“If we asked the US and Turkey how they see the future of the world and the region in ten years, we would get two completely opposite answers, and that is the whole story.” Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias, who spent years as his country’s foreign minister, offered that assessment this past February. It captures a chasm that Tom Barrack, the American ambassador to Turkey and President Donald Trump’s special envoy to Syria, still seems unable, or unwilling, to see.

Prime Minister Netanyahu laid out the logic behind the alleged Israeli strike in northern Syria without ambiguity. “We will not tolerate a Turkish military buildup pushing southward, because it threatens us,” he said, “and we made that clear in general terms.” Israel had detected Turkish plans to establish a foothold at an airfield south of its own lines, near Aleppo, and responded with a single-word warning. “‘Don’t.’ The message got through, but apparently it wasn’t heard, so we made sure they understood.”

Additional details about Israel’s diplomatic groundwork emerged over the weekend, apparently in response to criticism. Israel had shared intelligence on Turkey’s intentions with Washington, reports indicated, and separately passed a direct warning to regime officials in Damascus.

The air force strike on the Abu al-Duhur military airfield aimed to prevent a shift in the regional balance of power and protect Israel’s freedom of action. Acting early, before a new and harder-to-reverse reality took hold, made more sense than waiting until entrenched Turkish assets raised the stakes of any future confrontation. Israel struck only after its warnings went unanswered. Under those circumstances, the operation was not just justified – it was necessary. In this neighborhood, people tend to listen only once actions start speaking.

A broader vision

No country plays the great-power rivalry and Middle East upheaval better than Turkey. It dances at every wedding, collecting a diplomatic broker’s fee from every player at the table, and uses the chaos to cement its status as the region’s dominant power.

Since Assad’s regime collapsed and Iran’s military presence was pushed out, Turkey has become the central power broker in Syria. It has expanded from local control in the country’s north into wall-to-wall influence over the entire state. Today, Ankara is the chief patron of the new government in Damascus, rebuilding infrastructure and standing up Syria’s air force and army. It’s deepening its grip through energy projects, trade corridors, transportation networks and phosphate mining.

Syria is just one piece of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s larger vision of “neo-Ottomanism” (reviving Turkish influence across former Ottoman lands). He is pushing to restore Turkey to regional-superpower status and extend its reach well past its formal borders. That ambition was on full display in Turkey’s recent signing of the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” (MJDA, a mutual defense pact) with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It showed up earlier too, in Ankara’s push to open intercontinental trade routes, its deepening footprint in Africa, and its embrace of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine (Mavi Vatan, a maritime expansion strategy) projecting influence across the eastern Mediterranean.

Layer Erdoğan’s open hostility toward Israel on top of all that, and the potential for a strategic collision becomes hard to dismiss, and that’s before even mentioning the Palestinian issue or his support for Hamas.

Turkey is not Iran

Just last year, Turkey hosted a conference in Ankara of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (an international clerical body), where participants reached a consensus granting religious sanction to the October 7 attack and declared that “the existence of the Zionist entity has no religious validity.” Senior Hamas figures, some tied to directing terror cells in Judea and Samaria straight from Istanbul, continue operating on Turkish soil to this day. Turkey is also waging a legal and public-relations campaign accusing Israel of war crimes.

Still, Turkey is not Iran. It belongs to NATO. Erdoğan maintains a close relationship with President Trump. And Israel’s ties with Ankara, despite a deep crisis, have not fully unravelled. Precisely to keep that rivalry from tipping into military confrontation, clarifying the red lines made sense, and that is exactly what Israel’s air force strike in northern Syria accomplished.

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s statement that Damascus expects security negotiations to resume soon suggests the message landed. Israel should not rush, and should not, under any circumstances, agree to restrict its own freedom of action at sea, in the air or on land. The views voiced in recent days by American envoy Tom Barrack should serve as a serious wake-up call for anyone still betting on “international coordination mechanisms.”

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 26, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The flood of incessant statements from Tehran and Hezbollah strongholds against the framework agreement signed over the weekend reflects the deep frustration and sense of defeat overwhelming them. Only a week after declaring that “missile-based Iranian diplomacy” is what “protects Beirut from Israel,” Hezbollah and Iran are forced to recalculate their route.

“The agreement is invalid – we will continue to apply pressure for an Israeli withdrawal,” Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem responded. Echoing his sentiments, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri charged that the agreement is designed to sow division and civil war – a scenario that triggers severe anxiety across all strata of the Lebanese population. Iranian spokespersons focused primarily on denying the validity of the framework agreement, such as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who called on the US to “restrain Israel” and emphasized that under the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran, Washington must pressure Israel to halt its attacks and withdraw from Lebanese territory.

Understanding the administration

Developments in the Lebanese arena caught senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials in Tehran while they were preoccupied with a series of other burning issues, including the exchange of blows with the US, the Strait of Hormuz issue, developments in Iraq, and the statement by Gulf foreign ministers calling for the inclusion of ballistic missiles, drones, and Iranian support for proxy groups in the emerging agreement with Tehran.

The leadership in Tehran presumably seeks to understand the actions of the US administration, questioning whether this series of events marks the beginning of a shift in direction toward them. They wonder if the commitment to Iran to limit Israeli activity in Lebanon was part of a “conspiracy” leading up to the signing of an Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Assuming the administration remains concerned about the midterm elections, they are likely weighing how much further it can be pressured for concessions in Lebanon and on other issues.

The price Iran and Hezbollah are required to pay due to the agreement between Israel and Lebanon concerns demands to end Iranian involvement in Lebanese affairs and to disarm Hezbollah. The agreement directly links the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah, thereby refuting the claim that the IDF presence on Lebanese soil is illegitimate. While these are critical issues for Iran and Hezbollah, they do not necessitate immediate action on the ground as long as the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces do not alter their operational patterns.

Conversely, if the IDF views itself as liberated from the restrictions the US imposed following the “memorandum of understanding” and operates differently than it has over the past two weeks, it will serve as evidence of the practical dissolution – and not just in declarations – of the link Iran attempted to forge between the two arenas. Such a development would impale the Iranian regime on the horns of a dilemma between wanting to maintain its involvement in Lebanon and the price it might be forced to pay, not only in the Lebanese arena.

Sooner or later, Israel will be required to test the validity of the commitments granted to it in the “framework agreement” compared to the commitments the US gave to Iran in the “memorandum of understanding.”

Neutralizing, or at the very least significantly reducing, Iranian influence in this arena is critical to Israeli security, though Iran views its own involvement in the same arena in a similar light. The missile fire from Iran toward Israel following IDF strikes in the Dahiya has pushed the confrontation into a new phase. On the path to neutralizing Iranian influence, Israel will also need to shatter this equation. While this may not be required immediately, it is prudent to plan the move right now.

Recent speeches by Sheikh Naim Qassem offer a closer look at the organization’s current doctrine, in which he outlines five foundational pillars.

The first is the understanding that Hezbollah faces an existential threat due to the shift in the regional balance of power and in light of the “American-Israeli project to erase the Axis of Resistance.” Defining this as an existential threat mandates utilizing all resources and operating by any means necessary to remove it.

The second emphasis is that there is no turning back to the reality imposed on Hezbollah before the start of the current chapter of fighting on March 2. The organization will not accept “any form of occupation” and will not agree to what Israel terms “freedom of action” inside Lebanese territory.

The third is that as long as a threat looms against it, disarming Hezbollah remains “outside the boundaries of legitimate discourse.”

The fourth is that the organization adheres to its aspiration for national unity while preserving internal balances.

The fifth is that any diplomatic settlement must guarantee Lebanese sovereignty, based on an equation of “security for security” and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River.

The framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon undermines some of these pillars and paves the way for an open confrontation between the terror organization and the Lebanese government. Whether the government will be capable of this remains uncertain, as structural reforms within the administration and the Lebanese Armed Forces are essential for this purpose, and their implementation could take years.

Even before discussing its disarmament, Israel must continue to prevent the rehabilitation of Hezbollah, the rebuilding of its arrays, and its reinforcement processes. At least for the foreseeable future, a military presence and operational freedom of security action will remain the key to achieving this.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  29, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The IDF’s ground maneuver in southern Lebanon has been suspended for the time being, but Israel still holds extensive territories in the southern Lebanon region, more than it held in the years preceding the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. As part of the maneuver, the IDF captured a massive Hezbollah tunnel in the Shia village of Majdal Zoun, located eight kilometers from the Israeli border. This was not a surprise for the IDF, as it is a tunnel of strategic importance for Hezbollah that was known to Israel.

In practice, already during 2024, the tunnel was attacked by the Israeli Air Force and was partially blocked. Hezbollah attempted to rehabilitate the strategic site under the radar, just as it did in other areas in southern Lebanon attacked by Israel, to continue threatening the communities of the north and the Israeli coastline.

Therefore, the IDF chose this time to attack the tunnel from the ground. IDF forces entered Majdal Zoun by land and reached the terror infrastructures built there, both on the surface and underground, at a depth of about 25 meters beneath them. According to the IDF’s announcement, an underground route about 200 meters long was located, containing 4 launch shafts and 12 rooms for residency and the storage of explosive devices, anti-tank missiles, and UAVs throughout the entire area. In the battles in the village, more than 20 Hezbollah terrorists were eliminated, 10 of whom belonged to Hezbollah’s elite “Radwan” force.

As part of the tactic of using the civilian space as a shield, Hezbollah stored its observation posts and weapons depots in the village beneath civilian structures, a mosque, and a school. This is precisely the infrastructure that was intended to allow the terror organization to assemble, store, and launch UAVs from the heart of the civilian space. By doing so, it sought to make it difficult for Israel to strike it, and in fact left the IDF with no choice but to publish evacuation notices to minimize harm to civilians as much as possible as part of its warfare against Hezbollah.

IDF commanders operating in Majdal Zoun told the media that the forces found more than 50 UAVs in the village, including models with a wingspan of 2.5 meters, and over 8 tons of additional weaponry. The UAVs arrived disassembled, were assembled, and were launched from Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure in Majdal Zoun. The range of these UAVs reaches 200 to 500 km, which sharpens the severity of the threat posed by the strategic tunnel that was thwarted, which threatened far beyond the region of northern Israel and most of Israel’s coastline. Accordingly, the IDF announced that this was practically a “UAV airfield” that Hezbollah attempted to cover up underneath a civilian village.

At the same time, Hezbollah does not hide its aspirations to restart its plan for the “Conquest of the Galilee.” Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa stated in an interview with the Lebanese media on June 18 that the organization is committed to the “Galilee Conquest Plan,” and that it is preparing to execute it as soon as it can in the future. In parallel with the round of talks between Israel and the State of Lebanon in Washington on June 23, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem declared that the organization insists on a total Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, after which the Lebanese Army will deploy alone in the southern Lebanon region. According to Qassem, his organization will cooperate with the Lebanese Army based on mutual trust, “just as we did before.”

However, the deception of Hezbollah and southern Lebanon was exposed in the “Lion’s Roar” war. Contrary to the declarations of the Lebanese Army, and following it the Lebanese government, Hezbollah did not withdraw its forces from the southern Lebanon region, thereby enabling it to launch missiles and rockets against Israel from the southern Lebanon region during the war, and even to carry out an infiltration attempt using a Hezbollah terrorist who was eliminated by the IDF after infiltrating an Israeli enclave in the Ramim Ridge area of the Upper Galilee.

Despite suffering severe blows, the regime in Iran is encouraged by its achievements in the war, especially against the backdrop of the memorandum of understanding that is expected to guarantee it significant economic dividends. At the same time, statements by senior officials are heard in Iran from time to time about initiating a multi-arena invasion against Israel in cooperation with all components of the “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah’s motivation to participate in such a future attack, as reflected in Wafiq Safa’s statement, and the weakness displayed by the Lebanese Army in confronting Hezbollah, obligate Israel to continue holding the buffer zone to protect its border. In the face of pressure from the Trump administration, Israel must make it clear to Washington that the IDF will remain in the buffer zone as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed, since this is a red line for it, and a first-rate strategic interest concerning its national security and its continued existence.

In the interview, Wafiq Safa, who was close to Nasrallah, also admitted that Nasrallah could not bear the sights of the wounded from the pager attack. According to him, if he had not been eliminated by Israel, he would have died of grief. He stopped eating and barely drank. As Safa described it: “Everything that happened in the 40 years preceding the pager attack was one thing; the pager attack was something entirely different.”

Safa’s words make it very clear that through sophisticated warfare, Israel can break the spirit of the bitterest enemy. According to recent reports in the Lebanese media, one of the conditions Israel is placing in negotiations with the State of Lebanon for a withdrawal from the country is that the Lebanese Army must take control of the Ali al-Tahar Ridge area, expel Hezbollah operatives, and destroy the existing facilities there, under American supervision. After this is executed, IDF forces will withdraw from the villages of Zoutar and Kfar Tibnit.

Afterward, similar steps will be taken on a larger scale before any further Israeli withdrawal south of the Litani River. It is evident that Israel’s partners in the leadership of the State of Lebanon, who are also interested in the eradication of Hezbollah, will be able to complete the activity against Hezbollah if they act to strengthen the Lebanese Army so that it can serve as a body that enforces the government’s decisions against it. Alongside this, the State of Lebanon must act to sever Hezbollah’s control over the Shia community in the country, the exclusive power supplier of its military and political strength.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June  25, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

To deal with Hezbollah’s drone threat, Beirut must be brought into the equation.

At the heart of the matter is the understanding that defensive measures, and even offensive efforts against every component of Hezbollah’s value chain related to drone weapons, will not be enough to prevent their use against us. The availability of this weapon, its low cost and its simple and safe operation will preserve the motivation to use it and will make it difficult for our forces to chase down and eradicate every last drone.

Effectively confronting this threat depends on the ability to make Hezbollah question whether using it against the Israel Defense Forces is worthwhile. That can be achieved only through strikes and the toppling of buildings in Beirut.

According to media reports, at a meeting of the limited cabinet held last night, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir and government ministers supported this approach and recommended striking Beirut in response to explosive drone attacks.

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the drone attacks have continued unabated since then, Israel has so far refrained from striking the Lebanese capital. Instead, the internet is filled with stories about private initiatives to purchase fishing nets and other means of improving protection for our forces.

The current restriction on fire, in accordance with the American demand, provides Hezbollah with defensive space and prevents Israel from using its aerial superiority against it. In doing so, it also assists the terrorist organization in its efforts to restore the response equations that prevailed before November 2024.

Without detracting from the importance of defensive components, techno-tactical tools and the effort to locate and destroy production facilities, warehouses and drone operators, the effective path to dealing with this threat runs through Beirut.

To make Hezbollah question the wisdom of using these means, a price must be exacted from it that it cannot tolerate. That can be achieved only by striking targets in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut.

Not only targeted operations and eliminations, but the collapse of buildings and the sowing of destruction in the center of gravity, and the political, military and social symbol, of the Shiite terrorist organization in the Lebanese capital.

After Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem made clear in his speech that he had no intention of disarming, defied the Lebanese government and heaped praise on Iran, there is no reason to leave its strongholds in Dahiyeh and the Beqaa Valley standing.

Increasing the pressure on Hezbollah will also serve the American desire to reach an agreement with Iran, which at the moment has no reason to be worried about the condition of its Lebanese proxy.

“The era in which a terrorist organization holds a nation hostage is nearing its end,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in response to Naim Qassem’s speech. Strikes in Beirut would give that declaration more force than any tweet or diplomatic statement.

As for the implications for diplomatic talks between Israel and Lebanon, it should be assumed that Israeli strikes in Beirut would make it difficult for General Aoun to continue moving along the diplomatic track with Israel, at least in the short term.

However, they would give legitimacy to his demands of Hezbollah, and at more advanced stages he could be the one to bring the news of a ceasefire and the rescue of Beirut, instead of Iran, which is currently receiving the credit for it.

Either way, Israel must preserve its freedom of action to defend itself, and that includes strikes in Beirut intended to prevent UAV and drone attacks on the northern border.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May  25, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Against the backdrop of a probable military action in Iran and threats from Washington, residents of Israel’s northern front woke up to a morning of yet another tightening of the IDF’s Home Front Command guidelines, reflecting the security reality in the area more clearly than any polished diplomatic statement.

This latest tightening comes against the backdrop of Hezbollah’s explosive drone threat, which continues to exact a price and challenge the technological and operational capabilities of the IDF. Alongside strict adherence to the basic, familiar elements of defense, Israel’s security establishment and technology bodies must continue their efforts to find solutions that will also enable effective responses to fiber-optic drones.

Detection, destruction

The best defense is offense, and therefore the Israel Defense Forces, with the assistance of the intelligence agencies working alongside it, must step up activity to detect and destroy every component in the value chain of this weapon: production and assembly plants, warehouses and drone operators, wherever they are.

Regrettably, it can be assessed that this will not be enough. The availability of this weapon, its low cost and the simplicity and safety of its operation will preserve the motivation to use it and make it difficult for our forces to pursue and eliminate every last drone. Effectively confronting this threat depends on the ability to make Hezbollah question whether using it against the IDF is worthwhile.

This can be achieved only by attacking targets in the Dahiyeh district of Beirut. Not only targeted prevention operations and assassinations, but the collapse of buildings and the sowing of destruction in the center of gravity, the stronghold of control and the political, military and social symbol of the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. Israel must create a disproportionate response equation and publicly make clear that every use of an explosive drone against us will be answered with a strike in Beirut.

Realizing the air advantage

The current restriction on firepower, in line with the US demand, prevents Israel from realizing its air advantage and forces it to play on a field and under conditions that are comfortable for Hezbollah. Israel must impale the leadership in Beirut on the horns of the dilemma of whether the achievement of using explosive drones justifies the price of destroying western Beirut.

After Hezbollah made clear that it had no intention of disarming, its spokesmen are now making clear that they will also not agree to return to the reality that followed the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, and that their current struggle is intended to establish a new response equation vis-a-vis Israel. From Israel’s perspective, this is another reason to change its approach.

Saving Beirut

Increasing the pressure on Hezbollah would also serve the American interests in Iran, which currently has no reason to be alarmed by the price being exacted from Hezbollah. As for the implications for diplomatic contacts between Israel and Lebanon, there is no doubt that in the short term this approach would make it harder for the Aoun government to continue moving along this track.

However, it would provide legitimacy for its demands of the Shiite terrorist organization, and at more advanced stages it could be the one to deliver the message of a ceasefire and the saving of Beirut, instead of Iran, which is still receiving credit for it.

Either way, Israel should not compromise on the measures necessary for the security of our forces merely to give a chance to diplomatic contacts with a government that is highly doubtful to be capable of delivering the goods.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May  18, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

In the strategic confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the number of fatalities is not merely a statistical measure of bereavement, but a strategic asset in the battle to control the narrative.

While Israel issues evacuation warnings before strikes in civilian areas in an effort to minimize civilian casualties, Hezbollah is also adopting a policy of systematic ambiguity in the current war regarding the scope of its losses. This policy is a survival mechanism, designed to bridge the widening gap between the organization’s promises and the bloody reality on the ground.

Myth of “divine victory” 

The core of Hezbollah’s narrative rests on the ethos of “muqawama,” or resistance, an undefeated force operating under religious patronage. Revealing the true scale of its losses could crack the image of “divine victory” that the organization has worked to market. Hezbollah has also concealed the scale of the losses it sustained in the past, including during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, among them the number of dead and wounded. Today, however, the organization is more sensitive to criticism than ever. After dragging Lebanon into a third devastating war before the country had even managed to recover from the ruins of war and economic collapse, Hezbollah fears a wave of criticism from the Lebanese state and society, and especially from the Shiite public. Although the organization maintains its grip on its Shiite base through economic and social dependence, unrest can also be identified in southern Lebanon. Concealing the scale of its losses is the organization’s way of preventing this criticism from becoming a real threat to its stability.

On the operational level, publishing lists of the dead would be an intelligence “gift” to the Israel Defense Forces. Ambiguity allows Hezbollah to preserve the fog of war surrounding the effectiveness of Israeli strikes. Every disclosure of a fatality among the command ranks or in elite units, such as the Radwan Force, enables Israel to verify the accuracy of strikes against the command structure and identify weak points in the organization’s operational makeup. For Hezbollah, the enemy’s lack of knowledge is a force multiplier meant to conceal the depth of the damage to its capabilities.

A central layer of this strategy, as also emerges from analyses by the Alma Research and Education Center, is the embedding of the organization’s operatives who were killed in lists of civilian casualties. Hezbollah is carrying out a double manipulation here: It is concealing the erosion of its military force while at the same time inflating reports of civilian losses. The goal is to generate international and legal pressure on Israel, using cognitive warfare to force a ceasefire that would save the organization from a significant challenge.

Lack of accountability as an expression of the organization’s character

Ultimately, this policy reflects Hezbollah’s essential character as a totalitarian organization that is accountable to no one in Lebanon, neither the state nor the Shiite community. Its only obligation to report the truth is to its patron in Tehran. Internally, the organization continues to operate as a closed body that suppresses transparency, understanding that the truth is the greatest enemy of the narrative it seeks to instill.

In conclusion, Hezbollah’s ambiguity is not a sign of strength, but evidence of its vulnerability. It is an attempt to preserve an artificial image of victory in the face of a reality of attrition and destruction, with the organization knowing that exposing the truth could lead to the collapse of the myth on which it depends. In this reality, Israel would do well to devote efforts to exposing the scope of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah and to embedding this awareness among the Lebanese public, in order to weaken the organization and further undermine its standing.

Such exposure would also benefit Israel in the face of voices in the West protesting the scale of Israeli harm to Lebanese civilians. The growing calls from various circles in Lebanon for advancing a peace agreement with Israel reflect the potential “partner” that exists in Lebanon, which Israel must work hard to strengthen. Revealing the depth of the blow to Hezbollah will help serve this clear Israeli interest.

Published in Israel Hayom, on May 6, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The direct, historic talks that began between Israel and Lebanon are not taking place in a vacuum. They are being held in the shadow of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at imposing a “binding equation” on Israel: a multifront war of attrition designed to erode Israel’s freedom of action and shield Tehran’s core assets. To prevail in this campaign, Israel must adopt a realist approach that shatters the illusion of Lebanese sovereignty and replaces it with determined territorial control.

The reality in Beirut is clear to all: despite efforts at revival, the Lebanese state remains a hollow entity. The government in Beirut is too weak to implement its own decisions, and the Lebanese army lacks the ability and, at times, even the will to enforce government decisions regarding the disarmament of the Hezbollah terrorist organization. Accordingly, any diplomatic agreement signed with Lebanon, without physical guarantees on the ground, will not be worth the paper it is written on. Israel cannot entrust the security of its residents to a phantom sovereign that does not control its own backyard.

Faced with this governing vacuum, in which Iran and Hezbollah remain the true sovereign in Lebanon, Israel must shift from a strategy of active defense to one of creating a new reality in Lebanon. The key lies in establishing a sterile zone south of the Litani River. The direct-fire antitank threat has become Hezbollah’s main strategic tool for disrupting daily life in northern Israel. Neutralizing that threat requires physical Israeli control of the area, clearing the villages near the border of all military infrastructure, and controlling the high ground that topographically overlooks the Galilee communities in Israel.

Israel should make this clear in the negotiations: the IDFs will take and and hold strategic areas south of the Litani for an unlimited period of time. This presence would not constitute a passive “security zone,” but rather a security guarantee and a strategic bargaining chip. On the operational level, Israel must prepare for a scenario in which IDF forces stationed in the buffer zone become a constant target for guerrilla attacks. Such preparation requires a shift to “offensive defense”: the use of technological defense systems, smart fortifications and high mobility, alongside immediate lethal fire against any cell attempting to approach the line of contact. Israel’s withdrawal from the sterile zone should not be tied to timetables, but to one result alone: Hezbollah’s complete disarmament. The sterile zone thus becomes the only real lever of pressure on Hezbollah and its patrons in Tehran, who would see how their adventurism leads to the loss of Lebanese territorial assets.

At the same time, it would not be enough merely to clear the area up to the Litani. Israel must work to systematically destroy the smuggling routes from Iran and Syria, while making clear that any Hezbollah attempt to attack IDF forces remaining in southern Lebanon will be met with determined Israeli strikes on the organization’s strategic infrastructure deeper inside the country.

Also, Jerusalem must reject pressure from the Trump administration for a quick ceasefire in Lebanon, as part of a US attempt to pave the way for a broader agreement with Iran. Israel must firmly refuse any dictate linking the northern campaign to a deal with Tehran. It must make clear to its friends in Washington that halting the fighting prematurely, while leaving Hezbollah standing on the fences, would amount to a strategic victory for the axis of evil and lay the groundwork for a far more violent and deadly next round. Moreover, ending the war without ensuring the permanent reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and without removing all enriched uranium stockpiles from Iran could create a false sense of victory within the leadership in Tehran, overshadowing the severe and unprecedented price the regime has paid. Preventing such a sense of achievement requires insisting on tough conditions, and that is no less a distinctly American interest than an Israeli one. The existential security of Israeli citizens cannot serve as a bargaining chip in a package deal with Tehran.

On the broader strategic level, Israel must reject the Iranian equation that seeks to bind Lebanon’s fate to the war against Iran. It must work to sever the link between the fronts by projecting power that deters Tehran from intervening directly. The direct talks are an important tactical tool for exposing Hezbollah’s true face as Lebanon’s oppressor, but they must not become a trap of “quiet in exchange for postponing the threat.”

In conclusion, at a time when Lebanese sovereignty remains a fiction, Israel must be the security sovereign in the territory threatening its communities. Only a combination of diplomatic pressure exposing Beirut’s weakness, uncompromising ground control along the antitank line, and firm resistance to external dictates will ensure a shift in the balance against Iran and the Hezbollah terrorist organization, and enable residents to return to their homes with long-term security. Land is the only guarantee in a Middle East where words have lost their meaning.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 16, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

With the dust barely settled from the IDF’s precision strike in Beirut, uncertainty hangs over how, or when, Hezbollah will choose to retaliate for the killing of Haytham ‘Ali Tabataba’i– the group’s military wing chief. What is certain is that Israel has made it explicitly clear to the terrorist organization, and to everyone meddling in the turbulent Middle Eastern affairs, that it is resolved to prevent its military reconstruction, even if it means an increased risk of the fighting flaring up.

Almost a year after the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon took effect, and following clear indications that Israel was unwilling to tolerate Hezbollah’s entrenchment efforts or the Lebanese government’s inaction, Israel carried out a surgical and focused attack on the organization’s most senior military operative, who had been charged with the task of rebuilding its strength.

Israel did not equivocate or apologize but instead took full responsibility for the action. Crucially, Israel maintained a normal routine on the home front, a move calculated to prevent the enemy from interpreting a change in policy as an acknowledgment of a necessary response equation, particularly for eliminations at this senior level.

This operation represents a significant intelligence and operational coup for the IDF, especially considering Hezbollah’s adjustments over the past year and the lessons the group drew from the war. Israel is signaling that it retains the capability to track down terror operatives, locate their hideouts, and execute precise strikes deep inside residential areas of the Lebanese capital.

The willingness to conduct this operation, coming just weeks after Naim Qassem warned publicly that “the continuation of the aggression unacceptable and everything has a limit,” underscores that Israel is not deterred by the possibility of its actions leading to renewed fighting.

Israel is conveying this message through the elimination of Tabataba’i not only to other Hezbollah operatives but also to Hamas in Gaza, the Iranian leadership in Tehran, the Lebanese government in Beirut, Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus, and the various countries involved in security arrangements in both arenas, from Turkey and Qatar to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By taking this action, Israel is reaffirming its commitment to independently disarm its enemies should political arrangements prove incapable of doing so.

While Hezbollah leaders will undoubtedly attempt to leverage the strike to unite Lebanese forces against Israel, the operation could conversely bolster the Lebanese government’s demands of Hezbollah, most notably its call for a state monopoly on weapons.

Finally, the Beirut strike shows that Israel’s operational latitude remains intact under the current Trump administration policy. Although the administration prefers to avoid a renewal of intense fighting, it displays understanding, and possibly even support, for Israel’s pinpoint operations after other diplomatic efforts to prevent its enemies’ military expansion have been exhausted. It’s plausible that the American administration believes such a strike will not impede the political track but may even accelerate progress toward a resolution.

Much like Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon is being forced by Israel’s actions into a critical decision point where every available option is detrimental. If the group chooses restraint and de-escalation, Israel will continue to eliminate its operatives and further erode its tattered dignity. If it opts for a forceful response, it will incur a steep cost and bolster the arguments of its opponents within Lebanon. And if it settles for a symbolic counter-strike, it will demonstrate weakness against Israel and cheapen the value of its senior commanders’ lives.

Today, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas possesses the leverage to constrain Israel’s actions or impose a price that would compel it to hold back.

The enemy’s attempts to inflame the Judea and Samaria arena and thereby complicate Israel’s operations and extract a cost have persisted since the war began. The security establishment has learned how to manage this threat, and its ongoing operations have largely prevented the enemy from achieving its desired effect.

It is reasonable to assume that Hezbollah is also exploring the option of carrying out attacks abroad, potentially with or without the aid of other Iranian actors. This potential scenario is also a priority on the security establishment’s agenda.

The most challenging scenario demanding focused attention from Israeli agencies is a kidnapping attempt. Hamas is acutely aware of the difference between the reality before the release of the living hostages and the current situation, despite existing agreements. The lure of a kidnapping is substantial. While conditions in the Gaza Strip may create opportunities, the threat is not limited to that front.

Now is the time to heighten vigilance and intensify intelligence and preventative efforts across all theaters. IDF forces must be permitted to adopt an aggressive fire policy to protect the areas under their control within the Strip’s limits, thereby preventing Gazans from gaining access to those zones. Concurrently, offensive operations against terror operatives with relevant expertise in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem must be stepped up. The message must be unequivocal: Do not permit another kidnapping – at any cost.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 24, 2025.