and weaponry on Israel’s border? Turkey’s growing influence in Syria aligns with Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision for the Middle East, as part of which Syria could transform into a Sunni Islamist stronghold under Ankara’s auspices. 

This would intensify Turkey’s adversarial stance toward Israel, particularly as there is no end to the “Swords of Iron” war in sight.

Thus, it is plausible that Erdogan either directly orders jihadist groups operating on the Israeli border to attack Israel or, at the very least, supports them in doing so. 

That said, Turkey must weigh the consequences of opening such a front against Israel. Any escalation would risk straining its relationships with the United States and NATO, especially under a new US administration unlikely to tolerate such aggression. 

Considering these dynamics, Erdogan would be well advised to play his cards cautiously and avoid exacerbating the Syrian conflict, particularly with regard to Israel.

Regardless of Erdogan’s calculations, Israel was wise to mobilize tanks and infantry across the border for the first time in 50 years. Israel must continue leveraging this momentum to strike targets in Syria to diminish Iran’s and Hezbollah’s capabilities. 

Moreover, it is crucial for Israel to insist on a robust and expanded American military presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan triangle. 

This strategy will not only curb the influence of pro-Turkish Islamists but also preempt other hostile forces from gaining a foothold in neighboring Jordan—a country already under threat from Iran’s ambitions to destabilize its regime and launch attacks on Israel from the east.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Since Oct. 7, Israel has faced numerous internal and external challenges, yet appears to have succeeded in creating a new regional reality. However, security forces and political leadership had to advance these changes amid significant difficulties and at a heavy cost, operating across multiple fronts after failing to foresee and prepare for various developments.

The recent rapid developments in Syria should serve as another reminder of the importance of maintaining a healthy dose of pessimism. Such an approach helps prepare for worse scenarios – and allows for relief when they don’t materialize.

According to reports, even Israeli intelligence was caught off guard by Bashar Assad’s fall in Syria within days. Their overly optimistic assessment led political leadership to implement what hindsight reveals as flawed policy. Israel believed Damascus’ ruler’s position was stable, and based on this, diplomatic moves were made with Russia, including regarding the end of the Lebanon war. In practice, the Syrian lion proved to be nothing more than a paper tiger.

Excessive optimism was also evident regarding Iran during the war. Before the April missile attack, experts claimed Iran wouldn’t dare launch a direct attack on Israel from its territory, an assessment reportedly shared by US intelligence. The outcome, as we all know, was entirely different: Iran attacked Israel directly not once but twice – launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and UAVs.

This adds to the misconception held by Israeli security forces before Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack: many worked under the assumption that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in confrontation with Israel. Senior IDF officials displayed complacency and dismissiveness, leading to the Gaza war that remains ongoing.

Conversely, regarding the war with Hezbollah, Israel heard exaggerated assessments of the Shiite terror organization’s capabilities. Doomsday scenarios of thousands of daily missiles and rockets striking Israel, hundreds of casualties, and prolonged power grid failures circulated – but ultimately proved baseless. Israel fought Hezbollah with considerable success, and these nightmare scenarios proved false and misleading. The prices paid, heavy as they were, weren’t close to the numbers cited by many commentators and professionals.

So which approach should national assessors take – those tasked with predicting reality based on available information – optimistic or pessimistic? Seemingly, an optimistic approach or operational concept that relies somewhat on intelligence about enemy intentions becomes necessary when dealing with budget constraints. The numerous missions facing Israel’s security forces require prioritization and preparation accordingly.

Yet this was also part of the Oct. 7 error. Had commanders in the field based their military deployment along the Gaza Strip on the enemy’s capabilities rather than their analysis of Hamas’ intentions, we might be in a different place today. While budget and manpower certainly play a role, it’s worth remembering that optimistic scenarios sometimes lead to faulty preparation – and the price we ultimately pay proves exponentially higher.

Is this merely hindsight wisdom? Can we draw future lessons from such thinking? In my view, two conclusions emerge: First, the way to manage budget constraints against mission allocation is simply to increase the budget. Clearly, a jump in defense spending will come at the expense of other matters and affect our quality of life and welfare. However, in recent years, we’ve grown accustomed to living in great comfort, each under their own vine and fig tree. A clear-eyed look at reality reveals that Israel likely needs a larger defense budget. In the long run, maintaining stability and security here is worth significant investment across other areas of life.

The second lesson concerns future assessments of our regional situation, particularly regarding Jordan and Egypt. While the Syrian government’s fall doesn’t mean other neighboring regimes will collapse tomorrow, we must seriously consider and prepare for this possibility. If the regime in Egypt, which maintains war readiness against Israel even in peacetime, collapses, we could find ourselves surprised again on the southern front, potentially at an especially heavy cost. Similarly, if Iran succeeds in gaining control over Jordan, it would somewhat compensate for its loss in Syria while gaining easier direct access to act against Israel and promote terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

One derivative of such thinking emerged in discussions about keeping IDF forces along the Philadelphi Corridor after our troops captured it during the war. Although senior military officials, including the Chief of Staff, indicated that Israel could handle Hamas terrorism without controlling this route – many noted that the military had expressed similar optimistic positions before, yet failed to fulfill the mission.

The economic cost of pessimistic thinking is substantial and burdensome, sometimes proving unnecessary in hindsight. However, the price paid for overly optimistic and incorrect forecasts too often comes in blood, ultimately proving far costlier than any price we would have paid for acting according to pessimistic assessments.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 09, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

The desolation wrought on Hezbollah by Israel, and the humiliation inflicted on Iran, has not only left the Iranian axis exposed to Israeli power and further withering. It has altered the strategic tectonics of the Middle East. The story is not just Iran anymore. The region is showing the first signs of tremendous geopolitical change. And the plates are beginning to move.

First things first. The removal of the religious-totalitarian tyranny of the Iranian regime remains the greatest strategic imperative in the region for the United States and its allies, foremost among whom stands Israel. The Iranian regime, in its last days, is lurching toward a nuclear breakout to save itself. Such a breakout would not only leave one of the most destructive weapons in one of the most dangerous regimes in the world —as President Bush had warned against in 2002 — but in the hands of one of the most desperate ones. This is a prescription for catastrophe. Because of that, and because one should never turn one’s back on a cobra, even a wounded one, it is a sine qua non that Iran and its castrati allies in Lebanon be defeated.

However, as Iran’s regime descends into the graveyard of history, it is important not to neglect the emergence of other, new threats. Indeed, not only are those threats surfacing and becoming visible, but the United States and its allies need already now, urgently in fact, to start assessing and navigating the new reality taking shape.

These new threats are slowly reaching not only a visible, but acute phase. They only increase the urgency of dispensing with the Iranian threat expeditiously. Neither the United States nor our allies in the region have any longer the luxury of a slow containment and delaying strategy in Iran. Instead, a rapid move toward decisive victory in the twilight struggle with the Ayatollahs is required.

The retreat of the Syrian Assad regime from Aleppo in the face of Turkish-backed, partly Islamist rebels made from remnants of ISIS is an early skirmish in this new strategic reality. Aleppo is falling to the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham, or HTS — a descendant of the Nusra force led by Abu Muhammed al-Julani, himself a graduate of the al-Qaeda system and cobbled together of ISIS elements. Behind this force is the power of nearby Turkey. Ankara used the U.S. withdrawal from northern Iraq a few years ago to release Islamists captured by the U.S. and the Kurds. It sent some to Libya to fight the pro-Egyptian Libyan National Army under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar based in Tobruk. It reorganized the rest in Islamist militias oriented toward Ankara. The rise of a Muslim-Brotherhood dominated Turkey, rehabilitating and tapping ISIS residue to ride Iran’s decline/demise to Ankara’s strategic advantage, will plague American and Israeli interests going forward.

Added to this is the power vacuum created by the destruction of Hamas. The defeat of that terrorist group has been, for good reason, a critical goal for Israel and the United States, but it is one that also involves consequences that must be navigated and hopefully countered. The world of Hamas is a schizophrenic one. It has two heads, aligned with different internal fractions — one more anchored to the world of Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood politics led by Turkey and the other to the Iranian axis. In 2012 Israel killed Ahmad al-Jabri, a scion of the powerful al-Jabari clan lording over Hebron but who had transplanted westward to become the leader of the Murabitun forces (part of the Izz ad-Din al-Qasem Brigades) within Hamas in Gaza. He had transported those forces to train under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Mashhad, Iran, in the years before and became the driving force of Hamas by the time Israel felt it had to deal with him. Despite his demise, the structures he led anchored to Iran continued to grow and assume ever more dominance over the Hamas structure, in part because of the release, in the 2011 Gilad Shalit hostage-release deal, of several key figures, including Yahya Sinwar. But Iran did not cleanly control all of Hamas. Turkey maintained a powerful presence in the organization and had some senior Hamas leaders likely more loyal to Turkey than to Iran. In many ways, Hamas reflected the schizophrenia of its patron, Qatar, which served a critical ally to both Iran and Turkey in the last two decades.

In the past two decades, however, Iran proved more ascendent strategically in the region than Turkey. In fits and starts, Ankara had tried quietly to compete with Iran in the last two decades, but more often than not it was left only to nibble at the scraps left by Iran along the edges, whether in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon (after the August 2021 port explosion, for example) or among the two structures of geopolitical discourse, the “Lingua Franca” embodiments of regional competition — the Palestinians and the Islamists. Hamas, therefore, as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (an organization whose fealty was far more homogeneously held toward Iran), became increasingly far more defined by Tehran than by Ankara. Iran had become the region’s new Nasser, and its minions accordingly flourished as did its factions in Palestinian and Islamist politics.

However, suddenly the ground shifted. Israel has, since summer 2024, starting with Operation Grim Beeper and the demolition of Hezbollah, triggered an earthquake in the normally slow pace of regional strategic change. If Israel presses onward with priority, as it should, to devastate and destabilize the Iranian regime, and if the Iranian axis meets its demise, then Hamas—indeed all Palestinian and Islamist politics—drifts to a Turkish direction and they slowly emerge as Ankara’s strategic assets. This reorientation does not represent an increase in the Palestinian threat to Israel, but it would be the triumph of hope over experience to think it would reduce it. Indeed, it is likely no more than an exchange of a rabid donkey for a crazed mule.

The emergence of the Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood bloc, which includes Turkey’s slow drift to a dangerous position, as a strategic problem accelerated under President Obama. Turkish leader Tayyip Erdogan always was an Islamist politician. Yet until Obama, Erdogan’s attempts to recreate some sort of neo-Ottoman Caliphate and reignite its imperialist ambitions had been disconcerting but largely symbolic and rhetorical. It was, however, latently concerning, because the reference point on which Erdogan focused—resurrecting the terminated Ottoman Caliphate in 1921—also serves as common ground with the most dangerous Sunni Islamist movements, such as al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group (which was renamed Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), and Fatah al Islam, ISIS and the assortment of al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliate groups across the Maghreb in Africa. There was always the danger of convergence of the Turkish and the most radical Islamist worlds into one strategic threat.

In 2011, President Obama made at least two critical mistakes.

First, instead of supporting indigenous Syrian opposition such as the Free Syrian Army, which sought closer ties to the West, President Obama subcontracted to Turkey and Qatar the task of defining and supporting the opposition to President Assad of Syria as the Syrian regime descended into civil war. The threat of ISIS has thus remained ever since, and with Iran receding, Turkey surfs the crest of the ISIS-remnant wave.

Second, the U.S. tried to sustain Syria as a unified fiction of a state, fearing its partition. The same mistake was replicated in Libya, which had strategic consequences for Egypt. As a result, Egypt is also now drifting in a dangerous direction. The insistence on retaining a unified state meant that to survive in conditions of communal, sectarian, tribal, ethnic civil war, each faction within that state had to fight to the death for control over the other rather than disengage into partitioned pieces. Control meant survival while being controlled meant being slaughtered. This fueled the Syrian refugee crisis.

Given the calamity that befell Syria and the chaos that lies underneath, as well as these hovering strategic forces positioning already to scavenge the Syrian nation’s cadaver, it is important for both Israel and the United States, along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to contemplate as soon as possible many scenarios that hitherto were outlandish in the western end of the fertile crescent. It is too early to identify and digest fully, let alone definitively plan for the reality that will emerge. Now is the time, though, for some initial thoughts that might undergird a longer-term strategic planning process.

First, to be clear; Iran remains the central threat. And nothing can be done until it is defeated. But the urgency of ensuring and achieving its defeat is increasing rapidly.

With Iran’s defeat, Syria will begin unraveling. Russians will try to protect essential interests there — Assad’s Alawite regime and the Christian communities, especially the Greek Orthodox. It is not only the last remnant outside Cuba of the Soviet global bloc, but also a more civilizational sense of commitment to the remains of the world of Byzantium. As several current Russian political commentators, intellectuals and religious leaders have posited, Russia considers itself to some extent the “Third Rome” — Rome and Constantinople being the first two. The remnant Christian communities — especially the Greek Orthodox since the Maronites are Catholic and orient more to France — are envisioned as Moscow’s charge.

A Russo-Turkish confrontation might threaten Israel and America but it could also present opportunities. Russia may consider turning to Israel as a key offset to Turkish power once Iran is removed from the picture.

Moreover, China is likely to realign with Turkey and drop Iran when it realizes the Ayatollah regime is falling. China has hedged for the past few years, having signed a strategic agreement with Iran in 2021, but it has just as aggressively sought to tighten its relations with Turkey. Part of what drives Beijing and Ankara together is the strategic competition between China and India. China has ties to Pakistan through the Hindu Kush range and sees India as one of its premier enemies. Turkey as well has close strategic relations with Pakistan, uses that relationship to compete with India in Afghanistan, and has attempted in the last half decade to destabilize India both through using Pakistani help to rile up unrest in the Jammu and Kashmir, but also among India’s 200 million Muslims. As Iran falters, we see China shifting more toward Turkey.

And we see Egypt also recalibrating. This was in part because of Libya, but also the unrelenting pressure of the Biden administration on human rights and Washington’s tolerance of Qatar and the Muslim brotherhood regionally against the Saudis and Egypt. At first, Egypt retrenched into close alliance with the Saudis and positioned itself as Erdogan’s nemesis — even to the extent of supporting the Syrian regime in its efforts to withstand pressure from Turkey and its Islamist allies. But the pressure of Washington (paused during the first Trump presidency) mounted, and Egypt increasingly moved from confrontation to cooption of the internal Islamist threat. This process began under the Obama era — which led to a strategic shift away from peace, away from Israel, and away from viewing Hamas as a profound strategic and domestic threat, and instead toward slow accommodation of Hamas and Turkey.

The post-October 7 closure of the Red Sea and by extension Suez – and the unwillingness of the United States to reverse that, which Cairo viewed as an inconceivable abdication of American power — shook Cairo. It made it more attractive to align with the Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan and China. The evidence of this shift has been exposed in recent months. As the war progressed, and especially after Israel captured Rafah and the “Philadelphi” border region between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the level of Egyptian tolerance that was exposed of a far-more expansive Hamas smuggling network through the Sinai surprised even the Israelis. That smuggling could not have been done without the knowledge of all levels of Egypt’s security structures, and indeed various examinations of the network indicate that Egyptian officials profited off this trade in the hundreds of millions of dollars, or even billions. The tight cooperation between Israel and Egypt to check Hamas and curb Erdogan’s intrusion into Gazan and Egyptian affairs still evident in 2014 had somehow shifted toward Egyptian indulgence of Hamas and Iran and Turkey’s support for it. Another sign that this shift is accelerating recently was the sudden release of 800 Muslim Brotherhood operatives by Egypt last week. Such a blanket release indicates a material strategic shift — the Muslim Brotherhood is the vanguard of Erdogan’s threat to the Egyptian regime — not a minor gesture. For the moment, Egypt is not forced to choose whether to side with the emerging Turkish-Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-Chinese bloc or the Russo-Iran bloc. While clearly abandoning the West, it has yet to leap wholeheartedly into the Turkish camp. The power of Russia and the residues of history still have their grip to some extent on Cairo.

In other words, we already see a mass realignment underway to digest the fall of Iran and the rise of an imperial Turkey. If Syria approaches a final failure and collapse, what pieces might emerge?

A proper Lebanese state anchored to its Maronite foundation is one desirable outcome.

Beyond that are some less conventional prospects. The U.S. and Israel should start planning for an Alawite state further up the Mediterranean coast. Syria is unlikely to remain a single country. Russia may find that it will be able only to hold a rump Alawite state and Christian communities (Greek Orthodox — not Maronite) and retreat to protect an enclave state. It will also rapidly come to see Iran as useless in this regard and split from Iran on Syria — or what’s left of it.

How might the United States and Israel relate to the desperate Russian-oriented enclave entity?

Russia had envisioned a new foreign policy approach, launched a year ago at the Valdai Conference in Sochi and unveiled in Putin’s speech there on October 5, 2023. He proposed cobbling together the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations into one geopolitical strategic bloc to challenge the West. But that vision and the underlying unity upon which the Valdai vision is anchored now is being torn to shreds. Russia likely will reach out to India and a post-Ayatollah Iran, but less as a hostile challenge to Israel and the West and more as a desperate move to prepare itself and preserve its dwindling assets in the emerging Russo-Turkish confrontation.

It is strategically wise to consider now how one handles the disintegration of Syria.

It is likely that Russia will be forced to retreat into an effort to protect the Alawite and Christian (especially Greek Orthodox) communities, which it will likely only be able to do by creating a rump Syria state in traditional Alawite and Christian areas. Given that Russia relies on access to the area via Syria’s ports in Latakia, Tartus, and Banias (especially Tartus) along the Mediterranean coast, it will most likely anchor that rump entity along the eastern Mediterranean with strategic partners in Lebanon, and then a rump Alawite state to the north of that in Tartus and the surrounding mountains.

Putin has proven thus far that he is able to adjust or evolve his strategic vision, but only slowly. He suffers some rigidity. It is possible that Russia will remain so focused on imperial European ambitions that it falters and falls — along with its Iranian ally — in its survival in the region.

Yet it’s also conceivable that Russia may reach out to cooperate with the U.S. and Israel to save its position. If so, the U.S. and Israel will be faced with a decision about how much to cooperate with Russia against Turkey and China or how much to try instead to anchor the post-Syria structures to U.S. and Israeli power independent of Russia. It’s complicated, too, by the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO and home, simultaneously, to some of the remaining Hamas leadership and to the U.S. Air Force’s Incerlik Air Base.

It’s time to start noodling these questions — even the outlandish ones. Trump didn’t spend much time during the presidential campaign talking about the threat of Turkey. He did, though, often warn that we are closer than ever to World War III.

Published in The Editor, December 02, 2024.