“From a military standpoint, Israel has achieved all it can in Gaza,” a senior American officials told The New York Times on the eve of the summit in Doha. In their attempt to explain the futility of continuing the war, they actually underscored its necessity.

Israel cannot afford to end the war with the impression that it cannot topple Hamas. If this becomes the conclusion of its enemies and other actors in the region, it would significantly harm its efforts to achieve the central (though undeclared) goal of the war: restoring deterrence. Moreover, Israel cannot relinquish the gains it has made at such a high cost, and certainly cannot hand Hamas a lifeline or provide conditions that would enable its recovery.

It is worth reiterating: Even after Israel’s impressive military achievements, much work remains to destroy Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. The rocket fire over the past week is a reminder of this. Hamas also maintains control over the distribution of humanitarian aid within Gaza and is able to present a coordinated stance, despite the conditions its leaders are in. However, as long as the IDF controls the Philadelphi Route and continues to operate within the Gaza Strip, it is eroding Hamas’s capabilities, undermining its public standing, and forcing it to focus all its efforts on one goal: survival. Not growth, not empowerment, only mere existence.

The path to an arrangement – a turning point

Entering the path of an arrangement would be a turning point in this reality. The chances of renewing the fighting afterward are slim, if they exist at all. If the “deal” is implemented as agreed, some of its components would include the withdrawal of the IDF, the release of terrorists, the rehabilitation of Gaza, and the complete end of the war. In such a scenario, Israel would find it difficult to backtrack on its commitments to the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar.

But even if only part of the deal is implemented, Israel would still struggle to resume the fighting. Hamas would continue its manipulations and psychological warfare, mediating countries would present new initiatives, the U.S. would increase pressure especially as the elections approach, the international community would join in, and domestic pressures would intensify. The de-escalation process has its own momentum. Hamas, and not just Hamas, is banking on this.

Reports from Washington about the Americans’ intention to propose compromise suggestions on issues where the parties fail to reach an agreement should cause concern in Israel. The U.S.’s ability to influence Hamas to change its positions is minimal, if it exists at all. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the compromise formulas would erode Israel’s positions, as Israel is more sensitive to American pressures and incentives. For Hamas, such reports are yet another reason to dig in.

Dilemmas in Israel

The dilemma in Israel revolves around two issues: the release of hostages and the connection between the Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah. In both, the element of time plays a significant role. While time allows for deepening achievements in Gaza and reaching the release of hostages under better conditions, it also increases the danger to the hostages’ safety. The element of time creates tension between the importance of toppling Hamas and the urgency of releasing the hostages.

There is no one in Israel who doesn’t long for the release of the hostages, just as there is no one who doesn’t desire the total defeat of the monstrous terrorist organization. Resolving the tension between these goals is akin to the expression “caught between a rock and a hard place.” Any decision the government makes is legitimate, provided that its costs are clear and understood. In this regard, and after having been burned for years, it is not enough to rely on soothing statements or vague commitments that will sink into the sands of Rafah and the tunnels of Philadelphi.

As for the tension with Iran and Hezbollah, the very idea of offering concessions to “calm” them contradicts one of the objectives of the actions that heightened the tension: deterring these elements. In any case, it’s difficult to see the Gaza war as the key to calming them. The formula that the U.S. is trying to promote—restraining Israel in Gaza in exchange for restraining Iran towards Israel—does not satisfy Nasrallah and seemingly does not address Iran’s appetite for revenge.

But even if it did, from Israel’s perspective, it can only be relevant if it provides a solution to the root problems with these adversaries, primarily the efforts to obtain nuclear weapons and the desire to destroy Israel. Without diminishing the importance of diplomatic efforts, it is suggested to continue focusing the majority of efforts on strengthening readiness, both in defense and offense.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 16, 2024.

The Hamas attack on October 7 triggered a regional war with global repercussions. Israel is not only fighting on the frontlines but also in the court of global public opinion, with pro-Hamas protests on the streets of major European cities and on US campuses. However, the impact of the war extends beyond demonstrations, exposing the distorted and biased conduct of the UN and its institutions, including UNRWA. The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have also joined the parade of folly, blatantly displaying moral and ethical distortions regarding IDF operations in Gaza, and Judea and Samaria.

Against this backdrop, we are witnesses to the strengthening of bizarre Red-Green red alliances between “progressive” elements and Islamic fundamentalists, mindlessly championing a superficial worldview and revealing alarming ignorance about Hamas, radical Islam, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These phenomena indicate the danger posed by the spread of Hamas and radical Islamic narratives among various audiences in the free world, as well as the growing trend of radicalization among Muslim communities in the free world, particularly in Europe and the US. The echoing of these narratives and radicalization processes in the streets lead to violent rampages that severely disrupt social order. This includes the targeting of government and cultural symbols, with national flags burned, national monuments defaced, and slogans smeared in blood-colored paint in public spaces.

This Islamic violence also stirs fears among Western leaders, which causes them, in dangerous moral blindness, to restrain Israel, while failing to challenge Hamas, Iran, and its proxies. Although they are aware of Iran being the driving force behind a significant part of the protests and riots in the West, they nevertheless stand silent in the name of “democracy and liberalism,” even when (violent) freedom of expression is cynically used as a tool for undermining the most fundamental values of Western societies.

Yet, it is obvious to everyone that if Israel does not defeat Hamas in Gaza and leaves it as a governing power that can regain strength, this will have repercussions for the entire region and the world. This would boost Iran and the “axis of evil” it leads, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iranian proxies in the region. Shiite militias in western Iraq and southern Syria will continue to target American interests and troops, and above all, Iran will continue to operate within a strategic comfort zone, supplying and encouraging all its proxies to escalate the security situation in the region. These events will also fuel additional protests in the West, thus paving the way for radical Islam to expand its foothold in the free world.

The leaders of the free world must therefore internalize the statements made by Hamas seniors and Islamic clerics before and after October 7 and listen closely to what Iranian leaders have been saying for a long time. It is crucial to understand the foundations of political Islam and the spirit of jihadist-Salafism to realize that Israel is just the first target. The jihadist-Salafist vision is far-reaching, aspiring to establish an Islamic nation, an Islamic world, Islamic law, and Islamic civilization. In such a world, there will be no place for liberty seekers and human rights advocates, nor for champions of freedom of speech and assembly, women, and feminists, and certainly not for LGBTQ individuals.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech before the United States Congress on July 24 should be understood in this context. He emphasized that Israel’s war against the Iranian axis of evil and its proxies, in particular Hamas and Hezbollah, is part of the free world’s battle against radical Islamic barbarism. Netanyahu also stated that Israel’s fight is America’s fight and that Israel’s victory will be America’s victory.

Netanyahu aimed to achieve two objectives. The first was to highlight the significance of Israel’s war for the entire free world. The second was to illustrate the deep bond between Israel and the US, and Israel’s commitment to this relationship, as a testament to Israel’s affiliation with the free world under American leadership.

Whether or not Netanyahu’s words fell on receptive ears, they accurately describe the reality Israel has been facing over the last decades, especially during the Oslo process, which was intended to replace the paradigm of conflict and armed struggle against Israel with a framework for peace based on the idea of two states for two peoples.

However, the process has only increased the motivation to destroy Israel, owing to both the rise of Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) support for terrorism. Hamas managed to win the hearts and minds of many Palestinians and form an alliance with the Iranian axis. The PA has been inciting to violence against Jews through systematic indoctrination of the Palestinian public, the glorification of terrorists, and payments to families of those imprisoned for terrorist violence in Israeli jails.

This motivation is rooted in the absolute denial of Israel’s right to exist, as a state in general and as the nation-state of the Jewish people in particular. Israel is seen by the radical axis as a shameful symbol of Western imperialism and colonialism and of a declining Western civilization belonging to the free and enlightened world. Therefore, its destruction is perceived as the first necessary step towards establishing the Islamic caliphate, where Sharia law will prevail, and all infidels will be Islamized.

Viewed as a foreign element in the Middle East and the last stronghold to conquer before taking over the West, hatred and contempt towards Israel will only intensify. In this sense, the Iranian axis of evil is fully aware of Israel’s importance to the free world as its protector, making Israel’s destruction a prerequisite for the subjugation of the entire free world. These perceptions unite the diverse components of the axis of evil, bridging religious, historical, and ideological gaps between Shia and Sunni Arabs, and Iranians.

The loathing and hatred are not only directed at the State of Israel as a political entity but also towards the Jewish People. This animosity is rooted in the foundations of Islam, the Quran, and the historical legacy of Islam since the days of Prophet Muhammad and his disappointment with the Jews of Yathrib in the Arabian Peninsula (modern-day Medina) who did not accept Islam. While there are other interpretations of the Quran that emphasize peaceful elements, this approach puts excessive emphasis on Islam’s hostility towards Jews, and glorifies it, as manifested in the particularly barbaric Hamas attack on October 7 but also earlier in various suicide bombings against women, children, and the elderly.

It is crucial to understand the Hamas attack and Iran’s support for it, along with the support of other axis components, as an attempt to destabilize the regional and global order. Israel’s war with Hamas, Iran, and other proxies attacking the US is a war against the free world. This conflict is a clear expression not of a clash between civilizations but of the intense and violent confrontation between radical Islamic barbarism and the enlightened world, again as described by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech.

The spillover from the regional to the global arena is also reflected in Russia and China’s support for the Iranian axis. Both are revisionist powers seeking to undermine the existing world order and the US role in it. The regional war serves their goal by harming America’s most prominent and important ally in the region, and American regional standing. This is a step towards full erosion of global US hegemony.

In his speech before the American Congress, the Prime Minister held a mirror to the free world, presenting the hard reality we live in. An uncompromising struggle between the West and radical, violent Islam is nothing short of a world war. Netanyahu is therefore correct in his assessment of Israel’s critical role in it. Israel stands as the last fortress of the free world against the potential invasion of radical Islam. If this fortress falls, and the forces of evil, led by Iran and supported by China and Russia, succeed in breaching this last line of defense, Western civilization will collapse into itself, falling easy prey to barbarism and tyranny, with little hope for salvation.

America’s current approach to the threat of a large-scale Iranian attack against Israel is misguided and will not prevent regional war. Rather than focusing on a defensive posture and de-escalation, the best way for the US, Israel and regional allies to deter Iran is to present a credible threat to its strategic assets.

In the ongoing international maneuvering to prevent an Iranian assault, the United States is emphasizing a defensive approach. On August 5, US Defense Secretary Austin posted on X that he had discussed with his Israeli counterpart, “US defensive force posture moves… and stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region.”

According to reports, US officials have been warning Israel not to respond strongly to any Iranian attack. It seems that Washington’s goal is a reprise of the international response to Iran’s April 13 aerial attack, during which a US-led coalition downed the vast majority of the 300 plus missiles and drones fired by Tehran at Israel.

This approach by the US will not deter Iran or prevent a regional war. A credible American and Israeli threat to strike critical Iranian assets and sites – including military, nuclear, oil and electricity facilities, as well as air and sea ports – is far more likely to produce the desired outcome.

The Iranian regime is much more vulnerable than it would like to appear. Its air defenses are relatively weak. Its ability to carry out successful long-range aerial attacks is currently limited. Strategic sites, critical to its military strength and economy, as well as to the regime’s stability, could be destroyed or severely-damaged in a US-led strike.

Despite its bluster, the Islamic Republic is well aware of its weaknesses. This is precisely the reason that Iran is now making significant efforts to obtain advanced air defense and radar systems from Russia.

IRAN’S WEAKNESS is also the reason that the Ayatollah regime has adopted a proxy strategy in its war against Israel. Tehran, to date, has been enjoying the best of both worlds. On the one hand, the proxies which it arms and trains, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have launched thousands of attacks against the Jewish state, including the October 7 massacre.

On the other hand, Tehran has largely-avoided direct retribution in response to such attacks, with Israeli and US operations targeting primarily the proxies rather than the government arming and empowering them.

If the Iranian regime were to believe that it faces a severe threat to its stability and even survival if it should launch a massive assault against Israel, it would likely make do with a much more limited attack. Conversely, if Iran believes that following such an assault, international efforts will be focused on preventing a robust Israeli response, it has no reason to avoid launching such an attack.

Indeed, while the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran embarrassed the Iranian authorities and deprived them of an important partner, it is highly unlikely that the Iranian Shi’ite regime will risk its stability in order to avenge the death of a Palestinian Sunni terror leader. The regime instead will prefer to continue channeling arms, funds and expertise to Hamas and to whomever is appointed to replace Haniyeh.

If, despite a clear and credible warning, Iran nevertheless launches an intensive strike, the US and Israel should deal a devastating blow to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, one that degrades its nuclear and military sites, cripples its economy, and threatens the regime’s survival.

Such a blow may lead to a wider regional outbreak of hostilities. However, it is far more advantageous that such an outbreak take place now, before Iran has the opportunity to deploy sophisticated Russian air defenses and break out to a nuclear weapon, than after it has an opportunity to do so.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s weaponization program may be much further along than previously imagined. Countering a future attack by Iran and its proxies against US or Israeli interests will be much more dangerous if that attack takes place under an Iranian nuclear umbrella.

A credible US warning will also send a clear message to both regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who view Iran as a central foe, and to Russia and China, who have been deepening their ties with Tehran. Such a strategic approach has the greatest chances of deterring Iran, preventing a wider war, protecting US interests, and advancing regional stability.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 11, 2024

The US will have to demonstrate its firm stand on Israel’s side in the upcoming military campaign, as a long list of countries are watching it with a very, very critical eye.

The sense of betrayal and disappointment associated with the United States amidst its allies, following its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan (completed in September 2021) is still freshly imprinted in the minds of some of the region’s main role players, who had already begun to flirt with competing powers for alternative economic and security backing.

The manner in which the United States will demonstrate its strength vis-à-vis Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, Hamas, and Hezbollah – and of course Russia and China who are actively maneuvering behind the scenes – will be a watershed moment in terms of determining its positioning and status in the existing world order.

It may sound dramatic, but following October 7, it seems that the dam of radicalism had been broken – the same radical campaign that had been meticulously planned since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Already then, 45 years ago, the Mullah regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran began to plan the public relations campaign that we are witnessing today around the world – a campaign that is not, as we tend to think, against the State of Israel and/or the Jews, but against the West and its values ​​and in favor of the establishment of an extreme worldwide Islamic caliphate.

This campaign comprises small, slow and systematic steps, in the shape of infiltrating all systems in the West, including professional syndicates, student bodies, think tanks, neighborhood councils, LGBT circles, Green Peace circles, and more.

Within this large, macro framework, the events of October 7 were a very marginal part of the bigger picture, which as previously mentioned is the establishment of a large-scale radical Islamic Caliphate, while weakening the current superpower in the international arena, the USA, and simultaneously eliminating the influence of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, India, and more.

Iran is doing all this while temporarily cooperating with any potential partner who serves its goal – at least for the time being – including Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as large parts of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and more. Recently, it appears that in light of its poor economic condition, Egypt has also been caught in Iran’s dangerous spider web.

Egypt sits on the wrong side of history

This was reflected in a high-level Iranian visit to Cairo, approximately ten months ago, and in the fact that the official Egyptian regime gave the “green light” to the existence of dozens of significant terrorist tunnels running from Egyptian Rafah into Gaza. The latter allowed the smuggling of weapons and offensive equipment from Iran to Hamas, in preparation for the October 7 attack.

Furthermore, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s recent statement that he will not cooperate with a US-led coalition against Iran, which would counter Tehran’s attack on Israel, reinforces the assumption that some kind of a deal may have been forged between Cairo and Tehran, given Egypt’s precarious economic situation. Although Egypt accepts the second largest foreign aid package from the United States, it seems that it no longer trusts its benefactor’s strength in the region and is now prone to choosing the wrong side.

Alongside this choice, its significant armament efforts in recent years in the Sinai Peninsula should be a cause of concern for the West – yet another reason why the US must demonstrate clarity of policy against the Iranian axis in the upcoming campaign, so that Egypt must once again be convinced that there is no other side but the American one.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 9, 2024.

October 7 (Hamas’ invasion of Israel) and April 14 (Iran’s missile attack on Israel) demand that Jerusalem free itself from stale strategic paradigms. The targeted killings of Iran-backed terrorist leaders on July 30/31 suggest that Israel is indeed doing so.

They suggest that Israel is getting strategically “unstuck.” Israeli political and military leadership seems to finally realize that Israel has no choice but to confront across-the-board Iran’s 40-years-long and rapidly escalating war against it. Would the rest of the West awaken to this reality – halevai!

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted to stratospheric plateaus its hegemonic drive to dominate the Middle East and suffocate Israel. It is doing so through Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; through its massive missile attack on Israel directly from Iranian soil; and through its looming breakout to nuclear weapon capacity.

Just by way of example, remember that Hezbollah (Iran) still has 180,000 missiles, rockets and UAVs in Lebanon aimed at Israel, and northern Israel has been depopulated and devastated. This can no longer be waited out or ignored.

Yes, the remarkable intelligence and operational capabilities demonstrated this week in the two pinpoint assassinations of key enemies (note: enemies of the West as well) is an important marker in the effort to restore Israel’s deterrent posture after the collapse of October 7.

But the justified, successful kills do not change the overall strategic picture, nor will the strikes alone sufficiently vitiate the grand Iranian region-wide assault on Israel (and the West). If anything, the assassination in Beirut of Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s chief of staff, draws nearer the date of activation of the terrorist group’s arsenal. So be it, along with the necessary Israeli campaign to crush Hezbollah.

Understand: The worst possible thing is that a perception of Israel as “being stuck” takes root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza, in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck is also a situation where Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies; by allies who fool themselves into thinking that Iran (with its Russian backer) is not already engaged in WWIII against the West; by allies who prioritize temporary quiet over sustainable victory. This is an unacceptable, perilous position for Israel to be in.

Alas, Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival, at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They bought about cowering postures instead of appropriately necessary offensive ones.

As a result, even at this very moment Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas; to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions to the enemy population; and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas).

Israel also is being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows and to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” to whatever response Iran now dishes out to the July 30/31 assassinations.

Were they to be adopted, these policies taken together amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk; that brings into question its power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Jerusalem, these policies inevitably would crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s ongoing campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza; and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran – accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israeli diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings – are formulas for grand defeat. And as such, they must be resisted.

President Biden’s reported advice to Israel (after April 14) – to “take the win,” as it were; to suck-up its indignation; to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation”; and in general, to “avoid escalation” – is dangerous advice.

And, compounding the American failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden and his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have now hampered the likelihood of any strategic win against Iran by yet again piously (and foolishly) declaring that America seeks no confrontation with Iran, and that Washington had nothing to do with Israel’s targeted strikes on terrorist leaders. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

ALAS, there is a great disconnect between the way Israel sees the current war(s) and the way they are viewed abroad. The gap is enormous, serious, and terrifying.

Around the world, most leaders view the current conflicts as dangerous conflagrations (with a terrible humanitarian cost) that need to be ended quickly, with a swift return to diplomatic agreements (whether regarding the Palestinians, or Iran, or whatever).

However, for almost all Israelis, it has finally dawned on them that the country stands before a long war of attrition; a war for existential survival; a war at the cusp of a “clash of civilizations,” of “Western civilization against barbarism” (as Netanyahu said Congress last week); of a decades-long war that, with ups and downs, pauses and shaky ceasefires – must escalate in order to crush the Iranian juggernaut.

That is the lesson Israelis have learned from mostly turning a blind eye in recent decades to the military buildup on Israel’s southern and northern borders under the auspices of Iran. Turning this back cannot be done in a short time. Security will come through long battles (like the ten-month-long slog through Gaza, still unfinished) and eventual unequivocal defeat of Israel’s enemies, not hollow diplomatic agreements or guarantees.

Therefore, while Israel can and will negotiate here and there for respites and breaks in the conflicts (and hopefully for freedom for the Hamas-held Israeli hostages), the overall vector is one of long warfare against Iran and its proxies. Patience and resilience are needed for a long struggle.

Israel’s enemies certainly understand things this way. Iran’s Khamenei, Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, Hamas’ (now demised) Haniyeh, and the Houthis’ Abdul Malik al-Houthi explicitly have declared the current fighting as the beginning of a long war of attrition which they intend to pursue for as long as it takes until Israel’s elimination.

THE WAKE-UP call for Israelis is multi-level. It begins with discovery of the IDF’s hollowness and weakness (evident by the failures of October 7, and lack of preparation for long, hard war against Hamas and Hezbollah) and the failed diplomatic paradigms held by a broad spectrum of Israel’s political leaders. It continues with the shock of omnipresent antisemitic and anti-Israel protests worldwide.

But most of all, the wake-up call for Israelis lies in their discovery that the Western “liberal” mindset is incapable of recognizing the need for WWII-style crushing military “victories” over enemies who openly declare themselves on jihad with genocidal aims against Israel and the West, with every intention to grind away at it relentlessly “forever.”

For most Westerners (including many Jews and some Israelis), this presentation of the situation (that a “forever war” is underway) is anathema – because it involves the inevitable use of escalating military force rather than constant diplomatic compromise – and because it is, well, scary.

And because prevailing in this struggle requires deep ideological commitment and willingness to sacrifice for principle, which are traits so lacking in today’s Western post-religious, post-ideological, heavily materialistic world. And because nobody likes to be told by Jews that principles and liberties have to be defended.

Israel can no longer be hemmed in by such frailty. Perhaps the strikes of July 30/31 are the beginning of Israel’s emancipation from the impossible military and diplomatic handcuffs that Washington and others have sought to slap on Jerusalem.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 2, 2024 and Israel Hayom, August 7, 2024.

Eliminating key leaders of terror organisations is a practice often used by states such as the US and Israel in their war against terror. Muhammad Deif, Fouad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh follow many of their predecessors in the Palestinian terror organisations (Abu Jihad, Fathi Shikaki, Ahmad Yassin to mention a few) and in other terror groups (Osama Bin Laden, Qasem Soleimani, Imad Moghnieh; Abu Bakr AlBaghdadi for example).

No one expects that killing those figures will – by itself – bring about the defeat of these organisations, which thrive on strong commitment to an extreme interpretation of religious and/or nationalist ideas. Yet it seems that those who use this method of fighting terror consider this tool to be quite effective and the terror organisations themselves probably think the same, judging by their efforts to prevent it from happening.

Though eliminating the terror leaders does not constitute a decisive and existential blow, it inflicts psychological damage on them and a very painful hit to their morale – and exposes how easily they can be penetrated and how vulnerable they are. It is supposed to sow fear and distrust in their ranks, especially among the remaining leaders. It may degrade the quality of their leadership and weaken their operational competence. True, in some cases the successor maybe as capable or even more dangerous than the outgoing leader, but in most cases the replacement is less impressive. It is also a way of handing these terrorists the punishment they deserve and preventing them from carrying out more terror operations.

One lesson is clear. If the elimination of a terror leader is a stand-alone operation, its impact is usually limited – but if the eliminations repeat themselves within a relatively short period of time, are directed against the entire leadership echelon and are part of a wider effort to weaken and defeat the terror organisation, their impact can be more significant.

This is the context in which we should consider the recent attacks against Hamas and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah’s military leadership. The killing of Deif and Haniyeh is a major step in the war aimed at defeating Hamas in Gaza (and abroad) and hitting their leaders. Many were already hit (Salah AlArouri, Marwan Issa, Shabana and Salama are some high-ranking Hamas operatives). The same is true for Hezbollah.

The logic behind this effort is not only to weaken Hamas and Hezbollah and charge them a heavy price for their terror attacks, but to reestablish Israeli deterrence by showing its intelligence and military capabilities and making the terror groups and their supporters realise that launching the terror war on October 2023 was a very costly move, so they will not even think about it in the future.

Hitting terror leaders is also leveraged domestically to promote confidence in and support for the country’s leadership and security system, though this effect is usually short lived.

Eliminating terror leaders often has some disadvantages. First, in some cases it requires operating in problematic locations from the point of view of political and human collateral damage – and if the attempt fails, it builds the image of the targeted leader as a hero. Furthermore it may lead to escalation, since the terror groups and their patrons feel obliged to take revenge and retaliate as they feel humiliated, shocked and frustrated. This reaction may be relevant especially in the short term, but in certain circumstances it may lead to an unintended and unwanted widescale escalation – as may be the case now.

In the Israeli specific case, a major question is how the killing of Deif and Haniyeh may affect the prospects of concluding a deal for releasing the hostages. My assessment is that in the short term Hamas may delay the negotiations, fearing it may seem to be affected by the blow it suffered, but after a while it is going to resume the process. The fear that Israel may hit more leaders, including Sinwar, and the growing military pressure may convince Hamas to show more flexibility, though not necessarily enough to meet Israeli security demands.

To sum up, in the current situation eliminating Hamas leaders and Hezbollah key military figures makes sense and may help Israel in the medium term accomplish its goals in the war – defeating Hamas, releasing the hostages and creating a new situation vis-à-vis Gaza and Lebanon, so that the population can come back to their communities safely. But in the short term there might be a considerable escalation.

Published in The Jewish Chrinical, August 2, 2024.

Last week, Syrian citizens went to the polls for a genuine democratic celebration. For the fourth time since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, they were asked to elect their representatives to the parliament in Damascus. But don’t worry: these are not really free and fair elections, and no one expects any major surprises.

Firstly, residents under rebel or Kurdish control are not allowed to vote. They likely do not have access to polling stations set up by the regime anyway. Additionally, Syrians in the diaspora – like refugees who fled the country during the civil war – cannot cast their votes.

More importantly, the regime is suspected of having complete control over the results. For example, in the previous elections in 2020, the final results were delayed due to “technical failures,” and in the end, the regime won 166 out of 250 seats in the parliament. Just one seat short of two-thirds of the seats. Although the Syrian regime is popular in the country, this still seems excessive.

The absolute control over the elections allows the long-time president, Bashar al-Assad, to promote his personal interests. While the residents are mainly concerned about the crumbling Syrian economy, Assad wants to secure a majority in the parliament that will allow him to change the constitution and extend his rule, which is currently limited until 2028 “only.” He has been in office since 2000, as a reminder.

Assad, who is under US sanctions and has an arrest warrant against him in France due to the chemical attacks his army carried out during the civil war, is holding the elections in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. In 2015, the council issued Resolution 2254, which stipulated that elections would be held in Syria only as part of a comprehensive solution to the internal conflict. It also added other criteria for holding the elections – which the regime has ignored until today – including UN supervision, allowing Syrians abroad to vote, and the “significant” participation of women in the electoral process.

What enables Assad to act so calmly towards a Security Council decision? Perhaps he draws confidence from the fact that in the past year, and especially recently, he is increasingly solidifying his place as a member of the Arab nations’ family.

In November, Assad participated in an Arab League summit in Riyadh that dealt with the war in Gaza, and even gave a speech there. After many years, more than a decade, of regional diplomatic isolation, Syria was invited back to the Arab League two years ago, and Assad seized the opportunity. Even before that, in May 2023, he attended the league’s summit in Jeddah and said he hoped his invitation to the event, for the first time since 2011, “marks the beginning of a new phase in Arab action for solidarity among us.”

Not only has the league as a whole approached Assad, but individual countries have as well. Jordan was one of the countries that pushed for Syria’s reintegration into the Arab world, and even promoted a joint plan – despite American opposition – to minimize the effects of the decade-long conflict. Jordan presented the plan to another Arab country, Saudi Arabia, which agreed to take part in it.

Indeed, the plan gained momentum: last week, Saudi Arabia renewed regular commercial flights from Damascus to its territory, after the first flight took off in May from the Syrian capital to bring pilgrims from the country to the Hajj in Mecca. Last year, Iraq’s prime minister visited Damascus for the first time since 2010, and relations between the two countries are constantly improving.

Iraq, along with Egypt, was also one of the mediators between Syria and another non-Arab country, Turkey. After long negotiations and discussions, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced two weeks ago that he wanted to restore relations with Damascus and “return them to their previous state.” The leaders of Turkey and Syria – two countries that have been bitter rivals over the past decade against the backdrop of the civil war and the war against the Kurds – once enjoyed a friendship and even vacationed together with their families.

Erdogan’s rapprochement attempt may also be the background for his announcement, a few days later, of the imminent end of the military operation he launched in April 2022 against Kurdish rebel organizations in Turkey and Syria. The Turkish president, of course, justified this by saying he had managed to neutralize the Kurdish threat, but the timing remains somewhat suspicious.

Assad, for his part – used to being the bad boy of the neighborhood – does not respond so easily to Erdogan. He may hold a grudge against him for years of occupying territories in Syria, supporting rebels against his rule, and more. He said in response to Erdogan’s offer that he would agree to meet, but “only if core issues are discussed.” What does that mean? Probably the end of Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria, among other things.

Another non-Arab country has been at the center of Syrian affairs recently: Iran. After Masoud Pezhkian’s victory in the presidential elections in Tehran, Assad was one of the first leaders to call and congratulate him. A few days later, Pezhkian called him back to discuss advancing bilateral relations, implementing their agreements, and other issues on the agenda.

A Family Business

What has led to the thawing of relations between Assad and the region’s leaders? How is it possible that after more than a decade of being ostracized, isolated, and being the neighborhood bully that no one approaches – suddenly he is warmly welcomed?

The English proverb says, “If you can’t beat them, join them.” That’s roughly what happened here too. After Arab countries tried to isolate Syria but the bad boy only caused more trouble, they are trying a different approach: instead of the stick, they are now going for the carrot.

The Assad regime causes two main problems in the region: the first is the refugees, hundreds of thousands of Syrians who fled their country following the civil war since 2011 and flooded neighboring countries, and from there also moved to European and North African countries. This flow has not stopped, and some still think that perhaps they can be returned to their country through various initiatives, and that the regime in Damascus can help with that.

The second problem, no less significant, is the extensive drug trade that the Damascus regime has been engaged in in recent years, causing havoc throughout the Middle East. Yes, the butcher from Damascus, the compassionate ophthalmologist who slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his people, is also not deterred by widespread drug distribution and profiting from it. Surprising, isn’t it?

The main drug the regime distributes is Captagon, also sold under the name Fenethylline. It is a synthetic stimulant initially created to treat attention deficit disorders, narcolepsy, and more, and is considered highly addictive. It is so addictive that its use was discontinued, and it was classified as a dangerous drug. Throughout the Arab world, religious decrees have been issued against its use due to the danger involved.

During its years of isolation, the Assad regime, desperate for cash flow, began producing and exporting the substance. Indeed, the drug trade has yielded billions of dollars for the Syrians. In 2021, the regime reportedly earned nearly $6 billion (!) from this trade – a third of Israel’s defense budget last year, not including American aid money. The Syrians have become so “addicted” to this field that it is believed they are responsible for about 80 percent of the global supply of Captagon. According to official data, the value of this amount is three times the total trade of all the Mexican cartels combined. All this goodness Dr. Assad freely supplies to the world.

These drugs are transferred to terrorist organizations, including Palestinian ones, which sell them and generate significant revenue. It is claimed that Hezbollah is also involved in the production and distribution of the drug, although Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Shiite organization, previously denied his group’s involvement in drug distribution. “If we were earning billions, I would probably notice,” he said. He probably forgot about his group’s involvement in the drug trade in South America. People forget sometimes, it happens.

Captagon is often associated, especially in the Middle East, with use by terrorist operatives. It is claimed that they use it as a stimulant before carrying out attacks. After the horrors of the October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel, it was claimed that some Hamas terrorists were found with Captagon, but this claim was not substantiated.

One of the countries most severely affected by these smuggling activities is Jordan, which constantly fights groups of smugglers trying to bring the dangerous drug into its territory. Earlier this year, the Jordanians even began directly attacking smugglers across the border in an attempt to disrupt their activities. But Amman is not alone in the battle: the Emirates have also thwarted large-scale smuggling operations worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Captagon, and Iraq has also seized shipments of the addictive substance. Just last month, Jordan foiled a smuggling attempt of 9.5 million Captagon pills destined for Saudi Arabia.

This, then, may be the background for the recent rapprochement between Syria and some of the region’s countries. The issue is still sensitive, and Damascus is required to answer questions about drug distribution. When it failed to do so, there was even a retreat in its rapprochement with Arab countries, and its participation in an Arab summit last year was canceled.

Incidentally, one country still vehemently opposed to Syria’s reintegration into the Arab family, is Qatar. Some believe the reason is the Qatari regime’s desire to maintain its ties with the US and the fear that supporting Assad could alienate the Americans from Doha. On the other hand, it may be related to Qatar’s connections with various rebel groups in northern Syria and their desire to continue nurturing them and establishing a foothold in the country.

However, a significant question that remains open is whether Assad is even willing and able to fight drug smuggling and the spread of refugees from his country. Regarding drugs, it is important to note that it is not just a profit for the regime as a whole, but for the Assad family itself. The tyrant’s hands in Damascus are deeply involved in the drug trade: the president’s younger brother, Maher, who commands a division in the Syrian army, is a key figure in drug distribution. The European Union has imposed sanctions on two of Assad’s cousins due to suspicion that they are also involved in the distribution of Captagon. A family business.

A Final Word on Israel

As far as is known, Captagon is not widely distributed in Israel, although suspects have been caught en route to the country with the drug, and there have also been shipments intercepted by authorities on their way to Gaza. However, besides the addiction risk, as mentioned, this drug can also be used by terrorist organizations to strengthen themselves, including Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Yet, experts estimate that the fight against drug distribution could serve Israel as another channel through which it can integrate into the regional landscape. Israel might contribute its security capabilities, even intelligence, in its relations with Jordan, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to try to thwart smuggling and make the entire Middle East a slightly cleaner place. Who knows, maybe salvation for Israel will come from Assad in the end.

Published in Israel Hayom, July 24,  2024.

The two illegal weapons warehouses attributed to Iran and its proxies uncovered recently in the suburbs of Amman, the capital of Jordan, and revealed in the media, express the culmination of Iran-led Axis of Resistance activities in Jordan. Iran’s subversive activity in Jordan aims to make it a fertile ground for the implementation of Khamenei’s 2014 order to arm the West Bank. To this end, Iran consistently increases its violation of Jordanian sovereignty and exploits weaknesses in the Hashemite kingdom. Reports in recent months have shown that there has been a significant increase in attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank.

The current affair further sharpens the urgent need for Israel and Jordan to tighten security cooperation to curtail Iran’s activities and subversion in the Jordanian region. Jordan relies heavily on intelligence assistance from Israel and the US, and tightening cooperation between Jerusalem and Amman will help ease tensions between them against the background of the war in Gaza. Israel is urgently required to complete its renewed preparations on the border with Jordan, to close the loopholes, and to strengthen the fence in weakened areas.

The December 2023 call by Revolutionary Guards chief Hossein Salami for the Palestinians to carry out another Al-Aqsa flood attack from the south, north, and east of Israel should serve as a sharp warning sign for the Israeli security establishment. One must also remember the plan by elements of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, revealed in the Israeli media last March, to infiltrate Israel from Jordan and carry out a large-scale attack on localities in its territory. The plan was dropped from the agenda because the plot was exposed, but it still serves as a wake-up call given the seriousness of the threat from the east.

At the beginning of April, a New York Times investigation revealed that Shiite militias supported by the Quds Force, as well as Iranian operatives in Tehran’s terrorist organization, are carrying weapons from Syria to Jordan. From there, the armaments are transferred at the border to Bedouin smugglers, who then transport the weapon to the Israeli border, where it is transferred to criminal organizations who take it to the West Bank. From a Shin Bet countermeasure operation last March, we see the types of advanced armaments that Iran seeks to distribute in the West Bank, including cluster munitions, Iranian anti-aircraft mines, thunderbolts, anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles, RPGs, hand grenades, pistols, and assault rifles.

Israel does not have the privilege of waiting for the end of the war in Gaza – which will last for years. They need to design a new security doctrine that will immediately fit the reality of the aftermath of October 7. The tangible threat to Iran’s leadership is not limited only to its nuclear program but rather to the tightening stranglehold set by Iran and its proxies. This has already created an unprecedented security zone in northern Israel. Israel, after October 7th, cannot stand by but must retaliate against Iran to ensure its national security. Some recommended courses of action would be to restrain Iran by various means, such as arrest operations on Iranian territory of Iranian terrorist operatives; this has been done before.

In April 2022, it was reported that the Mossad arrested – in Iran – Mansour Rasouli, an operative in Unit 840 of the Quds Force (a secret operational unit which is responsible for planning and establishing terrorist infrastructures outside of Iran, against Western and Israeli targets). Rasouli admitted that he planned to assassinate one of the employees of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul and even planned to assassinate a senior American general in Germany and a journalist in France.

The multi-arena challenge from Iran is now fully activated for the first time in what is known as the convergence of the arenas. Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and, to a certain extent, Syria are attacking Israel in the current war. In doing so, they bring to fruition the Iranian ambition to choke Israel with a stranglehold and place it under an existential threat.

The situation in the north is still limited and has not turned into an all-out war; the multi-aspect challenge is not yet operating in full force. Israeli activity against Iran, as well as a joint struggle with Jordan against Iranian subversion in Jordanian territory, would make it clear to Tehran that it will bear the consequences and pay a price for promoting terrorism against Israel.

At the same time, the activity would help Israel restore its deterrence against the Iran-led axis of resistance and its image before the regional Sunni countries, to whom the Iranian subversion in Jordan reminds them that behind the smiles that Tehran spreads are hidden dark intentions.

Published in I24, July 4, 2024.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seizes every opportunity to criticize the IDF’s moral fighting in Gaza, echoing the false Palestinian “resistance” narrative and depicting murderous Hamas operatives as “freedom fighters.”

It’s time for Israel to respond in kind.

Since the Swords of Iron War began, Erdoğan has insisted on portraying Hamas as a liberation movement and presenting himself as the flag bearer of the Palestinian struggle. Recently, he proudly announced that over 1,000 Hamas operatives were being treated in hospitals across Turkey and lamented that the Greeks view Hamas as a terrorist organization rather than a resistance movement.

Erdoğan’s blatant alignment with Hamas is in line with other hostile actions by Ankara against Israel in recent years, especially since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, including the unprecedented decision to sever trade relations with Israel.

However, this also provides Israel with an opportunity it has not yet utilized: to shift from the defensive posture that has characterized its public diplomacy for years and to actively counter the hypocrisy entrenched in the false Palestinian narrative of occupation and dispossession that Erdoğan promotes on every possible platform.

In fact, there is no better example than Turkey to illustrate the depth of Erdoğan’s hypocrisy regarding the “Israeli occupation.” For decades, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” has functioned as a de facto state despite lacking international recognition. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek coup attempt against the legitimate Cypriot government, using the pretext of protecting the Turkish population on the island.

In violation of a U.N. ceasefire, Turkey then launched another operation, revealing its true aim: the partition of Cyprus. During this operation, Turkey forcibly expelled over 200,000 Greek Cypriots who were replaced by new settlers from Turkey, successfully establishing control over more than a third of Cyprus’s territory.

Turkish aggression continues today with the presence of over 40,000 Turkish troops in the north of the island, illegal construction on Greek Cypriot-owned property, ethnic segregation and the destruction of Christian cultural heritage.

Similarly, while Erdoğan boasts of standing alongside the “oppressed” Palestinian people, he denies political and cultural rights to Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

After the failed coup attempt in July 2016 by a military faction loyal to Erdoğan’s hated rival Fethullah Gulen, Erdoğan embarked on a major purge that extended far beyond Gulen’s supporters. Leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), members of parliament and thousands of party members across Turkey, including senior officials of various municipalities, were arrested.

A year earlier, during clashes between Turkish security forces and Kurdish insurgents, Erdoğan’s harsh measures to suppress the violence in the southeastern part of the country reached unprecedented levels. Turkey imposed curfews in many Kurdish areas and suspended essential services for the residents, leading to a massive humanitarian crisis and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens from their homes.

To be sure, Erdoğan gives “equal” treatment to Kurdish autonomies beyond the border. Since 2016, Turkey has launched a series of attacks against PKK bases in the Kurdish region of Iraq and its associated organizations in Syria. Under the guise of fighting terror, Turkey’s president carried out a de facto annexation, significantly violating the human rights of the area’s residents.

Since 2018, Turkey has transferred around 400,000 Arabs and Turkmen into the Kurdish enclave in Syrian Afrin, reducing the Kurdish population, which previously constituted 80% of the local population, to less than a quarter.

Even the war against ISIS did not alter Erdoğan’s priorities. When Turkey finally joined the coalition forces’ campaign against the murderous organization, it was used by Turkey as a cover story to land a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Iraq and Syria, investing far fewer resources in destroying ISIS strongholds.

And what can be more ironic than Erdoğan pretending to show concern for the welfare of Gazans in early October 2023, while at the same time striking about 140 civilian targets in northern Syria, including bombing hospitals?

Turkey also behaves as an occupying force in places where there is no direct threat to its security. To ensure the survival of the Libyan regime and reap economic as well as other benefits, in January 2020 Ankara sent drones and soldiers—including jihadist mercenaries from Syria—to support the Islamist “Government of National Accord” against the opposing forces led by Khalifa Haftar.

Turkey’s military entrenchment in Libya has worsened the human rights situation in Libya and its overall stability, and continues to raise concerns for Egypt, which fears the spillover of terrorism into its territory.

The next time Erdoğan waves terms like “occupation,” “resistance” and “freedom fighters,” Israel must not remain silent. It must remind the international community who the real occupier is.

Published in JNS, June 9, 2024.

Since the 1979 signing of their peace agreement, Israel-Egypt relations have mainly been characterized by fruitful cooperation in everything related to military, security, and regional issues.

At the same time, there has been an almost total disconnect between the two nations.

In Egypt’s view, since the establishment of a Palestinian entity was significant pillar of the peace agreement, its lack allowed the Mubarak-led Egyptian regime to refrain from promoting bilateral cooperation with Israel in the fields of trade, culture, tourism and more.

Hence, most of the other pillars upon which the peace agreement was based, were not realized.

Egypt adopts anti-Israel rhetoric

Over the years, Egyptian leadership has permitted, and at times even encouraged, the adoption of distinctly anti-Israel rhetoric, as, among other things, a mechanism to distract public attention from internal hardships.

This trend has been reflected in all the newspapers and magazines published in Egypt, whether identified with the opposition or official government mouthpieces.

Beyond anti-Zionist rhetoric, the media often includes clear antisemitic messages, such as the use of cartoons and illustrations.

Israelis are not allowed to appear in the Egyptian media, resulting in all discussions on the subject of Israel taking place without any Israeli representation.

The Qatari-owned-and-controlled Al-Jazeera channel has been outlawed in Egypt more than once – due to its harsh criticism of former president Hosni Mubarak and more recently of President Mohammed Al-Sisi. However, the general Egypt public continues to be exposed to other Arab social media sources providing a significant dose of antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment.

Israel has never insisted that Egypt change its syllabus and alter its negative messaging concerning Israel and the Jews.

Egypt’s duality vis-à-vis Hamas 

There is little doubt that official Egypt understands very well what Hamas is and the nature of its affiliation and kinship with the Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamist movement established in 1920s Egypt, that has been outlawed in the country for years.

The Egyptian constitution prohibits any organized political activity based on religion. Egyptian intelligence carefully monitors any hint of activity on behalf of Islamist organizations inside Egypt, its law enforcement agencies adopting an iron fist policy to contain it.

Egypt is doubtless worried about an influx of Palestinian refugees from Gaza due to the certain infiltration of Hamas operatives among them. In addition, it does not wish for the “temporary” sojourn of Palestinians to become a permanent settlement, as has happened with many Palestinian populations in Arab countries.

This weakened population is ripe for poverty, crime, extremism, and the potential for terrorist infiltration by radical Islamist elements, such as ISIS, Al Qaida, The Muslim Brotherhood.

What, then, caused official Egypt to turn a blind eye to the dozens of tunnels crossing from Gaza into Egypt that the IDF uncovered upon entering Rafah? Their existence must have sounded every single alarm.

Musa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, stated in a 2013 interview that the previous head of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, had assisted Hamas by preventing any attempt to dismantle the tunnels.

His words, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt, but the fact remains that the discovered tunnels exist. Their very existence has aided Hamas to arm itself in a way that, after October 7, is hard to dispute.

Furthermore, and since 2017, there appears to have been an improvement in Egypt’s relations with Hamas in Gaza, after its leaders published an updated version of the its charter, dissociating themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The considerable extent of the tunnels that were discovered is indicative of a strategic decision at a senior level, or at the very least, a deliberate “blind eye” at the highest level.

One can assume that Egypt sought to preserve its key position as a mediator between Hamas and Israel – thus ensuring its supremacy over Qatar, Turkey and other countries – by allowing Hamas this smuggling outlet as leverage. Cairo’s pursuit of regional hegemony remains an important national interest.

Yet, can that explain Egypt’s willingness to risk playing with fire, after, the 2008 Hamas intrusion into its territory and the murder of Egyptian officers? The characteristic duality of Egyptian policies serves to decipher this particular decision.

On one hand, Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel and strives to create trade routes and cooperation with the US, on the other, it feeds the Egyptian public anti-West and especially anti-Israel messages.

It nurtures an abysmal hatred for Turkey and Qatar, whose rulers have humiliated and criticized Egyptian rulers over the years and supported the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, which threatened the Egyptian regime; and at the same time it promotes paths of reconciliation and understanding with those countries.

[Egypt had demanded that Turkey and Qatar end their support of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a precondition to normalizing ties.]

This Egyptian duality has cultivated a long-standing rivalry with and suspicion of Shi’ite Iran, where, for many years, one of its capital’s main streets was named after the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s murderer – while Egypt buried the exiled Persian shah with great splendor in one of the most beautiful and impressive places in the center of Cairo.

Egypt recently hosted a senior Iranian delegation, producing a certain questionable rapprochement between the two countries.

Its sharp reaction in view of Israel’s determination to operate in Rafah evidenced that it was not happy about exposing the tunnels crossing from Gaza to its territory. This discovery raises further questions about other potential revelations, such as the infiltration of senior Hamas officials into Egyptian territory; smuggling of hostages into Egypt; or even beyond.

In this context, Cairo’s joining the South African effort at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague stands out.

Is this also an attempt to intensify pressure on Israel to prevent it from advancing into Rafah, while leveraging Egypt’s power in the international arena?

Or is there more to it and like South Africa, whose ruling party, the ANC has “sold its soul to the Iranian devil” in exchange for clearing its accumulated debts, is Egypt also expected to reap some sort of reward from Tehran for its efforts? Assumptions should be examined more closely and one should not rely on speculations.

What is clear, however, is that official Egypt could not help but know about and/or allow what took place in the large-scale tunnels discovered in Rafah.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 4, 2024.