Since October 7, Türkiye has been hardening its stance towards Israel in a manner uncharacteristic of the behavior exhibited by the Turkish administration in previous crises with Israel. More specifically, Türkiye’s decision to sever trade relations with Israel as an act of solidarity with Hamas reflects a troubling shift from its typical hostile rhetoric to inflicting actual economic damage. Although Türkiye later retracted from its sweeping boycott, this move marks a significant escalation in Erdoğan’s anti-Israel stance.

In the wider context, Türkiye’s growing presence in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean poses significant challenges for Israel and its Western allies. Erdoğan’s Türkiye leads a radical Islamist line and undertakes actions that undermine the existing regional order while harming crucial Israeli interests.

First and foremost, Türkiye’s support of Hamas, its attempts to force Israel to comply with its demands on the humanitarian aid issue, as well as other initiatives aimed at gaining a foothold in post-war Gaza, act as a considerable obstacle to achieving one of Israel’s main war objectives: the defeat of Hamas.

Moreover, despite the heavy consequences suffered by Ankara after sending the Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza in 2010, Türkiye has been preparing to launch a second Marmara under the supervision of the IHH, which was designated as a terrorist organization by Israel in 2008. This initiative is currently delayed after the Republic of Guinea-Bissau requested the removal of its flag from two of the ships, however, the organizers vow to overcome the obstacles and end the siege on Gaza.

These steps, along with the unprecedented announcement of cutting all economic ties with Jerusalem, position Türkiye as a hostile nation willing to deteriorate its relationship with Israel, with whom it previously maintained reasonable relations despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, even at the cost of severe damage to its already struggling economy.

Israel should also be concerned about Türkiye’s involvement in East Jerusalem, manifesting in the agitation of the local Muslim population against Israel while weakening Jordan’s role in administering the Muslim holy sites. Under the guise of tourism and religious activity, Türkiye strives to gain a foothold in the mosques on the Temple Mount and plays an active role in incitement and provocation against non-Muslim visitors. It is not unreasonable to assume that the stabbing incident of an Israeli Border Police officer by a Turkish tourist in Jerusalem about a month ago is a result of this incitement.

Ankara’s efforts in recent years to thwart cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the gas sector, alongside demonstrating military presence in Libya and other places, further illustrate that Ankara has become a factor that undermines regional stability while infringing on the sovereignty of its neighbors.

The escalation in Türkiye’s attitude towards Israel is particularly concerning given that, unlike in the past, Türkiye is now willing to abandon pragmatism and realpolitik in favor of ideological considerations and domestic public opinion, a trend that, if continues, could turn Ankara from a mere rival into an active enemy. If the Biden administration doesn’t exert significant pressure to curb Türkiye’s dangerous foreign policy, this threat is only likely to grow in the foreseeable future.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 2, 2024.

The current geostrategic situation in the Middle East appears at times impossible and even hopeless. Contrary to popular opinion, however, I am not taken with this fatalistic line of thought. Cleaning up the current regional “mess” requires courage and vision, yet it is, indeed, possible.

Beyond the significant threat to our citizens in the form of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, in recent years, the Judea and Samaria region has also become the Wild West, given the Iranian-backed growth of radical movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Currently, only a significant IDF presence prevents disaster for the residents of nearby Jewish towns and villages in the northern Sharon area, well within undisputed Israel, as Israel’s enemies make no secret of their wish to eradicate all of Israel’s citizens and destroy the entire state.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), officially ruling the Palestinians in that area, has proven over the years that it is, indeed, more moderate than Hamas, yet it is still very far from being a terror-free bed of roses.

Recently, along with the gradual and obvious weakening of PA President Mahmoud Abbas (a phenomenon clearly encouraged by the Israeli government over the last decade), the military arm of his political faction, Fatah, has begun competing with Hamas to see who kills more Israeli civilians. Clearly, the situation certainly does not look very promising. So, where is the light at the end of this dark tunnel?

Owing to the fact that in the current state of affairs, the State of Israel depends on the United States to a significant degree in terms of its security and its assistance in the international arena, Israel must creatively recruit Washington and other countries to help when it comes to dealing with the aforementioned threat in question.

A sustainable quiet

THE BIDEN administration is interested in creating “a sustainable quiet” between Israel and Hamas. Washington has a clear interest in calming the current strife between Israelis and Palestinians, especially in the months prior to the November elections in the US. In other words, Israel has inherent leverage with the US due to the Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip and the fact that it can produce a temporary “calm” if it so wishes.

Furthermore, dealing a decisive blow to all hostile terrorist activity in Gaza will be difficult to achieve in a short period of time, as the IDF has already publicly announced in recent days. This will entail a long-standing confrontation against a bitter and stubborn enemy. On the other hand, Jerusalem cannot and should not allow the continued existence of an enemy that declares its readiness to kill, rape, burn, and eliminate its people – and hence, has little choice but to continue to strike. There is little point in doing so, however, without three basic conditions being fulfilled at the same time.

The hostages must be returned, either via a deal or by force, given that Israel cannot violate the unwritten contract between itself and its citizens, who were brutally kidnapped from their homes and held in terrible conditions by a bitter enemy. However, I am not optimistic about Hamas’s intention to release all of them. In fact, to do so would be an antithesis to their worldview and the martial theory they adopted in the first place. There is much room for massive pressure from the US on Qatar with regard to the presence of the Hamas leadership in its territory and until now, such American leverage has not been fully applied.

A clear plan for the temporary civilian management of the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria must be adopted, along with the continued military presence of the IDF. As long as such an Israeli plan is not proposed, any and all in the international arena will view themselves as authorized to come up with a “road map” of one kind or another, without it being viewed and/or sanctified by Israel and regardless of whether it would suit the preservation of Israel’s security interests.

The international arena, with the US and the United Kingdom at its helm, must take responsibility for the temporary civil management of the Palestinians, while the IDF maintains a temporary military presence to prevent terror against its own civilians, Palestinians living in the Strip, and US and UK nationals who would be present. I do not accept the voices according to which certain political parties would not agree to this. What is true is that neither they nor any others would wish to be dragged into the Gazan and Palestinian mud. But this must be the temporary price for taking care of the Palestinian civilian population – until the establishment of a demilitarized political entity of one kind or another, after a decade or another time frame to be determined by the parties.

Throughout that interim period, constructive” regional parties (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.) would lend a hand to civilian aid, but above all, there would be one specific party – the United Arab Emirates – that would take care of the re-education of the population in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria, but also- and not less important (and in full coordination with the Hashemite Kingdom) in Jordan. Without this significant, long-term reeducation plan, consistent with Western values and devoid of incitement and hateful and murderous messaging – with which Palestinian and Jordanian youth are currently being brainwashed – the mentality will not change and the brainwashing will continue to create more and more terrorists.

The United Arab Emirates has already proved that it is willing and able to change the entire education system in its own territory, to the point of replacing teachers who did not adapt themselves to the renewed content. Also, the UAE has great interest in taking extremely harsh steps against the Muslim Brotherhood and its subsidiary organization, Hamas. It has been doing this tirelessly for years within its own borders, where it is strictly forbidden to act, identify with, or support the Muslim Brotherhood or anyone on their behalf, and anyone who does so feels the iron arm of the local law.

As someone who has lived for several years in an Arab country and learned Arabic, as well as to understand the mentality and even the core and vital elements of Islam, I do not recognize attempts to weaken the aforementioned proposals by epithets such as “naive.”

Living for several years, as a Jew and an Israeli, in an Arab country, does not leave much room for naivete. Albert Einstein once said that stupidity is defined by repeating the same action over and over while expecting a different result.

Given the complexity of the current situation, its solution calls for great faith in our Creator, along with extraordinary creativity, courage, and original thought.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 03, 2024.

In the age before Hamas’s October 7 massacre, the air defense operation that successfully intercepted Iran’s air assault against Israel would have seemed like a victory. Almost all (99%) of the over 300 missiles and UAVs launched by Tehran and its proxies were shot down by an international coalition led by the United States, and Israel emerged largely unscathed.

However, the failed paradigms that led to Hamas’s October 7 massacre have taught us that Israel and its allies, including the US, must not revert to a merely defensive posture. They must demonstrate clearly to Iran and the entire Middle East that there is a significant price to be paid for launching such attacks, even if they are deflected.

Before October 7, 2023, the dominant security paradigm in Israel was one that relied on defensive capabilities. Israel had become adept at shooting down Hamas rockets from the Gaza Strip with its Iron Dome system. Even as Hamas’s arsenal in Gaza grew more sophisticated, and Iran provided Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border with precise missiles, Jerusalem’s security concept remained grounded in preserving quiet to the extent possible by relying on its multi-layered air defenses. As long as damage to Israel’s home front could be minimized, the Jewish state could make do with limited strikes on the terrorist organizations that surrounded it.

This paradigm was supported not only by Israel’s military and political echelons, but also by the United States, which provided billions in support for Israeli air defense under the US-Israel 2018 Memorandum of Understanding. In 2022, Congress approved an additional $1 billion for Iron Dome. President Joe Biden’s November 2023 request for supplemental aid to Israel includes funding for 100 Iron Dome launchers.

This assistance has saved countless Israeli lives and Israelis are rightfully grateful for it. At the same time, this approach allowed Israel to tell itself that “defense is deterrence.” Jerusalem adopted the belief that the proper response to Tehran’s increasingly-dangerous efforts to build a ring of terror around Israel through its proxies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, was to build a defensive wall.

ON OCTOBER 7, that paradigm came crashing down. Despite all of Israel’s hi-tech systems, Hamas showed that it was not deterred, and launched a horrifically brazen and barbaric attack. One by one, Israel’s defensive systems failed to prevent Hamas terrorists from murdering more than 1,200 mostly Israelis and kidnapping more than 250 others, leading to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Israel’s reliance on its Iron Dome air defense made its security establishment overly-complacent in the face of Hamas, leading to a failure to detect the terrorist group’s plans for attacking Israel along other vectors.

In parallel, in line with its defensive posture, Israel evacuated the towns along its northern border, in order to move civilians out of the way of Hezbollah’s Iranian-funded missiles. It is not clear when the tens of thousands of internally displaced Israeli refugees will be able to return to their homes in the North.

On the night between October 13-14, Iran launched over 300 cruise and ballistic missiles and UAVs at Israel. Some 99% of them were intercepted by the Israeli, American, British and Jordanian militaries, reportedly with the involvement of Saudi Arabia and other countries as well. The successful response showed the utility of the nascent Middle East Air Defense architecture, built since the signing of the Abraham Accords.

According to media reports, President Biden told Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu soon after the successful interception that Israel should see the results as a victory, and that the US would not support an Israeli counter-strike.

Steadfast American support for an Israeli operation against Iran and Hezbollah will send a clear message to the Islamic Republic, while improving overall security in the region and laying the groundwork for future stability. A US-Israel show of unity and determination will lead Iran to limit its response. It must be remembered that the Iranian economy is in dire straits, with an increased reliance on energy sales to China and weapons sales to Russia. The ayatollah regime faces substantial opposition at home. Iran is therefore much more vulnerable to a strike targeting strategic assets.

President Biden warned Iran before it launched its attack with one word: “Don’t”. But Iran did. Now is the time to turn words into actions. Israel must demonstrate that it has learned the lessons of October 7, and will no longer make do with mere defense. The United States must show that its repeated assurances of “ironclad” support for Israel include the Jewish state’s ability not just to block blows, but to strike those who threaten its people.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 16, 2024

Iran concludes this chapter of confrontation with Israel with a mixed cost-benefit balance sheet: On one hand, it crossed the Rubicon, disregarded President Joe Biden’s explicit warning, and use its own territory to carry out the largest missile and UAV attack any country has ever launched against another country. In doing so, according to its view, it will cause Israeli decision-makers to think twice before approving strikes on Iranian elements.

On the other hand, it exposed itself to a direct response, led to the formation of a coalition of countries against it, provided an opportunity to showcase an impressive array of air defense capabilities against Iran, opened the door for Israel to extricate itself from the political travails it found itself in due to the situation in Gaza, led the US to intensify measures against it, and caused internal tension and escalation in American political climate.

In addition to preserving deterrence, Israel’s main goals vis-à-vis Iran are dismantling its nuclear capabilities and neutralizing the threat posed by the Iranian regime’s proxy forces, chief among them Hezbollah. In response to the pressure Washington is exerting on Israel to refrain from retaliation, its willingness to join a practical plan with a binding timeline for achieving these goals should be examined.

In any case, Israel need not rush to respond. It would be wise to keep Iranian nerves in tense anticipation, allowing the Iranian rial to continue plummeting and enabling internal criticism of the regime to intensify.

Iran concluded this chapter of confrontation with Israel in a worse geopolitical position than it began: It invested in building proxy forces to avoid direct confrontation with its adversaries, but ultimately became embroiled in a direct clash with Israel. The attack it carried out against Israel was impressive in scale but encountered an effective air defense array and did not cause significant damage. It prompted a cohesion of regional states and provided them with a successful experience of regional cooperation against it – which could encourage such a trend, contrary to its desires.

It provided legitimacy for striking it directly, and unlike Israel, it is less protected. It gave Israel leverage to pressure the US, so that even if it does not attack, it can extract concessions that will make things difficult for Iran. Russia and China, its allies, stood on the sidelines. It exacerbated Iran’s domestic situation, created a sense of tension and anxiety, and impacted the value of the rial.  

What does Iran still have in its arsenal that it has not yet employed against Israel? It mainly boils down to Hezbollah. The terrorist group’s set of considerations is broader and not solely focused on Iranian interests.

The Biden administration, which once again impressively stood by Israel’s side and assisted in forming a coalition of states that participated in thwarting the Iranian attack, fears a widening of the regional war due to the geostrategic and economic implications and the possibility of being dragged into intervening, especially in an election year. 

Therefore, it is trying to amplify the achievement against Iran, settling for that and a few diplomatic steps whose significance regarding neutralizing Iran’s capabilities is unclear. From Washington’s perspective, the developments reinforce its approach to hasten the establishment of a strategic regional alliance, and it will try to push for that to happen.

Israel, for its part, even if the prospects are unclear, must examine the possibility of seizing the opportunity created to advance its over-arching goal: Thwarting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. If that is a concession that can be obtained at this time – restraint on its part would be justified.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Israel is simultaneously dealing with several fronts, but it is precisely those that appear to be quieter that are most worrisome, primarily the Jordanian arena. 

Since its foundation, the Kingdom comprised a high percentage of Palestinians, some of whom are citizens of the Jordanian state, while the rest have remained in “refugee” status for decades. 

To this, masses of Syrian refugees who fled from the massacre perpetrated by the Syrian president were added in recent years.

All this, while the Hashemite regime, that controls Jordan is not Palestinian and well understands the dangers inherent in the composition of the population to its survival and stability. 

It is doubtful if what was done against the coup attempt in “Black September” by the Jordanian regime in the 1970s will be feasible to emulate by the current regime, even at the cost of the Kingdom itself, both due to the weakness of the current rulers and to the fact that Queen Rania is Palestinian.

Despite the Jordanian understanding of the potential internal danger lurking at home, it sometimes appears that the regime acts almost against its own interests.

In fact, Jordan insists on continuing to adhere to an outdated syllabus, which encourages hatred and incites the Jordanian crowd against Israel and Jews. 

Anyone who understands anything about the Arab world knows that the blatant antisemitism, which unfortunately has become an integral part of the value system of every Jordanian, does indeed encourage the public to divert tensions and frustrations away from the economic situation and the ills of society and vent anger against the “Zionist enemy.”

 But violent demonstrations against Israel and Jews tend to turn into fierce opposition to the government itself.

This happened, more than once, in Egypt and in Jordan. Furthermore, Israel and the US are essential for the continued survival of the Jordanian regime, on the economic, military, and intelligence levels. 

Incitement against Israel and the US spurs the Jordanian public to attack the Jordanian regime, if and when it adopts a policy that reflects cooperation with one of them, even when this cooperation is necessary for the national security of the Kingdom.

AND THAT brings me to the second point – in preserving this incitement-ridden education system, the Jordanian regime obliges itself to adhere to a harsh anti-Israel rhetoric, which is often contrary to Jordan’s security interests. 

Thus, we have almost become accustomed to hearing, every year during the month of Ramadan, senior Jordanian officials compete with Hamas as to who is more radical in their hatred of the “Zionist entity,” in order to prove to their own public that they are, indeed, deserving of this public support.

According to Muslim tradition, the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan was entrusted with the responsibility of guarding al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, an asset that over the years has become one with the potential to enthuse the entire Muslim world. Therefore, the “ownership” or the “protection” thereof is desired by many groups in the Muslim world.

In recent years the Hamas movement – with Iranian encouragement – began to try and “seize ownership” of the Mosque, in order to create instability among the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of east Jerusalem, and Muslims throughout the world.

During Ramadan in recent years, the Hamas terrorist group has adopted inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, accusing it of trying to damage and/or occupy the Mosque, while the Jordanian regime intensified the tone against Israel, in a manner of competition for the same “ownership” over this holy site.

Parallel to the above, Iran began to advance – methodically and with endless patience, starting in 1979 – its policy of taking over the Arab region first, and the West. 

This, while sowing instability and chaos in every country that it could do that in and that is in order to gain a foothold and influence and to establish some kind of military presence there – at times in the form of Shia militias and at times via a local Arab proxy.

Thus, it leveraged Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, starting in 2006, to establish its position in the southern periphery of Israel. It also strengthened its hold in that region, via support of the Islamic Jihad and other terrorist groups.

Furthermore, Tehran also operated over the years in Judea and Samaria by strengthening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Fatah rule, under the auspices of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), which advocates a secular ideology that is contrary to the religious view of Hamas and other Islamic movements.

In Lebanon, Iran strengthened Hamas above and beyond its unwavering support for Hezbollah as a voice in the region. All this, while undermining Lebanon on the economic and political levels to the core.

In Syria, Iran established an army of Shi’ite militias, and acted in the same manner in Iraq, which over the years and since the withdrawal of the United States, has become an Iranian stronghold on the borders of little Jordan.

BUT TEHRAN is yet unsatisfied and strives to create territorial continuity in the entire area up to the Jordanian border with Israel. Quietly and cunningly, Iran works to strengthen radical elements among the Palestinians in Jordan itself, and to strengthen the presence of Hamas in Jordanian territory.

The destabilization of the Kingdom is intended to further weaken the government in the country, and in due time cause masses of Palestinians to flock to the Jordanian-Israeli border, over 300 km. long – a situation that the IDF will have a hard time stopping.

Only in the last few weeks, the Kingdom seemingly “awakened” when King Abdullah II spoke out harshly against blatant attempts by the Hamas movement to “undermine the stability of the kingdom,” in his words.

When Israel recently hit a distinct Iranian target on Syrian soil, it actually targeted the Iranian Mullah regime’s world view, according to which a world-wide Sharia-based caliphate must control of the entire region and the West, by exploiting local extremist elements and without involving its own people and/or territory in the campaign.

All this, while Tehran continues almost uninterrupted, in equipping itself with unconventional weapons and nuclear capabilities for military purposes.

It is interesting to note that there were no overly harsh condemnations of the Israeli action from many Arab countries in the region, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and more – since all of those countries, despite their difficult rhetoric against Israel, well understand the magnitude of the challenge that Iran poses to the entire world. 

Those who fail to understand this are in the West, whose democracies makes them more vulnerable to infiltration by hostile elements, such as Sunni Muslim Brotherhood activists on the one hand and Shi’ite Hezbollah cells and Iranian influence on the other.

MEANWHILE, IRAN does not stop at all from doing everything it possibly can, to destabilize Israel itself from within. 

Recognizing the existing political rifts in Israeli society, just as it recognized similar rifts in all the other countries which Iran had undermined and dismantled from within, Tehran is constantly at work to deepen the chasm inside Israel.

It does this by impersonating Israelis from different camps on social networks, pretending to take extreme positions on the Right and the Left. 

It does this through unceasing attempts to create Shi’ite cells also among Sunni Israeli Arabs in Arab cities in the country – although so far, with little success. It does this through incessant attempts to smuggle illegal weapons to elements of the Arab sector in Israel, belonging to the criminal network.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and quality of the hostile activity against Israel in each of the aforementioned arenas, one must understand the picture as a whole and stop burying one’s head in the sand. The West in general and Israel in particular – are at least for now at the forefront of the world struggle – do not have the privilege to ignore the scale of the issue. 

If Iran has already succeeded in disintegrating Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, significant parts of Yemen, and Sudan, is on its way to disintegrating Jordan and has literally “bought” the corrupt ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, by erasing the huge debt it had accumulated, then it will try with all its might, and may even succeed, to destabilize the State of Israel from within.

This is The Plan. All we have to do, is not cooperate with the plot and understand that unity is more than just a naive cliché, but a matter of national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2024.

While most of the world’s attention is focused on Israel’s battle against Hamas in Gaza, Israel is simultaneously fighting on a second, lower-profile front against Hizballah in Lebanon. This is a war of attrition, and both sides have so far kept their ground forces out of the other’s territory. Yet, in all other respects, it is a war, and it is more severe than any of Israel’s numerous skirmishes with Hizballah since 2006. This war started the same day the one in Gaza did, when, on October 7, Hizballah expressed its support for Hamas by attacking Israel with missiles, RPGs, and drones. These attacks have continued daily since then. Worse, Hizballah has amassed ground forces along the border, poised to invade Israeli towns and carry out a slaughter that would make October 7th look mild by comparison.

This threat has forced Israel to evacuate the entire civilian population living within a few miles of the Lebanese border, leaving 80,000 Israelis internally displaced. The IDF has struck back at Hizballah targets, seeking to weaken the terror organization’s military capabilities and command structure, but it has not yet sought a large-scale maneuver while it is focused on the Gazan theatre. But to many if not most Israelis, an intensification of the war in the coming months seems inevitable. The scale and severity of that war is one of the subjects of this essay, as are Israel’s options in it, options that are shaped by the decisions—good and bad, wise and ill-conceived—that Israel has made about Lebanon in the past several decades.

The threat to Israel from its northern neighbor did not arise on October 7. It has been building since Israel fought its last war there in 2006, since it pulled its ground troops out at the turn of the new century, indeed since the modern state was founded. In a certain sense the threat from Lebanon has been present for millennia, a function less of politics and strategy than of simple geography.

How did we get to this point? What can be learnt from the previous rounds? What are Israel’s options? And what is at stake in the coming battle?…

1. Israel and Lebanon from the Bible to Begin
2. The Era of the Security Zone
3. Progress for the Party of God
4. Israel’s New Reality
5. The Northern Dilemma Returns
6. War in the North?

For full article see link.

Israeli media revealed recently that the Axis of Resistance led by Iran has made plans to invade Israel via Jordan and carry out a large-scale terror attack against Israeli communities near the border. According to the report, Israel’s defense establishment has identified increased motivation among Iraqi Shiite militia groups supported by Iran to attempt to attack Israel via Jordan using aerial platforms or by other means. Israel is preparing for a scenario in which Iraqi or Afghan Shiite terror cells, supported by Iran, try to invade Israeli territory via Jordan to carry out another massacre similar to October 7.

Since the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime in 2003, and following the Iraq War (2003–2011) and ISIS conflict (from 2014 onwards), Iran has entrenched itself in Iraq, thereby realizing its historical aspiration since the Safavid Empire (1501–1722), when it fought the Ottoman Empire for control of the Shia holy sites in Iraq. Thus, Iran has managed to take over the political and security arenas in post-Baath Iraq and turn them into important elements of the Shiite “crescent” developing in the Middle East. Accordingly, part of Iraqi territory serves as an important link in the land corridor supplying weapons delivered by the Iranian Quds Force to the Axis of Resistance proxies in Syria, as well as to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Jordan’s King Abdullah is increasingly aware of the Iranians breathing down his neck. He first used the term the ‘Shiite Crescent’ in 2004, when he warned against Iran gaining control over Iraq by intervening in the Iraqi parliamentary elections of January 2005. The Shiite Crescent, he cautioned at the time, would cause a shift in the traditional power balance between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East, threatening the interests of the United States and its allies. Jordan’s concern over the severity of the Iranian threat grew when Iran used the Syrian Civil War (2011–2020) to deploy Shiite militia groups to Jordan’s north.

In 2014, after Iran identified Jordan as fertile ground and a key arena for tightening the encirclement of Israel, Khamenei publicized the order he had given to arm the West Bank, declaring that “the West Bank should be armed just like Gaza.” As part of its attempt to lure Jordan to defect to the Axis of Resistance in 2012, Tehran offered the Hashemite Kingdom a free supply of oil and energy-based products for 30 years in exchange for allowing Iran to engage in religious tourism on its soil and providing the goods Tehran requires. King Abdullah, who relies heavily on U.S. support and Israeli intelligence, refused.

Over the following decade, there were several periods during which Iran accelerated its attempt to implement Khamenei’s directive to arm the West Bank via Jordan. As part of these efforts, several weapons deliveries intended for terrorists in the West Bank were seized on the Jordanian border, most of which likely originated in Iran. In response, Jordan increased its oversight of weapon and drug smuggling attempts from Syria, which included attempts to smuggle a wide range of weapons, such as Fajr rockets and Claymore charges produced by Iran and intended for the West Bank.

The Royal Jordanian Air Force even targeted a leader of one of the smuggling networks in December 2023 on Syrian soil as part of an attack against the hideouts used by smugglers supported by Iran and Hezbollah in the Syrian As-Suwayda Governorate, near the Jordanian border. The attack was part of Jordan’s campaign against captagon trafficking, as this illegal form of drug trade finances the spread of pro-Iranian and pro-governmental militia groups in Syria.

In addition to Iran’s subversive activity within Jordan, Tehran’s hope that its normalization agreement with Riyadh would serve as a significant lever for drawing closer to Amman seems to have been unfulfilled thus far. The reason is likely anger and concern among members of Jordan’s government and media elite over Iran’s subversive efforts in the Hashemite Kingdom.

Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre and the continuing attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel has internalized the severity of the threat posed from both the south and north, realizing that it can no longer accept the existence of Iran-supported terror organizations posing a grave threat to its national security. The potential threat posed by the Axis of Resistance on Israel’s eastern border is also severe, requiring Israel to prepare accordingly in cooperation with Jordan. Jordan is well aware of the severity of the threat that Iran poses to it, which reached a peak in Iran’s infringement of Jordan’s sovereignty in late January 2024, when Iranian proxies attacked the U.S. military outpost Tower 22 in northeast Jordan, killing 3 U.S. soldiers.

It is highly unlikely that the plan to invade Israel from its eastern border is being formulated solely by Shiite militia groups, as such a significant terror attack cannot be carried out unless directed or, at the very least, supported by Iran. IRGC commander Hossen Salami publicly posited the idea in early December that the Palestinians would repeat the “Al Aqsa flood” attack, this time from Israel’s north, south and east to ensure Israel’s annihilation.

Therefore, and in light of senior Israeli defense establishment officials’ warnings prior to the month of Ramadan, it seems that Iran is seeking to take advantage of the crisis with which Israel is grappling to deliver a decisive blow in the form of a murderous terror attack in the West Bank. The Iranian modus operandi, as reported by the Israeli media, is to prefer the use of proxies, due to Tehran’s fear of entering a direct confrontation with Israel.

At this stage it is unclear whether the Axis of Resistance led by Iran is fully prepared to put its invasion plan into practice. The fact that such plans were revealed by the media may decrease the likelihood of their execution. Nevertheless, Israel must relate to this Iranian terror scheme with utmost seriousness.

First, Israel should prepare its intelligence and make operational plans in cooperation with Jordan to curb the attack, should it indeed be launched. Working closely with Jordan to thwart this terror scheme would advance another crucial Israeli interest as well, as it would help mitigate tensions between the two countries, which have increased since the war in Gaza began. At the same time, the Iranian chain of command directing this impending terror attack should be identified and, in accordance with the invasion plan’s progress, one of its senior officials should be targeted in advance. This would make it clear to Tehran that Israel is determined to thwart the Iran-led Axis of Resistance’s terror scheme, and will not allow its citizens to be massacred again.

Recently, the Qatari Foreign Ministry denounced Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for Doha to increase pressure on Hamas. In a meeting held in January with hostage families, Netanyahu was quoted as saying that Qatar, in a sense, is “more problematic than the UN and the Red Cross.”

Admittedly, in pursuit of quiet in Gaza, Israel turned a blind eye to the risks entailed in the cooperation with Qatar being a major sponsor of Hamas. Now however, after the revelation of this colossal mistake, it would be folly to continue on the same path in the attempt to broker a hostage deal. The same is true with regard to Qatar’s potential involvement in the “day after” scenario.

These days as conditions for another hostage deal materialize, Israel should rally the support of its Western allies and make it clear to Qatar that it must use all the tools at its disposal to secure the release of the hostages and that unwillingness to do so will have serious consequences.

Israel must also act more assertively to show the international community that Qatari support for extremist groups is a threat not only to Israel, as the events of October 7 demonstrated, but also to the United States and Europe. As is commonly known, for many years Qatar has been nurturing extremist Islamist groups, promoting jihadist propaganda on its state-owned news network, Al-Jazeera, and fostering its ties with Iran, the greatest threat in the Middle East.

Less well-known is the detrimental influence that Qatari “soft” power wields in Western societies. Qatar has penetrated deep into American higher educational institutions and its extensive funding has gone hand in hand with the rise of antisemitic rhetoric in US elite universities.

It turns out that even its investments in seemingly humanitarian projects among Muslim communities in Europe are tainted with an agenda to promote a separatist Islamic identity. Evidence also suggests Qatar’s dubious involvement in the legislative processes of the European Parliament, and several bribery scandals have been linked to it.

Considering the above, Western countries must send a clear message to Qatar that it cannot reap the benefits of partnership with the West while simultaneously supporting radical Islamism, whether directly or indirectly. As long as Hamas offices in Doha remain open, there is no justification for praising Qatar’s mediation efforts either. Instead, a more assertive approach towards Doha is needed, demanding that it fully exert its influence on Hamas to provide evidence of the medical condition of the hostages and expedite their release.

To achieve this goal, Israel, the US, and Europe should make a combined effort to illustrate the consequences on Qatar if its behavior doesn’t change.

The United States should condition the upgrading of security cooperation with Qatar, including future arms deals, on Qatar completely cutting ties with terrorist organizations, expelling Hamas leaders, and enforcing American sanctions in full. Qatar should also be warned that its unwillingness to abandon its support for terror and increase pressure on Hamas could result in freezing Qatari assets, limiting its airlines’ airspace, and facilitating lawsuits by American terror victims against it. If Qatar continues its support for terror, the US should consider downgrading its status from an ally to a state sponsor of terrorism.

In addition, European countries should use the recent strengthening of economic ties with Qatar as leverage against it until substantial progress is made on the issue of the hostages.

Qatar needs to understand that it is replaceable.

Israel must be prepared to “lose” Qatar as a central player in negotiating a hostage deal while seeking alternatives.

It is not unthinkable that Egypt could play a more central role in the mediation efforts, alongside assistance from European countries that have served as mediators in the past, such as Germany.

The time has come to replace Western tolerance towards Doha with a more hardline stance. Only then will it be possible to put an end to Qatar’s dangerous double game.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 4, 2024. February

For over four decades, the leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran have been planning the world’s “redemption” by the Islamic Shia. This is the almost unimaginable reality that must be known and acted upon in order to stop it.

Currently, the supreme leader is old and ill, while his less-spoken son, Al-Kshad Al-Shaabi, continues his path with even greater cruelty and fervor.

Tehran has created a magnificent set of proxies through which it works to implement its dark vision.  These include “inferior” soldiers in the form of Palestinians in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Lebanon- Sunni Arabs.

The Palestinians and/or their national aspirations are of little interest to the Mullahs. The reason for training and financing the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and similar extremist movements is the promotion of regional chaos, which simplifies taking over as much territory, influence, and resources as possible by Iran.

The Iranian regime acts quietly, patiently, and methodically in regions reigned by instability and chaos.  A point in the case is Jabal Druze in Syria. The area has been populated by Syrian Druze for many years.  There was a silent understanding between Assad’s regime and the Druze that they would not interfere with his actions and he would not harm them. And so it was for years.

In recent years, however, Shi’ite locals forcefully took over some of the land and properties in that area, spurring intense struggles between local Shi’ites, directed by Iran, and the local Syrian Druze population.

The US removal of Saddam Hussein, the notorious leader of Iraq in the 1990s, created a vacuum into which Iran quickly entered and took control of the Iraqi oil reserves, gaining hundreds of millions of dollars per day. In recent years, when the anti-Shi’ite extremist ISIS emerged, the international arena effectively created a coalition that literally eliminated it, leaving Iran to once more return to being the undisputed force in the region.

In doing so, it unwittingly allowed the Islamic Republic to also continue its production of uranium for the purposes of promoting its nuclear project.

Iran also created a different “line” of proxies, namely the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. These Shi’ite proxies are seen as considerably more worthy in Iran’s perception, given their loyalty to the Islamic Revolution and its ideology.

In order to create competent Iranian militias imbued with Shi’ite ideology, resources, and soldiers are needed. Iran works to obtain the resources via its revenues from oil sales alongside massive drug smuggling operations throughout the region.

Producing the manpower needed for the militias has been forwarded by a mechanism so insane that it is hard to believe that it is actually real: encouraging Shi’ite girls in various countries in the region to enter into “marriages of pleasure” – a term coined in the Muslim world that grants religious permission to enter into “temporary” marriages, in which it is permissible to have conjugal relations, and after a short time to break up the covenant of “marriage.”

Indeed, Iran had incorporated the subject into the school curriculum for those girls. The children born within the framework of those “marriages of convenience” are then taken by the regime and undergo religious indoctrination to become exactly those aforementioned Shiite militias.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is but a convenient excuse for harnessing Arab-Muslim attention, given that the hatred of Israel and the “Zionists” is relatively undisputed in most public circles in the Muslim world. In this manner and by provoking the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, Iran has thus far succeeded in keeping Saudi Arabia away from normalizing relations with Israel and/or from creating an effective Sunni-Western coalition that will harm its grandiose, imperialistic aspirations.

In the meantime, it continues its efforts to promote its military nuclear program while the US is busy with its internal affairs in an election year, and Israel is preoccupied with returning its hostages held by Hamas terrorists in Gaza and protecting its Southern, Eastern and Northern borders from Iranian-backed extreme Palestinian and other terror organizations.

Jordan, whose regime is weak, trembles under the Iranian weight on its soil. This is the fruit of years-long efforts by Iran, systematic and quiet, as it always is, to gain influence within the Hashemite Kingdom. As I have emphasized more than once in my speeches, briefings, and writings, this is an urgent situation with a very low profile on international media and global public opinion, yet it is most concerning to all stability-seeking Sunni countries in the region, as well as the West and of course, to the State of Israel, given the very long border which Israel shares with Jordan.

The horrific scenario that Tehran is striving for is that the Jordanian government will no longer be able to stop the millions of Palestinians living there from forcefully entering the State of Israel.

The optimal strategic answer to all of the above is the creation of an effective Saudi-led alliance of Sunni countries, which Israel and the Western countries will join in order to make sure that the Iranian threat is curbed.

Published in the Jerusalem Post,  February 25, 2024.

The Israeli-Egyptian relations met with a fair share of challenges, after the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. It is interesting that precisely in the same year, the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran, and the deep and warm friendship forged between Israel and Iran instantly disappeared and was “replaced” by a cold, but strategic, peace with Egypt.

The lack of normalization that characterized the bilateral relations with Egypt from the very start, will continue to accompany the two countries throughout the next four decades, except for a brief respite after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Thus far, the Egyptian and Israeli interests, especially the ones pertaining to security, have prevailed. That is – despite a long series of military operations that Israel conducted against the Palestinians, two intifadas and many other obstacles.

They also managed to overcome the lack of basic affection inherent amidst the Egyptian public towards Israel in general and Jews in particular – a product of long years of indoctrination and the educational system in Egypt. Just this past year, we have witnessed isolated attacks by Egyptian soldiers and police officers against Israelis – one case along the shared border, where an Egyptian soldier attacked and killed two combatants while on guard duty, and another case that occurred immediately after the events of October 7, when an Egyptian security guard shot an Israeli man who was visiting as a tourist. Both countries, however, were quick to try and lower the public profile of the scandals.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, there has indeed been a welcome change in the textbooks in the elementary schools in Egypt. Definitive antisemitic and anti-Israeli messages were removed from the books as part of Egypt’s effort to position itself as a responsible country that respects minorities in the eyes of the West.

This is not a given in a country where things change at an extremely slow pace, sometimes to the point of frustration, but the positive trend has stopped for the time being and has not yet extended to middle schools and high schools. In practice, millions of Egyptians have been consuming antisemitic and anti-Israel information and messages for decades.

Every Ramadan month-long holiday, for example, Egyptians have become accustomed to watching anti-Israeli series dealing with espionage affairs in which the “evil” figure is always embodied by Israeli Mossad agents, while the Egyptian heroes prevail over them. That is, despite that in recent years, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a certain effort to minimize these messages.

Nonetheless, these are just a few of the many examples which demonstrate how the Egyptian public is being nurtured with antisemitic and anti-Israel sentiments, messages and materials. In addition to this, there is the inherent compassion which the Egyptians have towards the Palestinian people and their suffering, as it is portrayed by the social media in the Arab world and in networks such as the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera, Saudi-owned Al Arabiya and the like.

Thus, a rather surreal situation has arisen in which the Egyptian regime, which fosters security interests that are by definition compatible with those of Israel and opposed to those of Hamas, is forced to take into account the very negative public opinion held by the majority of the Egyptian street towards Israel and its very positive attitude towards the Palestinians, and therefore to act almost contrary to its own self-interest. As far as Israel’s current war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is concerned, on the one hand, the Egyptian regime is adamant about preventing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip from entering Egyptian territory.

The Egyptian leadership knows very well why it does not want this and understands that the “temporary” arrival of Palestinians could become absolutely permanent, as can be seen in Jordan and other places where Palestinian refugee camps have existed for decades. Moreover, the Egyptians well understand the ambitions of Hamas – for them the Muslim Brotherhood – which will strive to take advantage of any Palestinians who will “temporarily” settle in the Sinai Peninsula in order to strengthen their own stronghold in that arena.

The Egyptians well understand the ideology that characterizes Hamas. It is not a national ideology, that attaches any importance to gaining independence in the Gaza Strip or Judea and Samaria or even from the entire State of Israel, but rather a religious ideology that strives to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate, including Egypt as well.

On the other hand, the Egyptian public sympathizes with their Palestinian brethren in the Gaza Strip and expects the regime to help them. Hence, Egypt finds itself aiming arrows at Israel, encouraging the transfer of more and more humanitarian aid to the Palestinians in the Strip (although it is well aware that a significant part of the supplies is stolen by Hamas) and repeatedly states that the fighting in the Gaza Strip must stop, although in essence and behind closed doors, Cairo would not shed a tear in the face of the destruction of Hamas.

Even more dangerous now is the apparent rapprochement between Iran and Egypt. Although this is almost never discussed in the Israeli media, we must in no way take our eyes off Iran’s tireless pursuit to buy influence in the region. It is perhaps critical to recall that Egypt’s relations with Iran have always been accompanied by more than a tad of suspicion: Cairo remembers Tehran’s efforts to spy on its territory and, over the years, there have been several incidents which included the removal of the Iranian ambassador from Egyptian soil.

While Iran has been working for years inside Jordan, in order to strengthen its positioning there, while taking advantage of the weakness of the Jordanian regime, its attempts so far to do the same in Egypt have come to naught. Therefore, the recent rapprochement between the countries is worrisome and raises questions about the baits offered by Iran to Egypt with regards to the activities of the Houthis against ships passing through the region.

Sisi’s recent statement in this regard – “Attack only ships destined for Israel” – does not leave much room for doubt and is even more worrying since it is possible that it is an Iranian-Egyptian understanding not to damage Egyptian economic assets in exchange for systematic but consistent damage to Egypt’s relations with Israel.

Iran also has great influence on the African continent, which is very important to Egypt, especially in Ethiopia, with which Egypt has a long-standing conflict regarding the Ethiopian dam built on the Nile River and the issue of water distribution – an Egyptian strategic interest. Iran, which has been strengthening its foothold in many countries on the African continent for years, is perhaps the only one that very wisely extends its hand to Egypt on an issue that simply does not concern any other party in the region or outside of it. Iran, of course, will not be satisfied with providing help in this or any other context without adequate compensation…

To add to the above, the relations between Israel and Egypt have indeed been based on excellent and ongoing cooperation in recent years, but mainly on the professional level. The political-strategic discourse is almost nonexistent and the vacuum thereof is astounding, mainly in light of the very high tensions that currently exist around the IDF’s intended activity in the Philadelphi crossing.

Ongoing, high-level political and strategic talks, in which not only security issues will be discussed, but also the issue of decades-long incitement and indoctrination of the Egyptian public against Israel, must serve as an anchor to the relations. The latter is not merely a matter of being a nice-to-have issue resolved, but has far-reaching strategic consequences if not addressed.

Israel has its own leverages which it must exercise within the framework of the aforementioned strategic dialogue. This must be done within the framework of a broad and systematic analysis of the Egyptian and Israeli interests within the regional context of challenges and opportunities and not simply within a tactical framework, as is mostly the case at the moment. What is missing here is a broad and strategic view of the challenges facing Egypt and how Israel can assist it in creative ways. This should be seen first with a view to avoid Cairo from being tempted to rely on Tehran and secondly so that Israel will also benefit from regional inputs over time.

This strategic dialogue with Egypt must be institutionalized, with very senior representation on behalf of the Israeli government, accompanied with experts on Arab culture and language. We have already learned that every truth we were convinced of before October 7th requires a fresh look. A failure to do so vis-à-vis our relations with Egypt would be considered nothing less than pure negligence.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 10, 2024.