

# The dangerous ultimatum hidden in Hezbollah leader's speech

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 26.08.2025

Hezbollah secretary-general Naim Qassem's latest speech on Monday signals the organization's growing willingness to threaten Lebanon with civil war. This comes amid continued pressure from Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah of its weapons. Qassem declared that the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah represents acceptance of American dictates, and called on the government to cancel it.

Ahead of the protest rally that Hezbollah and other organizations plan to hold on Wednesday at Riad al-Solh Square, near the parliament building in Beirut, Qassem emphasized in his speech Hezbollah's firm position, with its main points being that the organization refuses to surrender its weapons, and is even prepared to confront Lebanese authorities to preserve the weapons, which are "our spirit, our honor and the future of our children," according to Qassem's words in his speech.

The clear address in Qassem's words is to President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Hezbollah propagandists are already calling both of them on social media by the dubious title "Yazid" after the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, hated by the Shiites, who was responsible for the murder of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala in 680. Alongside them, other Hezbollah propagandists on social media are calling for violent confrontation during Wednesday's protest rally. In this context, it should be noted that recently security around President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam has been increased, out of fear that their fate will be similar to that of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was eliminated by Hezbollah in 2005.

## Will the country be torn apart again?

Hezbollah is not interested in civil war. Such a war would cause severe image damage to the organization, which seeks to stick to its worn-out slogan, "the army, the people and the resistance," which Qassem repeated in his speech, even though Lebanese state leaders have made it clear that its validity has expired. A civil war would drag Lebanon back to the well-remembered territories from the

not-so-distant past, in which the country was torn apart in a bloody internal war, and would clarify the righteousness of the authorities in Beirut, according to which Hezbollah prefers its weapons over stability in Lebanon.

Hezbollah is pushed into a corner, and therefore seeks to exert counter-pressure on Lebanese state leaders through a series of shows of force, the closest of which will take place on Wednesday. The significant support that the organization still enjoys among its social base, the Shiite community in Lebanon, allows it to express a firm position against the historic decision of the Lebanese government to disarm it of its weapons by the end of 2025.

Alongside this, despite the political revival of the Lebanese state, its army and security mechanisms are still weak and will not be able to force Hezbollah to disarm. The Iranian backing also instills confidence in Naim Qassem's policy and encourages him to resist pressures from the Lebanese government and the Trump administration.

## **The cards that Israel might lose**

However, the fundamental disagreement that is shaking the political arena in Iran these days – around the regime's policy in the post-war era against Israel – also spills over to Tehran's position in light of the crisis in Lebanon. In contrast to the firm support that conservatives in Iran express for Hezbollah's position, in recent days, some of the reformist circles are calling on the regime to change its policy. According to these circles, Tehran should not intervene in the internal Lebanese issue; in their approach, Hezbollah should respect the decision of the Lebanese government, which is the sovereign in the country, since weapons should be held exclusively by it, and the existence of an armed organization in Lebanon is unacceptable. The reformist camp even questioned the usefulness of the visit that the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Ali Larijani, made to Beirut. They even warned that Tehran's intervention in Lebanon could harm the regime, that it could serve as a pretext for the US and Israel to act again against Iran. Therefore, the proposed solution that emerges from them is to integrate Hezbollah into the Lebanese army.

However, the regime's support for Hezbollah's position was well expressed in the statement by the deputy coordinator of the Quds Force, Iraj Masjedi, according to which the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah is an "American-

Zionist plan that is not acceptable to the Lebanese people, and will never be realized.”

Qassem called in his speech on the government, of which Hezbollah is still a member, to hold intensive discussions in which it will examine how to restore its sovereignty, which was damaged in the shadow of the continued Israeli presence in the five outposts penetrating southern Lebanon. He also called on parties, elites, and influential figures in the country “to help the government in the way of thinking and implementing plans,” and alongside this, also presented the solution that Hezbollah proposes. Israel should withdraw from southern Lebanon, stop the attacks against Hezbollah, and release its prisoners, and in parallel, the Lebanese state should begin the reconstruction of the south. In return, after completing these moves, which would remove from Israel its strategic cards, Hezbollah would be ready to discuss the “defense strategy” of Lebanon, according to Qassem’s words.

In recent contacts with the American government’s envoy to Lebanon and Syria, Tom Barrack, Israel offered, according to reports in the Lebanese media, to turn the contact villages strip in southern Lebanon into an uninhabited and disarmed economic zone. In return, Israel offers a gradual cessation of attacks and assassinations, gradual withdrawal from several occupied areas, and “completing the issue of Lebanese prisoners.” Such an agreement between Israel and Lebanon could indeed accelerate the return of northern residents to their homes. However, it does not address the need to deliver a severe blow to Hezbollah also in the political sphere, in the shadow of the new reality. Therefore, Israel might give up important cards and leave Hezbollah as a popular force among the Shiites in the country, who make up its power base.

It seems that in the struggle against Iran’s multi-year investment in Lebanon, there are no shortcuts. Israel and the US should strive to undermine Hezbollah among the Shiites, through establishing a competing network to the organization’s propaganda apparatus, and political support for its opponents from within the community. Until then, it is almost certain that Hezbollah will dare to threaten Lebanon’s stability, based on the extensive support from the Shiites in the country.

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# A Strategic Plan to Disarm Hizbullah

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 26.08.2025

Among Lebanese Shi'ites there is a widespread perception that their community must not return to the era of persecution and oppression that lasted hundreds of years under the Ottoman Turks and continued under the French Mandate and modern Lebanese state (until the founding of the first Shi'ite political movement, Amal, in 1975 followed by Hizbullah in 1982). Though they have long constituted the largest community in Lebanon (with estimates of up to 40 percent of the country), Shi'ites were at the bottom of the social, economic, and political ladder.

Today, the harsh scenes of sectarian violence in Syria reinforce the Lebanese Shi'ites' perceived need to maintain an armed force to protect their community. Hizbullah also portrays itself as the defender of the Lebanese nation against Israeli military incursions. Hizbullah views its weapons as an existential need and will continue to reject pressures to disarm.

A comprehensive strategic plan must be formulated, with the participation of the Lebanese state, US and Israel, in order to undermine Hizbullah's deep influence within the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, an influence achieved through extensive Iranian patronage for over four decades.

## Hizbullah's Current Crisis

Hizbullah faces a deepening crisis since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. Militarily, Israel continues to target Hizbullah operatives, including Radwan Force commandos, and to destroy military infrastructure, focusing especially on missile production bases. According to the Alma Research Center, Israel has killed 136 Hizbullah operatives between the November 2024 ceasefire and August 2025.

Economically, the United States is expanding sanctions against Hizbullah's financial network, at a critical time when the organization needs funds to rebuild

its damaged social base. Under pressure from the Trump administration, Lebanon's central bank has prohibited financial institutions in Lebanon from dealing with Al-Qard Al-Hassan, Hizbullah's quasi-bank.

Politically, Lebanese leaders are publicly declaring the need to disarm Hizbullah. On March 21, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam declared, "The *army, people, resistance* equation [a Hizbullah slogan] has become a thing of the past," and he demanded that the state hold sole control over weapons. On August 13, during the visit to Beirut of Iran's National Security Advisor Ali Larijani, Lebanese leaders made blunt statements to him opposing Tehran's interference in Lebanon's debate over Hizbullah's disarmament.

The United States has conditioned comprehensive economic aid to Lebanon on Hizbullah's disarmament. Recently, the Lebanese government attempted to negotiate with the Trump administration a condition whereby Hizbullah's disarmament would occur only after an Israeli withdrawal from the last five Israeli positions inside southern Lebanon. This move appeared designed to convince Hizbullah that its weapons were no longer necessary; however, the Trump administration rejected the proposal. When Iran's ambassador in Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, claimed that the calls to disarm Hizbullah were part of an American conspiracy, the Lebanese foreign ministry issued a public reprimand of him in April 2025.

## **Hizbullah's Continuing Popularity Among Shi'ites**

A survey by the Arab Barometer project, published in July 2024, found that 15 percent of the Shiite community in Lebanon expressed distrust or limited trust in Hizbullah, while 85 percent expressed strong confidence in the organization. The survey, conducted before Hasan Nasrallah's assassination, aligns with a Washington Institute of Near Eastern Policy survey in Lebanon in late 2023, which found that 89 percent of Shi'ites held a positive opinion of Hizbullah.

In the Lebanese municipal elections of May 2025, Hizbullah candidates won in Shi'ite-majority districts (in southern Lebanon, Baalbek, and Beirut) in alliance with the Shi'ite political party Amal, thereby passing the first political test since the demise of Hasan Nasrallah in 2024. The results reflect Hizbullah's continuing popularity among Lebanese Shi'ites, whether out of ideological motives or economic dependence or both.

To challenge Hezbollah's vast political and social network among Lebanese Shi'ites, under Iranian auspices, the Lebanese state should consider, with international support, establishing a competing structure to rival Hizbullah's broad institutional network, to include medical, educational, financial, humanitarian and other services that would, over time, reduce the Shi'ite community's economic dependence on Hizbullah. Among the possible donors to such an effort could be individuals in the large Lebanese diaspora in Europe and the Americas, as well as countries like France and the US.

## **Conclusion**

Hizbullah's armed militia forces are a core concern that dominates Lebanon's political landscape and lies at the center of US policy toward the country. Alongside the American and Lebanese pressures to disarm Hizbullah, significant economic investment is required; the Lebanese government should take the lead role in organizing such an effort with international support. The goal of three parties - Israel, the US and Lebanon - should be to work on parallel tracks to undermine Hizbullah's standing among its social base and thereby weaken its political influence in the Shi'ite community.

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# **Hezbollah in crisis as pressure mounts in Lebanon**

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 26.08.2025

The terrorist organization rejected Lebanon's historic August 7 government decision. The Lebanese prime minister sought to condition disarmament in talks with the Trump administration on an Israeli withdrawal from its outposts, but was rebuffed. Israel is benefiting from Hezbollah's weakening under Naim Qassem's leadership, while its ties with Iran have been damaged. Despite this, most of the country's Shiites have remained loyal.

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# **The massacre of the Druze is a moral test: Israel acted, the world failed**

written by Arsen Ostrovsky | 26.08.2025

The international community cannot continue treating President al-Sharra as a legitimate partner, while turning a blind eye to the atrocities that are being committing in Sweida.

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## **Hezbollah at a Crossroads**

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 26.08.2025

On the Anniversary of Israel's Withdrawal From Southern Lebanon in May 2000.

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## **Hezbollah's violations justify Israeli buffer zone**

written by Dr. Raphael BenLevi | 26.08.2025

Hezbollah has been dealt a great blow but it is by no means defeated. The indefensible topography of the Blue Line means only a forward Israeli presence can prevent Hezbollah's rearmament.

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# **Israel is missing a golden opportunity**

written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof | 26.08.2025

As long as Iran, which directs the proxy network with Hezbollah as its “crown jewel,” is not addressed, the regime is likely to continue its subversion into Lebanon.

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## **The failure of UNIFIL: Do your job, or get out of the way**

written by Arsen Ostrovsky | 26.08.2025

It is hard to think of a United Nations agency with a more glaring failure in its core mission than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, more commonly known as UNIFIL — and there has certainly been no shortage of contenders this year.

Following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, which was initiated after Hezbollah terrorists ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two others, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1701. This mandated the creation of a demilitarized zone south of Lebanon’s Litani River and entrusted UNIFIL to oversee Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal from the area.

That, however, did not happen.

Instead, with the acquiescence of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah entrenched itself, including literally burrowing in tunnels, along the common border with Israel. It amassed an arsenal of 150,000 or more Iranian-made precision guided rockets, in addition to an arsenal of missiles and suicide drones.



All of this happened under the watchful eye of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL's ineffectiveness has been underscored over the last 12 months. A day after Hamas's rampage in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Hezbollah joined the war as well, with notional plans to recreate a similar massacre in Israel's north. Since then, the group has fired more than 10,000 rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon, killing dozens and displacing tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes.

One may be forgiven for asking what, if anything, UNIFIL has done to uphold UNSCR 1701. The answer: nothing of substance.

Just this week, Hezbollah terror tunnels and weapons caches meters away from UNIFIL observation posts and bases, literally right under the noses of U.N. peacekeepers. That UNIFIL was unaware of this state of affairs is simply implausible.

Rather, it has either been grossly incompetent, acting as no more than as a passive bystander while Iran's chief terrorist proxy arms itself for war with Israel. Or, worse yet, it has become a shield allowing Hezbollah to attack Israeli civilian communities while complicating Israel's subsequent response.

On Sunday, a statement issued on behalf of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres defiantly reiterated that "UNIFIL peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly." That's a lofty statement, to be sure. But it obscures the real contours of the problem.

By staying in place, UNIFIL is not only obstructing the IDF's legitimate military operations against Hezbollah, it is also recklessly putting its own peacekeepers at risk.

Just the other day, five UNIFIL peacekeepers were inadvertently injured when Israeli forces fired in the direction of their Lebanon headquarters in Naqoura, while engaged in a fight against Hezbollah terrorists in the vicinity. This tragic consequence was the result of UNIFIL's rejection of repeated prior requests by Israel for it to withdraw from Hezbollah strongholds and active combat zones.

But UNIFIL isn't just an obstacle; it has also become an active enabler. Over the last month, at least 25 rockets and missiles have been launched at Israeli

communities and troops from Hezbollah terrorist compounds embedded near UNIFIL posts in southern Lebanon, exploiting their proximity to U.N. forces. One of the attacks even resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers.

How, then, can UNIFIL be entrusted to keep the peace and continue its mission?

In the 18 years since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has been an abject failure, allowing Hezbollah to rearm and entrench itself in southern Lebanon, setting the stage for the current conflict in the process. Moreover, it has done so with international support and American largesse. Last year, the U.S. appropriated \$143 million to UNIFIL for 2023, amounting to about one-quarter of the force's total budget of \$507 million. And once the current war ends, history suggests it won't not take long for Hezbollah to return to southern Lebanon, in spite of UNIFIL's presence there.

For the time being, however, there are only two feasible options. Either UNIFIL ceases to serve as a willing pawn for Hezbollah and actually enforces UNSCR 1701, or it closes up shop and leaves.

In other words, the U.N. should either do its job or let Israel do it.

The article was written in collaboration with Ilan Berman from the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

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# The Operational Objectives in Lebanon and the Strategic Context

written by Prof. Kobi Michael | 26.08.2025

**The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical**

**opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.**

When Hamas launched its offensive on October 7, the IDF mobilized many reserve forces. Part of this force was sent to the northern front, recognizing that Hezbollah has the capability and motivation to join the battle, with its Radwan force having been equipped, trained, and prepared to invade the Galilee for years. The deployment of forces to the north was aimed at taking up defensive positions before Hezbollah could attempt to execute its plans. Hezbollah's entry into the conflict on October 8 began with relatively low-scale fire, mainly targeting military objectives. Later, as the organization gained confidence and identified a policy of containment on the part of Israel, it ramped up fire across the entire front.


At the beginning of the campaign, Israel chose to separate the fronts and focus its primary efforts on the southern front. This situation persisted for nearly ten months. The Israeli intelligence-driven offensive on September 17, 2024 signaled a change in approach, and since then, Israel has been engaged in an expanding and evolving offensive against Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. After eliminating Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and decapitating a significant portion of the organization's senior command levels, as well as damaging its infrastructure, Israel launched a limited ground operation in southern Lebanon in early October 2024.

To this end, the Israeli government added an additional war goal, stating that the State of Israel would work to safely return the displaced residents of the North, who had evacuated their homes as Hezbollah ramped up its attacks. Based on what is publicly known, the IDF's ground operation is advancing cautiously, with forces currently operating only in the area adjacent to the line of engagement with an aim to destroy terrorist infrastructure close to the border (approximately 4 km deep). After four weeks of ground operations, a reality more severe than the

Israeli intelligence likely knew has emerged—and far more than what was made clear to the public before the ground operation.

Hezbollah has built an extensive terrorist infrastructure. This was done under the laxity of the Lebanese army, which failed to fulfill its obligations; under the eyes of the UNIFIL forces; and most gravely, due to Israel's decision not to instruct the IDF to thwart the transfer of massive quantities of weapons into the area. Weapons and equipment stockpiles were stored in extensive tunneling that reached very close to the Israeli border, and in at least one case, even crossed it. Extensive use was made of residential homes and civilian infrastructures such as mosques and schools. In fact, nearly every house and building in the Shiite villages along the front have been turned into a Hezbollah military outpost or prepared for offensive military effort. While it is clear that the overwhelming majority of buildings in these Shiite villages are considered legitimate military targets, and although it is evident that clearing the area cannot be limited to narrow surgical operations in a strip of a few kilometers, the IDF has so far refrained from systematically and thoroughly destroying all of these buildings.

However, even if a security buffer zone of a few kilometers' width is created, this space will not provide adequate protection to northern communities and will not allow evacuated residents to return to their homes safely. Defending the northern communities requires a broader approach that does not limit itself to addressing only the line of engagement. This defense requires the removal of Hezbollah forces from the entire area, at least up to the Litani River, and in certain areas where the river's course is closer to the Israeli border, even beyond. Since Hezbollah operatives are integrated into the Shiite villages--some even living there--and given that many of the Shiite villages conceal terrorist infrastructure, it will not be possible to allow residents of these villages to return to southern Lebanon. The map below illustrates a small portion of Hezbollah's terrorist infrastructure up to the Litani in the eastern sector (as of 2015).



In the initial phase, the IDF must take control of the entire area up to the Litani River (and in certain places beyond it) while fully evacuating the population of the Shiite villages in the area for their protection and to allow for the clearing of the area without endangering the Lebanese population. The IDF has already begun the process of evacuating the population, but there is still work to do as it is necessary to address the presence of terrorist infrastructure in the city of Tyre, which lies south of the Litani.

The operation in southern Lebanon is closely linked to the overall strategy of the State of Israel. The extent of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah creates an opportunity to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah to the point where it is no longer a relevant threat to Israel by continuously and persistently thwarting its efforts to recuperate and reconstitute itself.

In southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River and beyond where necessary, full Israeli control is required, preventing residents from returning to the villages to avoid Hezbollah operatives returning under the guise of the civilian population.

The Shiite region must be completely cleared of any military and civilian presence under Hezbollah's cover. Regarding other villages, a specific assessment will be needed to determine the level of threat posed by their population to Israel's security, and a policy will need to be established regarding monitoring their exit from and return to the area. As for how the IDF should take southern Lebanon, this article does not provide an operational outline, but it is expected that IDF commanders will carry out this mission in a cunning and creative manner.

A second area of operations would be between the Litani River and the Awali River and the Qaroun Lake line in the east. This area will serve as an immediate depth zone of operation for the IDF to prevent capabilities from drifting towards the Litani. The IDF can operate through aerial actions and special operations. Lastly, operations, mainly aerial, should be carried out throughout Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah's attempts to rebuild its military capabilities.

Until an agreement that meets Israel's security needs is achieved (although under current conditions and for the foreseeable future, it is unclear if such an agreement can be established), there should be a buffer zone (security perimeter) established north of the security zone in southern Lebanon. This area must be cleared of infrastructure and buildings, enabling observation and fire control to prevent any entry into the security zone established in southern Lebanon and to destroy any Hezbollah force attempting to return to this area. This should resemble the buffer zone along the Gaza Strip border. In the case of Lebanon, this zone should be 2-4 km wide depending on the terrain conditions. Therefore, a quick and efficient clearing of the area is required. For this purpose, maneuvering must be expanded and civilian structures destroyed to render the entire area uninhabitable.

Such a move would impose a painful cost on Hezbollah and the Shiite population in southern Lebanon that supports it, serving as a catalyst for Lebanon and the international community to dismantle Hezbollah and reach a security arrangement acceptable to Israel. Above all, it would allow effective military control and presence in the area until such an agreement is achieved. Given that this is likely to require a long-term commitment--perhaps even years until an achievable and enforceable agreement is reached--the IDF must prepare optimal conditions for military control in the area, which must also be better protected.

This improved defense will be achieved by emptying the area of its residents and

blocking access to it while considering any entity trying to enter the area as a hostile element to be neutralized. This reality is fundamentally different from what we knew during the 18 years when the IDF was in the security zone. In those years, the zone remained populated, and despite the actions of the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Hezbollah found it relatively easy to penetrate the area with the support of the large Shiite population and launch attacks on IDF and SLA forces.

Simultaneously with the necessary military organization in southern Lebanon, the IDF must continue its offensive actions against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. In this regard, there cannot be and should not be a ceasefire until the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Resolution 1701, meanwhile, should be discarded in the annals of history, as it is demonstrably unenforceable, nor can one rely on international actors for its implementation. Israel, after October 7, cannot afford to revert to a doctrine of containment regarding Hezbollah's growing strength. What is more, the ongoing pursuit of Hezbollah operatives, leaders, and military assets in turn weakens Iran and its entire axis. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of Iran, the spearhead, and the center of gravity in Iran's "Ring of Fire" strategy against Israel. Harming this key Iranian asset necessarily harms Iran, the central factor undermining regional security.

The effort in the northern arena must continue alongside the effort in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is dismantled and the conditions are set for a civilian governance alternative with Israeli security responsibility and full military freedom of action in order to prevent any attempt by Hamas to recuperate and rebuild its military and governmental capabilities.

All these efforts are intended to pave the way for the third effort. This effort should focus on weakening Iran itself through strikes on military and governmental assets, and subsequently on its nuclear infrastructure. Following Iran's 181-ballistic missile barrage launched at Israel which targeted military and civilian infrastructure alike (1 October 2024) and Israel's precise and targeted retaliatory strike against Iranian military infrastructure (26 October 2024), Iran seems poised to respond. Should it choose to, Israel's ambition should be to utilize such an Iranian response to persuade the United States to prepare to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Should Israel fail in this crucial effort, it must prepare to carry out this operation independently.

The fourth effort should focus on painful responses in Yemen, western Iraq, and southern Syria in response to missile and drone launches from these areas. As part of this effort, Israel should make it clear to Syria's president that it would be in his best interest to restrict the steps of Iran and the Shiite militias operating within Syria's sovereign territory or else his regime would be in danger.

It may seem that the multitude of required efforts stretches Israel's capabilities to the limit. Indeed, this series of efforts demands significant resource investment and is not without risks. However, in the reality that has emerged, Israel wields strategic momentum that it cannot afford to lose. Israel has no choice but to maintain and enhance its momentum as it can lead to the weakening of the entire Iranian axis and the laying of the foundations for establishing a new regional architecture, which-- beyond its contribution to regional security, stability, and prosperity-- would further weaken and restrain the Iranian axis and open new opportunities for addressing the Palestinian issue.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to the political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

1. This map, which includes only the eastern sector, was released by the IDF in 2015. Since then, Hezbollah's terrorist infrastructure has expanded significantly and is likely much broader today.
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# **Israel's elimination of Nasrallah was just and legal under laws of war**

written by Arsen Ostrovsky | 26.08.2025

All necessary principles and doctrines were met.