When Hamas launched its deadly attack on October 7, its primary objective was to mobilize all elements of the Iranian-led resistance axis to join the campaign, attack and weaken Israel, and create the conditions for Israel’s collapse. By integrating itself into the Iranian strategic framework, Hamas became an important part of the “ring of fire” surrounding Israel – a network of proxies that Iran has meticulously developed over the past decades through an enormous investment of resources and human capital. In particular, Iran identified the Palestinian arena as a crucial component of this “ring of fire” – supporting and nurturing Hamas and Islamic Jihad and enhancing their military capabilities through the provision of weaponry, military knowledge, and financial support.

On October 8, Hezbollah, Iran’s flagship proxy, also joined the war. Hezbollah, which operates mostly in Lebanon along Israel’s northern frontier, is an enormous Iranian enterprise in which vast resources have been invested. Hezbollah joined the war against Israel in an attempt to stretch Israel’s military capabilities and divert its strategic attention away from the war against Hamas in Gaza. The early days of the war were difficult for Israel; it was humiliated, bleeding, and unprepared, all while the Iranian axis, in its various components, experienced a surge in self-confidence.

Iran’s proxies were built to serve a dual-purpose. The first was defensive: the proxy network would act as a loaded gun aimed at Israel to deter it from attacking Iran’s nuclear program. The animating logic here is that Israel would think twice before attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, because such an attack would immediately expose Israel to an assault from Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas where Iran’s proxies operate, including well-armed terror elements in Judea and Samaria. The second purpose was offensive: to serve as launch sites for a coordinated offensive against Israel, wherein Iran would simultaneously “activate” the entire proxy network once its nuclear weapons reached viability (or approached the threshold of viability). Such an assault, Iran reasoned, would then lead to the collapse of the State of Israel and, ultimately, its destruction.

The war in Gaza and the northern front cannot be viewed as isolated events; rather, the ongoing war in these two theaters illuminates Iran’s strategy––coordinate multiple theaters of combat to trigger a regional war against Israel. Yet, this ostensibly “regional” war entails consequences for the entire world. Russia and China, both opposed to the current American-led world order, have lent their support to the Iranian “resistance axis.” In their view, any entity that undermines U.S. interests (such as a strong and secure Israel) and status deserves their backing. By their logic, any blow to American assets, interests, or reputation weakens the U.S. and damages its global standing, thereby advancing efforts to reshape the world order.

On October 16, 2023, Israel’s political leadership defined the war’s goals: the dismantling of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip, the elimination of the terror threat emanating from Gaza, and the creation of the conditions for the return of the hostages. The political leadership also decided that by the conclusion of the war, the IDF would enjoy full freedom of action regarding Gaza, without restrictions on the use of force. This freedom of action would enable the IDF to eliminate terrorist infrastructures, neutralize terror threats, and prevent terrorist infrastructures from being rebuilt. Notably, these war goals outlined at the beginning stage of the war contained no explicit provision regarding the northern front or the return of evacuated residents of the North. Only in September 2024 was this objective formally added as an official war goal.

For many months, Israel responded cautiously to Hezbollah’s aggression, effectively subjecting itself to the “equations” set by Nasrallah. Occasionally, Israel’s response was particularly forceful, which in turn escalated Hezbollah’s attacks. During this period, Israel opted to concentrate its efforts on the southern front, with the IDF dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in Gaza through extensive ground maneuvers and airstrikes. The capture of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was delayed by approximately four months, largely due to a direct confrontation with the U.S. administration which involved the withholding of critical arms shipments by the U.S.

With the formal shift of Israel’s military focus to the northern front (from mid-September 2024), Israel has succeeded in “decapitating” Hezbollah by eliminating most of its senior leadership, as well as damaging its command and control capabilities and causing enormous damage to the group’s weapons stockpiles and infrastructure across Lebanon. Israel also began ground operations in southern Lebanon (starting on October 1, 2024) with the goal of “cleaning” southern Lebanon of Hezbollah’s threatening military presence and enabling the safe return of the residents of Northern Israel to their homes. Israel’s actions managed to sow chaos, confusion, fear, and distrust within the organization, impairing its operational capability and its ability to harm Israel.

From the above, one can discern the main elements of Israel’s strategy. The underlying idea of this strategy involves three phases. The first phase includes the destruction of Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s capabilities in the southern front such that they no longer pose a threat to Israel. The second phase entails weakening Hezbollah enough to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and enable the safe return of the evacuated northern residents. Finally, the third phase, following the neutralization of the two most significant components of the Iranian axis (Gaza and Lebanon), Iran itself will be exposed to Israel’s might, as demonstrated on October 26 attack and potential future attacks, bereft of the protection provided by its important proxies.

In this broader context, one can understand the Israeli Prime Minister’s use of the term “total victory.” This term was mocked by political rivals who claimed that the statement was empty and that achieving “total victory” was impossible. However, Israel’s actions illuminate its strategic logic, which aims to weaken the entire resistance axis––including Iran itself. This strategy also serves as the foundation for shaping a new regional order that will see, at the very least, a significantly weakened Iranian threat with its ability to harm Israel and destabilize the region at large hindered.

Israel will no longer tolerate recurring cycles of conflict; it will no longer attempt to “buy calm” or mistakenly apply the logic of “quiet will be met with quiet.” Rather, Israel has decided to fundamentally change the rules of the game and adopt a strategy of decisive victory. In this sense, “total victory” refers to the adoption of an offensive and resolute approach aimed at dismantling the existing system. In strategic terms, this is termed a second-order change, which involves changing the system itself, as opposed to a first-order change, which involves changes and adjustments within the existing system. The intended outcome certainly deserves to be interpreted as “total victory.”

Therefore, the completion of this effort, with a sequence of Israeli successes, will be nothing short of “total victory,” a game-changer and a decisive shift. This success will open the door for Israel, the region, as well as the U.S. and its allies in the free world, to design a new regional architecture. This architecture would promote stability, security, and prosperity, while weakening Iran and its proxies as actors that destabilize security and spearhead radical Islamic terrorism. Such radicalism, fueled by Iran, Hamas and other radical Islamic entities like Qatar, has also permeated the streets of the free world, infiltrated university campuses, and served as fuel for progressive intellectual and media elites, who consistently identify Israel as the source of evil and the rotten fruit of colonialism, imperialism, and oppressive apartheid.

In less than a year, Israel has succeeded in dismantling Hamas and leaving it with only residual capabilities. These capabilities will continue to fade as the military campaign in Gaza concludes and the last major stronghold of Hamas in northern Gaza is dismantled through control of the civilian infrastructure (humanitarian aid distribution), rather than only through military action.

Israel’s and the IDF’s achievements are impressive by any standard, especially from a historical and comparative perspective, considering the success of other armies and international coalitions in wars against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others. The most remarkable and significant achievement is in undermining Iran’s confidence and pushing it into a realm of severe strategic confusion and disorientation, and in dealing a major blow to Iran’s strategic assets in which it has invested years of effort and enormous quantities of resources.

Iran has lost the two most important components of the axis it built over the years. In practical terms, Israel has succeeded in significantly weakening the Iranian system, which has in turn influenced the entire regional system. The weakening of the Iranian system and the dismantling of its potential threat to Israel and the region will inevitably lead to a shift in the entire regional system and will also have repercussions for the international system.

If the test of strategy lies in the nature of the change it brings about and its service of vital interests––goals which are reached through the savvy identification and leveraging of opportunities, continuous optimization and learning, and, ultimately, improvement at a fundamental level–– then from a one-year perspective, one can recognize the clear success of Israel’s strategy. The work is not yet complete, and more time and effort will be required to finish it. However, once completed, the statesman’s hour will arrive, and it will be their duty to translate these impressive achievements into diplomatic gains. Only then will we be able to see a grand strategy in all its glory.

While the significant strike on Hodeidah port was crucial, it has only led to a temporary calm. Israel must be prepared to once again take strong action against the Houthis and their operator – Iran.

The Israeli strike on Hodeidah on July 20 somewhat restored Israel’s deterrence, making an impression both domestically and across the Middle East that Israel can respond decisively to its adversaries. Now, two months after this powerful response, it is imperative to assess whether it had the strength to curb Houthi aggression and to draw the appropriate conclusions accordingly.

Judging by recent developments in the Red Sea, it appears not. On Monday, September 2, two oil tankers were attacked by ballistic missiles and explosive drones launched from Yemeni territory. Less than two weeks earlier, the Greek oil tanker Sounion, carrying a million barrels of oil, was also attacked by the rebels, burning for over a week and raising fears of a massive spill that could cause an unprecedented environmental disaster.

As for the direct threat to Israel, there seems to be little reason for optimism. According to the statement made by Houthi militia leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi on September 21, the Houthis are now preparing for the “fifth” phase of their confrontation with Israel, which includes unexpected initiatives and an expanded target bank. The Houthis threaten to strike back strongly against military targets, ports and energy sites, and disrupt Israel’s oil supply.

While some of the militia’s declarations appear to be no more than exaggerated shows of solidarity with Hamas, others – particularly the statements from senior Houthis claiming that retaliation against Israel is certain – should be taken more seriously, especially in light of their close cooperation with Tehran and the extensive support they receive from it to execute their plans.

Therefore, one should not conclude that the Houthis are deterred. The significant strike on the port of Hodeidah, as important as it was, only brought temporary relief, and based on the high motivation they are displaying to harm Israel and the renewed attacks in the Red Sea, it seems more likely that the Houthis took a pause to regroup.

Iranian-Houthi cooperation

SO LONG as Iranian-Houthi cooperation continues unhindered, the range of threats from Tehran and its proxy against Israel and the West is only expected to expand. The Houthis may grow stronger over the years, both in terms of the quantity and quality of their weaponry, and might even bring the threat closer, possibly through the resumption of direct flights from Sana’a to Amman.

Therefore, despite its focus on the more immediate threats posed by Gaza and Lebanon, Israel must be prepared to take harsh measures against the Houthis in the near future. These include targeting Houthi leadership, launching cyber attacks, and continuing to launch strikes against economic and military assets under Houthi control.

In parallel, similar to its struggle against other components of Iran’s proxy network, Israel cannot settle for dealing with the proxy alone and will need to strike at the head of the octopus. It must disrupt Iran’s lethal support for Houthi attacks by targeting the IRGC intelligence ship and hitting Iranian officials and assets in Yemen.

Moreover, Israel should work to raise awareness among policymakers in the US, Europe, and international forums about the threat posed by the Yemeni militia, including the Houthis’ ambitions to develop advanced weapons that could directly threaten Europe and the US.

The Israel-Hamas war

The “Swords of Iron” war, in which Israel is being attacked for the first time from seven fronts simultaneously, is an achievement of the “Axis of Resistance” that Iran can claim credit for. More specifically, Tehran is now reaping the fruits of its long-term investment in the Red Sea arena, which began as early as 2009 with its military assistance to the Houthis.

Consequently, Israel is now required to correct, together with the US, years of neglect towards the threat that has gradually developed in this area. Seeing that further escalation is expected down the road, Israel must develop a comprehensive strategic plan that includes proactive and decisive measures to reduce the scope of the threat.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, September 10, 2024.

“Diplomacy complements the field, and the field complements diplomacy. Together, we will move forward in such a way that the country’s national interests, complete security, and national dignity are fully realized.,” summarized Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s new Foreign Minister, encapsulating Tehran’s approach to the conflict with Israel and Middle East developments.

In a series of interviews this week, Araghchi reiterated Iran’s commitment to supporting all “resistance” groups. Like other regime spokespersons, he vowed that the “Zionist terrorist action” resulting in Haniyeh’s death would not go unanswered.

The anxious anticipation of Iran’s response is taking a toll on Israel psychologically, socially, and economically – a price Iranian officials claim is intentional. Some analysts justified the delay, citing the need to complete investigations into the intelligence breach that enabled the assassination in Tehran, allow for Gaza ceasefire negotiations, and meticulously prepare operational plans to achieve precisely the desired effect – no more, no less.

Amid this turmoil, diplomatic exchanges between Doha and Tehran persisted. Mohammed Al Thani, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, made an unusual visit to the Iranian capital, meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi. Media reports offer little insight into their discussions about “regional arrangement.” Particularly unclear are the concessions Iran seeks from the Americans, beyond the credit it’s already partially receiving for linking its response against Israel to Gaza ceasefire talks.

While information is scarce, indications suggest that returning the Iranian nuclear issue to the negotiating table is being considered. Statements by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the possibility of interacting with the enemy were interpreted as a signal of willingness to renew negotiations with the US on the nuclear issue. Choosing Pezeshkian and Araghchi for these key positions further signals this shift in approach. Iran seeks an agreement that would ease sanctions and improve its economic situation. For its part, the Biden administration seeks to prevent a regional war, which could complicate matters ahead of the elections, and attempts to derive political and diplomatic gains from the regional situation.

A State Department spokesperson said this week: “We will judge Iran on their actions, not words. If Iran wants to demonstrate seriousness or a new approach, they should stop nuclear escalations and start meaningfully cooperating with the IAEA.” We should welcome this stance, hoping it is not just an opening move in negotiations. To some extent, it forms part of the undeclared talks. The subsequent threats by Iranian spokespersons, reiterating their commitment to respond to Israel, should be seen not only as an expression of true intentions and an attempt to preserve national dignity but also as part of indirect negotiation tactics with the US. Naturally, Israel must prepare for all response scenarios without making lenient assumptions.

Israel cannot afford to be caught off guard by talks – if indeed they are taking place – on an issue so crucial to its future. Now is the time to examine these matters through direct dialogue with US administration officials and formulate its position accordingly. Iran, too, recognizes the urgency from elements in the Biden administration to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. We must not pay an unbearable price for this.

Published in Israel Hayom, August 30, 2024.

“From a military standpoint, Israel has achieved all it can in Gaza,” a senior American officials told The New York Times on the eve of the summit in Doha. In their attempt to explain the futility of continuing the war, they actually underscored its necessity.

Israel cannot afford to end the war with the impression that it cannot topple Hamas. If this becomes the conclusion of its enemies and other actors in the region, it would significantly harm its efforts to achieve the central (though undeclared) goal of the war: restoring deterrence. Moreover, Israel cannot relinquish the gains it has made at such a high cost, and certainly cannot hand Hamas a lifeline or provide conditions that would enable its recovery.

It is worth reiterating: Even after Israel’s impressive military achievements, much work remains to destroy Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. The rocket fire over the past week is a reminder of this. Hamas also maintains control over the distribution of humanitarian aid within Gaza and is able to present a coordinated stance, despite the conditions its leaders are in. However, as long as the IDF controls the Philadelphi Route and continues to operate within the Gaza Strip, it is eroding Hamas’s capabilities, undermining its public standing, and forcing it to focus all its efforts on one goal: survival. Not growth, not empowerment, only mere existence.

The path to an arrangement – a turning point

Entering the path of an arrangement would be a turning point in this reality. The chances of renewing the fighting afterward are slim, if they exist at all. If the “deal” is implemented as agreed, some of its components would include the withdrawal of the IDF, the release of terrorists, the rehabilitation of Gaza, and the complete end of the war. In such a scenario, Israel would find it difficult to backtrack on its commitments to the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar.

But even if only part of the deal is implemented, Israel would still struggle to resume the fighting. Hamas would continue its manipulations and psychological warfare, mediating countries would present new initiatives, the U.S. would increase pressure especially as the elections approach, the international community would join in, and domestic pressures would intensify. The de-escalation process has its own momentum. Hamas, and not just Hamas, is banking on this.

Reports from Washington about the Americans’ intention to propose compromise suggestions on issues where the parties fail to reach an agreement should cause concern in Israel. The U.S.’s ability to influence Hamas to change its positions is minimal, if it exists at all. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the compromise formulas would erode Israel’s positions, as Israel is more sensitive to American pressures and incentives. For Hamas, such reports are yet another reason to dig in.

Dilemmas in Israel

The dilemma in Israel revolves around two issues: the release of hostages and the connection between the Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah. In both, the element of time plays a significant role. While time allows for deepening achievements in Gaza and reaching the release of hostages under better conditions, it also increases the danger to the hostages’ safety. The element of time creates tension between the importance of toppling Hamas and the urgency of releasing the hostages.

There is no one in Israel who doesn’t long for the release of the hostages, just as there is no one who doesn’t desire the total defeat of the monstrous terrorist organization. Resolving the tension between these goals is akin to the expression “caught between a rock and a hard place.” Any decision the government makes is legitimate, provided that its costs are clear and understood. In this regard, and after having been burned for years, it is not enough to rely on soothing statements or vague commitments that will sink into the sands of Rafah and the tunnels of Philadelphi.

As for the tension with Iran and Hezbollah, the very idea of offering concessions to “calm” them contradicts one of the objectives of the actions that heightened the tension: deterring these elements. In any case, it’s difficult to see the Gaza war as the key to calming them. The formula that the U.S. is trying to promote—restraining Israel in Gaza in exchange for restraining Iran towards Israel—does not satisfy Nasrallah and seemingly does not address Iran’s appetite for revenge.

But even if it did, from Israel’s perspective, it can only be relevant if it provides a solution to the root problems with these adversaries, primarily the efforts to obtain nuclear weapons and the desire to destroy Israel. Without diminishing the importance of diplomatic efforts, it is suggested to continue focusing the majority of efforts on strengthening readiness, both in defense and offense.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 16, 2024.

The Hamas attack on October 7 triggered a regional war with global repercussions. Israel is not only fighting on the frontlines but also in the court of global public opinion, with pro-Hamas protests on the streets of major European cities and on US campuses. However, the impact of the war extends beyond demonstrations, exposing the distorted and biased conduct of the UN and its institutions, including UNRWA. The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have also joined the parade of folly, blatantly displaying moral and ethical distortions regarding IDF operations in Gaza, and Judea and Samaria.

Against this backdrop, we are witnesses to the strengthening of bizarre Red-Green red alliances between “progressive” elements and Islamic fundamentalists, mindlessly championing a superficial worldview and revealing alarming ignorance about Hamas, radical Islam, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These phenomena indicate the danger posed by the spread of Hamas and radical Islamic narratives among various audiences in the free world, as well as the growing trend of radicalization among Muslim communities in the free world, particularly in Europe and the US. The echoing of these narratives and radicalization processes in the streets lead to violent rampages that severely disrupt social order. This includes the targeting of government and cultural symbols, with national flags burned, national monuments defaced, and slogans smeared in blood-colored paint in public spaces.

This Islamic violence also stirs fears among Western leaders, which causes them, in dangerous moral blindness, to restrain Israel, while failing to challenge Hamas, Iran, and its proxies. Although they are aware of Iran being the driving force behind a significant part of the protests and riots in the West, they nevertheless stand silent in the name of “democracy and liberalism,” even when (violent) freedom of expression is cynically used as a tool for undermining the most fundamental values of Western societies.

Yet, it is obvious to everyone that if Israel does not defeat Hamas in Gaza and leaves it as a governing power that can regain strength, this will have repercussions for the entire region and the world. This would boost Iran and the “axis of evil” it leads, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iranian proxies in the region. Shiite militias in western Iraq and southern Syria will continue to target American interests and troops, and above all, Iran will continue to operate within a strategic comfort zone, supplying and encouraging all its proxies to escalate the security situation in the region. These events will also fuel additional protests in the West, thus paving the way for radical Islam to expand its foothold in the free world.

The leaders of the free world must therefore internalize the statements made by Hamas seniors and Islamic clerics before and after October 7 and listen closely to what Iranian leaders have been saying for a long time. It is crucial to understand the foundations of political Islam and the spirit of jihadist-Salafism to realize that Israel is just the first target. The jihadist-Salafist vision is far-reaching, aspiring to establish an Islamic nation, an Islamic world, Islamic law, and Islamic civilization. In such a world, there will be no place for liberty seekers and human rights advocates, nor for champions of freedom of speech and assembly, women, and feminists, and certainly not for LGBTQ individuals.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech before the United States Congress on July 24 should be understood in this context. He emphasized that Israel’s war against the Iranian axis of evil and its proxies, in particular Hamas and Hezbollah, is part of the free world’s battle against radical Islamic barbarism. Netanyahu also stated that Israel’s fight is America’s fight and that Israel’s victory will be America’s victory.

Netanyahu aimed to achieve two objectives. The first was to highlight the significance of Israel’s war for the entire free world. The second was to illustrate the deep bond between Israel and the US, and Israel’s commitment to this relationship, as a testament to Israel’s affiliation with the free world under American leadership.

Whether or not Netanyahu’s words fell on receptive ears, they accurately describe the reality Israel has been facing over the last decades, especially during the Oslo process, which was intended to replace the paradigm of conflict and armed struggle against Israel with a framework for peace based on the idea of two states for two peoples.

However, the process has only increased the motivation to destroy Israel, owing to both the rise of Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) support for terrorism. Hamas managed to win the hearts and minds of many Palestinians and form an alliance with the Iranian axis. The PA has been inciting to violence against Jews through systematic indoctrination of the Palestinian public, the glorification of terrorists, and payments to families of those imprisoned for terrorist violence in Israeli jails.

This motivation is rooted in the absolute denial of Israel’s right to exist, as a state in general and as the nation-state of the Jewish people in particular. Israel is seen by the radical axis as a shameful symbol of Western imperialism and colonialism and of a declining Western civilization belonging to the free and enlightened world. Therefore, its destruction is perceived as the first necessary step towards establishing the Islamic caliphate, where Sharia law will prevail, and all infidels will be Islamized.

Viewed as a foreign element in the Middle East and the last stronghold to conquer before taking over the West, hatred and contempt towards Israel will only intensify. In this sense, the Iranian axis of evil is fully aware of Israel’s importance to the free world as its protector, making Israel’s destruction a prerequisite for the subjugation of the entire free world. These perceptions unite the diverse components of the axis of evil, bridging religious, historical, and ideological gaps between Shia and Sunni Arabs, and Iranians.

The loathing and hatred are not only directed at the State of Israel as a political entity but also towards the Jewish People. This animosity is rooted in the foundations of Islam, the Quran, and the historical legacy of Islam since the days of Prophet Muhammad and his disappointment with the Jews of Yathrib in the Arabian Peninsula (modern-day Medina) who did not accept Islam. While there are other interpretations of the Quran that emphasize peaceful elements, this approach puts excessive emphasis on Islam’s hostility towards Jews, and glorifies it, as manifested in the particularly barbaric Hamas attack on October 7 but also earlier in various suicide bombings against women, children, and the elderly.

It is crucial to understand the Hamas attack and Iran’s support for it, along with the support of other axis components, as an attempt to destabilize the regional and global order. Israel’s war with Hamas, Iran, and other proxies attacking the US is a war against the free world. This conflict is a clear expression not of a clash between civilizations but of the intense and violent confrontation between radical Islamic barbarism and the enlightened world, again as described by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech.

The spillover from the regional to the global arena is also reflected in Russia and China’s support for the Iranian axis. Both are revisionist powers seeking to undermine the existing world order and the US role in it. The regional war serves their goal by harming America’s most prominent and important ally in the region, and American regional standing. This is a step towards full erosion of global US hegemony.

In his speech before the American Congress, the Prime Minister held a mirror to the free world, presenting the hard reality we live in. An uncompromising struggle between the West and radical, violent Islam is nothing short of a world war. Netanyahu is therefore correct in his assessment of Israel’s critical role in it. Israel stands as the last fortress of the free world against the potential invasion of radical Islam. If this fortress falls, and the forces of evil, led by Iran and supported by China and Russia, succeed in breaching this last line of defense, Western civilization will collapse into itself, falling easy prey to barbarism and tyranny, with little hope for salvation.

America’s current approach to the threat of a large-scale Iranian attack against Israel is misguided and will not prevent regional war. Rather than focusing on a defensive posture and de-escalation, the best way for the US, Israel and regional allies to deter Iran is to present a credible threat to its strategic assets.

In the ongoing international maneuvering to prevent an Iranian assault, the United States is emphasizing a defensive approach. On August 5, US Defense Secretary Austin posted on X that he had discussed with his Israeli counterpart, “US defensive force posture moves… and stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region.”

According to reports, US officials have been warning Israel not to respond strongly to any Iranian attack. It seems that Washington’s goal is a reprise of the international response to Iran’s April 13 aerial attack, during which a US-led coalition downed the vast majority of the 300 plus missiles and drones fired by Tehran at Israel.

This approach by the US will not deter Iran or prevent a regional war. A credible American and Israeli threat to strike critical Iranian assets and sites – including military, nuclear, oil and electricity facilities, as well as air and sea ports – is far more likely to produce the desired outcome.

The Iranian regime is much more vulnerable than it would like to appear. Its air defenses are relatively weak. Its ability to carry out successful long-range aerial attacks is currently limited. Strategic sites, critical to its military strength and economy, as well as to the regime’s stability, could be destroyed or severely-damaged in a US-led strike.

Despite its bluster, the Islamic Republic is well aware of its weaknesses. This is precisely the reason that Iran is now making significant efforts to obtain advanced air defense and radar systems from Russia.

IRAN’S WEAKNESS is also the reason that the Ayatollah regime has adopted a proxy strategy in its war against Israel. Tehran, to date, has been enjoying the best of both worlds. On the one hand, the proxies which it arms and trains, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have launched thousands of attacks against the Jewish state, including the October 7 massacre.

On the other hand, Tehran has largely-avoided direct retribution in response to such attacks, with Israeli and US operations targeting primarily the proxies rather than the government arming and empowering them.

If the Iranian regime were to believe that it faces a severe threat to its stability and even survival if it should launch a massive assault against Israel, it would likely make do with a much more limited attack. Conversely, if Iran believes that following such an assault, international efforts will be focused on preventing a robust Israeli response, it has no reason to avoid launching such an attack.

Indeed, while the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran embarrassed the Iranian authorities and deprived them of an important partner, it is highly unlikely that the Iranian Shi’ite regime will risk its stability in order to avenge the death of a Palestinian Sunni terror leader. The regime instead will prefer to continue channeling arms, funds and expertise to Hamas and to whomever is appointed to replace Haniyeh.

If, despite a clear and credible warning, Iran nevertheless launches an intensive strike, the US and Israel should deal a devastating blow to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, one that degrades its nuclear and military sites, cripples its economy, and threatens the regime’s survival.

Such a blow may lead to a wider regional outbreak of hostilities. However, it is far more advantageous that such an outbreak take place now, before Iran has the opportunity to deploy sophisticated Russian air defenses and break out to a nuclear weapon, than after it has an opportunity to do so.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s weaponization program may be much further along than previously imagined. Countering a future attack by Iran and its proxies against US or Israeli interests will be much more dangerous if that attack takes place under an Iranian nuclear umbrella.

A credible US warning will also send a clear message to both regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who view Iran as a central foe, and to Russia and China, who have been deepening their ties with Tehran. Such a strategic approach has the greatest chances of deterring Iran, preventing a wider war, protecting US interests, and advancing regional stability.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 11, 2024

The US will have to demonstrate its firm stand on Israel’s side in the upcoming military campaign, as a long list of countries are watching it with a very, very critical eye.

The sense of betrayal and disappointment associated with the United States amidst its allies, following its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan (completed in September 2021) is still freshly imprinted in the minds of some of the region’s main role players, who had already begun to flirt with competing powers for alternative economic and security backing.

The manner in which the United States will demonstrate its strength vis-à-vis Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Hamas, and Hezbollah – and of course Russia and China who are actively maneuvering behind the scenes – will be a watershed moment in terms of determining its positioning and status in the existing world order.

It may sound dramatic, but following October 7, it seems that the dam of radicalism had been broken – the same radical campaign that had been meticulously planned since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Already then, 45 years ago, the Mullah regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran began to plan the public relations campaign that we are witnessing today around the world – a campaign that is not, as we tend to think, against the State of Israel and/or the Jews, but against the West and its values ​​and in favor of the establishment of an extreme worldwide Islamic caliphate.

This campaign comprises small, slow and systematic steps, in the shape of infiltrating all systems in the West, including professional syndicates, student bodies, think tanks, neighborhood councils, LGBT circles, Green Peace circles, and more.

Within this large, macro framework, the events of October 7 were a very marginal part of the bigger picture, which as previously mentioned is the establishment of a large-scale radical Islamic Caliphate, while weakening the current superpower in the international arena, the USA, and simultaneously eliminating the influence of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, India, and more.

Iran is doing all this while temporarily cooperating with any potential partner who serves its goal – at least for the time being – including Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as large parts of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and more. Recently, it appears that in light of its poor economic condition, Egypt has also been caught in Iran’s dangerous spider web.

Egypt sits on the wrong side of history

This was reflected in a high-level Iranian visit to Cairo, approximately ten months ago, and in the fact that the official Egyptian regime gave the “green light” to the existence of dozens of significant terrorist tunnels running from Egyptian Rafah into Gaza. The latter allowed the smuggling of weapons and offensive equipment from Iran to Hamas, in preparation for the October 7 attack.

Furthermore, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s recent statement that he will not cooperate with a US-led coalition against Iran, which would counter Tehran’s attack on Israel, reinforces the assumption that some kind of a deal may have been forged between Cairo and Tehran, given Egypt’s precarious economic situation. Although Egypt accepts the second largest foreign aid package from the United States, it seems that it no longer trusts its benefactor’s strength in the region and is now prone to choosing the wrong side.

Alongside this choice, its significant armament efforts in recent years in the Sinai Peninsula should be a cause of concern for the West – yet another reason why the US must demonstrate clarity of policy against the Iranian axis in the upcoming campaign, so that Egypt must once again be convinced that there is no other side but the American one.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2024.

October 7 (Hamas’ invasion of Israel) and April 14 (Iran’s missile attack on Israel) demand that Jerusalem free itself from stale strategic paradigms. The targeted killings of Iran-backed terrorist leaders on July 30/31 suggest that Israel is indeed doing so.

They suggest that Israel is getting strategically “unstuck.” Israeli political and military leadership seems to finally realize that Israel has no choice but to confront across-the-board Iran’s 40-years-long and rapidly escalating war against it. Would the rest of the West awaken to this reality – halevai!

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted to stratospheric plateaus its hegemonic drive to dominate the Middle East and suffocate Israel. It is doing so through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; through its massive missile attack on Israel directly from Iranian soil; and through its looming breakout to nuclear weapon capacity.

Just by way of example, remember that Hezbollah (Iran) still has 180,000 missiles, rockets and UAVs in Lebanon aimed at Israel, and northern Israel has been depopulated and devastated. This can no longer be waited out or ignored.

Yes, the remarkable intelligence and operational capabilities demonstrated this week in the two pinpoint assassinations of key enemies (note: enemies of the West as well) is an important marker in the effort to restore Israel’s deterrent posture after the collapse of October 7.

But the justified, successful kills do not change the overall strategic picture, nor will the strikes alone sufficiently vitiate the grand Iranian region-wide assault on Israel (and the West). If anything, the assassination in Beirut of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s chief of staff, draws nearer the date of activation of the terrorist group’s arsenal. So be it, along with the necessary Israeli campaign to crush Hezbollah.

Understand: The worst possible thing is that a perception of Israel as “being stuck” takes root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza, in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck is also a situation where Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies; by allies who fool themselves into thinking that Iran (with its Russian backer) is not already engaged in WWIII against the West; by allies who prioritize temporary quiet over sustainable victory. This is an unacceptable, perilous position for Israel to be in.

Alas, Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival, at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They bought about cowering postures instead of appropriately necessary offensive ones.

As a result, even at this very moment Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas; to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions to the enemy population; and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas).

Israel also is being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows and to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” to whatever response Iran now dishes out to the July 30/31 assassinations.

Were they to be adopted, these policies taken together amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk; that brings into question its power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Jerusalem, these policies inevitably would crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s ongoing campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza; and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran – accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israeli diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings – are formulas for grand defeat. And as such, they must be resisted.

President Biden’s reported advice to Israel (after April 14) – to “take the win,” as it were; to suck-up its indignation; to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation”; and in general, to “avoid escalation” – is dangerous advice.

And, compounding the American failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden and his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have now hampered the likelihood of any strategic win against Iran by yet again piously (and foolishly) declaring that America seeks no confrontation with Iran, and that Washington had nothing to do with Israel’s targeted strikes on terrorist leaders. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

ALAS, there is a great disconnect between the way Israel sees the current war(s) and the way they are viewed abroad. The gap is enormous, serious, and terrifying.

Around the world, most leaders view the current conflicts as dangerous conflagrations (with a terrible humanitarian cost) that need to be ended quickly, with a swift return to diplomatic agreements (whether regarding the Palestinians, or Iran, or whatever).

However, for almost all Israelis, it has finally dawned on them that the country stands before a long war of attrition; a war for existential survival; a war at the cusp of a “clash of civilizations,” of “Western civilization against barbarism” (as Netanyahu said Congress last week); of a decades-long war that, with ups and downs, pauses and shaky ceasefires – must escalate in order to crush the Iranian juggernaut.

That is the lesson Israelis have learned from mostly turning a blind eye in recent decades to the military buildup on Israel’s southern and northern borders under the auspices of Iran. Turning this back cannot be done in a short time. Security will come through long battles (like the ten-month-long slog through Gaza, still unfinished) and eventual unequivocal defeat of Israel’s enemies, not hollow diplomatic agreements or guarantees.

Therefore, while Israel can and will negotiate here and there for respites and breaks in the conflicts (and hopefully for freedom for the Hamas-held Israeli hostages), the overall vector is one of long warfare against Iran and its proxies. Patience and resilience are needed for a long struggle.

Israel’s enemies certainly understand things this way. Iran’s Khamenei, Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, Hamas’ (now demised) Haniyeh, and the Houthis’ Abdul Malik al-Houthi explicitly have declared the current fighting as the beginning of a long war of attrition which they intend to pursue for as long as it takes until Israel’s elimination.

THE WAKE-UP call for Israelis is multi-level. It begins with discovery of the IDF’s hollowness and weakness (evident by the failures of October 7, and lack of preparation for long, hard war against Hamas and Hezbollah) and the failed diplomatic paradigms held by a broad spectrum of Israel’s political leaders. It continues with the shock of omnipresent antisemitic and anti-Israel protests worldwide.

But most of all, the wake-up call for Israelis lies in their discovery that the Western “liberal” mindset is incapable of recognizing the need for WWII-style crushing military “victories” over enemies who openly declare themselves on jihad with genocidal aims against Israel and the West, with every intention to grind away at it relentlessly “forever.”

For most Westerners (including many Jews and some Israelis), this presentation of the situation (that a “forever war” is underway) is anathema – because it involves the inevitable use of escalating military force rather than constant diplomatic compromise – and because it is, well, scary.

And because prevailing in this struggle requires deep ideological commitment and willingness to sacrifice for principle, which are traits so lacking in today’s Western post-religious, post-ideological, heavily materialistic world. And because nobody likes to be told by Jews that principles and liberties have to be defended.

Israel can no longer be hemmed in by such frailty. Perhaps the strikes of July 30/31 are the beginning of Israel’s emancipation from the impossible military and diplomatic handcuffs that Washington and others have sought to slap on Jerusalem.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 2, 2024 and Israel Hayom, August 7, 2024.

Eliminating key leaders of terror organisations is a practice often used by states such as the US and Israel in their war against terror. Muhammad Deif, Fouad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh follow many of their predecessors in the Palestinian terror organisations (Abu Jihad, Fathi Shikaki, Ahmad Yassin to mention a few) and in other terror groups (Osama Bin Laden, Qasem Soleimani, Imad Moghnieh; Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi for example).

No one expects that killing those figures will – by itself – bring about the defeat of these organisations, which thrive on strong commitment to an extreme interpretation of religious and/or nationalist ideas. Yet it seems that those who use this method of fighting terror consider this tool to be quite effective and the terror organisations themselves probably think the same, judging by their efforts to prevent it from happening.

Though eliminating the terror leaders does not constitute a decisive and existential blow, it inflicts psychological damage on them and a very painful hit to their morale – and exposes how easily they can be penetrated and how vulnerable they are. It is supposed to sow fear and distrust in their ranks, especially among the remaining leaders. It may degrade the quality of their leadership and weaken their operational competence. True, in some cases the successor maybe as capable or even more dangerous than the outgoing leader, but in most cases the replacement is less impressive. It is also a way of handing these terrorists the punishment they deserve and preventing them from carrying out more terror operations.

One lesson is clear. If the elimination of a terror leader is a stand-alone operation, its impact is usually limited – but if the eliminations repeat themselves within a relatively short period of time, are directed against the entire leadership echelon and are part of a wider effort to weaken and defeat the terror organisation, their impact can be more significant.

This is the context in which we should consider the recent attacks against Hamas and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah’s military leadership. The killing of Deif and Haniyeh is a major step in the war aimed at defeating Hamas in Gaza (and abroad) and hitting their leaders. Many were already hit (Salah AlArouri, Marwan Issa, Shabana and Salama are some high-ranking Hamas operatives). The same is true for Hezbollah.

The logic behind this effort is not only to weaken Hamas and Hezbollah and charge them a heavy price for their terror attacks, but to reestablish Israeli deterrence by showing its intelligence and military capabilities and making the terror groups and their supporters realise that launching the terror war on October 2023 was a very costly move, so they will not even think about it in the future.

Hitting terror leaders is also leveraged domestically to promote confidence in and support for the country’s leadership and security system, though this effect is usually short lived.

Eliminating terror leaders often has some disadvantages. First, in some cases it requires operating in problematic locations from the point of view of political and human collateral damage – and if the attempt fails, it builds the image of the targeted leader as a hero. Furthermore it may lead to escalation, since the terror groups and their patrons feel obliged to take revenge and retaliate as they feel humiliated, shocked and frustrated. This reaction may be relevant especially in the short term, but in certain circumstances it may lead to an unintended and unwanted widescale escalation – as may be the case now.

In the Israeli specific case, a major question is how the killing of Deif and Haniyeh may affect the prospects of concluding a deal for releasing the hostages. My assessment is that in the short term Hamas may delay the negotiations, fearing it may seem to be affected by the blow it suffered, but after a while it is going to resume the process. The fear that Israel may hit more leaders, including Sinwar, and the growing military pressure may convince Hamas to show more flexibility, though not necessarily enough to meet Israeli security demands.

To sum up, in the current situation eliminating Hamas leaders and Hezbollah key military figures makes sense and may help Israel in the medium term accomplish its goals in the war – defeating Hamas, releasing the hostages and creating a new situation vis-à-vis Gaza and Lebanon, so that the population can come back to their communities safely. But in the short term there might be a considerable escalation.

Published in The Jewish Chrinical, August 2, 2024.

Last week, Syrian citizens went to the polls for a genuine democratic celebration. For the fourth time since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, they were asked to elect their representatives to the parliament in Damascus. But don’t worry: these are not really free and fair elections, and no one expects any major surprises.

Firstly, residents under rebel or Kurdish control are not allowed to vote. They likely do not have access to polling stations set up by the regime anyway. Additionally, Syrians in the diaspora – like refugees who fled the country during the civil war – cannot cast their votes.

More importantly, the regime is suspected of having complete control over the results. For example, in the previous elections in 2020, the final results were delayed due to “technical failures,” and in the end, the regime won 166 out of 250 seats in the parliament. Just one seat short of two-thirds of the seats. Although the Syrian regime is popular in the country, this still seems excessive.

The absolute control over the elections allows the long-time president, Bashar al-Assad, to promote his personal interests. While the residents are mainly concerned about the crumbling Syrian economy, Assad wants to secure a majority in the parliament that will allow him to change the constitution and extend his rule, which is currently limited until 2028 “only.” He has been in office since 2000, as a reminder.

Assad, who is under US sanctions and has an arrest warrant against him in France due to the chemical attacks his army carried out during the civil war, is holding the elections in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. In 2015, the council issued Resolution 2254, which stipulated that elections would be held in Syria only as part of a comprehensive solution to the internal conflict. It also added other criteria for holding the elections – which the regime has ignored until today – including UN supervision, allowing Syrians abroad to vote, and the “significant” participation of women in the electoral process.

What enables Assad to act so calmly towards a Security Council decision? Perhaps he draws confidence from the fact that in the past year, and especially recently, he is increasingly solidifying his place as a member of the Arab nations’ family.

In November, Assad participated in an Arab League summit in Riyadh that dealt with the war in Gaza, and even gave a speech there. After many years, more than a decade, of regional diplomatic isolation, Syria was invited back to the Arab League two years ago, and Assad seized the opportunity. Even before that, in May 2023, he attended the league’s summit in Jeddah and said he hoped his invitation to the event, for the first time since 2011, “marks the beginning of a new phase in Arab action for solidarity among us.”

Not only has the league as a whole approached Assad, but individual countries have as well. Jordan was one of the countries that pushed for Syria’s reintegration into the Arab world, and even promoted a joint plan – despite American opposition – to minimize the effects of the decade-long conflict. Jordan presented the plan to another Arab country, Saudi Arabia, which agreed to take part in it.

Indeed, the plan gained momentum: last week, Saudi Arabia renewed regular commercial flights from Damascus to its territory, after the first flight took off in May from the Syrian capital to bring pilgrims from the country to the Hajj in Mecca. Last year, Iraq’s prime minister visited Damascus for the first time since 2010, and relations between the two countries are constantly improving.

Iraq, along with Egypt, was also one of the mediators between Syria and another non-Arab country, Turkey. After long negotiations and discussions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced two weeks ago that he wanted to restore relations with Damascus and “return them to their previous state.” The leaders of Turkey and Syria – two countries that have been bitter rivals over the past decade against the backdrop of the civil war and the war against the Kurds – once enjoyed a friendship and even vacationed together with their families.

Erdogan’s rapprochement attempt may also be the background for his announcement, a few days later, of the imminent end of the military operation he launched in April 2022 against Kurdish rebel organizations in Turkey and Syria. The Turkish president, of course, justified this by saying he had managed to neutralize the Kurdish threat, but the timing remains somewhat suspicious.

Assad, for his part – used to being the bad boy of the neighborhood – does not respond so easily to Erdogan. He may hold a grudge against him for years of occupying territories in Syria, supporting rebels against his rule, and more. He said in response to Erdogan’s offer that he would agree to meet, but “only if core issues are discussed.” What does that mean? Probably the end of Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria, among other things.

Another non-Arab country has been at the center of Syrian affairs recently: Iran. After Masoud Pezhkian’s victory in the presidential elections in Tehran, Assad was one of the first leaders to call and congratulate him. A few days later, Pezhkian called him back to discuss advancing bilateral relations, implementing their agreements, and other issues on the agenda.

A Family Business

What has led to the thawing of relations between Assad and the region’s leaders? How is it possible that after more than a decade of being ostracized, isolated, and being the neighborhood bully that no one approaches – suddenly he is warmly welcomed?

The English proverb says, “If you can’t beat them, join them.” That’s roughly what happened here too. After Arab countries tried to isolate Syria but the bad boy only caused more trouble, they are trying a different approach: instead of the stick, they are now going for the carrot.

The Assad regime causes two main problems in the region: the first is the refugees, hundreds of thousands of Syrians who fled their country following the civil war since 2011 and flooded neighboring countries, and from there also moved to European and North African countries. This flow has not stopped, and some still think that perhaps they can be returned to their country through various initiatives, and that the regime in Damascus can help with that.

The second problem, no less significant, is the extensive drug trade that the Damascus regime has been engaged in in recent years, causing havoc throughout the Middle East. Yes, the butcher from Damascus, the compassionate ophthalmologist who slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his people, is also not deterred by widespread drug distribution and profiting from it. Surprising, isn’t it?

The main drug the regime distributes is Captagon, also sold under the name Fenethylline. It is a synthetic stimulant initially created to treat attention deficit disorders, narcolepsy, and more, and is considered highly addictive. It is so addictive that its use was discontinued, and it was classified as a dangerous drug. Throughout the Arab world, religious decrees have been issued against its use due to the danger involved.

During its years of isolation, the Assad regime, desperate for cash flow, began producing and exporting the substance. Indeed, the drug trade has yielded billions of dollars for the Syrians. In 2021, the regime reportedly earned nearly $6 billion (!) from this trade – a third of Israel’s defense budget last year, not including American aid money. The Syrians have become so “addicted” to this field that it is believed they are responsible for about 80 percent of the global supply of Captagon. According to official data, the value of this amount is three times the total trade of all the Mexican cartels combined. All this goodness Dr. Assad freely supplies to the world.

These drugs are transferred to terrorist organizations, including Palestinian ones, which sell them and generate significant revenue. It is claimed that Hezbollah is also involved in the production and distribution of the drug, although Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Shiite organization, previously denied his group’s involvement in drug distribution. “If we were earning billions, I would probably notice,” he said. He probably forgot about his group’s involvement in the drug trade in South America. People forget sometimes, it happens.

Captagon is often associated, especially in the Middle East, with use by terrorist operatives. It is claimed that they use it as a stimulant before carrying out attacks. After the horrors of the October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel, it was claimed that some Hamas terrorists were found with Captagon, but this claim was not substantiated.

One of the countries most severely affected by these smuggling activities is Jordan, which constantly fights groups of smugglers trying to bring the dangerous drug into its territory. Earlier this year, the Jordanians even began directly attacking smugglers across the border in an attempt to disrupt their activities. But Amman is not alone in the battle: the Emirates have also thwarted large-scale smuggling operations worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Captagon, and Iraq has also seized shipments of the addictive substance. Just last month, Jordan foiled a smuggling attempt of 9.5 million Captagon pills destined for Saudi Arabia.

This, then, may be the background for the recent rapprochement between Syria and some of the region’s countries. The issue is still sensitive, and Damascus is required to answer questions about drug distribution. When it failed to do so, there was even a retreat in its rapprochement with Arab countries, and its participation in an Arab summit last year was canceled.

Incidentally, one country still vehemently opposed to Syria’s reintegration into the Arab family, is Qatar. Some believe the reason is the Qatari regime’s desire to maintain its ties with the US and the fear that supporting Assad could alienate the Americans from Doha. On the other hand, it may be related to Qatar’s connections with various rebel groups in northern Syria and their desire to continue nurturing them and establishing a foothold in the country.

However, a significant question that remains open is whether Assad is even willing and able to fight drug smuggling and the spread of refugees from his country. Regarding drugs, it is important to note that it is not just a profit for the regime as a whole, but for the Assad family itself. The tyrant’s hands in Damascus are deeply involved in the drug trade: the president’s younger brother, Maher, who commands a division in the Syrian army, is a key figure in drug distribution. The European Union has imposed sanctions on two of Assad’s cousins due to suspicion that they are also involved in the distribution of Captagon. A family business.

A Final Word on Israel

As far as is known, Captagon is not widely distributed in Israel, although suspects have been caught en route to the country with the drug, and there have also been shipments intercepted by authorities on their way to Gaza. However, besides the addiction risk, as mentioned, this drug can also be used by terrorist organizations to strengthen themselves, including Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Yet, experts estimate that the fight against drug distribution could serve Israel as another channel through which it can integrate into the regional landscape. Israel might contribute its security capabilities, even intelligence, in its relations with Jordan, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to try to thwart smuggling and make the entire Middle East a slightly cleaner place. Who knows, maybe salvation for Israel will come from Assad in the end.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 24,  2024.