Shattering the Palestinians' Hope of Defeating Israel

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 19.10.2026
Crushing the Palestinians' Hope of Imposing Their Will on Israel Is the First Condition for Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

Israel must compel Lebanon to adopt the 'Black September' model

written by Prof. Zaki Shalom | 19.10.2026
Following the Six-Day War in 1967, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians moved into Jordan. Palestinian terrorist organizations soon began launching a variety of terrorist attacks against Israel. Gradually, these organizations acquired an autonomous status within the kingdom, creating what amounted to a "state within a state."

At the same time, Palestinians – who constituted a majority of Jordan's population – initiated acts of rebellion aimed at undermining the authority of King Hussein, whom they strongly opposed. Their activities escalated dramatically in September 1970, when they hijacked four international passenger aircraft, forced them to land in Jordan, and subsequently blew up three of them before the eyes of the world.

The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Golda Meir, faced a complex strategic dilemma. King Hussein's regime was clearly pro-Western, and the United States had a vital interest in preventing its collapse. It was widely understood that Israeli retaliatory actions against the infrastructure of the Hashemite Kingdom might destabilize Hussein's rule.

At the same time, officials in the US administration repeatedly emphasized the king's inherent weakness and urged Israel to focus its actions exclusively against Palestinian organizations. Jordan, they reminded Israeli leaders, had maintained clandestine contacts with Israel for many years and functioned, in effect, as a tacit partner. From this perspective, Israel's national interest coincided with that of the West: preserving the stability and survival of the Hashemite regime.

Golda Meir listened carefully to these arguments but was not entirely persuaded. Israel did indeed strike directly at Palestinian militant organizations, as Western states recommended. Yet it was clear that a decisive solution could emerge only if the Jordanian government firmly imposed its authority over these groups. Meir understood that Jordan would act only if it realized that continued inaction would carry a substantial cost for the kingdom.

The Jordanian government feared, with good reason, a direct confrontation with Palestinian militants. Western backing could not be taken for granted, as the United States was still deeply entangled in the Vietnam War.

Eventually, Israel acted with great resolve. Contrary to the clear preference of Washington, Israel targeted key Jordanian infrastructures. The most significant of these actions was the destruction of the Ghor Canal, which supplied irrigation water to Jordanian farmers. Jordanian agriculture suffered severe consequences.

Only then did King Hussein decide to launch a full-scale campaign against the Palestinian militant organizations. When Syrian forces attempted to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians, they were deterred by the threat of Israeli air strikes—an option encouraged by the Nixon administration.

At a high human cost, King Hussein succeeded in restoring full control over his kingdom. Since then, the stability of his rule – and that of his successors – has remained largely intact, and hostile activity against Israel from the Jordanian frontier has been minimal.

Lebanon, for unclear reasons, has long enjoyed an informal "insurance policy" that shields it from direct Israeli pressure. On the first day of the Second Lebanon War, an intense debate arose over a fundamental question: against whom should Israel focus its retaliation – Hezbollah or the Lebanese state?

Only if the state of Lebanon suffers an unbearable cost, former IDF Chief of Staff

Dan Halutz argued, will its government wage a determined campaign against Hezbollah. Such a course would almost certainly exact a heavy toll on Lebanon itself. Yet there was no other effective option.

At present, as the Iranian regime absorbs significant blows, a strategic opportunity may be emerging. This could be the moment for the Lebanese government to act decisively against Hezbollah. Israel alone has the capacity to push Lebanon toward such a decision. It should therefore adopt the strategic precedent of the "Black September" model of 1970. In the long run, such a course could serve the interests of both Lebanon and Israel alike.

Published in Israel Hayom, March 08, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors' alone.

Israel needs a high-intensity campaign strategy against Iran

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 19.10.2026

Iran's unprecedented missile and drone attack against Israel last night is the pinnacle of a decades-long Iranian campaign that has been ongoing since the Islamic regime took power during the 1979 revolution. Over the years, Iran has gradually built a sophisticated proxy system and, with the exception of very few instances, has preferred to fight Israel via its proxies. Hiding behind them is part of Tehran's calculated strategy, which strives to distance Iran from war or any punishment for acts of terror, despite the Islamic Republic's key role in training, funding, directing, and, at times, actively dispatching its proxies.

Now, feeling obligated to restore its eroded deterrence vis-à-vis Israel following the targeted killings attributed to the latter in Damascus in early April, Iran has chosen to take a public stand and attack Israel directly using its advanced drones and missiles. This is not a comprehensive strategic shift on Iran's part. As soon as the strike ended, and before its scope had even been confirmed, Tehran clearly

signaled, via its UN embassy, that it wished to end this historical event and return to normal.

Israel cannot go back to October 6. It must not allow Iran to surround it with a tightening ring of fire while making intolerable threats of a potentially nuclear nature.

However, Israel does not operate in a vacuum either and is required to coordinate its actions with the Biden administration, both by virtue of the strategic alliance forged between the two countries and in view of the implications of an Israeli assault against Iran on local US forces and interests. Tehran seems to regard the United States as the weaker player in this arena, and therefore, since the Israel-Hamas War broke out, has instructed its proxies to carry out dozens of attacks against US interests in Iraq and Syria, in an effort to make President Biden pressure Israel to stop the war. The partial US response to the lethal drone strike in early January by Iran's Iraqi proxy, Kataib Hizballah, killing 3 US troops, appears to have only partially and temporarily deterred Tehran. The United States had, once again, chosen to retaliate against the Iraqi proxy, instead of its Iranian master.

Thus, although Quds Force Commander, Ismail Qaani, has reportedly instructed Iraqi Shiite militia groups to desist attacks against US interests, and has probably attempted to convince the Houthis in Yemen to do the same, the Iraqi militias have renewed (albeit not significantly) their assaults against US forces in Syria, while the Houthis continue to attack US sea vessels. Tehran itself, during its strike against Israel last night, threatened to attack any US forces that would help Israel in its retaliation against Iran. It is therefore clear that Iran views the United States as the weakest link and more easily pressured player.

Israel must formulate a comprehensive strategy for a high-intensity campaign against Iran, that could include peaks during which Iran would attempt to take direct action against Israel. Otherwise, Tehran would probably prefer to go back to operating via its proxies, given that direct Iranian actions against Israel would help form a regional coalition against Tehran, composed primarily of Jordan and Egypt, and supported by the United States, United Kingdom, and France (as seen in action last night). Such a coalition could shift from defensive to offensive mode since Iran is threatening to take action against any country supportive of Israel's defense efforts.

Israel appears to have certain latitude vis-à-vis Iran, despite US pressure. The Biden administration opposes broad conflict that would run the risk of regional war. At the same time, if Israel and the United States choose to restrain their response, Iran would interpret their inaction as permission to attack Israel, the United States' ally, directly, as well as other US partners in the region (to which Iran poses a threat) without paying the price for doing so. Furthermore, war breaking out between Iran and Israel still seems a long way off, allowing Israel to take action against Iran without necessarily leading the region to war. For instance, Israel could utilize the unprecedented Iranian attack to strike Iran kinetically when it is most suitable and convenient, whereas Tehran, which suffers from an acute domestic legitimacy crisis and can still collectively recall the destruction and aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), would think twice before aggravating its conflict with Israel. The cyberattack weapons that Israel has developed over the years could also serve it to repay Iran by damaging its essential infrastructure in an arena where responsibility is not unequivocally assumed by anyone.

Israel's updated security strategy should include various aspects, primary among which are: the desirable *modus operandi* vis-à-vis Iran; increased coordination with the United States on efforts to thwart the drone, missile, and terror infrastructure in Iran and the region; strengthening the IDF's force buildup so that it would tally with the challenge posed by Iran; and closing the various gaps that enable Iran to carry out cyberattacks and influence campaigns in Israel.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 15, 2024.

Defiance, if necessary

written by David M. Weinberg | 19.10.2026

A lesson of the Purim tale: Israel cannot allow the world to emasculate it. Finishing off Hamas and maintaining long-term control of a security envelope including Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is an essential goal that justifies Israeli defiance of the world.

The Ultra-Orthodox “vacation draft” plan

written by David M. Weinberg | 19.10.2026

Nobody can draft haredi Israeli Jews against their will – no matter what the Supreme Court rules or the Knesset legislates. But Ultra-Orthodox men could serve national or military service during their long semester breaks.

The myth of escalating settler violence

written by David M. Weinberg | 19.10.2026

Everybody, from US President Joe Biden to B’Tselem, is propagating the myth that West Bank settlers are exploiting the war against Hamas to invade private lands and attack Palestinians in the West Bank at alarming, never-seen-before levels of violence.

When US Vice President Kamala Harris spoke with President Isaac Herzog amid Israel’s difficult war against Hamas, she found it necessary to scold him about “holding extremist settlers accountable for violent acts.”

The US State Department spokesman this week denounced “unprecedented levels of violence by Israeli extremist settlers targeting Palestinians and their property, displacing entire communities,” no less.

The situation is supposedly so bad, so spiraling-out-of-control, that the US this week announced visa bans on “extremist settlers.” Belgium has now done so too.

Except that it is not true. There is no escalating or unprecedented wave of settler

violence in Judea and Samaria under cover of the war in Gaza. The frenzied focus on “settler terrorism,” by the highest officials in Washington, is based on fake news.

And why is such fake news being bandied about?

Apparently, this is to “balance” the crimes of Hamas, a way for wishy-washy friends of Israel or extreme left-wing Israelis to distance themselves from Israeli bad guys (settlers) while being forced, alas, to also condemn Palestinian bad guys (Hamas).

In other words, this is an attempt to uphold some degree of perverse moral equivalence between Israelis and Palestinians; to express equivalent condemnation of “all sides” for the proverbial “cycle of violence” that professional Mideast peace processors and hackneyed journalists like to babble about; for “fair-minded” international observers to make it clear that they are not, G-d forbid, fully on Israel’s side – even at a time when Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have committed the most atrocious crimes.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and UN Middle East envoy Tor Wennesland are among the worst such offenders. As is their usual rotten wont, they regularly condemn, and this week too, the “continuing cycle of violence” in Judea and Samaria – as if Israelis and Palestinians each were cavalierly engaging in murder just for fun or out of comparable burning hatred.

As if this sets an exculpating background for Hamas’s genocidal rampage of October 7 and its ongoing war crimes, including the holding of civilians as hostages.

TO GET PAST the fog of war, lies, and misinformation I decided to investigate this matter by going straight to the source. I submitted a formal request for information to the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), which is the government arm responsible for tracking and countering violence in Judea and Samaria.

From the detailed and precise statistics I received, it is crystal clear that there has not been a significant increase in right-wing Israeli-Jewish violence against Palestinian Arabs in Judea and Samaria since the beginning of the current Gaza war compared to the period of January-July 2023. There certainly has been no uptick or “surge” in settler violence in October-November as compared to the

same period in 2022.

(There was a noticeable decrease in such activity in August and September; the reason for this is not explained) Overall, the level of friction/violence in 2023 is about the same as that of 2022, totaling about 1,000 incidences of violence of all types over the course of the full year.

“Violence” in this context means many different things, from verbal altercations and rock throwing (what the ISA calls “frictions” or “harassment”), to spray-painting of anti-Arab slogans and other undercover vandalism including agricultural vandalism (“price tag activities”), to firebombing of homes or mosques (which are classified as outright “terrorist strikes”).

In fact, the more serious type of incidents dropped by 50% as compared to last year (although the handful of incidents that did take place this year were of a more violent nature), and there were zero incidents of “terrorist strikes” over the past 60 days. There is no evidence whatsoever of the wild B’Tselem accusation that “600 Palestinians from 13 communities were forced to abandon their homes” due to fear of settler attacks.

B’Tselem, Yesh Din, the Palestinian Authority Health Ministry, and the fiercely anti-Israel UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), also have fed the international media with blatantly false statistics that allege more than 180 Palestinians have been killed by “Israeli forces and settlers” this year, making it sound, once again, as more innocent Palestinian civilians targeted by “settler violence.”

In fact, 99.9% of these deaths are Palestinian terrorists who were eliminated by the IDF in counter-terror operations against Hamas and Fatah hideouts and weapons factories in Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and elsewhere in the West Bank.

These IDF counter-terror operations are the only thing that prevents the genocidal attacks of October 7 from repeating themselves in central Israel.

But that does not stop the PA or OCHA from pumping out more false allegations of “settler violence.”

It is unfortunately true that altercations and aggressions by settlers in 2022 (again, not 2023) rose sharply over that in 2020 and 2021. Perhaps this is because

Jewish residents of Judea and Samaria, in fact all citizens of Israel, were subject to a wild wave of murderous Palestinian terrorist attacks in 2022.

In case officials in Washington and elsewhere have forgotten, here is a reminder. In 2022, there were more than 5,000 Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli Jews, including car-ramming, shooting, stabbing, and bombing of innocent men, women, and children. These attacks included over 500 Molotov cocktail attacks (firebombs), leading to the injury of more than 150 Israelis. There was a 210% rise in rock throwing incidents in 2021 compared to 2020, and a 156% rise in bomb throwing incidents in 2021 over 2020.

And in spring-summer 2023, Palestinian terrorists slaughtered close to 40 Israelis in and beyond the Green Line, with more than 3,640 recorded acts of Palestinian and Arab terror throughout Israel, including 2,118 cases of rock-throwing, 799 fire-bombings, 18 attempted stabbings, and six vehicular assaults.

So, is there Jewish violence in Judea and Samaria? Yes. This is unacceptable, and I hold no wellsprings of sympathy for the hilltop wild men involved. Israel must aggressively combat this lawlessness, while acting even more aggressively against exponentially greater and more deadly Palestinian terrorism.

But has there been an enormous, out-of-control surge in settler violence recently? No.

And is there a culture of Jewish violence in settler communities? Also no. In fact, attacks on Palestinian property and individuals committed by a few extremists at the fringes of a half-million-person strong and overwhelmingly peaceful community of Israelis who live over the Green Line calculates to a level of violence that is lower than the level of violence (by Israelis against Israelis) that afflicts greater Tel Aviv.

And without meaning to diminish the ugliness of extremist Israeli attacks on Palestinians, violence by some settlers also pales in comparison to the “regular” 5,000 Palestinian stone-throwing, bomb, and shooting attacks a year aimed at killing Israeli civilians.

And of course, this completely pales in comparison to the 1,200 Israelis slaughtered by Hamas on October 7 or the reign of terror inflicted on all Israelis by the more than 10,500 rockets and missiles fired by Hamas into Israeli civilian

population centers over the past seven weeks.

So, at a time when Israel is reeling from the monstrous October 7 Hamas massacre and rightfully expects global support for its war effort against Hamas, it is surreal that some nauseatingly feel the need to conjure-up a false moral counterweight to Hamas violence in the form of non-existent "surging settler violence."

Essentially, the straw man of "settler violence" is an effort to limit sympathy for Israel and to backhandedly excuse Hamas atrocities. The Harvard and MIT presidents might superciliously say they are "putting the violence of all sides into context." How noxious.

To the Biden administration I say: Stop throwing "settler violence" in Israel's face as it fights for its very life against the genocidal Hamas. At best, this is a red herring issue. At worst, it is an ugly attempt to discredit the righteousness of Israel's war effort.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 9, 2023.

The only choice Israel has

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 19.10.2026

The circumstances under which Israel entered the war in Gaza exempt it from dealing with what will happen in Gaza after the war. The reason for this is simple: Israel has no other choice.

Israel’s two-pronged challenge

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 19.10.2026
How to restore deterrence while avoiding military escalation.

Neutralizing Iran comes before normalization with Riyadh

written by Meir Ben Shabbat | 19.10.2026
The Mossad chief’s recent speech was not really aimed against Iran; the words were actually intended to clarify to the Biden administration precisely where Jerusalem’s priority currently lies.

Weapons, weapons everywhere – why?

written by David M. Weinberg | 19.10.2026
Oslo is the root cause of today’s terrible epidemic of terrorist and crime shootings.