Executive Summary

• Only a comprehensive peace with Israel can truly unlock Lebanon’s future. The Solomon-Hiram Accords envision a historic Israel–Lebanon agreement that ends border disputes, stabilizes the region, and provides the indispensable foundation for restoring Lebanon’s shattered banking system and economy.
• Without peace, no financial solution is possible. The IMF’s failed 2022 plan showed that technical fixes collapse in the face of political instability. By contrast, peace with Israel is the confidence catalyst that can draw back capital, free frozen deposits, and replace conflict with prosperity.
• The framework would leverage Lebanon’s hidden assets—prime Mediterranean coastline, natural gas reserves, and existing port infrastructure—transforming them into engines of recovery and positioning Lebanon as a hub for regional trade in partnership with Israel.
• Financing formula: Public asset securitization (up to $50B), reversal of unfair crisis-era currency conversions (~$10B), and cooperative energy development with Israel, could cover the vast majority of Lebanon’s recapitalization needs from domestic resources.
• Peace-driven private capital flows—from the Lebanese diaspora, Gulf sovereign wealth funds, and European investors—could bring in $50–100B within five years, organically rebuilding the banking system without reliance on international bailouts.
• Every stakeholder gains: Lebanon restores deposits and jobs, Israel secures its northern frontier through integration rather than war, Gulf states counter Iran with investment, and the West proves that diplomacy and peace can deliver economic transformation.

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Hezbollah secretary-general Naim Qassem’s latest speech on Monday signals the organization’s growing willingness to threaten Lebanon with civil war. This comes amid continued pressure from Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah of its weapons. Qassem declared that the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah represents acceptance of American dictates, and called on the government to cancel it.

Ahead of the protest rally that Hezbollah and other organizations plan to hold on Wednesday at Riad al-Solh Square, near the parliament building in Beirut, Qassem emphasized in his speech Hezbollah’s firm position, with its main points being that the organization refuses to surrender its weapons, and is even prepared to confront Lebanese authorities to preserve the weapons, which are “our spirit, our honor and the future of our children,” according to Qassem’s words in his speech.

The clear address in Qassem’s words is to President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Hezbollah propagandists are already calling both of them on social media by the dubious title “Yazid” after the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, hated by the Shiites, who was responsible for the murder of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala in 680. Alongside them, other Hezbollah propagandists on social media are calling for violent confrontation during Wednesday’s protest rally. In this context, it should be noted that recently security around President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam has been increased, out of fear that their fate will be similar to that of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was eliminated by Hezbollah in 2005.

Will the country be torn apart again?

Hezbollah is not interested in civil war. Such a war would cause severe image damage to the organization, which seeks to stick to its worn-out slogan, “the army, the people and the resistance,” which Qassem repeated in his speech, even though Lebanese state leaders have made it clear that its validity has expired. A civil war would drag Lebanon back to the well-remembered territories from the not-so-distant past, in which the country was torn apart in a bloody internal war, and would clarify the righteousness of the authorities in Beirut, according to which Hezbollah prefers its weapons over stability in Lebanon.

Hezbollah is pushed into a corner, and therefore seeks to exert counter-pressure on Lebanese state leaders through a series of shows of force, the closest of which will take place on Wednesday. The significant support that the organization still enjoys among its social base, the Shiite community in Lebanon, allows it to express a firm position against the historic decision of the Lebanese government to disarm it of its weapons by the end of 2025.

Alongside this, despite the political revival of the Lebanese state, its army and security mechanisms are still weak and will not be able to force Hezbollah to disarm. The Iranian backing also instills confidence in Naim Qassem’s policy and encourages him to resist pressures from the Lebanese government and the Trump administration.

The cards that Israel might lose

However, the fundamental disagreement that is shaking the political arena in Iran these days – around the regime’s policy in the post-war era against Israel –also spills over to Tehran’s position in light of the crisis in Lebanon. In contrast to the firm support that conservatives in Iran express for Hezbollah’s position, in recent days, some of the reformist circles are calling on the regime to change its policy. According to these circles, Tehran should not intervene in the internal Lebanese issue; in their approach, Hezbollah should respect the decision of the Lebanese government, which is the sovereign in the country, since weapons should be held exclusively by it, and the existence of an armed organization in Lebanon is unacceptable. The reformist camp even questioned the usefulness of the visit that the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Ali Larijani, made to Beirut. They even warned that Tehran’s intervention in Lebanon could harm the regime, that it could serve as a pretext for the US and Israel to act again against Iran. Therefore, the proposed solution that emerges from them is to integrate Hezbollah into the Lebanese army.

However, the regime’s support for Hezbollah’s position was well expressed in the statement by the deputy coordinator of the Quds Force, Iraj Masjedi, according to which the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah is an “American-Zionist plan that is not acceptable to the Lebanese people, and will never be realized.”

Qassem called in his speech on the government, of which Hezbollah is still a member, to hold intensive discussions in which it will examine how to restore its sovereignty, which was damaged in the shadow of the continued Israeli presence in the five outposts penetrating southern Lebanon. He also called on parties, elites, and influential figures in the country “to help the government in the way of thinking and implementing plans,” and alongside this, also presented the solution that Hezbollah proposes. Israel should withdraw from southern Lebanon, stop the attacks against Hezbollah, and release its prisoners, and in parallel, the Lebanese state should begin the reconstruction of the south. In return, after completing these moves, which would remove from Israel its strategic cards, Hezbollah would be ready to discuss the “defense strategy” of Lebanon, according to Qassem’s words.

In recent contacts with the American government’s envoy to Lebanon and Syria, Tom Barrack, Israel offered, according to reports in the Lebanese media, to turn the contact villages strip in southern Lebanon into an uninhabited and disarmed economic zone. In return, Israel offers a gradual cessation of attacks and assassinations, gradual withdrawal from several occupied areas, and “completing the issue of Lebanese prisoners.” Such an agreement between Israel and Lebanon could indeed accelerate the return of northern residents to their homes. However, it does not address the need to deliver a severe blow to Hezbollah also in the political sphere, in the shadow of the new reality. Therefore, Israel might give up important cards and leave Hezbollah as a popular force among the Shiites in the country, who make up its power base.

It seems that in the struggle against Iran’s multi-year investment in Lebanon, there are no shortcuts. Israel and the US should strive to undermine Hezbollah among the Shiites, through establishing a competing network to the organization’s propaganda apparatus, and political support for its opponents from within the community. Until then, it is almost certain that Hezbollah will dare to threaten Lebanon’s stability, based on the extensive support from the Shiites in the country.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 28, 2025.

Among Lebanese Shi’ites there is a widespread perception that their community must not return to the era of persecution and oppression that lasted hundreds of years under the Ottoman Turks and continued under the French Mandate and modern Lebanese state (until the founding of the first Shi’ite political movement, Amal, in 1975 followed by Hizbullah in 1982). Though they have long constituted the largest community in Lebanon (with estimates of up to 40 percent of the country), Shi’ites were at the bottom of the social, economic, and political ladder.

Today, the harsh scenes of sectarian violence in Syria reinforce the Lebanese Shi’ites’ perceived need to maintain an armed force to protect their community. Hizbullah also portrays itself as the defender of the Lebanese nation against Israeli military incursions. Hizbullah views its weapons as an existential need and will continue to reject pressures to disarm.

A comprehensive strategic plan must be formulated, with the participation of the Lebanese state, US and Israel, in order to undermine Hizbullah’s deep influence within the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, an influence achieved through extensive Iranian patronage for over four decades.

Hizbullah’s Current Crisis 

Hizbullah faces a deepening crisis since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. Militarily, Israel continues to target Hizbullah operatives, including Radwan Force commandos, and to destroy military infrastructure, focusing especially on missile production bases. According to the Alma Research Center, Israel has killed 136 Hizbullah operatives between the November 2024 ceasefire and August 2025.

Economically, the United States is expanding sanctions against Hizbullah’s financial network, at a critical time when the organization needs funds to rebuild its damaged social base. Under pressure from the Trump administration, Lebanon’s central bank has prohibited financial institutions in Lebanon from dealing with Al-Qard Al-Hassan, Hizbullah’s quasi-bank.

Politically, Lebanese leaders are publicly declaring the need to disarm Hizbullah. On March 21, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam declared, “The army, people, resistance equation [a Hizbullah slogan] has become a thing of the past,” and he demanded that the state hold sole control over weapons. On August 13, during the visit to Beirut of Iran’s National Security Advisor Ali Larijani, Lebanese leaders made blunt statements to him opposing Tehran’s interference in Lebanon’s debate over Hizbullah’s disarmament.

The United States has conditioned comprehensive economic aid to Lebanon on Hizbullah’s disarmament. Recently, the Lebanese government attempted to negotiate with the Trump administration a condition whereby Hizbullah’s disarmament would occur only after an Israeli withdrawal from the last five Israeli positions inside southern Lebanon. This move appeared designed to convince Hizbullah that its weapons were no longer necessary; however, the Trump administration rejected the proposal. When Iran’s ambassador in Beirut, Mojtaba Amani, claimed that the calls to disarm Hizbullah were part of an American conspiracy, the Lebanese foreign ministry issued a public reprimand of him in April 2025.

Hizbullah’s Continuing Popularity Among Shi’ites

A survey by the Arab Barometer project, published in July 2024, found that 15 percent of the Shiite community in Lebanon expressed distrust or limited trust in Hizbullah, while 85 percent expressed strong confidence in the organization. The survey, conducted before Hasan Nasrallah’s assassination, aligns with a Washington Institute of Near Eastern Policy survey in Lebanon in late 2023, which found that 89 percent of Shi’ites held a positive opinion of Hizbullah.

In the Lebanese municipal elections of May 2025, Hizbullah candidates won in Shi’ite-majority districts (in southern Lebanon, Baalbek, and Beirut) in alliance with the Shi’ite political party Amal, thereby passing the first political test since the demise of Hasan Nasrallah in 2024. The results reflect Hizbullah’s continuing popularity among Lebanese Shi’ites, whether out of ideological motives or economic dependence or both.

To challenge Hezbollah’s vast political and social network among Lebanese Shi’ites, under Iranian auspices, the Lebanese state should consider, with international support, establishing a competing structure to rival Hizbullah’s broad institutional network, to include medical, educational, financial, humanitarian and other services that would, over time, reduce the Shi’ite community’s economic dependence on Hizbullah. Among the possible donors to such an effort could be individuals in the large Lebanese diaspora in Europe and the Americas, as well as countries like France and the US.

Conclusion

Hizbullah’s armed militia forces are a core concern that dominates Lebanon’s political landscape and lies at the center of US policy toward the country. Alongside the American and Lebanese pressures to disarm Hizbullah, significant economic investment is required; the Lebanese government should take the lead role in organizing such an effort with international support. The goal of three parties – Israel, the US and Lebanon – should be to work on parallel tracks to undermine Hizbullah’s standing among its social base and thereby weaken its political influence in the Shi’ite community.

Published in The Jerusalem Stratrgic Tribune, August 20, 2025.

Since the November 2024 ceasefire, Hezbollah has been mired in a severe crisis, facing military, economic, and political attacks. Israel has been striking the terrorist organization’s operatives and strategic infrastructure, the US has been intensifying sanctions, and the Lebanese government is under growing pressure to disarm Hezbollah and curb its influence.

Hezbollah rejected Lebanon’s historic August 7 government decision to dismantle its military wing, and implementation now appears unlikely. Lebanon is motivated by two main factors: freeing itself from Iranian domination and meeting US conditions for urgently needed economic aid.

Lebanon’s prime minister dismissed Hezbollah’s long standing formula of “the army, the people, the resistance” and attempted to link disarmament to an Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in the country. The Trump administration refused, pushing instead for immediate disarmament.

Israel has been benefiting from Hezbollah’s weakness, highlighted by its absence from Operation Rising Lion, in which Iran suffered a major blow. Under Naim Qassem, Hezbollah faces a prolonged recovery after the assassination of its senior leadership, which has also strained ties with Tehran. Although Qassem was appointed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon and received symbolic gestures of Iranian support, the personal dimension of the relationship has been disrupted by Hassan Nasrallah’s elimination.

In a recent online address to a religious conference in Qom, Qassem portrayed Hezbollah as a direct continuation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s ideology and praised its fight against Israel. In reality, he has largely refrained from retaliating for Israeli strikes that have killed more than 130 operatives and destroyed critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has allowed the Israel Defense Forces to maintain control over five strategic positions along the border.

A 2024 poll found that 85% of Lebanon’s Shiites express strong trust in Hezbollah, consistent with previous surveys indicating stable or growing support. In the May 2025 municipal elections, Hezbollah strengthened its grip on Shiite-majority areas through political alliances, particularly with the Amal movement. This backing stems from both ideological loyalty and economic dependence.

With no economic alternative and continued Iranian funding, most Shiites remain loyal. To undermine Hezbollah’s base, the US must lead a long-term strategy to challenge the terrorist organization’s network of schools, welfare programs, religious institutions, and financial services, by creating a rival infrastructure backed by billions of dollars in American investment.

Such a strategy would aim to break Shiite economic dependence on Hezbollah. Shiites make up about 40% of Lebanon’s population, compared to Sunnis at around 30% and Christians at 25%, and bring them under the Lebanese state’s authority. With sustained American economic and political aid, Lebanon might persuade Shiites to keep only light weapons and give up Hezbollah’s heavy arsenal, despite fears rooted in the sectarian bloodshed in Syria and security concerns.

Backed by US support and strengthened Shiite opposition to Hezbollah, combined with ongoing Israeli efforts to block its recovery, the terrorist organization’s political and social influence could be eroded over the long term, rather than aiming for quick results during Trump’s presidency.

Hezbollah, which remained armed under the 1989 Taif Agreement, has effectively become Lebanon’s sovereign power, using its weapons for political assassinations. It still seeks to advance its vision of a Shiite revival and continued conflict with Israel, even as it attempts to reinvent itself.

The massacre in Syria’s Sweida province has reinforced Hezbollah’s determination to remain armed, fearing revenge from Sunnis and Christians. The terrorist organization remains loyal to Iran and signals readiness to renew armed conflict with Israel in the future, serving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which relies on it as a key regional force.

Despite recent remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Tehran appears to be avoiding public involvement in the dispute, weakened by the war and aware that open support would damage Hezbollah. This was evident in April 2024, when Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry issued an unprecedented reprimand to Iran’s ambassador in Beirut after he spoke out against Hezbollah’s disarmament.

To counter Hezbollah’s rejection of disarmament, Lebanon needs sustained US economic and political investment, along with continued Israeli action to prevent the terrorist organization’s recovery, aimed at weakening its support among Shiites and diminishing its military and political power.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August  10, 2025.

The massacre unfolding against the Druze in southern Syria, in which hundreds of civilians have been slaughtered, is not just another footnote in a region otherwise filled with constant bloodshed and turmoil. This is a moral test for the international community, and those who claim to stand for human rights and seek to rebuild the country torn apart by decades of civil war and the brutal dictatorship of the Assad regime.

In recent days, we have witnessed Druze civilians systematically hunted, humiliated, and murdered by forces loyal to, or possibly even part of, the Syrian regime of Ahmad al-Sharra: the jihadist-turned-would-be statesman, and new darling of the international community. That same international community has remained largely silent in the face of this unfolding massacre.

But silence is complicity.

As Holocaust survivor Elie Weisel implored us: “We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented. Sometimes we must interfere.”

That is precisely why Israel chose to interfere with military action, to defend the Druze.

The Druze are a small but proud religious and ethnic minority in the Middle East, numbering around one million, primarily in Syria, Lebanon, and northern Israel. In Israel, they are an integral and cherished part of our society. They serve in the military, hold senior positions in government, and have long stood shoulder to shoulder with the Jewish people in defending the state, including fighting in Gaza, after the October 7 massacre by Hamas. They are our brothers-in-arms.

But in Syria, the Druze are now at a perilous crossroad. After more than a decade of civil war, economic collapse, betrayal and hardship, the Druze in the southern Syrian city of Sweida, home to the country’s largest Druze community, sought to peacefully protest for their basic rights, dignity, and freedom.

And for that, they are now in the regime’s crosshairs.
What started with attacks by Bedouin forces against the Druze escalated when government forces entered Sweida, supposedly to oversee a ceasefire. But according to media reports and eye witnesses, the Syrian soldiers, recognisable by their uniforms and military insignia, joined the Bedouins and murdered Druze on the streets and in their homes.

Sickening videos have also emerged of thugs forcibly shaving the beards of Druze men, a calculated act of religious humiliation. Such outrages against personal dignity, particularly acts of humiliating and degrading treatment, constitute clear violations of international law and the Geneva Conventions.

For the Jewish people, this evokes a chilling reminder of one of the darkest chapters in our history, when Nazis similarly sought to strip Jewish men of their dignity and faith by publicly shaving their beards and humiliating them in public. This is not just repression, it is dehumanisation.

And as the world largely stood by – silent, or offering little more than empty words and meek statements of concern – while Druze were massacred in Sweida, I am proud that Israel did not turn its back. The Jewish state showed courage, conviction and leadership, to step in with military force against the Syrian regime, to help defend our Druze brothers.

For Israel, the bond with the Druze is not abstract. It is deeply personal. Their loyalty has never wavered. Nor can ours now.
The Druze have also stood for moderation, coexistence, and resistance to extremism. In a region overrun by Iranian proxies, jihadist militias, and failed regimes, the Druze offer a rare glimmer of hope.

This is not only about doing the right thing and protecting a vulnerable minority. Supporting the Druze is a moral imperative.
Meantime, the international community cannot continue treating President al-Sharra as a legitimate partner on the world stage or welcome Syria into the Abraham Accords, while turning a blind eye to the atrocities that are being committing in Sweida.

It is not enough for al-Sharra to issue vague condemnations or deflect blame onto so-called “outlaw groups.” Even if he did not give the orders, these atrocities are unfolding on his watch, under his authority, carried out by forces loyal to his regime – and reportedly by his own troops.

There must be accountability.

If al-Sharra wishes to be seen as a credible leader or statesman, he must demonstrate it – not with empty rhetoric, but through decisive action. That begins with reining in these jihadist thugs, whether they are merely aligned with his regime or, worse, operating within it.

The Druze of Sweida are not pleading for your sympathy, they are demanding their inalienable right to live in peace and dignity, with full civil rights. What happens next will reveal whether the international community truly seeks a new Syria, or will continue rewarding tyranny with silence. For Israel however, silence was simply not an option.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, July 18, 2025.

May 24, 2000, marked the height of Hezbollah’s glory. A moment in which, from its perspective, it succeeded, for the first time in the Arab world, in causing Israel to unilaterally withdraw from Arab territory (the security zone in southern Lebanon) without a political agreement. That victory not only strengthened its standing in Lebanon and among the Shiite society but also enabled it to complete its takeover of Lebanon and shape a new reality in the country, wherein it is the real sovereign, while the Lebanese government and army became secondary players. It seems that Nasrallah’s “Spider Web” speech, delivered in Bint Jbeil on May 26, 2000, two days after the withdrawal, expressed the smugness and euphoria he fell into at that time, after the terrorist organization achieved the most significant accomplishment in its history.

In Hezbollah’s view, the victory in 2000 constituted a historical turning point.
Under the guise of “resistance,” Hezbollah took over the mechanisms of the Lebanese state and society and granted itself complete freedom of action. The most notable expression of this was the abduction of IDF soldiers Goldwasser and Regev in July 2006 – a military initiative that caught the Lebanese government and its army completely by surprise. Nasrallah acted smugly and with a sense of superiority toward Israel, believing he understood its weak points after decoding the Israeli genome. But in reality, he miscalculated, and Israel chose to respond with full-scale war (the Second Lebanon War).

After the failures of the Second Lebanon War, both sides sought to learn from it and prepare for the next campaign. Hezbollah, with the support of Iran’s Quds Force, began an impressive force-building process, including the precision missile project, the establishment of the Radwan Force intended for the “conquest of the Galilee,” and broad strengthening of its logistics and combat systems. The organization built itself into an advanced army, equipped with modern weapons and diverse capabilities.
But in Israel, a quiet yet powerful transformation took place: a dramatic intelligence improvement and the intensification of precise counteraction capabilities.

All of this was manifested with great force during the war that broke out in October 2023, especially from late July 2024, when Hezbollah’s “Chief of Staff” Fuad Shukr was eliminated, and the peak that transpired in September 2024 with the surprise attack – the “Pager Attack” – through which Israel succeeded in striking deep into Hezbollah’s command and control arrays, and through a series of eliminations it carried out during the war, it succeeded in eliminating the organization’s leadership: Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safi al-Din, operations commander Ibrahim Aqil, southern front commander Ali Karaki, Mohammad Jaafar Qasir – commander of Unit 4400 (responsible for smuggling weapons from Iran to Lebanon), and many others. The combination of accurate intelligence and lethal means created a move that reshuffled the deck for Hezbollah.

According to the Alma Center, Israel succeeded in impairing 176 senior Hezbollah members – leadership, high to mid-level military command, knowledge centers, and so forth.

Since the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah is undergoing a deep internal review.
The organization is investigating how Israel managed to achieve such dramatic successes and how it penetrated its systems so deeply. It claims to have arrested spy networks working for Israel. But the simple fact is that Hezbollah was critically harmed – physically, economically, morally, and cognitively – and needs a long and comprehensive rehabilitation of its military, intelligence, and political power.

Meanwhile, it must also deal with a difficult internal challenge: rebuilding trust within the Shiite community, which suffered heavy losses in the war. The community, which supported it for years out of a sense of mission and resistance to Israel, is showing signs of fatigue. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem understands the difficulty facing the organization and accordingly signaled again in his speech marking the withdrawal anniversary on May 25, 2025, that the organization will not be dragged into a new confrontation with Israel and is leaving the lead in dealing with Israel to the Lebanese government.

But not everything is bad for Hezbollah: In the municipal elections, the organization succeeded in maintaining its influence in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Beirut.
It proves that in the civil and municipal sphere – its power is still great. Its political, economic, and social infrastructures still give it an inherent advantage that has not eroded.

Still, Hezbollah stands before a dual strategic challenge: External – rehabilitating deterrence and power against Israel, and internal – maintaining hegemony within Lebanon.
Initiatives by senior Lebanese state officials – led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam – to advance Hezbollah’s disarmament, illustrate the state’s attempt to rid itself of Hezbollah’s hegemony. But there is serious doubt whether declarations alone will succeed in forcing Hezbollah to give up its weapons, which are the backbone of its power and influence.

To challenge Hezbollah’s power, a comprehensive American strategy is needed, that will help the Lebanese state draw the Shiite community closer via a broad mechanism that will offer it patronage and aim to sever its dependence on Iran and Hezbollah, thus eroding Hezbollah’s social base. Alongside this, the U.S. must strengthen the Lebanese army by removing Hezbollah’s influence over it, primarily through Shiite officers in its ranks holding army roles.

Despite the Trump administration’s desire to achieve immediate gains against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is difficult to expect that the United States will be able to reap immediate benefits in the country when faced with a comprehensive Iranian strategy that has been implemented in Lebanon since the early 1980s. Therefore, the Trump administration should adopt a long-term perspective aimed at leading deep processes that cannot be completed hastily.

The Trump administration should encourage the Lebanese state to regain sovereignty at Hezbollah’s expense. In light of Hezbollah’s weakening, significant signs already indicate the Lebanese state’s strengthening since the ceasefire. This includes the election (January 2025) of Joseph Aoun as president (after two years without a president, during which Hezbollah pushed for Suleiman Frangieh’s election), who already declared at his inauguration that only the Lebanese state would act to remove the “Israeli occupation,” and subsequently the election of Nawaf Salam as prime minister; the summons of Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, (April 2025) for a historic reprimand after publicly criticizing the Lebanese initiative to disarm Hezbollah, calling it a “clear conspiracy” and warning against “falling into the enemy’s trap” ; the suspension of flights from Iran to Lebanon in January 2025—prompted by Israel’s threat to target Beirut Airport due to its use by Tehran for smuggling to Hezbollah—which paved the way for a broader initiative by the Lebanese state to assert control over the airport. Reportedly, in early May, Hezbollah’s significant foothold at this strategic site was impaired after dozens of airport employees suspected of ties to it were fired, and inspection procedures were tightened.

These early signs of the Lebanese state’s reclaiming of sovereignty and the erosion of Hezbollah’s influence are significant and promising yet still fall short of bringing about a historic transformation in Lebanon.

Thus, despite PM Salam’s recent declaration (May 26) that the era of exporting the Iranian revolution to Lebanon is over, as important as it is, it is still not enough to produce real change. Hezbollah, apparently now led by two of its surviving commanders, Mohammad Haidar and Haitham Ali Tabatabai (alongside Secretary General Naim Qassem), is now experiencing, indeed, the most significant crisis in its history.

Nonetheless, according to Alma Center’s assessment, Hezbollah still holds around 20,000 rockets of all sorts and is assisted by Quds Force personnel in Lebanon to rebuild its force and readiness. Due to the difficulty in smuggling arms from Iran, including thwarted attempts via Syria by the new regime, the organization is striving to rebuild its missile arsenal via local production, however, under continued Israeli attacks, it is also seeking to establish a maritime smuggling route in collaboration with Iran. Moreover, Hezbollah has come to recognize a disconnect between its military capabilities and its capacity to fully exercise them, due to opposition from the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, it is actively striving to rebuild and strengthen itself in order to regain its footing.

In conclusion, 25 years after the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah, now in the deepest crisis of its history, is no longer the same organization. Hezbollah must adapt to the absence of Nasrallah, who played such a dominant role in the organization since the 1990s, and cultivate a new generation of commanders (including senior officers at the unit and regional command levels) to fill the ranks in place of their eliminated peers.
History remembers the withdrawal as a rare achievement for it, but the present and the future confront it with significant challenges.

Published in Alma, May 29, 2025.

Close to a month into the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, the daily rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has stopped, but since the very first day, the IDF has had to act to counter Hezbollah’s attempts to transfer weaponry into southern Lebanon. Given this situation, we must ask: has the government’s stated goal of safely returning northern residents to their homes been achieved? And what are the long-term implications if, within 60 days, the IDF withdraws from southern Lebanon as stipulated in the agreement?

On one hand, significant achievements have been made against Hezbollah. Most of their missile arsenal and production capabilities have been destroyed, and their senior leadership and operational command have been eliminated. Hezbollah is now weaker than it has been in 20 years. Many of the border villages in which Hezbollah was entrenched have been heavily damaged, and there is currently no immediate threat of an invasion by Radwan forces. One could argue that since there is no immediate threat to northern communities, life can begin to return to normal. This time, Israel would be determined to enforce the agreement through the international supervision mechanism and unilaterally from its own territory when necessary.

The problem is that to truly restore life and rehabilitate Israel’s north, which has been abandoned for over a year, achieving short-term quiet is not enough. The real question is whether, under these conditions, Israel can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament and the resurgence of a direct threat to its border communities. And the answer is that, in this sense, we are far from achieving the war’s objectives for the Lebanese front.

The critical point of failure here is the reported requirement for Israel to withdraw the IDF back within the Blue Line within 60 days. For anyone who has been there to see it with their own eyes, it becomes undeniably clear that the way the Blue Line cuts through the terrain makes this border indefensible for Israel. The topography along most of the line places Lebanese villages in elevated positions overlooking and dominating Israeli communities. If we learned one thing from October 7, it is that we must not accept a situation where hostile villages, serving as bases for a terror army operating under civilian cover, exist in close proximity and topographic dominance of Israeli towns.

Have we learned nothing from the failed attempts to rely on international supervision for our security? And has the Lebanese army done anything to prove it could effectively fulfill the role of enforcer of Hezbollah’s perpetual disarmament south of the Litani River? Anyone who thinks the IDF can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament through visual intelligence and standoff airstrikes alone is sorely mistaken.

The only way to secure Israel’s north, bring residents back, and rehabilitate the region in the long term is to maintain a buffer zone along the first mountain ridge in southern Lebanon. This area should be defined as a no-man’s-land, prohibiting any movement, with the IDF maintaining control over the high ground overlooking Israel. Only from this forward defensive position can the IDF effectively act against Hezbollah’s rearmament and prevent the threat of invasion or anti-tank fire into northern communities. Such a buffer zone would not even require holding the entire area up to the Litani River and could even be smaller than the previous Security Zone.

From the first day of the agreement, Hezbollah has been violating it with repeated attempts to infiltrate forces and weapons into southern Lebanon and has even fired into Israeli territory on Mount Dov. Israel cannot be expected to fully withdraw its forces under such conditions.

The incoming Trump administration is indeed interested in achieving ceasefires on all fronts, but it will not impose terms of defeat on Israel. Trump primarily seeks to halt the intense fighting that could spread to other arenas. However, maintaining the buffer zone, which in practice already exists, is simply enforcing the ceasefire conditions from a forward position and should remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Hezbollah has been dealt a great blow, but it is by no means defeated. A full Israeli withdrawal at this time means that many residents will not return, placing Israel’s north in an economic tailspin, and will ensure that within a few years, those who do remain in the north will live under severe security threats. Only maintaining a forward Israeli presence to proactively prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament in the area can prevent this and justify the price we have paid thus far.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 24, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

The emerging ceasefire with Hezbollah may include a strategic achievement by decoupling the Lebanon and Gaza theaters, but it also reveals a missed golden opportunity for Israel. Iran is conspicuously absent from the ceasefire agreement; it is neither a party to the deal nor bound by it, and it is highly unlikely that Iran would relinquish Hezbollah – its leading strategic arm in the Middle East – which plays a key role in advancing the Regime’s plans to destroy Israel and for regional hegemony. Iran is expected, immediately after the ceasefire, to initiate a comprehensive plan to rebuild Hezbollah and preserve its dominance in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, for its part, will focus on internal recovery and restoration of its status, especially considering the criticism from its social base in the Shiite community. With its billions of dollars from Iran, it will launch a massive reconstruction effort. Meanwhile, various Quds Force units responsible for arming and strengthening Hezbollah will continue their quiet activities of arms smuggling (Unit 190) and improvement of missile accuracy, range, and destructive capabilities (Unit 340). These units were recently exposed by media coverage of the strategic struggle between Israel and Iran. Additionally, Hezbollah operatives, including the Radwan Force, will resume training in Iran, including preparations to pursue their ambitions of invading Israel as part of their “Galilee Conquest” plan.

The emerging ceasefire agreement brings to light several problems. As evidenced by the experience with UNIFIL, Israel cannot entrust its security to foreign entities tasked with enforcing UN Resolution 1701 in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) – a central pillar of US strategy in Lebanon – is infiltrated by Hezbollah, with some of its officers doubling as operatives. The LAF is outmatched by Hezbollah and lacks the ability or motivation to confront it as the US hopes.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already declared, including in his most recent speech (Monday), that Hezbollah is the war’s victor. Similarly, Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Mohammad Bagheri, asserted yesterday that Israel’s aspiration to restore security to its northern residents is merely an illusion.

Despite the unprecedented blows to Hezbollah, including the elimination of its senior leadership and the death of its leader, Tehran is looking ahead. It is leveraging Hezbollah’s survival and the continuous missile and UAV attacks to claim victory and advance its learning process to better prepare for the next war.

The absence of a secure buffer zone guarantees that Hezbollah will return to the border, shielded by southern Lebanese residents, to renew the potential threat even as it rebuilds its infrastructure (with massive Iranian support). Once Israel withdraws from Lebanon and releases its reserve forces, it will face difficulty resuming large-scale combat against Hezbollah. Additionally, the lack of any robust mechanism guaranteeing Israel freedom of action in response to future violations by Hezbollah – likely under Iran’s guidance – justifies the grievance and sense of disappointment felt by Israelis.

Israel’s significant battlefield achievements in Lebanon have not translated into principles that ensure the goals of the war are met; the agreement does not reflect Israel’s freedom from the “October 6 conception.” As long as Iran, which directs the proxy network with Hezbollah as its “crown jewel,” is not addressed, the Regime is likely to continue its subversion into Lebanon, its security in Hezbollah’s dominance, and its grip on the country remains unchallenged and ensured. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, November  27, 2024.

It is hard to think of a United Nations agency with a more glaring failure in its core mission than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, more commonly known as UNIFIL — and there has certainly been no shortage of contenders this year.

Following the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war, which was initiated after Hezbollah terrorists ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two others, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1701. This mandated the creation of a demilitarized zone south of Lebanon’s Litani River and entrusted UNIFIL to oversee Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal from the area.

That, however, did not happen.

Instead, with the acquiescence of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah entrenched itself, including literally burrowing in tunnels, along the common border with Israel. It amassed an arsenal of 150,000 or more Iranian-made precision guided rockets, in addition to an arsenal of missiles and suicide drones. All of this happened under the watchful eye of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness has been underscored over the last 12 months. A day after Hamas’s rampage in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Hezbollah joined the war as well, with notional plans to recreate a similar massacre in Israel’s north. Since then, the group has fired more than 10,000 rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon, killing dozens and displacing tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes.

One may be forgiven for asking what, if anything, UNIFIL has done to uphold UNSCR 1701. The answer: nothing of substance.

Just this week, Hezbollah terror tunnels and weapons caches meters away from UNIFIL observation posts and bases, literally right under the noses of U.N. peacekeepers. That UNIFIL was unaware of this state of affairs is simply implausible.

Rather, it has either been grossly incompetent, acting as no more than as a passive bystander while Iran’s chief terrorist proxy arms itself for war with Israel. Or, worse yet, it has become a shield allowing Hezbollah to attack Israeli civilian communities while complicating Israel’s subsequent response.

On Sunday, a statement issued on behalf of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres defiantly reiterated that “UNIFIL peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly.” That’s a lofty statement, to be sure. But it obscures the real contours of the problem.

By staying in place, UNIFIL is not only obstructing the IDF’s legitimate military operations against Hezbollah, it is also recklessly putting its own peacekeepers at risk.

Just the other day, five UNIFIL peacekeepers were inadvertently injured when Israeli forces fired in the direction of their Lebanon headquarters in Naqoura, while engaged in a fight against Hezbollah terrorists in the vicinity. This tragic consequence was the result of UNIFIL’s rejection of repeated prior requests by Israel for it to withdraw from Hezbollah strongholds and active combat zones.

But UNIFIL isn’t just an obstacle; it has also become an active enabler. Over the last month, at least 25 rockets and missiles have been launched at Israeli communities and troops from Hezbollah terrorist compounds embedded near UNIFIL posts in southern Lebanon, exploiting their proximity to U.N. forces. One of the attacks even resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers.

How, then, can UNIFIL be entrusted to keep the peace and continue its mission?

In the 18 years since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has been an abject failure, allowing Hezbollah to rearm and entrench itself in southern Lebanon, setting the stage for the current conflict in the process. Moreover, it has done so with international support and American largesse. Last year, the U.S. appropriated $143 million to UNIFIL for 2023, amounting to about one-quarter of the force’s total budget of $507 million. And once the current war ends, history suggests it won’t not take long for Hezbollah to return to southern Lebanon, in spite of UNIFIL’s presence there.

For the time being, however, there are only two feasible options. Either UNIFIL ceases to serve as a willing pawn for Hezbollah and actually enforces UNSCR 1701, or it closes up shop and leaves.

In other words, the U.N. should either do its job or let Israel do it.

The article was written in collaboration with Ilan Berman from the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

Published in The Hill, October 17, 2024.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

When Hamas launched its offensive on October 7, the IDF mobilized many reserve forces. Part of this force was sent to the northern front, recognizing that Hezbollah has the capability and motivation to join the battle, with its Radwan force having been equipped, trained, and prepared to invade the Galilee for years. The deployment of forces to the north was aimed at taking up defensive positions before Hezbollah could attempt to execute its plans. Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict on October 8 began with relatively low-scale fire, mainly targeting military objectives. Later, as the organization gained confidence and identified a policy of containment on the part of Israel, it ramped up fire across the entire front.

At the beginning of the campaign, Israel chose to separate the fronts and focus its primary efforts on the southern front. This situation persisted for nearly ten months. The Israeli intelligence-driven offensive on September 17, 2024 signaled a change in approach, and since then, Israel has been engaged in an expanding and evolving offensive against Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. After eliminating Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and decapitating a significant portion of the organization’s senior command levels, as well as damaging its infrastructure, Israel launched a limited ground operation in southern Lebanon in early October 2024.

To this end, the Israeli government added an additional war goal, stating that the State of Israel would work to safely return the displaced residents of the North, who had evacuated their homes as Hezbollah ramped up its attacks. Based on what is publicly known, the IDF’s ground operation is advancing cautiously, with forces currently operating only in the area adjacent to the line of engagement with an aim to destroy terrorist infrastructure close to the border (approximately 4 km deep). After four weeks of ground operations, a reality more severe than the Israeli intelligence likely knew has emerged—and far more than what was made clear to the public before the ground operation.

Hezbollah has built an extensive terrorist infrastructure. This was done under the laxity of the Lebanese army, which failed to fulfill its obligations; under the eyes of the UNIFIL forces; and most gravely, due to Israel’s decision not to instruct the IDF to thwart the transfer of massive quantities of weapons into the area. Weapons and equipment stockpiles were stored in extensive tunneling that reached very close to the Israeli border, and in at least one case, even crossed it. Extensive use was made of residential homes and civilian infrastructures such as mosques and schools. In fact, nearly every house and building in the Shiite villages along the front have been turned into a Hezbollah military outpost or prepared for offensive military effort. While it is clear that the overwhelming majority of buildings in these Shiite villages are considered legitimate military targets, and although it is evident that clearing the area cannot be limited to narrow surgical operations in a strip of a few kilometers, the IDF has so far refrained from systematically and thoroughly destroying all of these buildings.

However, even if a security buffer zone of a few kilometers’ width is created, this space will not provide adequate protection to northern communities and will not allow evacuated residents to return to their homes safely. Defending the northern communities requires a broader approach that does not limit itself to addressing only the line of engagement. This defense requires the removal of Hezbollah forces from the entire area, at least up to the Litani River, and in certain areas where the river’s course is closer to the Israeli border, even beyond. Since Hezbollah operatives are integrated into the Shiite villages––some even living there––and given that many of the Shiite villages conceal terrorist infrastructure, it will not be possible to allow residents of these villages to return to southern Lebanon. The map below illustrates a small portion of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure up to the Litani in the eastern sector (as of 2015).

In the initial phase, the IDF must take control of the entire area up to the Litani River (and in certain places beyond it) while fully evacuating the population of the Shiite villages in the area for their protection and to allow for the clearing of the area without endangering the Lebanese population. The IDF has already begun the process of evacuating the population, but there is still work to do as it is necessary to address the presence of terrorist infrastructure in the city of Tyre, which lies south of the Litani.

The operation in southern Lebanon is closely linked to the overall strategy of the State of Israel. The extent of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah creates an opportunity to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah to the point where it is no longer a relevant threat to Israel by continuously and persistently thwarting its efforts to recuperate and reconstitute itself.

In southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River and beyond where necessary, full Israeli control is required, preventing residents from returning to the villages to avoid Hezbollah operatives returning under the guise of the civilian population. The Shiite region must be completely cleared of any military and civilian presence under Hezbollah’s cover. Regarding other villages, a specific assessment will be needed to determine the level of threat posed by their population to Israel’s security, and a policy will need to be established regarding monitoring their exit from and return to the area. As for how the IDF should take southern Lebanon, this article does not provide an operational outline, but it is expected that IDF commanders will carry out this mission in a cunning and creative manner.

A second area of operations would be between the Litani River and the Awali River and the Qaroun Lake line in the east. This area will serve as an immediate depth zone of operation for the IDF to prevent capabilities from drifting towards the Litani. The IDF can operate through aerial actions and special operations. Lastly, operations, mainly aerial, should be carried out throughout Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its military capabilities.

Until an agreement that meets Israel’s security needs is achieved (although under current conditions and for the foreseeable future, it is unclear if such an agreement can be established), there should be a buffer zone (security perimeter) established north of the security zone in southern Lebanon. This area must be cleared of infrastructure and buildings, enabling observation and fire control to prevent any entry into the security zone established in southern Lebanon and to destroy any Hezbollah force attempting to return to this area. This should resemble the buffer zone along the Gaza Strip border. In the case of Lebanon, this zone should be 2–4 km wide depending on the terrain conditions. Therefore, a quick and efficient clearing of the area is required. For this purpose, maneuvering must be expanded and civilian structures destroyed to render the entire area uninhabitable.

Such a move would impose a painful cost on Hezbollah and the Shiite population in southern Lebanon that supports it, serving as a catalyst for Lebanon and the international community to dismantle Hezbollah and reach a security arrangement acceptable to Israel. Above all, it would allow effective military control and presence in the area until such an agreement is achieved. Given that this is likely to require a long-term commitment––perhaps even years until an achievable and enforceable agreement is reached––the IDF must prepare optimal conditions for military control in the area, which must also be better protected.

This improved defense will be achieved by emptying the area of its residents and blocking access to it while considering any entity trying to enter the area as a hostile element to be neutralized. This reality is fundamentally different from what we knew during the 18 years when the IDF was in the security zone. In those years, the zone remained populated, and despite the actions of the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Hezbollah found it relatively easy to penetrate the area with the support of the large Shiite population and launch attacks on IDF and SLA forces.

Simultaneously with the necessary military organization in southern Lebanon, the IDF must continue its offensive actions against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. In this regard, there cannot be and should not be a ceasefire until the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Resolution 1701, meanwhile, should be discarded in the annals of history, as it is demonstrably unenforceable, nor can one rely on international actors for its implementation. Israel, after October 7, cannot afford to revert to a doctrine of containment regarding Hezbollah’s growing strength. What is more, the ongoing pursuit of Hezbollah operatives, leaders, and military assets in turn weakens Iran and its entire axis. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of Iran, the spearhead, and the center of gravity in Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel. Harming this key Iranian asset necessarily harms Iran, the central factor undermining regional security.

The effort in the northern arena must continue alongside the effort in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is dismantled and the conditions are set for a civilian governance alternative with Israeli security responsibility and full military freedom of action in order to prevent any attempt by Hamas to recuperate and rebuild its military and governmental capabilities.

All these efforts are intended to pave the way for the third effort. This effort should focus on weakening Iran itself through strikes on military and governmental assets, and subsequently on its nuclear infrastructure. Following Iran’s 181-ballistic missile barrage launched at Israel which targeted military and civilian infrastructure alike (1 October 2024) and Israel’s precise and targeted retaliatory strike against Iranian military infrastructure (26 October 2024), Iran seems poised to respond. Should it choose to, Israel’s ambition should be to utilize such an Iranian response to persuade the United States to prepare to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Should Israel fail in this crucial effort, it must prepare to carry out this operation independently.

The fourth effort should focus on painful responses in Yemen, western Iraq, and southern Syria in response to missile and drone launches from these areas. As part of this effort, Israel should make it clear to Syria’s president that it would be in his best interest to restrict the steps of Iran and the Shiite militias operating within Syria’s sovereign territory or else his regime would be in danger.

It may seem that the multitude of required efforts stretches Israel’s capabilities to the limit. Indeed, this series of efforts demands significant resource investment and is not without risks. However, in the reality that has emerged, Israel wields strategic momentum that it cannot afford to lose. Israel has no choice but to maintain and enhance its momentum as it can lead to the weakening of the entire Iranian axis and the laying of the foundations for establishing a new regional architecture, which–– beyond its contribution to regional security, stability, and prosperity–– would further weaken and restrain the Iranian axis and open new opportunities for addressing the Palestinian issue.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to the political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

1. This map, which includes only the eastern sector, was released by the IDF in 2015. Since then, Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure has expanded significantly and is likely much broader today.