Billions for Gaza, nothing for Israel

The Trump Administration and the “international community” are revving up to raise funds for Gaza’s rehabilitation—even under de facto Hamas rule. The talk is of $70 to $120 billion in funds to provide Palestinians in Gaza with “human dignity” and “humanitarian relief.” 

At the inaugural meeting in Washington of his grandiose Board of Peace, on Feb. 19, President Donald Trump announced $10 billion in U.S. funding for Gaza alongside $7 billion more from other countries.

All this passion and concern would be admirable if it were not so counterproductive (at this point) and so one-sided.

The world at large still has said nothing at all about Hamas’s use of women and children as human shields, hospitals as weapons depots, or United Nations schools as launchpads for rockets. It has said little at all about Hamas’s violent seizure of humanitarian aid shipments into Gaza or its targeting of Palestinians approaching aid centers operated by Western-backed humanitarian foundations.

The world seems incapable of admitting that Hamas’s dictatorial and genocidal regime in Gaza is responsible for every bit of ruin suffered by Palestinians, and it has nothing but platitudes to offer about how this time it might be different.

But what really gets my goat is that nobody around the world is talking about raising even one penny for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Israel; of Israel’s southern and northern areas that have been depopulated and devastated by Hamas and Hezbollah attacks over the past two years and even the past decade. 

Not a penny for the battered people of Israel – war widows and orphans, terrorized civilians, traumatized soldiers, and battered businesses. 

Except for Jews abroad, nobody is prioritizing relief and aid for Israel.

Sure, with the war over, Western countries will now return to buy Israeli technology and weapons for their own benefit, and cooperate in science and the arts too. But lavish sympathies and abundant budgets are reserved for the attacking Palestinians, not for the attacked Israelis.

Understand: The cumulative economic toll of the two-year-long conflict inflicted upon Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran is estimated at 352 billion shekels ($112 billion), according to the Bank of Israel. This figure encompasses direct military spending, property compensation and broader civilian outlays. This calculates to a daily burden of about $100 million on Israeli taxpayers.

Remember that this war has brought about the mass displacement of Israeli civilian communities. Approximately 200,000 Israelis remain displaced from their homes in border communities near Gaza and Lebanon. The cost of evacuating northern residents alone topped $2 billion. Israel has dedicated about 60 billion shekels ($18 billion) to supporting displaced citizens and maintaining social services. 

To rebuild the southern region (Gaza Envelope) the government has established the Tekuma (Revival) Directorate with an initial five-year budget of 19 billion shekels ($5.3 billion) to rehabilitate and upgrade 47 communities and cities in the south. 

Some 1.8 billion shekels have been devoted towards development in the regional councils of Ofakim, Netivot, Merhavim, Eshkol, Sha’ar HaNegev and Sdot Negev. The funds are earmarked for 24 municipalities that sustained damage during the war, but are not included in the budget for the western Negev Tekuma region

To rehabilitate, secure, and revive northern towns Israel intends to invest 15 billion shekels ($4 billion) over five years, with an initial NIS 200 million injection for immediate infrastructure restoration. Wildfire losses caused by Hezbollah rockets in the north are said to exceed $100 million.

As for the destruction wrought by Iranian ballistic missiles, mainly in the center of the country, Israel faces $10 billion in property compensation and rebuilding costs. 

Then there are the workforce absences caused by the war. Reservist call-ups have cost the economy an estimated $600 million per week in lost productivity. The Bank of Israel estimates that one month of reservist service equals roughly 38,000 shekels ($12,100) in lost production per soldier.

As a result of the war, especially the heavy load of army reserve duty, more than 50,000 Israeli businesses have closed.

I won’t elaborate here on Israel’s direct military costs, but these amount to at least NIS 243 billion ($77 billion) on ammunition, fuel, and equipment. Israel likely spent more than $1 billion on Arrow missile interceptions alone since the start of the multifront war.

And I won’t elaborate here on the cost of preparing for the next wars, which against Hezbollah and Iran may begin this month. The Israeli defense establishment has already decided it needs a far more independent defense-industrial base as a hedge against future boycotts or embargoes, like the one imposed by the Biden administration when it decided to suspend deliveries of 2,000-pound bombs. 

The development of cutting-edge military technologies that allow Israel to stay a step ahead of its enemies, such as the Iron Beam laser for which the state last year signed a $500 million contract with defense contractors Elbit and Rafael, will further strain the public purse, even if the laser is ultimately able to dramatically reduce the cost of interceptions.

Israel’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which stood at 4.5 percent in 2023, has risen to a whopping 8.8 percent—the second highest in the world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Israel’s Nagel Commission, headed by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Jacob Nagel, believes that those numbers are only going to increase. The military budget is expected to nearly double, reaching as much as 500 billion shekels ($159 billion) over the next decade.

On the fiscal/monetary levels, Israel has taken on an additional 19 billion shekels ($6 billion) in debt servicing costs due to increased borrowing. Israel ran a budget deficit in 2025 of 6.9 percent of GDP. That is more than twice the level of Germany and higher than even France.

Israel has already begun cutting civilian ministry budgets by roughly $5 billion, with a view toward bringing its budget deficits to below 3 percent over the next three years.

In short, the economic and fiscal burden that Israelis shoulder is enormous, and this does not take into account pain, trauma, post-trauma, and other “medical” costs, nor the tribulations of 2,000 families with widows and orphans, nor 15,000 soldiers with varying degrees of injury, including many with long-term medical rehabilitation challenges.

But again, nobody around the world is talking about raising even one penny for the reconstruction of Israel and the rehabilitation of Israelis, never mind for their “human dignity.” Except for Jews abroad, nobody is prioritizing the rebuilding and strengthening of Israel.

Now, of course, Israel is a strong first-world country that has miraculously and smartly pulled through the war with incredible economic resilience. Israel does not run around the world with a cap in hand begging for handouts. And Israel has graciously received massive military assistance from the United States.

Nevertheless, there is something grossly perverse about the fact that the world sees only the suffering of the attackers, Palestinians, and not the suffering of the attacked, Israelis.

There is something truly wicked about the fact that the world rushes to plunk down billions for Gaza but not Kfar Aza; for Rafah (and of course Ramallah, as always) but not Rehovot; for Khan Yunis but not Kiryat Shmona.

I’m just saying.

Published in JNS, on February 22, 2026.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




Rubio’s Munich message: US wants a powerful, self-reliant Israel

In his address at the Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed important messages regarding the direction of President Trump’s foreign policy. Although his remarks were aimed primarily at Europe, they clearly reflected a broader strategic worldview that is highly relevant to all American allies—including the State of Israel.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,—according to Rubio — the West succumbed to a dangerous illusion. Many believed that history had reached its endpoint; that liberal democracy would become universal; that national interests would be replaced by a “rules-based global order”; and that borders and sovereignty would lose their central importance. This euphoria, he argued, ignored the lessons of history and human nature.

In parallel, Western societies increasingly shed elements of their sovereignty, transferring authority to international institutions and multilateral frameworks. There was an assumption that global norms and legal mechanisms would ensure stability and peace. Yet during the same period, hostile actors strengthened their military capabilities and prepared for confrontation. The belief that abstract principles alone could secure order proved misguided.

  

Rubio also addressed the consequences of mass migration. In pursuit of a “world without borders,” Western states opened their doors widely, without fully considering the long-term implications for social cohesion, cultural continuity, and national identity. The failure to control borders, he stressed, is not a marginal issue but a fundamental question of sovereignty and civilizational survival.

A central theme of the speech was the deep civilizational bond between the United States and Europe. America, though geographically distant, remains spiritually and historically rooted in Europe. The ideas of liberty, the rule of law, and the great intellectual and cultural achievements of the West emerged from this shared heritage. Security, Rubio emphasized, is not merely about budgets or military deployments; it is about defending a people, a nation, and a way of life.

His criticism of international institutions was sharp. While not calling for their abandonment, Rubio made clear that they have failed to resolve the most pressing crises of our time. The United Nations has not brought an end to the war in Gaza, has not resolved the conflict in Ukraine, and has not removed the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In an imperfect world, states cannot allow their adversaries to shield themselves behind principles of international law which they themselves routinely violate.

For Israel, Rubio’s message carries significant implications. The doctrine he articulated suggests that the United States does not seek weak or dependent allies. On the contrary, it prefers partners that are strong, sovereign, and capable of defending themselves. After years in which certain American approaches seemed to favor a restrained and cautious Israel, the current message is different: a powerful, self-reliant Israel that deters its enemies serves not only its own interests but also those of the United States.

Rubio’s skepticism toward the automatic primacy accorded to international institutions resonates strongly with Israel’s longstanding experience. For decades, Israel has operated under severe diplomatic constraints imposed by multilateral bodies that have often limited its freedom of action while failing to restrain its adversaries.

Finally, the worldview articulated in Munich also sheds light on the Trump administration’s unprecedented involvement in issues perceived as internal Israeli matters. From this perspective, the stability, authority, and resilience of a crucial ally are not purely domestic concerns. A strong and cohesive Israel is viewed as an integral component of the broader Western alliance and therefore as part of the United States’ own national interest.

Rubio’s speech in Munich thus conveyed a clear and consequential message: America expects its allies—including Israel—to strengthen their sovereignty, enhance their military and technological capabilities, and act with confidence in the defense of their civilization and national interests.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 18, 2026.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.

 




How Trump turned insults into tools of US diplomacy

Modern Western diplomacy has traditionally emphasized restraint, indirection, and the careful management of language. Diplomatic practice favored criticism of policies rather than personalities, avoidance of overt humiliation, and the cultivation of influence through legitimacy and attraction—what is commonly termed “soft power.” Even in periods of acute disagreement, leaders generally sought to preserve decorum, recognizing that respect and predictability help sustain alliances and international stability. Political correctness and legalistic discourse in recent decades further reinforced these conventions.

Critics have long argued that excessive caution may weaken deterrence or obscure strategic “red lines.” Yet even these critics rarely advocated abandoning civility altogether. The diplomatic style associated with President Donald Trump represents a far more radical rupture with these norms, replacing restraint with confrontation and calculated disrespect.

Historically, humiliation has often served as a political instrument. Ancient empires publicly degraded defeated enemies; sacred objects were seized, rulers paraded in chains, and ceremonies staged to symbolize submission. Modern history also contains examples of symbolic degradation designed to assert dominance. Yet these practices were usually reserved for wartime or its aftermath. Trump’s innovation lies in integrating humiliation into routine peacetime diplomacy.

From the outset of his presidency, Trump adopted a public style characterized by blunt language, personal insults, exaggerations, and threats. Adversaries were labeled with derisive nicknames—”Rocket Man” for Kim Jong-un, for example—while entire regions were disparaged in coarse terms. More strikingly, such rhetoric was not confined to rivals. Allies were treated similarly. European leaders were publicly belittled for alleged weakness or dependence on the United States. NATO partners were accused of “free-riding,” and long-standing security commitments were described as unfair burdens rather than shared responsibilities.

His treatment of France’s president Emmanuel Macron illustrates this pattern. Trump repeatedly mocked Macron’s domestic political difficulties, minimized France’s military contributions, and implied that Paris depended entirely on American protection. At public events and on social media, he portrayed Macron not as a partner but as a subordinate. Comparable behavior was directed at Germany’s Angela Merkel, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, and other democratic leaders, often through personal jabs that blurred the line between diplomatic negotiation and public shaming. Such conduct signaled that even close allies were subject to coercive pressure and symbolic degradation.

This rhetorical strategy frequently relied on questionable or inflated claims. A notable example concerns Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system. Trump asserted that the system was essentially based on American technology and implied primary U.S. ownership of the achievement, despite the broad recognition that Iron Dome represents a distinctly Israeli innovation developed by Israel’s defense industries, albeit with important American financial support. The statement reflected a broader tendency to appropriate allies’ successes in order to reinforce narratives of American primacy.

Trump’s speeches, including high-profile international forums, often amplified this approach. Instead of coded diplomatic language, he employed ridicule and intimidation to project dominance. These choices appear deliberate rather than impulsive. They form part of a coherent worldview that challenges the post-1945 liberal order. In this conception, international politics is hierarchical and transactional: legitimacy derives from power, not norms; alliances are conditional bargains; and respect is extracted through pressure rather than earned through cooperation.

Trump’s diplomatic style therefore represents more than unconventional behavior or rhetorical excess. It reflects an attempt to normalize insult, humiliation, and coercion as legitimate tools of statecraft. Whether such tactics strengthen deterrence or instead erode trust, weaken alliances, and accelerate fragmentation of the international order remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that this approach marks a substantive transformation in the language and practice of contemporary diplomacy.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 05, 2026.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




Trump’s first year back in office expanded Israel’s freedom of action

Much attention is currently being devoted to assessing the first year of President Donald Trump’s term in office.

There is no doubt that this year has been marked by an exceptionally intense level of diplomatic, military, legal, law-enforcement, and economic activity on the part of this administration, both in the realms of domestic and foreign policy.

From the Israeli perspective, President Trump’s entry into the White House represented an unprecedentedly positive turning point. Trump granted Israel full legitimacy to operate across all seven theaters of conflict that have opened against it since the October 7 Massacre in 2023. He also provided Israel with the necessary tools to do so. On several occasions, he made it clear that if Hamas failed to comply with his demands, it would face what he termed the “gates of hell.”

Surprisingly, Israel made only partial use of this “authorization”. As a result, Hamas continues to exercise firm control over the Gaza Strip. True, its capabilities have been significantly degraded. It can no longer disrupt daily life in Israel through massive rocket fire. Nevertheless, it is still regarded as a legitimate interlocutor in any political arrangement. Hamas continues to enjoy substantial support from several influential Middle Eastern states, including Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas still expresses unequivocal opposition to the Israeli-American demand that it disarm. It remains unclear whether it will voluntarily relinquish its weapons or whether it will choose instead to enter into a comprehensive military confrontation with Israel.

In any case, President Trump’s aspiration and vision to undertake a historic move – namely, the evacuation of Gaza’s residents and their resettlement in other countries – has faded beyond the horizon. Why did this initiative fail – at least at this stage – despite its potential to secure Israel’s southern border for many years? Was it due to criticism from left-wing circles in Israel, from legal experts, and from military figures who opposed the plan with varying degrees of intensity? Who knows?

Israeli-American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities

President Trump’s most significant contribution over the past year was the joint Israeli-American strike on strategic sites in Iran, foremost among them Iran’s nuclear facilities, which posed an existential threat to Israel.

However, beyond these strategic events, President Trump bestowed upon Israel a number of “covert gifts” that have yet to receive the attention they deserve. His demand for control over Greenland appears, at first glance, to be far removed from the spectrum of Israel’s national interests. In practice, however, it is of immense importance to Israel.

Since the end of the Six-Day War, the international community has consistently upheld the principle that the territories captured during the war constitute a kind of deposit that Israel would be required to return to their owners once “peace comes to the land.”

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 gave explicit expression to this notion by emphasizing “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” In its wake, almost every US president initiated peace plans based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories. The Israeli government itself adopted this conception, at least partially, in its cabinet decision of 19 June 1967, which expressed Israel’s willingness to withdraw to the international borders with Egypt and Syria in exchange for peace agreements.

President Trump’s demand to obtain sovereignty over, or at least military control of, Greenland–initially met with ridicule and derision – now appears far more tangible. Senior officials of the Danish government have recently been engaged in intensive negotiations with representatives of the Trump administration on this issue. The Trump administration justifies this demand on security grounds.

This point is of great importance to Israel. The range of risks facing Israel is far greater than that confronting the United States. In short, Israel now has a “strong rope” to cling to should it seek to realize claims of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, as well as over territories seized during the current war in the Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, and Somaliland.

US military activity vis-à-vis Venezuela, particularly the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro, constitutes a clear expression of the “America First” principle that President Trump emphasized from the earliest days of his presidency. In practice, one of the most far-reaching implications of this trend is the prioritization of US security needs over the principles of international law.

From Israel’s perspective, this development significantly expands its military freedom of maneuver in wartime situations–freedom that has been constrained, to varying degrees, by legal considerations.

Finally, the establishment of the “Board of Peace,” intended to address the regulation of crisis in the Gaza Strip (and, subsequently, in other conflict zones worldwide), may free Israel from the constraints imposed on it by the United Nations, thereby further expanding its strategic room for maneuver.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 25, 2026.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




An open letter to Trump: Protect the free world from those who seek to dominate it

Dear Mr. President,

I am Jewish.

I am Israeli.

I am a mother.

I am a firm believer in God and believe that He has chosen you to deliver the free world from those who seek to dominate it and take away its liberties.

Since the atrocities of October 7, 2023, the global campaign against the State of Israel and the Jewish people has become overt. It became increasingly plain to witness the demonization of a people, whom history has proved it is easy to scapegoat and against whom, wide public support can be galvanized.

As such, this demonization serves as a most brilliant diversion from a far greater plan, almost surreal in its nature, to overtake those lands and peoples throughout the globe that are not yet under Islamic rule.

Islamist ideology, led by financial giants such as Qatar, and their temporary cronies such as the current Turkish leadership, has divided the world into two concepts: Dar el-Salaam, meaning “the lands of peace,” referring to those lands that are already ruled by Islam; and Dar el-Harb, meaning “the lands of war/jihad,” referring to those lands throughout the globe that have not yet been conquered by Islam.

The United States, Latin America, Europe, Australia, some remaining parts of Africa, and the Middle East – including the tiny State of Israel – all fall into the latter category and require a jihad, or “a holy war,” to dominate them.

Fighting jihad

The term ”jihad,” with which we have all become so familiar since October 7, may be waged via military might or terrorism, or via a softer, more sophisticated infiltration into cultural, academic, professional, political, and other realms as a means by which to disintegrate a society from within. More often than not, the two are carried out simultaneously by different factions of the same ideology.

The latter has been in progress for approximately half a century, slowly and systematically embedding itself first into progressive circles, speaking their jargon, adopting their themes, and seemingly embracing liberal ideas, only to scorn them behind closed doors.

This infiltration has been carried out by the Nazi regime, then perfected by the former Soviet Union, America’s archenemy. This art of subversion was then co-opted by the leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran when they pretended to cooperate with the liberal circles and youth who were demonstrating against the monarchy, and were then swallowed and silenced.

It was used by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring several years ago, and most recently it can be seen throughout the Western world via the use, or rather abuse, of young students and innocent minds in the so-called fight for the Palestinian cause. That very same cause was literally created, branded, and turned into what is probably the most brilliant public relations campaign by the former Soviet leadership in their quest to destabilize the Middle East and American influence upon it.

Since then, many Western curricula, including America’s very decentralized education system, have been infected and altered to include messages of extremism, Marxism, socialism, and hatred of American values.

Impressionable progressives

This, Mr. President, directly targeted impressionable progressive minds with ideas of self-loathing, moral decay, and ideas of colonialism, conquest, imperialism, white supremacist guilt, and similar ideas, which impacted and continues to impact the West’s future leadership.

In Canada, as I write this, there are more members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who embody the Sunni extremist Islamist ideology, than anywhere else in the world. The infiltration of Iran’s version of the brotherhood, in the form of the ICRG and dormant Hezbollah cells, has simultaneously been in the making for years, slowly edging its way even into Western political circles.

However, this slow, poisonous ambition is not quenched with just the political Left, Mr. President. When Qatar decided to influence decision-making in the field of sports, for example, it opted to buy both teams, as well as the judge and the court itself.

Likewise, its work in the political arena is comprehensive, attempting to influence all sides, not just the progressive one. Hence, currently, even America First, right-wing influencers can be heard regurgitating very odd, anti-American slogans, raising eyebrows as to whose interests they are truly serving.

Dark ambitions

You, Mr. President, who have closed innumerable huge business deals and faced the most manipulative and fiercest of negotiators and foes, cannot possibly be naïve about this decades-long subversion and infiltration – particularly not now, when intelligence and written documents no longer allow such notions to be discarded as mere paranoia.

I believe that you are not fooled by the undertones of Syria’s new president, whose mercenaries continue to murder minorities in Syria while these words are being written.

I credit you with intuitively comprehending the dark ambitions of Turkey’s Islamist leader, who is a disciple of the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood.

I trust that you will not ignore the dire impact of decades of radical education throughout Egypt, Jordan, Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey – to name a few – and that such indoctrination as can be plainly seen, in varying degrees in all of their curricula, cannot produce anything but a huge wave of radical, hate-filled youth who are the current and future opponents of the West.

They are not just taught to hate Israel and the Jews, they are taught to hate the liberties, the freedoms, and the values for which American blood has been spilled by the forefathers of your great nation.

Recognizing peril

Mr. President, you have certainly recognized the peril, as you have begun the challenging yet necessary legislation against the Muslim Brotherhood, on the Sunni extremist side, much like the Islamic Republic’s ICRG and Hezbollah on the Shi’ite side. Both must be outlawed everywhere in the West as they have been in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and other countries that well know what they really are.

Yet, you have chosen to refrain from also designating and proscribing Qatar and Turkey as the two most notorious supporters of this murderous ideology. These agents of chaos and extremism – which seek to rule and conquer and use Islam as the tool to dominate – remain free and dominant, given your support of them.

Mr. President, I believe that only you have the power to change this, as you have been chosen to serve as a beacon of peace. Not via imposed agreements, based on the treachery of manipulative leaders, but rather in the form of magnificent pacts such as the Abraham Accords that you engineered. May God continue to bless you.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




Why calls for a US withdrawal from NATO matter for Israel

Although the likelihood that this legislation will lead to an actual US withdrawal from NATO is extremely low, its implications should not be underestimated.

The sponsors of the legislation argue that the original objectives of the NATO alliance, established during the Cold War, no longer align with the contemporary national interests of the United States. Their principal claims are:

  1. NATO was established to confront the Soviet Union, a superpower that no longer exists.
  2. The United States disproportionately finances NATO.
  3. The European members of NATO possess sufficient military and economic capabilities to defend themselves independently.

It is highly unlikely that the bill will be approved by Congress. Powerful legal and political considerations stand in the way of its adoption:

a. The alliance is rooted in a profound sense of historical solidarity, forged through substantial sacrifices in various military campaigns.

b. Many observers rightly view Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union.

c. The alliance serves as a major deterrent against the enemies of the Western democratic states.

US tensions with NATO allies

This legislative initiative does not emerge in a vacuum. Since US President Donald Trump’s entry into the White House, tensions between the United States and Western European countries – nearly all of them NATO members – have steadily increased. Recently, the president employed particularly disparaging language toward European states. He described them as “weak” and “decaying,” arguing that Europe “doesn’t know what to do” in addressing the major challenges it faces.

Trump did not stop there. In an unusual statement that appears to constitute blatant interference in Europe’s internal political affairs, he made clear that he would endorse European leaders whose views align with his own, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Although the likelihood that this legislation will lead to an actual US withdrawal from NATO is extremely low, its implications should not be underestimated. The legislative effort reflects a mindset that is gaining increasing traction in the United States – namely, that the time has come for the country to focus more narrowly on its national interests. From this perspective, the United States will henceforth evaluate its relations with other countries primarily based on how much they contribute to advancing American national interests.

Numerous voices, including within the American Right, express growing discomfort with what they perceive as an excessively close relationship between the United States and Israel. The highly popular right-wing commentator Tucker Carlson has become a powerful spokesperson for this sentiment.

In anticipation of the forthcoming meeting – the fifth this year – between Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it is essential to make one point clear: Israel should not be complacent about the close strategic cooperation that currently exists between Israel and the United States. Powerful currents threaten to significantly weaken this cooperation, and Israel must act with great sophistication to counter this emerging challenge.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




Time for Israel to reassess its trump strategy

In a speech delivered at the Reagan National Defense Forum on Decem­ber 6, US Sec­ret­ary of Defense Pete Heg­seth expan­ded on the need for the United States to adopt a real­ist approach in shap­ing its global strategy.

The first prin­ciple of such an approach, he argued, is a dra­matic enhance­ment of Amer­ican mil­it­ary cap­ab­il­it­ies. No polit­ical achieve­ments, he main­tained, are pos­sible without robust power. Equally import­ant, however, is a clear under­stand­ing of how – and for what pur­poses – Amer­ican power should be employed.

Heg­seth out­lined four prin­ciples gov­ern­ing the legit­im­ate use of US force:

• Force is used only to defend vital interests.

• Force is used only with the inten­tion of

achiev­ing vic­tory.

• Force is used only when goals are clear,

lim­ited, and attain­able.

• Force is used only as a last resort.

Accord­ing to Heg­seth, many past pres­id­ents aban­doned the real­ist doc­trine cham­pioned by Ron­ald Reagan. They weakened Amer­ica’s mil­it­ary pos­ture, and turned the United States into “the police­man of the world.” These admin­is­tra­tions, he argued, ini­ti­ated mil­it­ary mis­sions that were either uncon­nec­ted to core national secur­ity interests or were fun­da­ment­ally unachiev­able – such as efforts to export demo­cracy across the globe.

In the name of hol­low ideo­lo­gies, they embroiled the United States in futile wars around the world. Pres­id­ent Don­ald Trump, Heg­seth asser­ted, is now revers­ing this course and restor­ing a stra­tegic approach rooted in national interest and mil­it­ary strength.

Accord­ing to the sec­ret­ary of defense, the prin­cipal object­ives guid­ing Amer­ican policy today include:

a. Defend­ing the home­land, includ­ing secur­ing US bor­ders and devel­op­ing advanced defens­ive sys­tems against mis­siles and drones.

b. Deter­ring China through strength – main­tain­ing mil­it­ary superi­or­ity to avoid dir­ect con­front­a­tion.

c. Rebal­an­cing the divi­sion of defense bur­dens with allies, thereby redu­cing strain on the US defense budget.

d. Accel­er­at­ing the devel­op­ment of the Amer­ican defense industry, ensur­ing that the United States remains the world’s premier mil­it­ary power.

Heg­seth’s remarks, and the broader stra­tegic world­view they reflect, require Israel to under­take a fun­da­mental rethink­ing in its approach towards the Trump admin­is­tra­tion.

Israel must recog­nize that repeated ref­er­ences to its unique status – phrases such as “We are the only demo­cracy in the Middle East,” “We alone pro­tect human rights in the region,” or “We are a nation emer­ging from the Holo­caust” – carry far less weight in the eyes of a US admin­is­tra­tion guided primar­ily by real­ist prin­ciples. Moral argu­ments, his­tor­ical nar­rat­ives, and appeals to shared val­ues play a more lim­ited role in this stra­tegic envir­on­ment.

The Trump admin­is­tra­tion seeks to see Israel as a strong, cap­able, and self-reli­ant ally. Unlike pre­vi­ous admin­is­tra­tions, it is will­ing – even eager – to reduce Israel’s depend­ence on the United States. Its expect­a­tion is that Israel will act as a part­ner cap­able of con­trib­ut­ing to Amer­ican secur­ity interests, not merely bene­fit­ing from them.

There­fore, the gov­ern­ment of Israel will need to work dili­gently to per­suade the Trump admin­is­tra­tion that its pro­posed policy frame­works regard­ing Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, and the West Bank advance not only Israel’s national interests but also those of the United States.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 14, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.




Trump and Netanyahu’s New Partnership

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets President Trump this week at a time of upheaval in the U.S.-Israel relationship. The two leaders have a chance to set the contours of a new strategic framework.

Since launching its response to the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, Israel has redefined the dynamics of the Middle East. It has contained the plague of Iranian power, which spread throughout the region for nearly five decades, and established itself as a regional power—perhaps one without a clear rival. The Trump administration plans to support these developments via a novel foreign-policy framework: The U.S. will reduce its global footprint, empower its allies and enhance its own strength.

For most of the past 16 years, the Obama and Biden administrations complicated and undermined Israel’s position in the Middle East. Their fear of escalation and entanglement—and belief that the region’s most radical ideologies could be domesticated—led them to seek a series of cease-fires that spared Israel’s mortal enemies, left conflicts to fester, and continually shackled the Jewish state. This, in turn, reinforced America’s regional reputation as a perfidious ally.

The Obama-Biden strategy also deepened American military involvement in the Middle East. The more Washington zip-tied Israel and other allies, the more the U.S. had to fill the security gap. In 2016, President Obama urged a Saudi-led coalition against seizing the Houthi-controlled Hodeidah port in the Red Sea, claiming humanitarian concerns. This helped delay plans by the United Arab Emirates to take the port in 2017. In 2022, under pressure from the Biden administration, the factions agreed to a cease-fire that left the Houthis in control of the port. Two years later, they are terrorizing the Red Sea, forcing the U.S. to increase its operations in the region.

The Obama-Biden approach followed a consensus held by American elites dating back to the end of the war between Israel and Egypt in 1970, when the U.S. pressured Israel to exercise restraint after Egypt violated the cease-fire. The idea was that the U.S. would foster peace by demanding Israel’s strategic passivity in exchange for greater U.S. support, protection and funds. Israel’s shift to a more reactive defense was disastrous. Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. But rather than abandon its reactive approach, Jerusalem continued it, growing more reliant on the U.S. for weapons and funds. The concept again failed catastrophically on Oct. 7. Now Israel has returned to its pre-1970 assertiveness, initiative and self-reliance.

Mr. Trump’s return to the White House will reinforce Israel’s new strategy. His America-first policy rests on two pillars. First, he promises “no new wars.” Second, he seeks to rebuild global respect for the U.S. Such power and resolve, combined with the promise of a withering response when challenged or harassed, can deter war.

Yet Mr. Trump’s first priority could contradict the second. If the world believes the U.S. is fundamentally averse to war, its enemies may not feel the fear and respect that underpins deterrence. This is particularly true for radical terrorist groups such as Hamas and al Qaeda, which value life so little that they are impervious to Western threats.

Mr. Trump can bring the two objectives into alignment by making powerful allies the leading edge of Western defense. Washington has for years allowed many of its allies to be strategically passive in exchange for greater military and financial investment. Mr. Trump’s desire to change this dynamic is the reason he’s demanding that European countries increase their defense spending so they can independently counter threats to the Continent.

Israel’s strategic shift toward strength aligns with Mr. Trump’s global vision. But establishing this new relationship requires that Israel emerge from the current war not only as a U.S. ally but as a powerful proponent of Western values. In the short term, the greatest support the U.S. can lend Israel is weapons and diplomatic cover. In the long term, the U.S. must provide steadfast moral support for the survival and self-defense of the Jewish people in their homeland.

The alternative is a U.S. retreat from the region, which would invite attack and engender a global perception of American decline. Or the U.S. could revert to the policies of the past nearly six decades, when it increased its engagement while demanding Israeli weakness. Neither path has led to regional stability, reduced U.S. engagement in the Middle East, secured American interests, or enhanced global respect for the U.S.

American efforts to tether Israel, spare its enemies and compensate for Israeli weakness with its own forces have led to further entanglement and restricted Israel’s ability to vanquish its enemies. In the Middle East, no ally is identified as a symbol of the West more than Israel, nor is any country as capable of fighting and defending itself even without American boots on the ground. Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu will surely discuss specific policies. More important, they will forge a new, innovative U.S.-Israel relationship that secures Israel’s strength and makes use of it to advance America’s interests.

Published in The Wall Street Journal, February 03, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**




Netanyahu’s White House visit

When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday, the leaders are expected to address a long list of interconnected issues with fateful repercussions for Israel’s national security.

With the war in Gaza at a turning point, continued talks about normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s nuclear program advancing further than ever before, Netanyahu has a key opportunity to strengthen Israel’s position in the region. Netanyahu will be the first foreign leader invited to the White House in Trump’s second term, and he will have the chance to try to align Israel and the U.S. positions on these critical issues.

Here are some of the top issues on the agenda:

Gaza ceasefire: Israel and Hamas entered a ceasefire agreement that was virtually identical to the one Israel had agreed to over six months before. While Hamas was not willing to consider the deal at all until shortly before Trump re-entered office, it came as somewhat of a disappointment on Israel’s end that the deal could not be significantly improved following Trump’s involvement.

The ceasefire went into effect on January 19, 2025, with Israeli hostages freed in exchange for Palestinian terrorists released from prison, along with a gradual withdrawal of the IDF from much of the Gaza Strip. While the hostages’ release has been broadly celebrated in Israel, the deal is also viewed as a kind of devil’s bargain by Israelis, who are well aware that Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind behind the Oct. 7 attacks, was released in such an exchange in 2011. Every terrorist released is a danger to Israelis.

In addition, Israel has had primarily negative experiences with outsourcing its security to others. It remains unclear whether the private contractors charged with inspecting Gazan pedestrians and vehicles returning to northern Gaza will be successful in ensuring that weapons and terrorists do not cross from southern Gaza northward, to areas that closely abut Israeli cities and kibbutzim.

Monday, February 3, marked day 16 of the deal, the day on which negotiations are meant to resume over the second stage of the deal, in which Israel would move towards fully withdrawing from Gaza and the hostage-for-terrorist exchanges would continue.

Netanyahu’s meeting with Trump is an opportunity to try to shape the next stages of the deal in a way which mitigates the risks to Israel, and allow Israel’s advancement towards “total victory,” as the prime minister has put it — eradicating Hamas as the dominant military and governing force in Gaza. Turning the second stage of the deal into an extension of stage one would be advantageous to Israel. Full military withdrawal from Gaza would allow Hamas to smuggle in weapons and terrorists in order to regroup militarily. Ending the war in a situation in which there is no governing alternative to Hamas being set up in Gaza, while the terrorist group continues to pocket humanitarian aid and uses it to enrich itself, is a recipe for only a very partial victory.

Relocation and reconstruction: One of Trump’s favorite topics in recent weeks has been deportation and relocation — not only of illegal immigrants from America, but also the voluntary move of Gazans to other countries. Israeli officials suggested as much early in the war, but were rejected by leaders in the region, as well as by the Biden administration. Trump however has touted the idea of moving Gazans elsewhere, noting that large swaths of Gaza have been destroyed, and that having hundreds of thousands, perhaps over a million people living in rubble will make reconstruction difficult.

There is some concern in certain parts of the Israeli government about Trump’s suggestion that Jordan and Egypt take in Gazan refugees. While there is a great deal of logic to that suggestion, certainly geographically and to some extent because of Egypt’s responsibility due to its failure to curb Hamas smuggling, there is some concern in Jerusalem about the potential destabilization of its neighbors, leading to the suggestion that more distant Muslim-majority countries be considered as potential destinations as well.

Of even greater concern for Israel is who will fund and administer reconstruction in Gaza. While U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff may believe that Qatar is doing “God’s work” as a mediator in the hostage talks, Israel knows better. Israel understands that Qatar is really doing the work of jihadists, and trying to keep Hamas in power in Gaza. Netanyahu must relay to Trump that a Qatar-backed reconstruction or “day after” plan is unacceptable.

Broadening the circle of peace: Officials in the Trump administration and the Israeli government have talked about how normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as other Arab and Muslim countries, is still possible. Riyadh’s public statements have been accusatory towards Israel and insistent on tangible progress toward a Palestinian state in order to advance towards diplomatic relations. After suffering the worst attack on Jewish people since the Holocaust, which the Palestinian Authority has barely condemned, Israel is not inclined to make major concessions to the Palestinians, even while seeking ties with the Saudis.

The job of the U.S. is to find the middle ground, something Israel can do that will not endanger its national security or sovereignty, and that will be satisfactory for Saudi Arabia and allow its leadership to say that it helped the Palestinians. Trump has not given indications on where he stands on this question since entering office, but his enthusiasm for deal-making does not seem to have waned. With the Abraham Accords being one of the most positively-received policies of his first term, he’s likely to push for their expansion.

Iran: The issue underpinning all others is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mullahs’ regime sponsored and trained Hamas before the Oct. 7 attack. Iran’s proxies Hezbollah and the Houthis continued to attack Israel throughout the past year and three months. Iran directly attacked Israel multiple times. And Tehran continues to advance its nuclear program beyond the point that has a plausible civilian justification.

Israel took out much of Iran’s air defenses in October 2024, leading many to think that a further attack, perhaps on oil production sites or nuclear facilities, was on the way.  Neither happened in the short term, which sparked speculation that Israel was waiting for the Trump administration.

Now, Trump is using the possibility of an Israeli strike as a threat to Iran to try to bring the mullahs to the negotiating table and reach a new nuclear deal. Unlike the Obama administration, Trump is saying this openly. Hopefully, he will welcome Netanyahu’s input on the matter, such that the deal will be worthwhile and not one that leaves a window for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon in a short time, as the last JCPOA deal did. A worthwhile deal would also curb Iran’s ballistic missile program and its sponsorship of terrorist proxies around the world.

This week’s meeting is a chance for Netanyahu and Trump to align their positions on the Iranian threat in order to better work together to weaken the Islamic Republic and eliminate its nuclear weapons program before it is too late. Israel and the US should keep military action against Iran on the table in case negotiations fail.

Isolationists: Netanyahu is arriving in Washington as the second Trump administration is still coming together. While some of the most prominent names — Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz — are strongly pro-Israel figures, there are other, lower-level administration figures who hold views that are of concern to Israel. Among those are people who think that the U.S. should fully disengage from the Middle East, and those who believe that while Iran may pose a significant threat to Israel, it does not pose a significant threat to America. Netanyahu can effectively explain the folly of such views to Trump, as well as to other administration figures he is set to meet this week.

Conclusion:

President Trump has made it clear that he wants Hamas defeated, Iran’s nuclear program eradicated and normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia to come to fruition. All of these issues are interconnected: The Saudis want to be able to point to some kind of achievement on the Palestinian front, which cannot happen when the war is still ongoing and Hamas retains some level of control in Gaza. Hamas is part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” which also threatens Saudi Arabia, a country which took a friendlier approach to Israel in the past decade due to their shared enemy.

When Netanyahu is in Washington this week, it will be his job to connect these dots for Trump. President Trump would likely support a plan that would address all of the issues on the agenda. Netanyahu therefore has a historic opportunity to advance Israel’s national security and move towards victory against the terrorists on Israel’s borders and the Islamic Republic threatening it from afar — and to do it all in one package deal, with the support of the United States.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**




A shared vision for the Middle East

A meeting between Israel’s prime minister and the US president is always the most significant event on Israel’s diplomatic calendar. This time, it carries implications for the entire region’s future.

The meeting takes place at the start of the final term of a supportive, achievement-oriented, and results-driven president who isn’t afraid to break frameworks and paradigms, and who readily employs unconventional tools and pressure points to reduce opposition.

It occurs against the backdrop of a struggle for global hegemony and the near-official opening of a trade war with far-reaching implications, not only for the global economy but also for the international political system.

The meeting comes as Israel stands at a diplomatic and security crossroads, facing decisions on several tensions: between the imperative to eliminate Hamas’ rule and military capabilities in Gaza and the urgent return of all hostages in its custody, between the desire for normalization with Saudi Arabia and the requested price of ceasing combat in Gaza and returning the Palestinian issue to the negotiating table, between neutralizing Iran’s nuclear threat and weakening its extremist regime versus concessions required in other issues to focus attention on this matter.

It’s difficult to overstate the meeting’s significance. Not only for the message its very occurrence sends, just two weeks after the president’s inauguration and his first meeting with a foreign leader in this term, but also given its purpose and the initiatives it’s expected to set in motion.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump will seek to present a shared vision for the Middle East and an agreed road map to achieve it. Additionally, they will aim to deepen and anchor the strategic relations between the US and Israel across a wide range of short and long-term issues. The directives emerging from this meeting will guide the diplomatic and security establishment efforts in both nations.

The scale of opportunities presented by Trump’s approach matches the magnitude of its inherent challenges. Netanyahu will need to prove that Israel is an asset to the US: militarily, technologically, and economically, demonstrating that partnership with Israel isn’t just fulfilling an commitment between allies sharing ideological views and similar values, but also a worthwhile investment for the American superpower.

Netanyahu will seek to position Israel as a regional power capable of self-defense and able to lead a coalition of moderate nations against Iran and radical Islam. A power that will be a key player in economic and technological development initiatives and assist in advancing American interests in the region. Trump will be pleased to be convinced that Israel can serve as America’s anchor in the Middle East – strong and victorious rather than dependent and hesitant.

In the spirit of his recent UN General Assembly speech, Netanyahu will propose to expand and deepen the Abraham Accords and transforming the Middle East, through Israel and its Arab partners, into a bridge connecting Asia and Europe, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Along this bridge, railway tracks, energy pipelines, and fiber optic cables will be laid. Such an initiative would impact global trade and economy and the living standards of about a quarter of the world’s population.

Regarding Iran, the Trump administration clearly understands the need for an immediate change in approach. The Biden administration’s courtship were interpreted by Tehran as insurance against the use of force, increasing its boldness and weakening America’s position across the region. The IAEA director general recently warned that Tehran is “pressing the gas pedal of uranium enrichment.” Trump recognizes Iran’s tactics to create delays in negotiations and is likely already convinced of the need to set a timeline for diplomatic efforts, considering the date set for renewing sanctions (“snap-back”) and security-related considerations.

However, at the meeting’s core will be the question – how to square the circle: how to achieve within a measured timeframe both the return of hostages, Hamas’ destruction, a ceasefire (to progress with Saudi Arabia) and returning the Palestinian state issue to discussion (as demanded by Riyadh).

Recent declarations and moves may hint at the formula Americans might propose.

It will include four components: First, continuing implementation of the ceasefire and hostage return agreement. Second, establishing new governance in Gaza replacing Hamas – a kind of “organizing committee” comprising Palestinian Authority representatives and other organizations including Hamas, managing Gaza’s civilian affairs under supervision or guidance of an international-regional steering committee. Third, Trump’s migration plan, framed as a condition for and part of the reconstruction process. Fourth, strengthening the PA’s role subject to reforms it will undertake.

What would Israel receive under this formula? First, the hostages; second, Hamas’ government overthrow; third, possibility for profound change in Gaza following Trump’s plan and reconstruction program conditions; and fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia.

What are the risks for Israel? Foremost – “Hezbollahization of Gaza” – externally, Gaza’s government won’t be identified with Hamas, but in practice would be its proxy since under this framework Hamas would remain the central power force in Gaza and under this government’s auspices would preserve its military capabilities. It’s no coincidence that Hamas already signals readiness for such a solution.

The second danger – military buildup – anyone thinking they can station “non-Hamas affiliated Palestinians from Gaza” at the Rafah crossing and assume they won’t allow Hamas’ strengthening ignores lessons from years of such experience. Truth be told, any entity besides the Israel Defense Forces tasked with border and crossing supervision cannot provide the minimum standard response Israel requires.

Third – erosion of reconstruction process conditions – Hamas has already proven its capabilities in this regard. The US and Israel struggle to control the many details related to reconstruction processes. Hamas knows how to exploit this well for its needs.

Fourth – renewal of the Palestinian “veto” over regional processes following the Palestinian issue’s return to the discussion table. This while the Palestinian Authority itself hasn’t condemned the Oct. 7 massacre, continues to indirectly support attackers and struggles to deal even with terrorism in areas under its responsibility, as seen in Jenin and Tulkarem.

After Oct. 7, Israel cannot afford to compromise on the end result in Gaza. Demilitarizing this area and creating conditions ensuring no future threat to Israeli civilians’ security are vital to guarantee this combat round will be the last. Countries around us, even those growing remarkably stronger, are watching Gaza – its end result will affect their relationship with us. We cannot be considered a regional power while this enemy continues to exist alongside us.

Published in  Israel Hayom, February 03, 2025.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**