Since the November 2024 ceasefire, Hezbollah has been mired in a severe crisis, facing military, economic, and political attacks. Israel has been striking the terrorist organization’s operatives and strategic infrastructure, the US has been intensifying sanctions, and the Lebanese government is under growing pressure to disarm Hezbollah and curb its influence.

Hezbollah rejected Lebanon’s historic August 7 government decision to dismantle its military wing, and implementation now appears unlikely. Lebanon is motivated by two main factors: freeing itself from Iranian domination and meeting US conditions for urgently needed economic aid.

Lebanon’s prime minister dismissed Hezbollah’s long standing formula of “the army, the people, the resistance” and attempted to link disarmament to an Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in the country. The Trump administration refused, pushing instead for immediate disarmament.

Israel has been benefiting from Hezbollah’s weakness, highlighted by its absence from Operation Rising Lion, in which Iran suffered a major blow. Under Naim Qassem, Hezbollah faces a prolonged recovery after the assassination of its senior leadership, which has also strained ties with Tehran. Although Qassem was appointed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon and received symbolic gestures of Iranian support, the personal dimension of the relationship has been disrupted by Hassan Nasrallah’s elimination.

In a recent online address to a religious conference in Qom, Qassem portrayed Hezbollah as a direct continuation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s ideology and praised its fight against Israel. In reality, he has largely refrained from retaliating for Israeli strikes that have killed more than 130 operatives and destroyed critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has allowed the Israel Defense Forces to maintain control over five strategic positions along the border.

A 2024 poll found that 85% of Lebanon’s Shiites express strong trust in Hezbollah, consistent with previous surveys indicating stable or growing support. In the May 2025 municipal elections, Hezbollah strengthened its grip on Shiite-majority areas through political alliances, particularly with the Amal movement. This backing stems from both ideological loyalty and economic dependence.

With no economic alternative and continued Iranian funding, most Shiites remain loyal. To undermine Hezbollah’s base, the US must lead a long-term strategy to challenge the terrorist organization’s network of schools, welfare programs, religious institutions, and financial services, by creating a rival infrastructure backed by billions of dollars in American investment.

Such a strategy would aim to break Shiite economic dependence on Hezbollah. Shiites make up about 40% of Lebanon’s population, compared to Sunnis at around 30% and Christians at 25%, and bring them under the Lebanese state’s authority. With sustained American economic and political aid, Lebanon might persuade Shiites to keep only light weapons and give up Hezbollah’s heavy arsenal, despite fears rooted in the sectarian bloodshed in Syria and security concerns.

Backed by US support and strengthened Shiite opposition to Hezbollah, combined with ongoing Israeli efforts to block its recovery, the terrorist organization’s political and social influence could be eroded over the long term, rather than aiming for quick results during Trump’s presidency.

Hezbollah, which remained armed under the 1989 Taif Agreement, has effectively become Lebanon’s sovereign power, using its weapons for political assassinations. It still seeks to advance its vision of a Shiite revival and continued conflict with Israel, even as it attempts to reinvent itself.

The massacre in Syria’s Sweida province has reinforced Hezbollah’s determination to remain armed, fearing revenge from Sunnis and Christians. The terrorist organization remains loyal to Iran and signals readiness to renew armed conflict with Israel in the future, serving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which relies on it as a key regional force.

Despite recent remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Tehran appears to be avoiding public involvement in the dispute, weakened by the war and aware that open support would damage Hezbollah. This was evident in April 2024, when Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry issued an unprecedented reprimand to Iran’s ambassador in Beirut after he spoke out against Hezbollah’s disarmament.

To counter Hezbollah’s rejection of disarmament, Lebanon needs sustained US economic and political investment, along with continued Israeli action to prevent the terrorist organization’s recovery, aimed at weakening its support among Shiites and diminishing its military and political power.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August  10, 2025.

The massacre unfolding against the Druze in southern Syria, in which hundreds of civilians have been slaughtered, is not just another footnote in a region otherwise filled with constant bloodshed and turmoil. This is a moral test for the international community, and those who claim to stand for human rights and seek to rebuild the country torn apart by decades of civil war and the brutal dictatorship of the Assad regime.

In recent days, we have witnessed Druze civilians systematically hunted, humiliated, and murdered by forces loyal to, or possibly even part of, the Syrian regime of Ahmad al-Sharra: the jihadist-turned-would-be statesman, and new darling of the international community. That same international community has remained largely silent in the face of this unfolding massacre.

But silence is complicity.

As Holocaust survivor Elie Weisel implored us: “We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented. Sometimes we must interfere.”

That is precisely why Israel chose to interfere with military action, to defend the Druze.

The Druze are a small but proud religious and ethnic minority in the Middle East, numbering around one million, primarily in Syria, Lebanon, and northern Israel. In Israel, they are an integral and cherished part of our society. They serve in the military, hold senior positions in government, and have long stood shoulder to shoulder with the Jewish people in defending the state, including fighting in Gaza, after the October 7 massacre by Hamas. They are our brothers-in-arms.

But in Syria, the Druze are now at a perilous crossroad. After more than a decade of civil war, economic collapse, betrayal and hardship, the Druze in the southern Syrian city of Sweida, home to the country’s largest Druze community, sought to peacefully protest for their basic rights, dignity, and freedom.

And for that, they are now in the regime’s crosshairs.
What started with attacks by Bedouin forces against the Druze escalated when government forces entered Sweida, supposedly to oversee a ceasefire. But according to media reports and eye witnesses, the Syrian soldiers, recognisable by their uniforms and military insignia, joined the Bedouins and murdered Druze on the streets and in their homes.

Sickening videos have also emerged of thugs forcibly shaving the beards of Druze men, a calculated act of religious humiliation. Such outrages against personal dignity, particularly acts of humiliating and degrading treatment, constitute clear violations of international law and the Geneva Conventions.

For the Jewish people, this evokes a chilling reminder of one of the darkest chapters in our history, when Nazis similarly sought to strip Jewish men of their dignity and faith by publicly shaving their beards and humiliating them in public. This is not just repression, it is dehumanisation.

And as the world largely stood by – silent, or offering little more than empty words and meek statements of concern – while Druze were massacred in Sweida, I am proud that Israel did not turn its back. The Jewish state showed courage, conviction and leadership, to step in with military force against the Syrian regime, to help defend our Druze brothers.

For Israel, the bond with the Druze is not abstract. It is deeply personal. Their loyalty has never wavered. Nor can ours now.
The Druze have also stood for moderation, coexistence, and resistance to extremism. In a region overrun by Iranian proxies, jihadist militias, and failed regimes, the Druze offer a rare glimmer of hope.

This is not only about doing the right thing and protecting a vulnerable minority. Supporting the Druze is a moral imperative.
Meantime, the international community cannot continue treating President al-Sharra as a legitimate partner on the world stage or welcome Syria into the Abraham Accords, while turning a blind eye to the atrocities that are being committing in Sweida.

It is not enough for al-Sharra to issue vague condemnations or deflect blame onto so-called “outlaw groups.” Even if he did not give the orders, these atrocities are unfolding on his watch, under his authority, carried out by forces loyal to his regime – and reportedly by his own troops.

There must be accountability.

If al-Sharra wishes to be seen as a credible leader or statesman, he must demonstrate it – not with empty rhetoric, but through decisive action. That begins with reining in these jihadist thugs, whether they are merely aligned with his regime or, worse, operating within it.

The Druze of Sweida are not pleading for your sympathy, they are demanding their inalienable right to live in peace and dignity, with full civil rights. What happens next will reveal whether the international community truly seeks a new Syria, or will continue rewarding tyranny with silence. For Israel however, silence was simply not an option.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, July 18, 2025.

May 24, 2000, marked the height of Hezbollah’s glory. A moment in which, from its perspective, it succeeded, for the first time in the Arab world, in causing Israel to unilaterally withdraw from Arab territory (the security zone in southern Lebanon) without a political agreement. That victory not only strengthened its standing in Lebanon and among the Shiite society but also enabled it to complete its takeover of Lebanon and shape a new reality in the country, wherein it is the real sovereign, while the Lebanese government and army became secondary players. It seems that Nasrallah’s “Spider Web” speech, delivered in Bint Jbeil on May 26, 2000, two days after the withdrawal, expressed the smugness and euphoria he fell into at that time, after the terrorist organization achieved the most significant accomplishment in its history.

In Hezbollah’s view, the victory in 2000 constituted a historical turning point.
Under the guise of “resistance,” Hezbollah took over the mechanisms of the Lebanese state and society and granted itself complete freedom of action. The most notable expression of this was the abduction of IDF soldiers Goldwasser and Regev in July 2006 – a military initiative that caught the Lebanese government and its army completely by surprise. Nasrallah acted smugly and with a sense of superiority toward Israel, believing he understood its weak points after decoding the Israeli genome. But in reality, he miscalculated, and Israel chose to respond with full-scale war (the Second Lebanon War).

After the failures of the Second Lebanon War, both sides sought to learn from it and prepare for the next campaign. Hezbollah, with the support of Iran’s Quds Force, began an impressive force-building process, including the precision missile project, the establishment of the Radwan Force intended for the “conquest of the Galilee,” and broad strengthening of its logistics and combat systems. The organization built itself into an advanced army, equipped with modern weapons and diverse capabilities.
But in Israel, a quiet yet powerful transformation took place: a dramatic intelligence improvement and the intensification of precise counteraction capabilities.

All of this was manifested with great force during the war that broke out in October 2023, especially from late July 2024, when Hezbollah’s “Chief of Staff” Fuad Shukr was eliminated, and the peak that transpired in September 2024 with the surprise attack – the “Pager Attack” – through which Israel succeeded in striking deep into Hezbollah’s command and control arrays, and through a series of eliminations it carried out during the war, it succeeded in eliminating the organization’s leadership: Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safi al-Din, operations commander Ibrahim Aqil, southern front commander Ali Karaki, Mohammad Jaafar Qasir – commander of Unit 4400 (responsible for smuggling weapons from Iran to Lebanon), and many others. The combination of accurate intelligence and lethal means created a move that reshuffled the deck for Hezbollah.

According to the Alma Center, Israel succeeded in impairing 176 senior Hezbollah members – leadership, high to mid-level military command, knowledge centers, and so forth.

Since the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah is undergoing a deep internal review.
The organization is investigating how Israel managed to achieve such dramatic successes and how it penetrated its systems so deeply. It claims to have arrested spy networks working for Israel. But the simple fact is that Hezbollah was critically harmed – physically, economically, morally, and cognitively – and needs a long and comprehensive rehabilitation of its military, intelligence, and political power.

Meanwhile, it must also deal with a difficult internal challenge: rebuilding trust within the Shiite community, which suffered heavy losses in the war. The community, which supported it for years out of a sense of mission and resistance to Israel, is showing signs of fatigue. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem understands the difficulty facing the organization and accordingly signaled again in his speech marking the withdrawal anniversary on May 25, 2025, that the organization will not be dragged into a new confrontation with Israel and is leaving the lead in dealing with Israel to the Lebanese government.

But not everything is bad for Hezbollah: In the municipal elections, the organization succeeded in maintaining its influence in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa, and Beirut.
It proves that in the civil and municipal sphere – its power is still great. Its political, economic, and social infrastructures still give it an inherent advantage that has not eroded.

Still, Hezbollah stands before a dual strategic challenge: External – rehabilitating deterrence and power against Israel, and internal – maintaining hegemony within Lebanon.
Initiatives by senior Lebanese state officials – led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam – to advance Hezbollah’s disarmament, illustrate the state’s attempt to rid itself of Hezbollah’s hegemony. But there is serious doubt whether declarations alone will succeed in forcing Hezbollah to give up its weapons, which are the backbone of its power and influence.

To challenge Hezbollah’s power, a comprehensive American strategy is needed, that will help the Lebanese state draw the Shiite community closer via a broad mechanism that will offer it patronage and aim to sever its dependence on Iran and Hezbollah, thus eroding Hezbollah’s social base. Alongside this, the U.S. must strengthen the Lebanese army by removing Hezbollah’s influence over it, primarily through Shiite officers in its ranks holding army roles.

Despite the Trump administration’s desire to achieve immediate gains against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is difficult to expect that the United States will be able to reap immediate benefits in the country when faced with a comprehensive Iranian strategy that has been implemented in Lebanon since the early 1980s. Therefore, the Trump administration should adopt a long-term perspective aimed at leading deep processes that cannot be completed hastily.

The Trump administration should encourage the Lebanese state to regain sovereignty at Hezbollah’s expense. In light of Hezbollah’s weakening, significant signs already indicate the Lebanese state’s strengthening since the ceasefire. This includes the election (January 2025) of Joseph Aoun as president (after two years without a president, during which Hezbollah pushed for Suleiman Frangieh’s election), who already declared at his inauguration that only the Lebanese state would act to remove the “Israeli occupation,” and subsequently the election of Nawaf Salam as prime minister; the summons of Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani, (April 2025) for a historic reprimand after publicly criticizing the Lebanese initiative to disarm Hezbollah, calling it a “clear conspiracy” and warning against “falling into the enemy’s trap” ; the suspension of flights from Iran to Lebanon in January 2025—prompted by Israel’s threat to target Beirut Airport due to its use by Tehran for smuggling to Hezbollah—which paved the way for a broader initiative by the Lebanese state to assert control over the airport. Reportedly, in early May, Hezbollah’s significant foothold at this strategic site was impaired after dozens of airport employees suspected of ties to it were fired, and inspection procedures were tightened.

These early signs of the Lebanese state’s reclaiming of sovereignty and the erosion of Hezbollah’s influence are significant and promising yet still fall short of bringing about a historic transformation in Lebanon.

Thus, despite PM Salam’s recent declaration (May 26) that the era of exporting the Iranian revolution to Lebanon is over, as important as it is, it is still not enough to produce real change. Hezbollah, apparently now led by two of its surviving commanders, Mohammad Haidar and Haitham Ali Tabatabai (alongside Secretary General Naim Qassem), is now experiencing, indeed, the most significant crisis in its history.

Nonetheless, according to Alma Center’s assessment, Hezbollah still holds around 20,000 rockets of all sorts and is assisted by Quds Force personnel in Lebanon to rebuild its force and readiness. Due to the difficulty in smuggling arms from Iran, including thwarted attempts via Syria by the new regime, the organization is striving to rebuild its missile arsenal via local production, however, under continued Israeli attacks, it is also seeking to establish a maritime smuggling route in collaboration with Iran. Moreover, Hezbollah has come to recognize a disconnect between its military capabilities and its capacity to fully exercise them, due to opposition from the Lebanese state. Nevertheless, it is actively striving to rebuild and strengthen itself in order to regain its footing.

In conclusion, 25 years after the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah, now in the deepest crisis of its history, is no longer the same organization. Hezbollah must adapt to the absence of Nasrallah, who played such a dominant role in the organization since the 1990s, and cultivate a new generation of commanders (including senior officers at the unit and regional command levels) to fill the ranks in place of their eliminated peers.
History remembers the withdrawal as a rare achievement for it, but the present and the future confront it with significant challenges.

Published in Alma, May 29, 2025.

Close to a month into the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, the daily rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has stopped, but since the very first day, the IDF has had to act to counter Hezbollah’s attempts to transfer weaponry into southern Lebanon. Given this situation, we must ask: has the government’s stated goal of safely returning northern residents to their homes been achieved? And what are the long-term implications if, within 60 days, the IDF withdraws from southern Lebanon as stipulated in the agreement?

On one hand, significant achievements have been made against Hezbollah. Most of their missile arsenal and production capabilities have been destroyed, and their senior leadership and operational command have been eliminated. Hezbollah is now weaker than it has been in 20 years. Many of the border villages in which Hezbollah was entrenched have been heavily damaged, and there is currently no immediate threat of an invasion by Radwan forces. One could argue that since there is no immediate threat to northern communities, life can begin to return to normal. This time, Israel would be determined to enforce the agreement through the international supervision mechanism and unilaterally from its own territory when necessary.

The problem is that to truly restore life and rehabilitate Israel’s north, which has been abandoned for over a year, achieving short-term quiet is not enough. The real question is whether, under these conditions, Israel can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament and the resurgence of a direct threat to its border communities. And the answer is that, in this sense, we are far from achieving the war’s objectives for the Lebanese front.

The critical point of failure here is the reported requirement for Israel to withdraw the IDF back within the Blue Line within 60 days. For anyone who has been there to see it with their own eyes, it becomes undeniably clear that the way the Blue Line cuts through the terrain makes this border indefensible for Israel. The topography along most of the line places Lebanese villages in elevated positions overlooking and dominating Israeli communities. If we learned one thing from October 7, it is that we must not accept a situation where hostile villages, serving as bases for a terror army operating under civilian cover, exist in close proximity and topographic dominance of Israeli towns.

Have we learned nothing from the failed attempts to rely on international supervision for our security? And has the Lebanese army done anything to prove it could effectively fulfill the role of enforcer of Hezbollah’s perpetual disarmament south of the Litani River? Anyone who thinks the IDF can prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament through visual intelligence and standoff airstrikes alone is sorely mistaken.

The only way to secure Israel’s north, bring residents back, and rehabilitate the region in the long term is to maintain a buffer zone along the first mountain ridge in southern Lebanon. This area should be defined as a no-man’s-land, prohibiting any movement, with the IDF maintaining control over the high ground overlooking Israel. Only from this forward defensive position can the IDF effectively act against Hezbollah’s rearmament and prevent the threat of invasion or anti-tank fire into northern communities. Such a buffer zone would not even require holding the entire area up to the Litani River and could even be smaller than the previous Security Zone.

From the first day of the agreement, Hezbollah has been violating it with repeated attempts to infiltrate forces and weapons into southern Lebanon and has even fired into Israeli territory on Mount Dov. Israel cannot be expected to fully withdraw its forces under such conditions.

The incoming Trump administration is indeed interested in achieving ceasefires on all fronts, but it will not impose terms of defeat on Israel. Trump primarily seeks to halt the intense fighting that could spread to other arenas. However, maintaining the buffer zone, which in practice already exists, is simply enforcing the ceasefire conditions from a forward position and should remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Hezbollah has been dealt a great blow, but it is by no means defeated. A full Israeli withdrawal at this time means that many residents will not return, placing Israel’s north in an economic tailspin, and will ensure that within a few years, those who do remain in the north will live under severe security threats. Only maintaining a forward Israeli presence to proactively prevent Hezbollah’s rearmament in the area can prevent this and justify the price we have paid thus far.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 24, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

The emerging ceasefire with Hezbollah may include a strategic achievement by decoupling the Lebanon and Gaza theaters, but it also reveals a missed golden opportunity for Israel. Iran is conspicuously absent from the ceasefire agreement; it is neither a party to the deal nor bound by it, and it is highly unlikely that Iran would relinquish Hezbollah – its leading strategic arm in the Middle East – which plays a key role in advancing the Regime’s plans to destroy Israel and for regional hegemony. Iran is expected, immediately after the ceasefire, to initiate a comprehensive plan to rebuild Hezbollah and preserve its dominance in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, for its part, will focus on internal recovery and restoration of its status, especially considering the criticism from its social base in the Shiite community. With its billions of dollars from Iran, it will launch a massive reconstruction effort. Meanwhile, various Quds Force units responsible for arming and strengthening Hezbollah will continue their quiet activities of arms smuggling (Unit 190) and improvement of missile accuracy, range, and destructive capabilities (Unit 340). These units were recently exposed by media coverage of the strategic struggle between Israel and Iran. Additionally, Hezbollah operatives, including the Radwan Force, will resume training in Iran, including preparations to pursue their ambitions of invading Israel as part of their “Galilee Conquest” plan.

The emerging ceasefire agreement brings to light several problems. As evidenced by the experience with UNIFIL, Israel cannot entrust its security to foreign entities tasked with enforcing UN Resolution 1701 in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) – a central pillar of US strategy in Lebanon – is infiltrated by Hezbollah, with some of its officers doubling as operatives. The LAF is outmatched by Hezbollah and lacks the ability or motivation to confront it as the US hopes.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already declared, including in his most recent speech (Monday), that Hezbollah is the war’s victor. Similarly, Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Mohammad Bagheri, asserted yesterday that Israel’s aspiration to restore security to its northern residents is merely an illusion.

Despite the unprecedented blows to Hezbollah, including the elimination of its senior leadership and the death of its leader, Tehran is looking ahead. It is leveraging Hezbollah’s survival and the continuous missile and UAV attacks to claim victory and advance its learning process to better prepare for the next war.

The absence of a secure buffer zone guarantees that Hezbollah will return to the border, shielded by southern Lebanese residents, to renew the potential threat even as it rebuilds its infrastructure (with massive Iranian support). Once Israel withdraws from Lebanon and releases its reserve forces, it will face difficulty resuming large-scale combat against Hezbollah. Additionally, the lack of any robust mechanism guaranteeing Israel freedom of action in response to future violations by Hezbollah – likely under Iran’s guidance – justifies the grievance and sense of disappointment felt by Israelis.

Israel’s significant battlefield achievements in Lebanon have not translated into principles that ensure the goals of the war are met; the agreement does not reflect Israel’s freedom from the “October 6 conception.” As long as Iran, which directs the proxy network with Hezbollah as its “crown jewel,” is not addressed, the Regime is likely to continue its subversion into Lebanon, its security in Hezbollah’s dominance, and its grip on the country remains unchallenged and ensured. 

Published in  Israel Hayom, November  27, 2024.

It is hard to think of a United Nations agency with a more glaring failure in its core mission than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, more commonly known as UNIFIL — and there has certainly been no shortage of contenders this year.

Following the 2006 Israel–Lebanon war, which was initiated after Hezbollah terrorists ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping two others, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1701. This mandated the creation of a demilitarized zone south of Lebanon’s Litani River and entrusted UNIFIL to oversee Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal from the area.

That, however, did not happen.

Instead, with the acquiescence of the Lebanese government, Hezbollah entrenched itself, including literally burrowing in tunnels, along the common border with Israel. It amassed an arsenal of 150,000 or more Iranian-made precision guided rockets, in addition to an arsenal of missiles and suicide drones. All of this happened under the watchful eye of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness has been underscored over the last 12 months. A day after Hamas’s rampage in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Hezbollah joined the war as well, with notional plans to recreate a similar massacre in Israel’s north. Since then, the group has fired more than 10,000 rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon, killing dozens and displacing tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes.

One may be forgiven for asking what, if anything, UNIFIL has done to uphold UNSCR 1701. The answer: nothing of substance.

Just this week, Hezbollah terror tunnels and weapons caches meters away from UNIFIL observation posts and bases, literally right under the noses of U.N. peacekeepers. That UNIFIL was unaware of this state of affairs is simply implausible.

Rather, it has either been grossly incompetent, acting as no more than as a passive bystander while Iran’s chief terrorist proxy arms itself for war with Israel. Or, worse yet, it has become a shield allowing Hezbollah to attack Israeli civilian communities while complicating Israel’s subsequent response.

On Sunday, a statement issued on behalf of U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres defiantly reiterated that “UNIFIL peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly.” That’s a lofty statement, to be sure. But it obscures the real contours of the problem.

By staying in place, UNIFIL is not only obstructing the IDF’s legitimate military operations against Hezbollah, it is also recklessly putting its own peacekeepers at risk.

Just the other day, five UNIFIL peacekeepers were inadvertently injured when Israeli forces fired in the direction of their Lebanon headquarters in Naqoura, while engaged in a fight against Hezbollah terrorists in the vicinity. This tragic consequence was the result of UNIFIL’s rejection of repeated prior requests by Israel for it to withdraw from Hezbollah strongholds and active combat zones.

But UNIFIL isn’t just an obstacle; it has also become an active enabler. Over the last month, at least 25 rockets and missiles have been launched at Israeli communities and troops from Hezbollah terrorist compounds embedded near UNIFIL posts in southern Lebanon, exploiting their proximity to U.N. forces. One of the attacks even resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers.

How, then, can UNIFIL be entrusted to keep the peace and continue its mission?

In the 18 years since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has been an abject failure, allowing Hezbollah to rearm and entrench itself in southern Lebanon, setting the stage for the current conflict in the process. Moreover, it has done so with international support and American largesse. Last year, the U.S. appropriated $143 million to UNIFIL for 2023, amounting to about one-quarter of the force’s total budget of $507 million. And once the current war ends, history suggests it won’t not take long for Hezbollah to return to southern Lebanon, in spite of UNIFIL’s presence there.

For the time being, however, there are only two feasible options. Either UNIFIL ceases to serve as a willing pawn for Hezbollah and actually enforces UNSCR 1701, or it closes up shop and leaves.

In other words, the U.N. should either do its job or let Israel do it.

The article was written in collaboration with Ilan Berman from the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

Published in The Hill, October 17, 2024.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

When Hamas launched its offensive on October 7, the IDF mobilized many reserve forces. Part of this force was sent to the northern front, recognizing that Hezbollah has the capability and motivation to join the battle, with its Radwan force having been equipped, trained, and prepared to invade the Galilee for years. The deployment of forces to the north was aimed at taking up defensive positions before Hezbollah could attempt to execute its plans. Hezbollah’s entry into the conflict on October 8 began with relatively low-scale fire, mainly targeting military objectives. Later, as the organization gained confidence and identified a policy of containment on the part of Israel, it ramped up fire across the entire front.

At the beginning of the campaign, Israel chose to separate the fronts and focus its primary efforts on the southern front. This situation persisted for nearly ten months. The Israeli intelligence-driven offensive on September 17, 2024 signaled a change in approach, and since then, Israel has been engaged in an expanding and evolving offensive against Hezbollah across all of Lebanon. After eliminating Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and decapitating a significant portion of the organization’s senior command levels, as well as damaging its infrastructure, Israel launched a limited ground operation in southern Lebanon in early October 2024.

To this end, the Israeli government added an additional war goal, stating that the State of Israel would work to safely return the displaced residents of the North, who had evacuated their homes as Hezbollah ramped up its attacks. Based on what is publicly known, the IDF’s ground operation is advancing cautiously, with forces currently operating only in the area adjacent to the line of engagement with an aim to destroy terrorist infrastructure close to the border (approximately 4 km deep). After four weeks of ground operations, a reality more severe than the Israeli intelligence likely knew has emerged—and far more than what was made clear to the public before the ground operation.

Hezbollah has built an extensive terrorist infrastructure. This was done under the laxity of the Lebanese army, which failed to fulfill its obligations; under the eyes of the UNIFIL forces; and most gravely, due to Israel’s decision not to instruct the IDF to thwart the transfer of massive quantities of weapons into the area. Weapons and equipment stockpiles were stored in extensive tunneling that reached very close to the Israeli border, and in at least one case, even crossed it. Extensive use was made of residential homes and civilian infrastructures such as mosques and schools. In fact, nearly every house and building in the Shiite villages along the front have been turned into a Hezbollah military outpost or prepared for offensive military effort. While it is clear that the overwhelming majority of buildings in these Shiite villages are considered legitimate military targets, and although it is evident that clearing the area cannot be limited to narrow surgical operations in a strip of a few kilometers, the IDF has so far refrained from systematically and thoroughly destroying all of these buildings.

However, even if a security buffer zone of a few kilometers’ width is created, this space will not provide adequate protection to northern communities and will not allow evacuated residents to return to their homes safely. Defending the northern communities requires a broader approach that does not limit itself to addressing only the line of engagement. This defense requires the removal of Hezbollah forces from the entire area, at least up to the Litani River, and in certain areas where the river’s course is closer to the Israeli border, even beyond. Since Hezbollah operatives are integrated into the Shiite villages––some even living there––and given that many of the Shiite villages conceal terrorist infrastructure, it will not be possible to allow residents of these villages to return to southern Lebanon. The map below illustrates a small portion of Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure up to the Litani in the eastern sector (as of 2015).

In the initial phase, the IDF must take control of the entire area up to the Litani River (and in certain places beyond it) while fully evacuating the population of the Shiite villages in the area for their protection and to allow for the clearing of the area without endangering the Lebanese population. The IDF has already begun the process of evacuating the population, but there is still work to do as it is necessary to address the presence of terrorist infrastructure in the city of Tyre, which lies south of the Litani.

The operation in southern Lebanon is closely linked to the overall strategy of the State of Israel. The extent of the damage inflicted on Hezbollah creates an opportunity to fundamentally change the situation in Lebanon and weaken Hezbollah to the point where it is no longer a relevant threat to Israel by continuously and persistently thwarting its efforts to recuperate and reconstitute itself.

In southern Lebanon, up to the Litani River and beyond where necessary, full Israeli control is required, preventing residents from returning to the villages to avoid Hezbollah operatives returning under the guise of the civilian population. The Shiite region must be completely cleared of any military and civilian presence under Hezbollah’s cover. Regarding other villages, a specific assessment will be needed to determine the level of threat posed by their population to Israel’s security, and a policy will need to be established regarding monitoring their exit from and return to the area. As for how the IDF should take southern Lebanon, this article does not provide an operational outline, but it is expected that IDF commanders will carry out this mission in a cunning and creative manner.

A second area of operations would be between the Litani River and the Awali River and the Qaroun Lake line in the east. This area will serve as an immediate depth zone of operation for the IDF to prevent capabilities from drifting towards the Litani. The IDF can operate through aerial actions and special operations. Lastly, operations, mainly aerial, should be carried out throughout Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its military capabilities.

Until an agreement that meets Israel’s security needs is achieved (although under current conditions and for the foreseeable future, it is unclear if such an agreement can be established), there should be a buffer zone (security perimeter) established north of the security zone in southern Lebanon. This area must be cleared of infrastructure and buildings, enabling observation and fire control to prevent any entry into the security zone established in southern Lebanon and to destroy any Hezbollah force attempting to return to this area. This should resemble the buffer zone along the Gaza Strip border. In the case of Lebanon, this zone should be 2–4 km wide depending on the terrain conditions. Therefore, a quick and efficient clearing of the area is required. For this purpose, maneuvering must be expanded and civilian structures destroyed to render the entire area uninhabitable.

Such a move would impose a painful cost on Hezbollah and the Shiite population in southern Lebanon that supports it, serving as a catalyst for Lebanon and the international community to dismantle Hezbollah and reach a security arrangement acceptable to Israel. Above all, it would allow effective military control and presence in the area until such an agreement is achieved. Given that this is likely to require a long-term commitment––perhaps even years until an achievable and enforceable agreement is reached––the IDF must prepare optimal conditions for military control in the area, which must also be better protected.

This improved defense will be achieved by emptying the area of its residents and blocking access to it while considering any entity trying to enter the area as a hostile element to be neutralized. This reality is fundamentally different from what we knew during the 18 years when the IDF was in the security zone. In those years, the zone remained populated, and despite the actions of the IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Hezbollah found it relatively easy to penetrate the area with the support of the large Shiite population and launch attacks on IDF and SLA forces.

Simultaneously with the necessary military organization in southern Lebanon, the IDF must continue its offensive actions against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon. In this regard, there cannot be and should not be a ceasefire until the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Resolution 1701, meanwhile, should be discarded in the annals of history, as it is demonstrably unenforceable, nor can one rely on international actors for its implementation. Israel, after October 7, cannot afford to revert to a doctrine of containment regarding Hezbollah’s growing strength. What is more, the ongoing pursuit of Hezbollah operatives, leaders, and military assets in turn weakens Iran and its entire axis. Hezbollah is the crown jewel of Iran, the spearhead, and the center of gravity in Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel. Harming this key Iranian asset necessarily harms Iran, the central factor undermining regional security.

The effort in the northern arena must continue alongside the effort in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is dismantled and the conditions are set for a civilian governance alternative with Israeli security responsibility and full military freedom of action in order to prevent any attempt by Hamas to recuperate and rebuild its military and governmental capabilities.

All these efforts are intended to pave the way for the third effort. This effort should focus on weakening Iran itself through strikes on military and governmental assets, and subsequently on its nuclear infrastructure. Following Iran’s 181-ballistic missile barrage launched at Israel which targeted military and civilian infrastructure alike (1 October 2024) and Israel’s precise and targeted retaliatory strike against Iranian military infrastructure (26 October 2024), Iran seems poised to respond. Should it choose to, Israel’s ambition should be to utilize such an Iranian response to persuade the United States to prepare to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Should Israel fail in this crucial effort, it must prepare to carry out this operation independently.

The fourth effort should focus on painful responses in Yemen, western Iraq, and southern Syria in response to missile and drone launches from these areas. As part of this effort, Israel should make it clear to Syria’s president that it would be in his best interest to restrict the steps of Iran and the Shiite militias operating within Syria’s sovereign territory or else his regime would be in danger.

It may seem that the multitude of required efforts stretches Israel’s capabilities to the limit. Indeed, this series of efforts demands significant resource investment and is not without risks. However, in the reality that has emerged, Israel wields strategic momentum that it cannot afford to lose. Israel has no choice but to maintain and enhance its momentum as it can lead to the weakening of the entire Iranian axis and the laying of the foundations for establishing a new regional architecture, which–– beyond its contribution to regional security, stability, and prosperity–– would further weaken and restrain the Iranian axis and open new opportunities for addressing the Palestinian issue.

The State of Israel cannot afford to revert to an approach of containment, nor to miss the strategic opportunity to inflict significant damage on Iran and all elements of the axis it leads. Israel has no choice but to maintain and even intensify its momentum. This is not merely a historical opportunity which may not present itself again, but also a unique strategic opportunity that must be fully seized. The reality that has emerged allows a return to the concept of decisive action and a departure from the now significantly eroded concept of deterrence. Political leaders must harness and subordinate military actions to the political strategy, which should first set the conditions for building the new regional architecture and then accelerate its construction, understanding that not only will this process involve the reshaping of the region, but also inevitably result in global implications.

1. This map, which includes only the eastern sector, was released by the IDF in 2015. Since then, Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure has expanded significantly and is likely much broader today.

Last week the world watched as the terrorist army Hezbollah was hit by an attack that was equal parts debilitating and humiliating. On Tuesday, September 17, the special pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives suddenly exploded. Then, on Wednesday, their walkie talkies literally blew up.

Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for the operation, in the event they did carry out this historically unprecedented strike, it was entirely justified and in full accordance with international law.

It is not surprising that it did not take long for the usual chorus of anti-Israel politicians and pundits — those who only remember International Humanitarian Law (IHL) whenever they think it might hurt the Jewish State — to find some obscure provision, divorced from context, that they might deceptively latch onto and accuse Israel of violating, knowing full well that the uneducated armchair ‘experts’ who blindly follow them would thoughtlessly amplify their claims, muddy the waters of good vs. evil, and somehow make Israel the bad guy again. 

This time, the frenzied cries centered around Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which prohibits the use of booby-traps in certain circumstances. Pseudo-academics like Kenneth Roth could not wait to tell their breathless adherents that IHL unequivocally “prohibits the use of booby traps” — even though it is obvious that if booby traps are prohibited in certain circumstances, they must be permitted in others.

For the record, this is one of those permitted times, and here, with citations, is why.

First, it is important to establish that communication devices ordered by terrorists, issued to terrorists, for terrorist purposes, do not count as harmless civilian objects. Under Article 52 of the Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention I, the communication devices that a designated foreign terrorist organization issues to its operatives are legitimate military targets, and this should not be controversial. The fact that civilians may also use cell phones does not mean that you cannot target a terrorist call center.

Article 7 of the Amended Protocol II provides certain restrictions as to the use of booby traps and other similar devices. Paragraph 1 lists certain categories of objects — religious objects, children’s toys, etc. — for which it is prohibited to use booby traps in all circumstances. The devices in question do not fall under any of those categories.

Paragraph 2 of Article 7 prohibits using booby traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are

specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material. As the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual explains:

The prohibition is intended to prevent the production of large quantities of dangerous objects that can be scattered around and are likely to be attractive to civilians, especially children.

It has nothing to do with communications devices procured by terrorists for terrorists, devices that were not specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material, and were instead modified to detonate once they clearly became military objects.

Paragraph 3 of Article 7 reminds us that even when permissible any such weapon must be placed “in the close vicinity of a military objective.” It is hard to imagine a more surgically precise procedure than the destruction of personal devices that were (literally) held by terrorists.

Analyzing the legality of a military operation also requires factoring in the principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality. The principle of necessity permits actions necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. In this instance, in a single operation, an entire enemy army was significantly impacted, and not only physically – the attack also exposed the Hezbollah network, in Lebanon but also throughout the Middle East where Hezbollah agents or affiliates were carrying these specific Hezbollah issued pagers. The devastating psychological impact also cannot be discounted;

Hezbollah can no longer trust their own equipment, cannot communicate (ironically, they are rumored to have switched to pagers out of concerns Israel was monitoring their comms!), and will have to change many elements of their operations with the potential to make further mistakes that can then be exploited.

The principle of distinction requires combatants to distinguish between civilians and military objectives during armed conflict. Here, the attack specifically targeted combatants, members of the Hezbollah army who had received specific Hezbollah equipment that is usually kept on their person. The law does not require perfect accuracy, which is impossible, and that leads to the principle of proportionality: Would such an attack be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated In this case, not a chance. Recall that Hezbollah has been bombing Israel incessantly for almost a year. In a swift and defensive maneuver — fully legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter — Israel (allegedly) immobilized a large segment of a terrorist organization actively hellbent on the genocidal elimination of the country.

Reports say that a few civilians, including two children, were tragically hurt as well. Innocent civilians getting hurt is absolutely tragic, but not in any way unlawful or Israel’s fault.

The truth is that the entire booby trap framework of analysis is wrong. IF Israel did commit these actions, then it was perhaps the finest and cleanest act of lawful sabotage in military history. As the ICRC explains:

Sabotage is generally the work of individuals or small formations operating in enemy-controlled territory and taking advantage of clandestinity, surprise, and ruses of war. It is generally carried out with great precision and therefore does not usually harm the civilian population. The targets of sabotage must form part of the enemy’s material infrastructure, that is, they must be military objectives. To sum up, sabotage against the enemy is a lawful operation provided the legal rules for the choice of targets and the methods and means employed are respected.

To quote one actual international humanitarian law expert, Eugene Kontorovitch:

Those protesting the attack on Hezbollah cell phones would have been crying over bombs placed on Nazi Germany’s train tracks.

The sad conclusion is this: if you are among those who were silent while Hezbollah committed thousands of undeniable, uncontested, and unprovoked

war crimes against innocent Israeli civilians — killing men, women,

and children in the process — and yet now find yourself horrified that Israel finally responded in a lawful, targeted manner by neutering (in some cases literally) hundreds of the terrorists who had been indiscriminately attacking them for months — your problem is not with Israel’s actions under international law; it is with Israel’s very existence.

Arsen Ostrovsky wrote the article together with John Spencer from West Point and Attorney Mark Goldfeder. 

Published in the Daily Wire, September 24, 2024.

For years, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly claimed that “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web.” This message was woven throughout his speeches and echoed in Hamas propaganda. The entire Iran-backed alliance believed it. The goal wasn’t just psychological; it had an operational purpose. It was meant to motivate the organization’s operatives, especially the Radwan Force, to train even more vigorously for the conquest of the Galilee, seen as the first step in Israel’s total destruction.

To be honest, albeit regrettably, some Israeli actions reinforced this message in the narrative of the “resistance axis” and Hezbollah itself, rather than undermining it. The refusal to eliminate armed Hezbollah operatives approaching the border, instead chasing them away; the months-long reluctance to destroy two tents Hezbollah erected on Mount Dov beyond the international border line as a challenge to Israeli sovereignty and a sign of its weakness; along with Israel’s internal weakness displayed in the year before the war – all these strengthened Nasrallah’s belief that Israel was indeed a paper tiger that would immediately collapse once the Radwan Force invaded northern settlements and conquered the Galilee.

The 500 casualties Hezbollah has suffered since deciding to attack Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, and the enormous losses Hamas endured in the Gaza Strip following its terror attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, began to change the picture, both within Hezbollah and among the Lebanese public.

Many in Lebanon, even if not among Hezbollah supporters, who witnessed the increasing power of Israeli Air Force strikes in Lebanon and the massive destruction in Gaza, began to express public opposition to the war. This is an unprecedented phenomenon in Lebanon.

The situation took another dramatic turn last week following the pager and radio communication device attack on Hezbollah operatives and senior officials, which took thousands of them out of the fight within seconds. It intensified further with the surprising and, from Nasrallah’s perspective, shocking elimination of the Radwan Force leadership in the heart of Dahieh.

Although Nasrallah claimed in his speech responding to these events that they didn’t affect the organization’s operational capabilities, no one in Lebanon believes him anymore. Hezbollah is perceived as weak, and there’s a prevailing understanding that in this conflict, Israel undoubtedly has the upper hand – technologically, militarily, and in terms of intelligence.

The Israeli Air Force bombings in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley over the past two days, which hit hundreds of important Hezbollah assets built over many years, and Israeli awareness efforts directed at Lebanese public opinion, aimed at evacuating civilian populations from villages turned by Hezbollah into weapons depots and launch sites for cruise missiles, rockets, and drones, make it clear to every Lebanese and every member of the Iran-backed alliance that Israel is a real tiger. Everyone now understands that underestimating it was a very costly mistake.

Even in interviews with Lebanese commentators on the country’s TV networks, it’s explicitly stated: “We thought we could destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. We were gravely mistaken.”

Even if Nasrallah publicly maintains that the Lebanese front is linked to the Gaza front and that his organization will continue to fire at Israel as long as there’s no ceasefire in the Strip, it seems that, watching the refugee convoys traveling from southern Lebanon to Beirut and the significant casualties his organization suffers daily at Israel’s hands, Nasrallah surely regrets now believing his own false propaganda.

The consequences of this mistake are now manifesting in Hezbollah’s unprecedented and long-term weakening. Every day that the Israel Defense Forces powerfully strikes Hezbollah’s infrastructure and denies it capabilities built over decades to harm Israel brings closer the day when northern residents will return to their homes and enjoy long-term peace.

Alongside the military effort, successful influence and psychological warfare efforts on the Lebanese public, whose trust in Hezbollah has been severely shaken and whose fear of Israel has intensified sevenfold, must continue. This axis – which sears the enemy’s consciousness – will also ensure long-term quiet on the northern border.

Published in  Israel Hayom, September 24, 2024.