The desolation wrought on Hezbollah by Israel, and the humiliation inflicted on Iran, has not only left the Iranian axis exposed to Israeli power and further withering. It has altered the strategic tectonics of the Middle East. The story is not just Iran anymore. The region is showing the first signs of tremendous geopolitical change. And the plates are beginning to move.

First things first. The removal of the religious-totalitarian tyranny of the Iranian regime remains the greatest strategic imperative in the region for the United States and its allies, foremost among whom stands Israel. The Iranian regime, in its last days, is lurching toward a nuclear breakout to save itself. Such a breakout would not only leave one of the most destructive weapons in one of the most dangerous regimes in the world —as President Bush had warned against in 2002 — but in the hands of one of the most desperate ones. This is a prescription for catastrophe. Because of that, and because one should never turn one’s back on a cobra, even a wounded one, it is a sine qua non that Iran and its castrati allies in Lebanon be defeated.

However, as Iran’s regime descends into the graveyard of history, it is important not to neglect the emergence of other, new threats. Indeed, not only are those threats surfacing and becoming visible, but the United States and its allies need already now, urgently in fact, to start assessing and navigating the new reality taking shape.

These new threats are slowly reaching not only a visible, but acute phase. They only increase the urgency of dispensing with the Iranian threat expeditiously. Neither the United States nor our allies in the region have any longer the luxury of a slow containment and delaying strategy in Iran. Instead, a rapid move toward decisive victory in the twilight struggle with the Ayatollahs is required.

The retreat of the Syrian Assad regime from Aleppo in the face of Turkish-backed, partly Islamist rebels made from remnants of ISIS is an early skirmish in this new strategic reality. Aleppo is falling to the Hayat Tahrir ash-Sham, or HTS — a descendant of the Nusra force led by Abu Muhammed al-Julani, himself a graduate of the al-Qaeda system and cobbled together of ISIS elements. Behind this force is the power of nearby Turkey. Ankara used the U.S. withdrawal from northern Iraq a few years ago to release Islamists captured by the U.S. and the Kurds. It sent some to Libya to fight the pro-Egyptian Libyan National Army under General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar based in Tobruk. It reorganized the rest in Islamist militias oriented toward Ankara. The rise of a Muslim-Brotherhood dominated Turkey, rehabilitating and tapping ISIS residue to ride Iran’s decline/demise to Ankara’s strategic advantage, will plague American and Israeli interests going forward.

Added to this is the power vacuum created by the destruction of Hamas. The defeat of that terrorist group has been, for good reason, a critical goal for Israel and the United States, but it is one that also involves consequences that must be navigated and hopefully countered. The world of Hamas is a schizophrenic one. It has two heads, aligned with different internal fractions — one more anchored to the world of Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood politics led by Turkey and the other to the Iranian axis. In 2012 Israel killed Ahmad al-Jabri, a scion of the powerful al-Jabari clan lording over Hebron but who had transplanted westward to become the leader of the Murabitun forces (part of the Izz ad-Din al-Qasem Brigades) within Hamas in Gaza. He had transported those forces to train under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Mashhad, Iran, in the years before and became the driving force of Hamas by the time Israel felt it had to deal with him. Despite his demise, the structures he led anchored to Iran continued to grow and assume ever more dominance over the Hamas structure, in part because of the release, in the 2011 Gilad Shalit hostage-release deal, of several key figures, including Yahya Sinwar. But Iran did not cleanly control all of Hamas. Turkey maintained a powerful presence in the organization and had some senior Hamas leaders likely more loyal to Turkey than to Iran. In many ways, Hamas reflected the schizophrenia of its patron, Qatar, which served a critical ally to both Iran and Turkey in the last two decades.

In the past two decades, however, Iran proved more ascendent strategically in the region than Turkey. In fits and starts, Ankara had tried quietly to compete with Iran in the last two decades, but more often than not it was left only to nibble at the scraps left by Iran along the edges, whether in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon (after the August 2021 port explosion, for example) or among the two structures of geopolitical discourse, the “Lingua Franca” embodiments of regional competition — the Palestinians and the Islamists. Hamas, therefore, as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (an organization whose fealty was far more homogeneously held toward Iran), became increasingly far more defined by Tehran than by Ankara. Iran had become the region’s new Nasser, and its minions accordingly flourished as did its factions in Palestinian and Islamist politics.

However, suddenly the ground shifted. Israel has, since summer 2024, starting with Operation Grim Beeper and the demolition of Hezbollah, triggered an earthquake in the normally slow pace of regional strategic change. If Israel presses onward with priority, as it should, to devastate and destabilize the Iranian regime, and if the Iranian axis meets its demise, then Hamas—indeed all Palestinian and Islamist politics—drifts to a Turkish direction and they slowly emerge as Ankara’s strategic assets. This reorientation does not represent an increase in the Palestinian threat to Israel, but it would be the triumph of hope over experience to think it would reduce it. Indeed, it is likely no more than an exchange of a rabid donkey for a crazed mule.

The emergence of the Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood bloc, which includes Turkey’s slow drift to a dangerous position, as a strategic problem accelerated under President Obama. Turkish leader Tayyip Erdogan always was an Islamist politician. Yet until Obama, Erdogan’s attempts to recreate some sort of neo-Ottoman Caliphate and reignite its imperialist ambitions had been disconcerting but largely symbolic and rhetorical. It was, however, latently concerning, because the reference point on which Erdogan focused—resurrecting the terminated Ottoman Caliphate in 1921—also serves as common ground with the most dangerous Sunni Islamist movements, such as al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group (which was renamed Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), and Fatah al Islam, ISIS and the assortment of al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliate groups across the Maghreb in Africa. There was always the danger of convergence of the Turkish and the most radical Islamist worlds into one strategic threat.

In 2011, President Obama made at least two critical mistakes.

First, instead of supporting indigenous Syrian opposition such as the Free Syrian Army, which sought closer ties to the West, President Obama subcontracted to Turkey and Qatar the task of defining and supporting the opposition to President Assad of Syria as the Syrian regime descended into civil war. The threat of ISIS has thus remained ever since, and with Iran receding, Turkey surfs the crest of the ISIS-remnant wave.

Second, the U.S. tried to sustain Syria as a unified fiction of a state, fearing its partition. The same mistake was replicated in Libya, which had strategic consequences for Egypt. As a result, Egypt is also now drifting in a dangerous direction. The insistence on retaining a unified state meant that to survive in conditions of communal, sectarian, tribal, ethnic civil war, each faction within that state had to fight to the death for control over the other rather than disengage into partitioned pieces. Control meant survival while being controlled meant being slaughtered. This fueled the Syrian refugee crisis.

Given the calamity that befell Syria and the chaos that lies underneath, as well as these hovering strategic forces positioning already to scavenge the Syrian nation’s cadaver, it is important for both Israel and the United States, along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to contemplate as soon as possible many scenarios that hitherto were outlandish in the western end of the fertile crescent. It is too early to identify and digest fully, let alone definitively plan for the reality that will emerge. Now is the time, though, for some initial thoughts that might undergird a longer-term strategic planning process.

First, to be clear; Iran remains the central threat. And nothing can be done until it is defeated. But the urgency of ensuring and achieving its defeat is increasing rapidly.

With Iran’s defeat, Syria will begin unraveling. Russians will try to protect essential interests there — Assad’s Alawite regime and the Christian communities, especially the Greek Orthodox. It is not only the last remnant outside Cuba of the Soviet global bloc, but also a more civilizational sense of commitment to the remains of the world of Byzantium. As several current Russian political commentators, intellectuals and religious leaders have posited, Russia considers itself to some extent the “Third Rome” — Rome and Constantinople being the first two. The remnant Christian communities — especially the Greek Orthodox since the Maronites are Catholic and orient more to France — are envisioned as Moscow’s charge.

A Russo-Turkish confrontation might threaten Israel and America but it could also present opportunities. Russia may consider turning to Israel as a key offset to Turkish power once Iran is removed from the picture.

Moreover, China is likely to realign with Turkey and drop Iran when it realizes the Ayatollah regime is falling. China has hedged for the past few years, having signed a strategic agreement with Iran in 2021, but it has just as aggressively sought to tighten its relations with Turkey. Part of what drives Beijing and Ankara together is the strategic competition between China and India. China has ties to Pakistan through the Hindu Kush range and sees India as one of its premier enemies. Turkey as well has close strategic relations with Pakistan, uses that relationship to compete with India in Afghanistan, and has attempted in the last half decade to destabilize India both through using Pakistani help to rile up unrest in the Jammu and Kashmir, but also among India’s 200 million Muslims. As Iran falters, we see China shifting more toward Turkey.

And we see Egypt also recalibrating. This was in part because of Libya, but also the unrelenting pressure of the Biden administration on human rights and Washington’s tolerance of Qatar and the Muslim brotherhood regionally against the Saudis and Egypt. At first, Egypt retrenched into close alliance with the Saudis and positioned itself as Erdogan’s nemesis — even to the extent of supporting the Syrian regime in its efforts to withstand pressure from Turkey and its Islamist allies. But the pressure of Washington (paused during the first Trump presidency) mounted, and Egypt increasingly moved from confrontation to cooption of the internal Islamist threat. This process began under the Obama era — which led to a strategic shift away from peace, away from Israel, and away from viewing Hamas as a profound strategic and domestic threat, and instead toward slow accommodation of Hamas and Turkey.

The post-October 7 closure of the Red Sea and by extension Suez – and the unwillingness of the United States to reverse that, which Cairo viewed as an inconceivable abdication of American power — shook Cairo. It made it more attractive to align with the Muslim Brotherhood, Erdogan and China. The evidence of this shift has been exposed in recent months. As the war progressed, and especially after Israel captured Rafah and the “Philadelphi” border region between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, the level of Egyptian tolerance that was exposed of a far-more expansive Hamas smuggling network through the Sinai surprised even the Israelis. That smuggling could not have been done without the knowledge of all levels of Egypt’s security structures, and indeed various examinations of the network indicate that Egyptian officials profited off this trade in the hundreds of millions of dollars, or even billions. The tight cooperation between Israel and Egypt to check Hamas and curb Erdogan’s intrusion into Gazan and Egyptian affairs still evident in 2014 had somehow shifted toward Egyptian indulgence of Hamas and Iran and Turkey’s support for it. Another sign that this shift is accelerating recently was the sudden release of 800 Muslim Brotherhood operatives by Egypt last week. Such a blanket release indicates a material strategic shift — the Muslim Brotherhood is the vanguard of Erdogan’s threat to the Egyptian regime — not a minor gesture. For the moment, Egypt is not forced to choose whether to side with the emerging Turkish-Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-Chinese bloc or the Russo-Iran bloc. While clearly abandoning the West, it has yet to leap wholeheartedly into the Turkish camp. The power of Russia and the residues of history still have their grip to some extent on Cairo.

In other words, we already see a mass realignment underway to digest the fall of Iran and the rise of an imperial Turkey. If Syria approaches a final failure and collapse, what pieces might emerge?

A proper Lebanese state anchored to its Maronite foundation is one desirable outcome.

Beyond that are some less conventional prospects. The U.S. and Israel should start planning for an Alawite state further up the Mediterranean coast. Syria is unlikely to remain a single country. Russia may find that it will be able only to hold a rump Alawite state and Christian communities (Greek Orthodox — not Maronite) and retreat to protect an enclave state. It will also rapidly come to see Iran as useless in this regard and split from Iran on Syria — or what’s left of it.

How might the United States and Israel relate to the desperate Russian-oriented enclave entity?

Russia had envisioned a new foreign policy approach, launched a year ago at the Valdai Conference in Sochi and unveiled in Putin’s speech there on October 5, 2023. He proposed cobbling together the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations into one geopolitical strategic bloc to challenge the West. But that vision and the underlying unity upon which the Valdai vision is anchored now is being torn to shreds. Russia likely will reach out to India and a post-Ayatollah Iran, but less as a hostile challenge to Israel and the West and more as a desperate move to prepare itself and preserve its dwindling assets in the emerging Russo-Turkish confrontation.

It is strategically wise to consider now how one handles the disintegration of Syria.

It is likely that Russia will be forced to retreat into an effort to protect the Alawite and Christian (especially Greek Orthodox) communities, which it will likely only be able to do by creating a rump Syria state in traditional Alawite and Christian areas. Given that Russia relies on access to the area via Syria’s ports in Latakia, Tartus, and Banias (especially Tartus) along the Mediterranean coast, it will most likely anchor that rump entity along the eastern Mediterranean with strategic partners in Lebanon, and then a rump Alawite state to the north of that in Tartus and the surrounding mountains.

Putin has proven thus far that he is able to adjust or evolve his strategic vision, but only slowly. He suffers some rigidity. It is possible that Russia will remain so focused on imperial European ambitions that it falters and falls — along with its Iranian ally — in its survival in the region.

Yet it’s also conceivable that Russia may reach out to cooperate with the U.S. and Israel to save its position. If so, the U.S. and Israel will be faced with a decision about how much to cooperate with Russia against Turkey and China or how much to try instead to anchor the post-Syria structures to U.S. and Israeli power independent of Russia. It’s complicated, too, by the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO and home, simultaneously, to some of the remaining Hamas leadership and to the U.S. Air Force’s Incerlik Air Base.

It’s time to start noodling these questions — even the outlandish ones. Trump didn’t spend much time during the presidential campaign talking about the threat of Turkey. He did, though, often warn that we are closer than ever to World War III.

Published in The Editor, December 02, 2024.

The visit by Secretary of State Antony Blinken appears to be a final effort by the US to secure a full ceasefire before the upcoming elections. However, the chances for this are not high. Israel has not yet settled its score with Iran over the ballistic missile attack on October 1. Furthermore, Israel’s accusations toward Iran for the drone strike on the Prime Minister’s residence in Caesarea have increased the stakes.

In Lebanon, although Hezbollah has taken significant blows, it is showing signs of recovery, and its confidence is growing. It is difficult to imagine Hezbollah forgoing further retaliation for its losses or accepting Israel’s terms for a ceasefire. In Gaza, while Israel has scored a significant achievement with the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, the effects are not immediate, and much work remains to be done—particularly in securing the release of hostages and achieving all of Israel’s war objectives.

Given the signals Iran has been sending about its reluctance to be drawn into a regional war, and following its negotiations via Qatari mediation to renew nuclear talks with the U.S., it is possible that Blinken will attempt to craft an agreement that would limit Israel’s operations in a way Tehran can tolerate without military retaliation. In exchange for this and for humanitarian arrangements in Gaza, Blinken is likely to assure continued U.S. military aid to Israel and support for its stance regarding Lebanon.

It can be assumed that Blinken has not given up on the idea of pushing for a comprehensive ceasefire through a deal in Gaza, using a “Biden Plan” format. This would frame the elimination of Sinwar and the implementation of humanitarian measures in northern Gaza as a victory image. However, at this stage, Hamas remains committed to the positions set by Sinwar, making such a ceasefire unlikely.

Given this situation, significant political shifts are not expected soon. Military activity will continue to shape the reality on the ground. Israel will persist in dismantling the threat that Iran has built around it, weakening Iran and its regime in the process, and seizing opportunities to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Simultaneously, Israel will continue to target the remaining military capabilities of Hamas and its efforts to reestablish governance in Gaza.

Against Iran

The Iranian attack on Israel demands a response, but Israel need not rush. The current delay is fraying Iranian nerves, and the growing internal criticism of the regime is a positive byproduct of Israel’s restraint.

Israel should maintain maximum ambiguity (even after reported leaks), prepare for preventive and reactive scenarios, and allow its actions to speak for themselves.

Against Hezbollah

Israel’s declared goal is to ensure the safe return of northern residents to their homes. The ongoing fighting is pushing Hezbollah out of threatening range, but a long-term solution is needed to maintain this new reality. The achievements of the Israeli military, which have placed Israel in a strong position for the post-war period, allow Israel to aim for Hezbollah’s disarmament and the establishment of measures to prevent its rearmament.

Israel should continue striking Beirut to damage Hezbollah’s assets and increase pressure on the organization from other Lebanese factions, who are alarmed by the destruction of the capital. Israel should stick to the stance that any agreement regarding Lebanon must be made under fire, taking advantage of Lebanon’s severe crisis.

Against Hamas

Increased military pressure in northern Gaza is necessary to prevent Hamas’s recovery, deepen the damage to its remaining capabilities, disrupt its efforts to govern, and eliminate key figures who may be appointed as successors. This pressure will also provide justification for factions willing to compromise on the issue of hostages.

It is difficult to assess the chances of success for the proposal to create “humanitarian bubbles” secured by an American company, though it clearly carries significant risks. Nonetheless, Israel’s agreement to this proposal may be a reasonable price to pay to maintain a positive relationship with the Biden administration, especially as it is a temporary and reversible measure.

Additionally, there is a need to increase pressure on the decision-makers in Hamas’s overseas leadership and on Qatar, which hosts them. Qatar can no longer attribute delays to Sinwar and his partners. Israel should also intensify efforts to strike Hamas’s military and organizational infrastructure in the West Bank, preventing coordination channels between those on the ground and the overseas command and targeting key figures involved in driving terrorist activity.

As the Simchat Torah holiday of 5785 approaches, one Hebrew year after the horrific massacre, Israel continues to demonstrate to the Western world how to confront Iran’s proxies, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, or the West Bank. The task is far from over, with many challenges ahead. These include the complete removal of threats, preventing their resurgence, and confronting the head of the Iranian snake.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  23, 2024.

As Israel’s military campaign against the proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeds, and the scope of potential attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran against Israel in the South and the North becomes narrower, there is a growing probability that the latter will activate additional fronts that have not yet been exhausted.

I have written previously about the threat that looms from the east, yet now it no longer “looms.” It is here. We are, almost unwittingly, already in the midst of yet another campaign, only one which is not yet making headlines in the media.

From a broad observation of the interests of the Islamic Republic, the intention to expand over as wide an area as possible is evident. First, it intends to take over the Middle East, then the Gulf countries, and then the entire world. Despite the fact that it sounds more than a little like science fiction, this is indeed the aspiration of the Shi’ite extremist Islamic rule in Iran.

Iran’s modus operandi is to overthrow regimes and countries from within and to then take control of them, amid the chaos and lack of stability. This is what was done in Iraq, following the withdrawal of the Americans from the country and also the international coalition led by the US against the Sunni terrorist organization ISIS. Today, Iraq is no longer an independent country but an extension of Iran, which has significantly expanded its own territory.

This is how the Islamic Republic of Iran also behaved in Lebanon, through the designated terrorist organization Hezbollah, and in Syria, via its Shi’ite militias. This is how it operated and continues to do so in Yemen, via the Houthis, and this is how it operates through sl

Jordan and Israel interrupt Iranian expansion

What prevents the territorial continuity of the Iranian regime in the region is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel. The relatively weak Jordanian regime, whose national security is being upheld by the US and in more ways than one also by Israel, has had difficulty in recent years preventing the Ayatollah regime from trying to erode its strength from within. This is a point that is not at the center of attention of the world and/or the public in Israel.

The current Iranian regime has begun to justify its infiltration into Jordan several years ago, by having to send emissaries to maintain the graves of righteous Shi’ites in the kingdom, some of which, quite coincidentally of course, are close to the Israel-Jordan border. At the same time, the Iranian regime works day and night to strengthen Hamas among the Palestinian majority in the kingdom.

The Islamic Republic also made and continues to make cynical use of the territory of Jordan as a transit country for smuggling weapons to the Judea and Samaria region to arm Hamas, as well as for smuggling weapons and drugs to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Another unexpected country in Latin America joins this profitable industry – Venezuela – which supports the drug industry and sees it as an important source of income.

All this has been going on for years, while between Israel and Jordan there is a significant border of over 300 km., without any substantial obstacle between the two countries for most of those kilometers, and with a laughable obstacle along a very small part of the border.

The meager military presence along the border is that of the Jordanian army, which is financed and equipped for the most part by the Americans, and relies on the US for its very existence, but is largely fed by an educational system that is no different from the one used in Judea and Samaria – that is, full of incitement against Israel, the US, and the West.

Indeed, until now, once every few years, a Jordanian soldier carried out an attack against Israelis, before things were swept under the carpet in order not to disrupt the delicate nature of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement signed in 1994.

It is perhaps also important to highlight what has been happening in the past several years in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan. Hamas, an extremist Sunni movement, which is known to be funded and supported by the Ayatollah regime in Iran, cried out against the “cruel Zionist regime that is attacking the holy al-Aqsa Mosque.”

This outcry was cleverly engineered by the Islamic Republic, as an attempt to “steal” the ownership of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque from its traditional guardians – the Hashemite dynasty in Jordan.

The elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, coupled with the damage to Hezbollah’s leadership structure and operational capabilities, marks a potential turning point in the Middle East. The IDF’s ground operation in southern Lebanon, the second attack in Yemen, and Israel’s success in withstanding two massive Iranian missile attacks demonstrate Israel’s brilliant intelligence and operational achievements. These events shake the entire Middle East and create potential for fundamental change. The nature and intensity of this change will depend significantly on Israel’s actions, as well as on United States and Iranian policies.

Hezbollah finds itself confused and battered, the price it paid for Nasrallah’s insistence on maintaining support for Hamas. Despite the blows it has suffered since the beeper attack, the organization does not intend to learn its lesson at this stage. It is unlikely to agree to disconnect the Lebanese front from the Gaza front, enter a ceasefire, or allow northern residents to return safely to their homes. Instead, Hezbollah will likely attempt to avenge the blow it suffered, in the spirit of its charismatic leader’s legacy and testament.

Hezbollah’s lack of preparation for the new reality will make it difficult for the organization to function effectively. It did not conceive of this situation until two weeks ago and has since repressed the significance of the change in Israel’s policy. The organization has failed to draw lessons from Israel’s successive strikes against it. This will increase Hezbollah’s dependence on Iran, which will be forced to focus on its rehabilitation.

At the strategic level, Nasrallah’s elimination and the series of other actions represent the ultimate expression of the change in the war’s trend. After October 7, the trend favored achievements for Hamas and the Iranian axis. They embarrassed Israel, undermined its confidence in its ability to protect its citizens, and worked to create an Islamist order under Iranian leadership in the Middle East. Gradually and patiently, Israel has reversed this trend. With limited consideration for American advice, Israel dismantled Hamas’s military capabilities. It took control of the strategically important Philadelphia Corridor and demonstrated its strength and creativity in a series of impressive operations. These culminated in Nasrallah’s elimination and the attack in Yemen—in short, Israel is winning.

This trend strengthens Israel’s regional standing and self-confidence while significantly weakening Iran and its sponsored entities, which are suffering heavy losses. It is still too early to determine to what extent this change will lead to a reversal. The peak of such a reversal should be Israel’s response to the Iranian attack and full normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The chances for integration between the countries—namely economic and security cooperation without a direct political dimension—have increased due to the blow to Hezbollah, the sworn enemy of the Riyadh regime.

The impact on Hezbollah’s strength and leadership will likely have implications for its status in Lebanon, the region, and in the eyes of its Iranian patron. Israel’s view of the organization will also be affected. Hezbollah’s rivals in Lebanon and the region will try to capitalize on its weakness, pushing it out of its position of power. They will demand that it act to solve Lebanon’s ongoing crises and prevent further destruction from expanded fighting.

Israel has been careful not to damage Lebanese infrastructure. However, Lebanese residents, especially Shiites, are already paying an increasing price due to Hezbollah’s decisions. The role Hezbollah took upon itself as Lebanon’s protector seems ridiculous when it cannot protect itself. Pressure to bring about its disarmament may intensify. Without charismatic leadership, the organization will face difficulties implementing policies that categorically reject this idea, although it is likely to insist on it.

Continued fire towards Israel as revenge for the elimination of its revered leader leads Hezbollah into a dangerous trap. Nasrallah had identified this risk and was careful to avoid it. It gives Israel justification to launch a ground operation and encourages the U.S. to give Israel the green light to do so.

Despite the opportunities created by the shock to the “axis of evil,” the Biden administration adheres to its original priorities as the presidential election approaches. These include preventing escalation into a regional war, concern for the Gaza population and hostage return, and seeing political deals as the best way to achieve a ceasefire. However, given the escalating response of Iran and its proxies, the United States may change its position: it might back Israel’s forceful moves and, in extreme cases, even assist with force.

This narrows the gap between the Israeli and American strategies. Israel aims for victory through decisive action, weakening the axis of evil to force agreement to its terms or impose a new reality. The American strategy aims for compromise, promising illusory stability. Both strategies face enormous challenges. The American strategy lacks regional cooperation, while the Israeli strategy requires long-term de-radicalization and significant policy changes among regional powers. The chance for such change in the foreseeable future is low, leaving mainly the option of forcibly imposing a new reality.

The ball is now largely in Iran’s court. The Ayatollah regime is undergoing an unprecedented experience. Its investments in building a ring of fire around Israel seemed successful, but this has proven to be an illusion. Israel can almost single-handedly undermine the array Iran built. The main danger continues to be the threat of removing Hamas from power in Gaza. Now Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Yemen are also proving unreliable for deterrence against potential strikes on Iran, particularly its nuclear program.

The regime showed concern about events demonstrating its vulnerability, such as Haniyeh’s elimination and the implications of its failed April attempt to avenge Mahdavi’s elimination in Damascus. This proved how dangerous the regime is, but simultaneously exposed how much less effective and more vulnerable it is than it had estimated. Now, it must improve protection of its assets, especially the Supreme Leader, and restore deterrence. It is promoting revenge moves against Israel, aiming for success and pain, but without provoking Israel—perhaps with American assistance—to further exploit Iran’s vulnerability, particularly through assassinations of senior Israeli officials. After realizing its efforts were failing, the regime decided to respond forcefully, as it did in April. This creates an opportunity for Israel to respond forcefully with American backing. The regime may also consider the possibility of a breakthrough in nuclear weapons production, based on everything it has prepared so far, as an alternative to the deterrence that Hezbollah was supposed to provide.

Israel’s success in changing the trend encourages it to take initiative in various arenas, focusing on the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah. This is necessary to achieve war objectives in Gaza and the north. However, the path to these goals may be prolonged. Hamas continues to hold 101 hostages. Hezbollah and Hamas struggle to admit failure and continue fighting. Regime change in Iran remains difficult. Israel must also preserve cooperation and coordination with the United States, vital for the campaign’s continuation, especially given possible Iranian moves.

Published in the Middle East Forum, October 7, 2024.

When Hamas launched its deadly attack on October 7, its primary objective was to mobilize all elements of the Iranian-led resistance axis to join the campaign, attack and weaken Israel, and create the conditions for Israel’s collapse. By integrating itself into the Iranian strategic framework, Hamas became an important part of the “ring of fire” surrounding Israel – a network of proxies that Iran has meticulously developed over the past decades through an enormous investment of resources and human capital. In particular, Iran identified the Palestinian arena as a crucial component of this “ring of fire” – supporting and nurturing Hamas and Islamic Jihad and enhancing their military capabilities through the provision of weaponry, military knowledge, and financial support.

On October 8, Hezbollah, Iran’s flagship proxy, also joined the war. Hezbollah, which operates mostly in Lebanon along Israel’s northern frontier, is an enormous Iranian enterprise in which vast resources have been invested. Hezbollah joined the war against Israel in an attempt to stretch Israel’s military capabilities and divert its strategic attention away from the war against Hamas in Gaza. The early days of the war were difficult for Israel; it was humiliated, bleeding, and unprepared, all while the Iranian axis, in its various components, experienced a surge in self-confidence.

Iran’s proxies were built to serve a dual-purpose. The first was defensive: the proxy network would act as a loaded gun aimed at Israel to deter it from attacking Iran’s nuclear program. The animating logic here is that Israel would think twice before attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, because such an attack would immediately expose Israel to an assault from Gaza, Lebanon, and other arenas where Iran’s proxies operate, including well-armed terror elements in Judea and Samaria. The second purpose was offensive: to serve as launch sites for a coordinated offensive against Israel, wherein Iran would simultaneously “activate” the entire proxy network once its nuclear weapons reached viability (or approached the threshold of viability). Such an assault, Iran reasoned, would then lead to the collapse of the State of Israel and, ultimately, its destruction.

The war in Gaza and the northern front cannot be viewed as isolated events; rather, the ongoing war in these two theaters illuminates Iran’s strategy––coordinate multiple theaters of combat to trigger a regional war against Israel. Yet, this ostensibly “regional” war entails consequences for the entire world. Russia and China, both opposed to the current American-led world order, have lent their support to the Iranian “resistance axis.” In their view, any entity that undermines U.S. interests (such as a strong and secure Israel) and status deserves their backing. By their logic, any blow to American assets, interests, or reputation weakens the U.S. and damages its global standing, thereby advancing efforts to reshape the world order.

On October 16, 2023, Israel’s political leadership defined the war’s goals: the dismantling of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip, the elimination of the terror threat emanating from Gaza, and the creation of the conditions for the return of the hostages. The political leadership also decided that by the conclusion of the war, the IDF would enjoy full freedom of action regarding Gaza, without restrictions on the use of force. This freedom of action would enable the IDF to eliminate terrorist infrastructures, neutralize terror threats, and prevent terrorist infrastructures from being rebuilt. Notably, these war goals outlined at the beginning stage of the war contained no explicit provision regarding the northern front or the return of evacuated residents of the North. Only in September 2024 was this objective formally added as an official war goal.

For many months, Israel responded cautiously to Hezbollah’s aggression, effectively subjecting itself to the “equations” set by Nasrallah. Occasionally, Israel’s response was particularly forceful, which in turn escalated Hezbollah’s attacks. During this period, Israel opted to concentrate its efforts on the southern front, with the IDF dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities in Gaza through extensive ground maneuvers and airstrikes. The capture of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor was delayed by approximately four months, largely due to a direct confrontation with the U.S. administration which involved the withholding of critical arms shipments by the U.S.

With the formal shift of Israel’s military focus to the northern front (from mid-September 2024), Israel has succeeded in “decapitating” Hezbollah by eliminating most of its senior leadership, as well as damaging its command and control capabilities and causing enormous damage to the group’s weapons stockpiles and infrastructure across Lebanon. Israel also began ground operations in southern Lebanon (starting on October 1, 2024) with the goal of “cleaning” southern Lebanon of Hezbollah’s threatening military presence and enabling the safe return of the residents of Northern Israel to their homes. Israel’s actions managed to sow chaos, confusion, fear, and distrust within the organization, impairing its operational capability and its ability to harm Israel.

From the above, one can discern the main elements of Israel’s strategy. The underlying idea of this strategy involves three phases. The first phase includes the destruction of Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s capabilities in the southern front such that they no longer pose a threat to Israel. The second phase entails weakening Hezbollah enough to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and enable the safe return of the evacuated northern residents. Finally, the third phase, following the neutralization of the two most significant components of the Iranian axis (Gaza and Lebanon), Iran itself will be exposed to Israel’s might, as demonstrated on October 26 attack and potential future attacks, bereft of the protection provided by its important proxies.

In this broader context, one can understand the Israeli Prime Minister’s use of the term “total victory.” This term was mocked by political rivals who claimed that the statement was empty and that achieving “total victory” was impossible. However, Israel’s actions illuminate its strategic logic, which aims to weaken the entire resistance axis––including Iran itself. This strategy also serves as the foundation for shaping a new regional order that will see, at the very least, a significantly weakened Iranian threat with its ability to harm Israel and destabilize the region at large hindered.

Israel will no longer tolerate recurring cycles of conflict; it will no longer attempt to “buy calm” or mistakenly apply the logic of “quiet will be met with quiet.” Rather, Israel has decided to fundamentally change the rules of the game and adopt a strategy of decisive victory. In this sense, “total victory” refers to the adoption of an offensive and resolute approach aimed at dismantling the existing system. In strategic terms, this is termed a second-order change, which involves changing the system itself, as opposed to a first-order change, which involves changes and adjustments within the existing system. The intended outcome certainly deserves to be interpreted as “total victory.”

Therefore, the completion of this effort, with a sequence of Israeli successes, will be nothing short of “total victory,” a game-changer and a decisive shift. This success will open the door for Israel, the region, as well as the U.S. and its allies in the free world, to design a new regional architecture. This architecture would promote stability, security, and prosperity, while weakening Iran and its proxies as actors that destabilize security and spearhead radical Islamic terrorism. Such radicalism, fueled by Iran, Hamas and other radical Islamic entities like Qatar, has also permeated the streets of the free world, infiltrated university campuses, and served as fuel for progressive intellectual and media elites, who consistently identify Israel as the source of evil and the rotten fruit of colonialism, imperialism, and oppressive apartheid.

In less than a year, Israel has succeeded in dismantling Hamas and leaving it with only residual capabilities. These capabilities will continue to fade as the military campaign in Gaza concludes and the last major stronghold of Hamas in northern Gaza is dismantled through control of the civilian infrastructure (humanitarian aid distribution), rather than only through military action.

Israel’s and the IDF’s achievements are impressive by any standard, especially from a historical and comparative perspective, considering the success of other armies and international coalitions in wars against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others. The most remarkable and significant achievement is in undermining Iran’s confidence and pushing it into a realm of severe strategic confusion and disorientation, and in dealing a major blow to Iran’s strategic assets in which it has invested years of effort and enormous quantities of resources.

Iran has lost the two most important components of the axis it built over the years. In practical terms, Israel has succeeded in significantly weakening the Iranian system, which has in turn influenced the entire regional system. The weakening of the Iranian system and the dismantling of its potential threat to Israel and the region will inevitably lead to a shift in the entire regional system and will also have repercussions for the international system.

If the test of strategy lies in the nature of the change it brings about and its service of vital interests––goals which are reached through the savvy identification and leveraging of opportunities, continuous optimization and learning, and, ultimately, improvement at a fundamental level–– then from a one-year perspective, one can recognize the clear success of Israel’s strategy. The work is not yet complete, and more time and effort will be required to finish it. However, once completed, the statesman’s hour will arrive, and it will be their duty to translate these impressive achievements into diplomatic gains. Only then will we be able to see a grand strategy in all its glory.

While the significant strike on Hodeidah port was crucial, it has only led to a temporary calm. Israel must be prepared to once again take strong action against the Houthis and their operator – Iran.

The Israeli strike on Hodeidah on July 20 somewhat restored Israel’s deterrence, making an impression both domestically and across the Middle East that Israel can respond decisively to its adversaries. Now, two months after this powerful response, it is imperative to assess whether it had the strength to curb Houthi aggression and to draw the appropriate conclusions accordingly.

Judging by recent developments in the Red Sea, it appears not. On Monday, September 2, two oil tankers were attacked by ballistic missiles and explosive drones launched from Yemeni territory. Less than two weeks earlier, the Greek oil tanker Sounion, carrying a million barrels of oil, was also attacked by the rebels, burning for over a week and raising fears of a massive spill that could cause an unprecedented environmental disaster.

As for the direct threat to Israel, there seems to be little reason for optimism. According to the statement made by Houthi militia leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi on September 21, the Houthis are now preparing for the “fifth” phase of their confrontation with Israel, which includes unexpected initiatives and an expanded target bank. The Houthis threaten to strike back strongly against military targets, ports and energy sites, and disrupt Israel’s oil supply.

While some of the militia’s declarations appear to be no more than exaggerated shows of solidarity with Hamas, others – particularly the statements from senior Houthis claiming that retaliation against Israel is certain – should be taken more seriously, especially in light of their close cooperation with Tehran and the extensive support they receive from it to execute their plans.

Therefore, one should not conclude that the Houthis are deterred. The significant strike on the port of Hodeidah, as important as it was, only brought temporary relief, and based on the high motivation they are displaying to harm Israel and the renewed attacks in the Red Sea, it seems more likely that the Houthis took a pause to regroup.

Iranian-Houthi cooperation

SO LONG as Iranian-Houthi cooperation continues unhindered, the range of threats from Tehran and its proxy against Israel and the West is only expected to expand. The Houthis may grow stronger over the years, both in terms of the quantity and quality of their weaponry, and might even bring the threat closer, possibly through the resumption of direct flights from Sana’a to Amman.

Therefore, despite its focus on the more immediate threats posed by Gaza and Lebanon, Israel must be prepared to take harsh measures against the Houthis in the near future. These include targeting Houthi leadership, launching cyber attacks, and continuing to launch strikes against economic and military assets under Houthi control.

In parallel, similar to its struggle against other components of Iran’s proxy network, Israel cannot settle for dealing with the proxy alone and will need to strike at the head of the octopus. It must disrupt Iran’s lethal support for Houthi attacks by targeting the IRGC intelligence ship and hitting Iranian officials and assets in Yemen.

Moreover, Israel should work to raise awareness among policymakers in the US, Europe, and international forums about the threat posed by the Yemeni militia, including the Houthis’ ambitions to develop advanced weapons that could directly threaten Europe and the US.

The Israel-Hamas war

The “Swords of Iron” war, in which Israel is being attacked for the first time from seven fronts simultaneously, is an achievement of the “Axis of Resistance” that Iran can claim credit for. More specifically, Tehran is now reaping the fruits of its long-term investment in the Red Sea arena, which began as early as 2009 with its military assistance to the Houthis.

Consequently, Israel is now required to correct, together with the US, years of neglect towards the threat that has gradually developed in this area. Seeing that further escalation is expected down the road, Israel must develop a comprehensive strategic plan that includes proactive and decisive measures to reduce the scope of the threat.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, September 10, 2024.

“Diplomacy complements the field, and the field complements diplomacy. Together, we will move forward in such a way that the country’s national interests, complete security, and national dignity are fully realized.,” summarized Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s new Foreign Minister, encapsulating Tehran’s approach to the conflict with Israel and Middle East developments.

In a series of interviews this week, Araghchi reiterated Iran’s commitment to supporting all “resistance” groups. Like other regime spokespersons, he vowed that the “Zionist terrorist action” resulting in Haniyeh’s death would not go unanswered.

The anxious anticipation of Iran’s response is taking a toll on Israel psychologically, socially, and economically – a price Iranian officials claim is intentional. Some analysts justified the delay, citing the need to complete investigations into the intelligence breach that enabled the assassination in Tehran, allow for Gaza ceasefire negotiations, and meticulously prepare operational plans to achieve precisely the desired effect – no more, no less.

Amid this turmoil, diplomatic exchanges between Doha and Tehran persisted. Mohammed Al Thani, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, made an unusual visit to the Iranian capital, meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi. Media reports offer little insight into their discussions about “regional arrangement.” Particularly unclear are the concessions Iran seeks from the Americans, beyond the credit it’s already partially receiving for linking its response against Israel to Gaza ceasefire talks.

While information is scarce, indications suggest that returning the Iranian nuclear issue to the negotiating table is being considered. Statements by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the possibility of interacting with the enemy were interpreted as a signal of willingness to renew negotiations with the US on the nuclear issue. Choosing Pezeshkian and Araghchi for these key positions further signals this shift in approach. Iran seeks an agreement that would ease sanctions and improve its economic situation. For its part, the Biden administration seeks to prevent a regional war, which could complicate matters ahead of the elections, and attempts to derive political and diplomatic gains from the regional situation.

A State Department spokesperson said this week: “We will judge Iran on their actions, not words. If Iran wants to demonstrate seriousness or a new approach, they should stop nuclear escalations and start meaningfully cooperating with the IAEA.” We should welcome this stance, hoping it is not just an opening move in negotiations. To some extent, it forms part of the undeclared talks. The subsequent threats by Iranian spokespersons, reiterating their commitment to respond to Israel, should be seen not only as an expression of true intentions and an attempt to preserve national dignity but also as part of indirect negotiation tactics with the US. Naturally, Israel must prepare for all response scenarios without making lenient assumptions.

Israel cannot afford to be caught off guard by talks – if indeed they are taking place – on an issue so crucial to its future. Now is the time to examine these matters through direct dialogue with US administration officials and formulate its position accordingly. Iran, too, recognizes the urgency from elements in the Biden administration to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. We must not pay an unbearable price for this.

Published in Israel Hayom, August 30, 2024.

“From a military standpoint, Israel has achieved all it can in Gaza,” a senior American officials told The New York Times on the eve of the summit in Doha. In their attempt to explain the futility of continuing the war, they actually underscored its necessity.

Israel cannot afford to end the war with the impression that it cannot topple Hamas. If this becomes the conclusion of its enemies and other actors in the region, it would significantly harm its efforts to achieve the central (though undeclared) goal of the war: restoring deterrence. Moreover, Israel cannot relinquish the gains it has made at such a high cost, and certainly cannot hand Hamas a lifeline or provide conditions that would enable its recovery.

It is worth reiterating: Even after Israel’s impressive military achievements, much work remains to destroy Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities. The rocket fire over the past week is a reminder of this. Hamas also maintains control over the distribution of humanitarian aid within Gaza and is able to present a coordinated stance, despite the conditions its leaders are in. However, as long as the IDF controls the Philadelphi Route and continues to operate within the Gaza Strip, it is eroding Hamas’s capabilities, undermining its public standing, and forcing it to focus all its efforts on one goal: survival. Not growth, not empowerment, only mere existence.

The path to an arrangement – a turning point

Entering the path of an arrangement would be a turning point in this reality. The chances of renewing the fighting afterward are slim, if they exist at all. If the “deal” is implemented as agreed, some of its components would include the withdrawal of the IDF, the release of terrorists, the rehabilitation of Gaza, and the complete end of the war. In such a scenario, Israel would find it difficult to backtrack on its commitments to the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar.

But even if only part of the deal is implemented, Israel would still struggle to resume the fighting. Hamas would continue its manipulations and psychological warfare, mediating countries would present new initiatives, the U.S. would increase pressure especially as the elections approach, the international community would join in, and domestic pressures would intensify. The de-escalation process has its own momentum. Hamas, and not just Hamas, is banking on this.

Reports from Washington about the Americans’ intention to propose compromise suggestions on issues where the parties fail to reach an agreement should cause concern in Israel. The U.S.’s ability to influence Hamas to change its positions is minimal, if it exists at all. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the compromise formulas would erode Israel’s positions, as Israel is more sensitive to American pressures and incentives. For Hamas, such reports are yet another reason to dig in.

Dilemmas in Israel

The dilemma in Israel revolves around two issues: the release of hostages and the connection between the Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah. In both, the element of time plays a significant role. While time allows for deepening achievements in Gaza and reaching the release of hostages under better conditions, it also increases the danger to the hostages’ safety. The element of time creates tension between the importance of toppling Hamas and the urgency of releasing the hostages.

There is no one in Israel who doesn’t long for the release of the hostages, just as there is no one who doesn’t desire the total defeat of the monstrous terrorist organization. Resolving the tension between these goals is akin to the expression “caught between a rock and a hard place.” Any decision the government makes is legitimate, provided that its costs are clear and understood. In this regard, and after having been burned for years, it is not enough to rely on soothing statements or vague commitments that will sink into the sands of Rafah and the tunnels of Philadelphi.

As for the tension with Iran and Hezbollah, the very idea of offering concessions to “calm” them contradicts one of the objectives of the actions that heightened the tension: deterring these elements. In any case, it’s difficult to see the Gaza war as the key to calming them. The formula that the U.S. is trying to promote—restraining Israel in Gaza in exchange for restraining Iran towards Israel—does not satisfy Nasrallah and seemingly does not address Iran’s appetite for revenge.

But even if it did, from Israel’s perspective, it can only be relevant if it provides a solution to the root problems with these adversaries, primarily the efforts to obtain nuclear weapons and the desire to destroy Israel. Without diminishing the importance of diplomatic efforts, it is suggested to continue focusing the majority of efforts on strengthening readiness, both in defense and offense.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 16, 2024.

The Hamas attack on October 7 triggered a regional war with global repercussions. Israel is not only fighting on the frontlines but also in the court of global public opinion, with pro-Hamas protests on the streets of major European cities and on US campuses. However, the impact of the war extends beyond demonstrations, exposing the distorted and biased conduct of the UN and its institutions, including UNRWA. The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have also joined the parade of folly, blatantly displaying moral and ethical distortions regarding IDF operations in Gaza, and Judea and Samaria.

Against this backdrop, we are witnesses to the strengthening of bizarre Red-Green red alliances between “progressive” elements and Islamic fundamentalists, mindlessly championing a superficial worldview and revealing alarming ignorance about Hamas, radical Islam, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These phenomena indicate the danger posed by the spread of Hamas and radical Islamic narratives among various audiences in the free world, as well as the growing trend of radicalization among Muslim communities in the free world, particularly in Europe and the US. The echoing of these narratives and radicalization processes in the streets lead to violent rampages that severely disrupt social order. This includes the targeting of government and cultural symbols, with national flags burned, national monuments defaced, and slogans smeared in blood-colored paint in public spaces.

This Islamic violence also stirs fears among Western leaders, which causes them, in dangerous moral blindness, to restrain Israel, while failing to challenge Hamas, Iran, and its proxies. Although they are aware of Iran being the driving force behind a significant part of the protests and riots in the West, they nevertheless stand silent in the name of “democracy and liberalism,” even when (violent) freedom of expression is cynically used as a tool for undermining the most fundamental values of Western societies.

Yet, it is obvious to everyone that if Israel does not defeat Hamas in Gaza and leaves it as a governing power that can regain strength, this will have repercussions for the entire region and the world. This would boost Iran and the “axis of evil” it leads, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iranian proxies in the region. Shiite militias in western Iraq and southern Syria will continue to target American interests and troops, and above all, Iran will continue to operate within a strategic comfort zone, supplying and encouraging all its proxies to escalate the security situation in the region. These events will also fuel additional protests in the West, thus paving the way for radical Islam to expand its foothold in the free world.

The leaders of the free world must therefore internalize the statements made by Hamas seniors and Islamic clerics before and after October 7 and listen closely to what Iranian leaders have been saying for a long time. It is crucial to understand the foundations of political Islam and the spirit of jihadist-Salafism to realize that Israel is just the first target. The jihadist-Salafist vision is far-reaching, aspiring to establish an Islamic nation, an Islamic world, Islamic law, and Islamic civilization. In such a world, there will be no place for liberty seekers and human rights advocates, nor for champions of freedom of speech and assembly, women, and feminists, and certainly not for LGBTQ individuals.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech before the United States Congress on July 24 should be understood in this context. He emphasized that Israel’s war against the Iranian axis of evil and its proxies, in particular Hamas and Hezbollah, is part of the free world’s battle against radical Islamic barbarism. Netanyahu also stated that Israel’s fight is America’s fight and that Israel’s victory will be America’s victory.

Netanyahu aimed to achieve two objectives. The first was to highlight the significance of Israel’s war for the entire free world. The second was to illustrate the deep bond between Israel and the US, and Israel’s commitment to this relationship, as a testament to Israel’s affiliation with the free world under American leadership.

Whether or not Netanyahu’s words fell on receptive ears, they accurately describe the reality Israel has been facing over the last decades, especially during the Oslo process, which was intended to replace the paradigm of conflict and armed struggle against Israel with a framework for peace based on the idea of two states for two peoples.

However, the process has only increased the motivation to destroy Israel, owing to both the rise of Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) support for terrorism. Hamas managed to win the hearts and minds of many Palestinians and form an alliance with the Iranian axis. The PA has been inciting to violence against Jews through systematic indoctrination of the Palestinian public, the glorification of terrorists, and payments to families of those imprisoned for terrorist violence in Israeli jails.

This motivation is rooted in the absolute denial of Israel’s right to exist, as a state in general and as the nation-state of the Jewish people in particular. Israel is seen by the radical axis as a shameful symbol of Western imperialism and colonialism and of a declining Western civilization belonging to the free and enlightened world. Therefore, its destruction is perceived as the first necessary step towards establishing the Islamic caliphate, where Sharia law will prevail, and all infidels will be Islamized.

Viewed as a foreign element in the Middle East and the last stronghold to conquer before taking over the West, hatred and contempt towards Israel will only intensify. In this sense, the Iranian axis of evil is fully aware of Israel’s importance to the free world as its protector, making Israel’s destruction a prerequisite for the subjugation of the entire free world. These perceptions unite the diverse components of the axis of evil, bridging religious, historical, and ideological gaps between Shia and Sunni Arabs, and Iranians.

The loathing and hatred are not only directed at the State of Israel as a political entity but also towards the Jewish People. This animosity is rooted in the foundations of Islam, the Quran, and the historical legacy of Islam since the days of Prophet Muhammad and his disappointment with the Jews of Yathrib in the Arabian Peninsula (modern-day Medina) who did not accept Islam. While there are other interpretations of the Quran that emphasize peaceful elements, this approach puts excessive emphasis on Islam’s hostility towards Jews, and glorifies it, as manifested in the particularly barbaric Hamas attack on October 7 but also earlier in various suicide bombings against women, children, and the elderly.

It is crucial to understand the Hamas attack and Iran’s support for it, along with the support of other axis components, as an attempt to destabilize the regional and global order. Israel’s war with Hamas, Iran, and other proxies attacking the US is a war against the free world. This conflict is a clear expression not of a clash between civilizations but of the intense and violent confrontation between radical Islamic barbarism and the enlightened world, again as described by Prime Minister Netanyahu in his speech.

The spillover from the regional to the global arena is also reflected in Russia and China’s support for the Iranian axis. Both are revisionist powers seeking to undermine the existing world order and the US role in it. The regional war serves their goal by harming America’s most prominent and important ally in the region, and American regional standing. This is a step towards full erosion of global US hegemony.

In his speech before the American Congress, the Prime Minister held a mirror to the free world, presenting the hard reality we live in. An uncompromising struggle between the West and radical, violent Islam is nothing short of a world war. Netanyahu is therefore correct in his assessment of Israel’s critical role in it. Israel stands as the last fortress of the free world against the potential invasion of radical Islam. If this fortress falls, and the forces of evil, led by Iran and supported by China and Russia, succeed in breaching this last line of defense, Western civilization will collapse into itself, falling easy prey to barbarism and tyranny, with little hope for salvation.

America’s current approach to the threat of a large-scale Iranian attack against Israel is misguided and will not prevent regional war. Rather than focusing on a defensive posture and de-escalation, the best way for the US, Israel and regional allies to deter Iran is to present a credible threat to its strategic assets.

In the ongoing international maneuvering to prevent an Iranian assault, the United States is emphasizing a defensive approach. On August 5, US Defense Secretary Austin posted on X that he had discussed with his Israeli counterpart, “US defensive force posture moves… and stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region.”

According to reports, US officials have been warning Israel not to respond strongly to any Iranian attack. It seems that Washington’s goal is a reprise of the international response to Iran’s April 13 aerial attack, during which a US-led coalition downed the vast majority of the 300 plus missiles and drones fired by Tehran at Israel.

This approach by the US will not deter Iran or prevent a regional war. A credible American and Israeli threat to strike critical Iranian assets and sites – including military, nuclear, oil and electricity facilities, as well as air and sea ports – is far more likely to produce the desired outcome.

The Iranian regime is much more vulnerable than it would like to appear. Its air defenses are relatively weak. Its ability to carry out successful long-range aerial attacks is currently limited. Strategic sites, critical to its military strength and economy, as well as to the regime’s stability, could be destroyed or severely-damaged in a US-led strike.

Despite its bluster, the Islamic Republic is well aware of its weaknesses. This is precisely the reason that Iran is now making significant efforts to obtain advanced air defense and radar systems from Russia.

IRAN’S WEAKNESS is also the reason that the Ayatollah regime has adopted a proxy strategy in its war against Israel. Tehran, to date, has been enjoying the best of both worlds. On the one hand, the proxies which it arms and trains, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have launched thousands of attacks against the Jewish state, including the October 7 massacre.

On the other hand, Tehran has largely-avoided direct retribution in response to such attacks, with Israeli and US operations targeting primarily the proxies rather than the government arming and empowering them.

If the Iranian regime were to believe that it faces a severe threat to its stability and even survival if it should launch a massive assault against Israel, it would likely make do with a much more limited attack. Conversely, if Iran believes that following such an assault, international efforts will be focused on preventing a robust Israeli response, it has no reason to avoid launching such an attack.

Indeed, while the July 31 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran embarrassed the Iranian authorities and deprived them of an important partner, it is highly unlikely that the Iranian Shi’ite regime will risk its stability in order to avenge the death of a Palestinian Sunni terror leader. The regime instead will prefer to continue channeling arms, funds and expertise to Hamas and to whomever is appointed to replace Haniyeh.

If, despite a clear and credible warning, Iran nevertheless launches an intensive strike, the US and Israel should deal a devastating blow to Iran’s strategic infrastructure, one that degrades its nuclear and military sites, cripples its economy, and threatens the regime’s survival.

Such a blow may lead to a wider regional outbreak of hostilities. However, it is far more advantageous that such an outbreak take place now, before Iran has the opportunity to deploy sophisticated Russian air defenses and break out to a nuclear weapon, than after it has an opportunity to do so.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran is weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s weaponization program may be much further along than previously imagined. Countering a future attack by Iran and its proxies against US or Israeli interests will be much more dangerous if that attack takes place under an Iranian nuclear umbrella.

A credible US warning will also send a clear message to both regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who view Iran as a central foe, and to Russia and China, who have been deepening their ties with Tehran. Such a strategic approach has the greatest chances of deterring Iran, preventing a wider war, protecting US interests, and advancing regional stability.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, August 11, 2024