A new survey conducted for the Jerusalem-based Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy leaves no doubt as to the extent Israelis doubt that Hamas will disarm. Sevent-four percent (74%) of Israelis do not believe that the Trump Plan will lead to the removal of all weapons from Gaza and the complete dismantling of Hamas. According to the survey, there are no differences on this question among Israelis belonging to rival political camps.
This, according to data collected by Lazar Research headed by Dr. Menachem Lazar at the request of the Misgav Institute.
A breakdown by demographic characteristics found that skepticism toward the Trump Plan was particularly high among respondents residing in the Tel Aviv and southern districts of Israel (81% in both groups).
Among the alternatives presented to respondents, only 7% of Israel’s Jewish population supports the Trump Plan for the Gaza Strip. Thirty percent (30%) of respondents said they favored intensifying Israel’s military campaign until military objectives are achieved. Twenty-four percent (24%) supported establishing an Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip. Only 10% favored transferring governance of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority. Another 2% favored maintaining the status quo. (11% proposed other solutions, while 16% were undecided.)
The survey also found that Israel’s Jewish population is divided over the issue of Israeli settlement in Gaza. 47% oppose the idea, while 42% support renewed Israeli settlement in Gaza.
In response to the findings, Meir Ben Shabbat, Chairman of the Misgav Institute (and former head of Israel’s National Security Council), said:
“The Israeli public is not prepared to accept arrangements that leave the enemy standing. Skepticism regarding the prospects of the US-led Board of Peace ‘15-Point Plan’ to bring about the removal of all weapons from Gaza and the complete dismantling of Hamas amounts to a near-total consensus. An overwhelming majority of the Israeli public, on both the left and the right, holds virtually the same view on this matter.”
“Israel must insist on three clear and unequivocal red lines: Israel must not stop interdicting and eliminating the enemy; it must not withdraw from the territory in Gaza currently under its control; and it must not allow reconstruction in Gaza as long as weapons remain there. Actions speak louder than words, and the Israeli public expects its government to act against the enemy.”
The survey was conducted in cooperation with the Panel4All online respondent panel on August 20, 2026. A total of 501 respondents participated, constituting a representative sample of Israel’s adult Jewish population.

In Gaza and Lebanon, Israel is compelled to play the diplomatic game being led by Washington in order to continue enjoying its support and avoid being portrayed as the recalcitrant party. But Israel must not allow that game to constrain its freedom of action to destroy terrorist infrastructure and eliminate terrorists wherever they may be.

Over the weekend, Israel rejected current plans to disarm Hamas. Its reasons were clear: Despite the efforts of the United States, the terrorist organization has no intent to do so.

While the CEO of the Board of Peace, Nikolay Mladenov, has maneuvered between the intricacies of the “20-point plan” and the “15-point framework” to reassure Israel, Hamas has made its intentions regarding the commitments contained in these agreements perfectly clear.

“We do not intend to hand over the weapons to Israel,” says senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad. “No disarmament process will take place before Israel completes its withdrawal from the Strip.”

For those who may have difficulty remembering, this is the same Ghazi Hamad who, just days after the massacre of 1,200 people in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, explained in media interviews that Israel is “a state that we want to bring down” and promised that the “‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ is only the first time. There will be a second, third and fourth time. We have the resilience and the ability to fight and pay the price.”

This is also the same Ghazi Hamad who, in an interview last week with English broadcaster Piers Morgan, insisted that Hamas had never intended to kill civilians on Oct. 7, attempting to blur—and even deny—the seminal event that ignited the ensuing war.

The long arm of Israel’s security services has not yet reached him, but the score will yet be settled.

Either way, if anyone had any doubts, Hamad’s words make clear that Hamas views the diplomatic talks merely as leverage to drive the Israel Defense Forces out of Gaza, without relinquishing either its military power or its ruling infrastructure.

Meanwhile, with the assistance of the Board of Peace, Gaza terrorists have received, free of charge, a 14-day respite from the blitz of Israeli targeted counterterrorism strikes that had been hitting them until a week ago.

Hamad’s tune can also be heard in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s leadership is making it clear in its own voice that the diplomatic arrangements do not tie its hands. The organization’s secretary-general, Naim Qassem, recently declared emphatically that “we did not commit to anyone not to resist aggression or respond to it” and categorically rejected any relinquishment of its weapons at the present time.

For its part, Israel’s response to attacks on its soldiers must be immediate and disproportionate. A restrained response that does not hurt the enemy will not merely fail to deter it from attacking again but will be perceived by the enemy as an acceptable price to pay for the damage that it inflicted upon Israel.

As for the question of whether the deadly explosive device that killed two Israeli soldiers last week was planted by Hezbollah before or after the ceasefire agreement, Israel should not get into this game. Either way, Israel must respond fiercely.

When terrorist organizations understand that this is Israel’s approach, they will have to ask themselves whether it is worthwhile for them to leave devices in the field that were planted in advance or whether they should act to dismantle them before they lead to trouble. Conversely, if Israel takes into consideration the claim that the explosive device was planted before the agreement, we may, God forbid, find ourselves facing additional devices that explode against our forces, only to be told that these were “pre-agreement devices.”

Hezbollah and Hamas have no intention of voluntarily disarming themselves, and no one will do the job for Israel. What disrupts their ability to build up their strength or carry out attacks is the constant pressure of targeted counterterrorism operations. It would therefore be a strategic mistake to ease that pressure.

As long as they remain under a constant Israeli threat, the organizations’ senior leaders and operatives are forced to live as hunted men—in hiding, maintaining a low profile and taking security precautions that complicate their daily operations.

Moreover, to prevent a surprise attack against Israel, it is essential to deny the enemy the ability to organize and prepare. Halting or significantly reducing counterterrorism operations will give the enemy the confidence and sense of immunity that it currently lacks.

Instead of getting bogged down in legalistic hairsplitting over the wording of the various plans and frameworks, Israel needs to keep things simple on both fronts. It must not relinquish its freedom of action to conduct counterterrorism operations; it cannot withdraw from any territory currently held before the terrorist groups have been dismantled; and it should respond forcefully to every attack or attempt to attack Israel.

Published in JNS, August 10, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Key Points

• The reported screening of 5,000 candidates appears focused primarily on Hamas affiliation and direct security risks. This is necessary, but insufficient.
• Moving Palestinians within Gaza, placing them in new uniforms and giving them weapons does not create a fundamentally new force if their understanding of the conflict remains unchanged.
• No candidate should be armed unless he formally accepts Gaza as his permanent home, renounces any claimed ‘right of return’ to Israel, and commits himself to peaceful coexistence and the permanent end of the conflict.
• For UNRWA-registered candidates, screening must produce a documented administrative transition: relinquishing refugee documentation, requesting removal from UNRWA’s lists, and receiving a Gaza-resident identity document.
• If qualified candidates reject these conditions, the standard must not be relaxed. Their refusal would reveal whether a reliable, nonbelligerent force can presently be established.

Introduction

The US-backed Board of Peace (BoP) has reportedly completed the vetting of approximately 5,000 Gazans for the first class of a new Palestinian police force. More than 200,000 people applied.[1] The candidates are expected to undergo training, much of it outside Gaza, although no deployment timetable has yet been announced. Israeli security bodies apparently supplied information during the screening.

Preventing Hamas members from entering the force is indispensable. But determining that a candidate has no documented organizational connection to Hamas does not establish that he accepts Israel’s existence, rejects continued war, or would refuse an order to use his weapon against Israel.

The problem is therefore broader than organizational affiliation. Gaza’s armed institutions have repeatedly been shaped by the political culture of the conflict: the belief that the war of 1948 remains unfinished, that Palestinians in Gaza are temporary ‘refugees,’ and that they or their descendants are entitled to ‘return’ to sovereign Israel. A police force recruited without addressing these ideas may have a different name and chain of command, but it will not represent a different political future.

Security vetting asks whether a candidate previously belonged to a hostile organization. Strategic vetting must also ask what political purpose he believes his weapon should ultimately serve.

A genuine transition requires candidates to choose between incompatible statuses: perpetual refugees committed to reversing Israel’s creation, or permanent residents of Gaza committed to building their future there. A person cannot credibly exercise armed authority in postwar Gaza while continuing to claim that Gaza is merely a temporary station on the road to Israel.

Policy Recommendations

1. Establish an explicit political threshold for armed service

Every candidate should sign – and record on video – a binding declaration stating that:

• Gaza is his only permanent national and political home;
• he possesses and asserts no personal or inherited ‘right of return’ to Israel;
• he rejects ‘from the river to the sea’ and any comparable program seeking Israel’s elimination;
• he accepts peaceful coexistence with Israel and the permanent conclusion of the conflict; and
• he will neither join nor support any organization advocating or conducting armed action against Israel.

The declaration must remain a condition of recruitment, training, salary, promotion and continued possession of a weapon – not a ceremonial statement.

2. Identify all candidates registered as UNRWA ‘Palestine refugees’

Israel and the BoP should compare the candidate list with available UNRWA-registration data. The review should identify each registered candidate and his immediate family members with refugee status.

3. Require a documented transition from ‘refugee’ to permanent Gaza resident

Before entering armed service, every UNRWA-registered candidate should:

• surrender his UNRWA refugee card to the BoP for cancellation or verified destruction;
• sign a declaration that he no longer considers himself a ‘Palestine refugee’ and will not seek to renew or restore that status;
• submit a written request to UNRWA headquarters asking that he and the members of his family be removed from its refugee-registration system;
• provide proof that UNRWA received the request, even if it has not yet processed it; and
• receive a new BoP Resident document identifying Gaza – not Israel – as his permanent home.

Adult family members should make equivalent declarations.

4. Apply the standard without exceptions

No numerical recruitment target should take precedence over reliability. If only a fraction of the 5,000 candidates accepts these conditions, the force should initially consist only of that fraction. If none accepts them, no Gazan police force should be armed at this stage.

That outcome would reveal that the necessary political transition has not yet occurred. Lowering the standard would merely feed the next confrontation and supply its future participants with weapons, salaries and training.

Conclusion

A new uniform does not create a new political identity. Arming Gazans without first establishing that they accept a future in Gaza – rather than a future achieved through ‘return’ to Israel – means transferring weapons from one hostile Palestinian formation to another. A verified transition away from perpetual refugeehood and continued conflict must therefore precede the transfer of arms.

The test is not simply whether a candidate belonged to Hamas yesterday. It is whether he has demonstrably chosen a peaceful and permanent future alongside Israel today. Therefore, a verified political transition away from perpetual refugeehood and continued conflict must precede the provision of weapons.

[1] https://www.timesofisrael.com/vetting-of-first-5000-cadets-for-gaza-police-force-complete-says-official/.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

“The growing discourse in Israel about the acceleration of Hamas’ military force buildup in Gaza is intended only to justify continued Israeli aggression in this area,” Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem charged at the beginning of the week. He stressed that his organization remained committed to the ceasefire agreement and called on the mediating countries to pressure Israel to stop its violations.

Hamas’ leadership is troubled by the spotlight being turned back on the Gaza front. The wars in Iran and Lebanon, which drew most of Israel’s attention and military capabilities, eased some of the pressure on Hamas. It stabilized its systems, further entrenched its governance and stepped up efforts to restore its military capabilities. The series of targeted killings in its ranks has returned it to its grim reality and sent its senior officials back deep into the tunnels.

Reports that the Board of Peace quietly approved Israel’s policy of targeted killings and reducing Hamas-controlled territory are troubling the terrorist organization’s leaders. They are pulling out the creative formulas they prepared in advance to mislead the public and the mediating countries, but without any intention of disarming. They do not intend to accept even the softer formula proposed by Nikolay Mladenov, who was temporarily willing to settle for the “concentration, storage or freezing of the use of weapons.”

The growing list of operatives killed provides Hamas with a demonstration not only of Israeli intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities, but also of its success in carrying out this policy despite the restrictive arrangements that Hamas and the mediating countries tried to impose on it.

From Israel’s perspective, there is also something less encouraging about this list: It illustrates the growing threat from inside the Gaza Strip.

The wording of the IDF Spokesperson’s announcements on the targeted killings offers hints of this. A large share of the terrorists killed were those who “advanced terrorist plots against our forces operating in the Gaza Strip.”

Some of the strikes targeted underground infrastructure that Hamas tried to restore after the ceasefire, as well as launch shafts and launchers used by the organization. These too can be added to the indications of the terrorist organization’s reconstruction efforts.

Do not allow Hamas to copy Hezbollah

Over the years, the Lebanese front has provided Hamas with countless strategic lessons about building its force and confronting Israel militarily. These include, among other things, the establishment of Hamas’ army, the concept of underground warfare, which Hezbollah pioneered through its “nature reserves” in southern Lebanon, and the adoption of the principle of transferring the fighting into enemy territory. Hamas studied Hezbollah’s models and adapted them to its own constraints and to the unique characteristics of the Gaza front.

It does not take an overactive imagination to guess what is going through the minds of Hamas leaders when they see the videos Hezbollah is distributing about the use of drones, and when they hear about the damage this weapon is causing Israel.

Hamas, which proved its capabilities in this field during the Oct. 7 attack and even before it, may see drones as the operational solution to the constraints it currently faces.

The path to building a significant threat of this kind could be short if the smuggling routes are not blocked. This is the most important preventive measure against the development of such a capability. In addition, it is vital to attack and destroy everything connected to the drone field: weapons, equipment, facilities and the people involved.

Instead of basking in the glow of an occasional counter-smuggling success, Israel should be asking what it is not managing to intercept. More broadly, amid the conflicting reports regarding Hamas’ condition, it would be useful for an official source to present the public with a clear and detailed picture, not of the operatives and capabilities Israel has destroyed, but of what Hamas still has: its order of battle, the number and length of tunnels, weapons by type and quantity, weapons production infrastructure and more. We do not know everything, and not everything that is known can be reported. Even if the picture is incomplete, it would still be better than fragments of information, speculation or commissioned commentary.

Netanyahu vs. Trump

Three events could influence Israel’s security policy in the near future and perhaps even endanger its achievements.

The first is the US midterm elections and the desire of President Donald Trump and his team to preserve maximum stability, at least until Nov. 3.

The second is the negotiations between the US and Iran over a nuclear agreement, and the attempts the regime in Tehran will make to use them as leverage against Israel through the Americans, in order to restrict Israeli activity and perhaps even its presence in the various fronts.

The third is Israel’s election campaign.

The mistake that allowed the US to link the Lebanese front to the ceasefire with Iran must stand before Israel’s decision-makers as a reminder in how to conduct themselves with Washington. With regard to Gaza, this means Israel must beware of any initiative or move that would link it to other regional issues.

It is right to be highly suspicious about the chances of activating a “technocrats’ committee” or other mechanisms supposedly free of Hamas in a reality in which Gaza is still Hamas.

In the front where it all began, Israel cannot compromise on achieving all its objectives. Removing the threat from this front is an important achievement, but not enough. Preventing the threat from being rebuilt, completely dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, and demilitarizing the area are goals Israel must achieve. Until then, Gaza must remain an active front.

Published in Israel Hayom, on July 7, 2026. 

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Executive Summary

• The ongoing debate over which Israeli authority should appoint a commission of inquiry into the collapse on October 7, 2023, is important for maintaining public confidence in the investigative process. However, this debate overlooks an equally important question: How the investigation itself should be conducted.
• The model of commissions of inquiry traditionally employed in Israel closely resembles judicial proceedings. Such commissions are typically chaired by judges and conduct public hearings, allow legal representation, issue formal warnings to individuals who may be adversely affected by their findings, hear witness testimony, and permit cross-examination.
• This model is ill-suited to investigating a systemic failure on the scale of the October 7 attack. Its quasi-judicial structure risks producing an inquiry that is unnecessarily slow, procedurally cumbersome, and overly focused on assigning responsibility rather than deeply understanding the underlying causes of failure.
• Investigations of this nature should instead prioritize establishing an accurate factual record, reconstructing the sequence of events, identifying systemic failures, and generating lessons capable of preventing future catastrophes. These objectives are more consistent with the methodology employed in aviation accident investigations.
• Judges and legal professionals are not necessarily the most suitable individuals to lead such an inquiry. The adversarial methodology of legal proceedings differs fundamentally from the interdisciplinary, research-based, and system-oriented approach required to investigate complex organizational failures.
• This paper therefore proposes an alternative model based on multidisciplinary investigative teams operating in a manner similar to aviation accident investigation agencies and military operational debriefings. Such teams would be supported by experts in intelligence, military operations, organizational behavior, technology, weapons systems, human factors, and related disciplines.
• This proposal does not advocate abandoning either individual or public accountability. Rather, it argues that the institutional process of learning from failure should be separated from the mechanisms responsible for determining personal, command, and political responsibility.

Introduction

Since the October 7 attack, public debate has focused primarily on the question of who should appoint the members of the commission charged with investigating the attack and the massacre. This is an important issue. Public confidence in those conducting the investigation is essential if both the investigative process and its conclusions are to command legitimacy. Without such confidence, the investigation is unlikely to produce lessons that Israel’s political and security leadership will be willing to implement. Only under these conditions can investigative findings be translated into meaningful institutional reform capable of reducing the risk of future catastrophes.

Yet this debate has obscured another question that deserves equal—if not greater—attention: how should the investigation itself be conducted?

This article argues that the investigative model traditionally employed in Israel—referred to here as the judicial model—is poorly suited to inquiries into systemic failures such as the October 7 attack. Instead, Israel should adopt an investigative framework modeled more closely on aviation accident investigations and military operational debriefings, while adapting these approaches to the unique characteristics of a national security catastrophe.

The Judicial Model

For the purposes of this discussion, I refer to the traditional Israeli approach to commissions of inquiry as the judicial model because it closely resembles judicial proceedings. This characterization applies to both principal forms of inquiry recognized under Israeli law: the Commission of Inquiry (commonly referred to as the “State Commission of Inquiry,” although this term does not appear in the statute) and the Governmental Commission of Examination (officially termed a Governmental Examination Committee).¹

The similarities between these commissions and courts are substantial. They are ordinarily chaired by sitting or retired judges,² and their membership typically consists of an odd number of commissioners, reflecting the practice of judicial panels.³ Their proceedings are generally conducted in public, consistent with the principle of open justice.⁴ Knowingly providing false testimony before a commission constitutes perjury to the same extent as false testimony before a court.⁵ Individuals who may be adversely affected by the commission’s findings are entitled to prior warning, and anyone whose interests may be affected may be represented by legal counsel throughout the proceedings.⁶ Through their attorneys, such individuals may also cross-examine witnesses.

Like courts, commissions of inquiry possess extensive coercive powers, including the authority to compel testimony, require the production of documents, and seize relevant materials.⁷ Their reports are published pursuant to statute and may include dissenting opinions. In some instances, their conclusions have influenced subsequent legal and public understandings of responsibility in a manner resembling judicial precedent. The Kahan Commission, for example, articulated the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility among Israeli public officials.⁸

The judicial orientation of these commissions has both historical and institutional roots. The framers of the Commissions of Inquiry Law presumably believed that appointing judges to lead such inquiries would enhance their objectivity and impartiality while reinforcing public confidence in their conclusions. At the time the legislation was enacted, the judiciary enjoyed broad public trust, making judges a natural choice to chair commissions of national importance (as opposed to current low levels of public trust in the judicial branch). The resemblance between commissions of inquiry and judicial proceedings may also reflect the intuitive assumption that both institutions seek to reconstruct disputed events and reach authoritative conclusions regarding responsibility. Moreover, the commissions’ statutory coercive powers naturally reinforce their resemblance to courts.

Institutional design, however, shapes institutional behavior. Organizations tend to adopt the professional norms and methodologies of those who lead them. It is therefore unsurprising that commissions chaired predominantly by judges have evolved according to judicial methods of reasoning and procedure. Had engineers, military investigators, or systems analysts traditionally chaired such commissions, they would almost certainly have developed a markedly different investigative methodology and character.

Cumbersome, Inefficient, and Ill-Suited to the Search for Truth

The judicial model is fundamentally ill-suited to investigating systemic failures such as the October 7 attack and the massacre that accompanied it. Even at an intuitive level, this conclusion is difficult to avoid. Few people would be comfortable boarding an aircraft if aviation accident investigations were conducted according to procedures modeled on Israeli commissions of inquiry.⁹

The first difficulty is institutional. Compared with professional accident investigation agencies, commissions operating under the judicial model are procedurally cumbersome. Their quasi-judicial structure imports many of the inefficiencies associated with litigation. Extensive participation by legal counsel, public hearings, procedural safeguards, formal witness examinations, and cross-examination inevitably lengthen the investigative process and divert attention from its central objective.

These procedural safeguards serve an important purpose in judicial proceedings, where protecting the rights of individuals who may be adversely affected is paramount. Yet the principal objective of a national inquiry into a catastrophe such as October 7 is fundamentally different. As with aviation accident investigations, its overriding purpose should be to establish an accurate factual record, identify the systemic causes of failure, and generate recommendations capable of preventing future disasters. Procedures designed primarily to safeguard adversarial fairness should not be permitted to undermine those objectives.

With all due respect to the judiciary, the routine appointment of judges to chair commissions of inquiry further limits their suitability for investigating systemic organizational failures. This is not a criticism of judges themselves, but rather a recognition that professional expertise is context dependent. Judges are trained to resolve legal disputes through established rules of evidence and procedure. Investigating a complex institutional failure requires a fundamentally different set of skills.

The methodological contrast is particularly striking. Israeli legal proceedings are fundamentally adversarial. Courts generally occupy a relatively passive position while opposing parties present competing factual narratives. The judge’s role is to evaluate the evidence placed before the court rather than to conduct the investigation itself.

Professional accident investigators operate according to an entirely different logic. They actively direct the investigative process, identify missing information, formulate and test hypotheses, integrate evidence from multiple disciplines, and continuously refine their reconstruction of events. Rather than acting as neutral arbiters between competing narratives, they assume primary responsibility for uncovering what actually occurred.

This methodological difference extends beyond institutional procedure to modes of reasoning. Legal analysis focuses primarily on determining responsibility and applying legal doctrines to established facts. Investigations of systemic failures, by contrast, require empirical, interdisciplinary inquiry. They demand an understanding of the complex interactions among organizational structures, technological systems, intelligence processes, human decision-making, cognitive bias, and institutional culture.

Events such as the October 7 attack therefore require the use of methods extending well beyond legal reasoning. Effective investigation depends upon contributions from specialists in intelligence, military operations, systems engineering, organizational behavior, human factors, decision-making under uncertainty, communications technology, cyber capabilities, and related disciplines. A commission designed primarily around judicial methods is not naturally equipped to integrate these diverse forms of expertise into a coherent investigative framework.

The Alternative: An Investigative Model

The shortcomings of the judicial model become even clearer when contrasted with a more suitable alternative. In my view, Israel should establish a professional investigative body modeled on aviation accident investigation agencies while incorporating selected elements of the military operational debriefing process.

The team’s primary responsibility should be the systematic reconstruction of the events surrounding the October 7 attack. Its central mission would be rigorous fact-finding: establishing as accurately as possible what occurred, why it occurred, and how the various failures interacted to produce the catastrophe.

As in aviation accident investigations, the investigative team should be supported by specialists drawn from all relevant disciplines. Depending on the issues under examination, these could include experts in intelligence collection and assessment, weapons systems, surveillance technologies, communications, cyber operations, command and control, organizational behavior, human factors, systems engineering, and any other fields necessary to reconstruct the events and identify their underlying causes.

Similarly, following the model of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the investigative body could convene multidisciplinary hearings involving experts and institutional representatives from the relevant organizations. Unlike judicial proceedings, however, these sessions would not be adversarial. Their purpose would be collaborative fact-finding aimed at developing the most accurate and comprehensive understanding of the vents.

The composition of the investigative body should reflect the principal purpose of the inquiry. If the primary objective is to assign blame or determine legal or personal liability, procedures resembling judicial proceedings are appropriate because they provide essential procedural protection for those whose interests may be adversely affected.

If, however, the principal objective is institutional learning and the prevention of future failures, the investigative process should be designed accordingly. Questions of legal, disciplinary, command, and political responsibility can be addressed through separate institutional mechanisms. Free from the procedural constraints inherent in quasi-judicial proceedings, investigators would be able to employ a more flexible methodology, draw upon a broader range of expertise, and conduct a more efficient inquiry. Such an approach would maximize the investigation’s capacity to achieve its central public purpose: preventing future national catastrophes.

Conclusion

The argument advanced in this paper should not be understood as suggesting that responsibility for the October 7 attack and the ensuing massacre should be ignored. On the contrary, accountability remains an essential component of democratic governance. The central claim is instead that determination of responsibility should be institutionally separated from the principal fact-finding process.

Within the Israel Defense Forces and the various security agencies, each organization should evaluate the factual findings relating to its own personnel and determine whether disciplinary, professional, or command measures are warranted. With respect to political leaders and former officeholders, the public should be presented with a comprehensive factual record and allowed to reach its own judgments through the ordinary mechanisms of democratic accountability.

The principal purpose of a national inquiry into an event such as the October 7 attack should not be to replicate the functions of a court of law. Courts exist to resolve disputes and assign legal responsibility. A commission established in the aftermath of an unprecedented national catastrophe should serve a different institutional function: to establish the factual record, identify the systemic failures that made the catastrophe possible, and generate the knowledge necessary to reduce the likelihood of similar failures in the future.

Achieving these objectives requires an investigative methodology fundamentally different from the traditional judicial model. The inquiry should be led by professionals with expertise in complex systems, intelligence, military operations, technology, organizational analysis, and interdisciplinary investigation, operating according to methodologies that have proven effective in fields where learning from catastrophic failure is paramount—most notably aviation safety.

Only by distinguishing between the objectives of learning and accountability can a national investigation maximize its contribution to institutional resilience. Accountability is indispensable, but it should not come at the expense of understanding. Where the overriding objective is to prevent future catastrophes, rigorous fact-finding must take precedence over the procedural framework of adjudication.

Footnotes

1. Nevertheless, the judicial model is considerably less applicable to parliamentary commissions of inquiry.
2. In the case of a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the President of the Supreme Court, the chairperson must, by law, be a judge (Section 4(b) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968). With respect to a Governmental Commission of Examination, the commission enjoys statutory powers only if its chairperson is a judge (Section 8A(a) of the Government Law, 5761–2001).
3. Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
4. Section 18 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
5. Section 237 of the Penal Law, 5737–1977.
6. See, for example, Section 15 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
7. See, for example, Sections 9, 11, and 12 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
8. The Commission nevertheless emphasized that “It is not our function, as a commission of inquiry, to establish the precise legal basis for this indirect responsibility.” Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (Sabra and Shatila) (1983), 65–73.
9. A similar insight underlies Professor Boaz Sangero’s argument that the criminal justice system should, at least in part, adopt investigative and safety methodologies developed in aviation and medicine. See Boaz Sangero, Safety from Wrongful Convictions (2023).

In a joint operation by the Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet security agency, a weapons production site belonging to Islamic Jihad was destroyed over the weekend in the northern Gaza Strip, the IDF Spokesperson said. He added that the site belonged to Islamic Jihad but had recently also been used by Hamas to manufacture explosive devices and store weapons “intended to harm IDF troops operating in the yellow line area and Israeli civilians.”

In a separate statement, the IDF Spokesperson said Sunday that forces under the command of the Kfir Brigade had destroyed two underground tunnel routes in which several living quarters and weapons were found. During searches in the area, the forces found dozens of rockets and explosive devices.

The two fairly routine statements provide official confirmation of media reports about the rearmament processes taking place in the Gaza Strip, to which the public is not exposed and whose scale it cannot even assess.

Under cover of the war against Iran and Hezbollah and the ceasefire in Gaza, figures who until recently were mentioned almost daily in military correspondents’ reports have disappeared from Israeli consciousness.

One example is Izz al-Din al-Haddad, who assumed command of the military wing in Gaza after the elimination of Mohammed Deif and Raad Saad, and who is considered one of the surviving architects of the Oct. 7 massacre. Others include Mohammed Oudeh, commander of the northern brigade; Tawfiq Abu Naim, head of Hamas’ security apparatuses and a member of the terrorist organization’s founding generation; Ali Amoudi, one of the senior leaders in Gaza; and other operatives who have lowered their media profile and are operating under a heavy cloak of secrecy.

The deadline set for Hamas to disarm expired, was extended, and no one is following its renewed validity anymore. Hamas political bureau member Basem Naim stressed a few days ago that it was impossible to discuss the ceasefire agreement because of “violations by Israel.” He made clear that “resistance” is the Palestinian people’s “right” and that weapons are an inseparable part of that “resistance.”

Earlier, the spokesman for Hamas’ military wing claimed that the demand to disarm was “a scandalous attempt by the occupation to achieve through negotiations what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” Hamas’ position on the issue of weapons does not need to be read between the lines.

Alongside the restoration of governance, Hamas is continuing its military entrenchment. Although for now it is projecting a desire for quiet that will allow it to rebuild, it will not miss any opportunity that comes its way to abduct soldiers or carry out an offensive operation if it believes its chances of success are reasonable.

Israeli counterterrorism efforts in Gaza are far from keeping pace with Hamas’ reconstruction and reflect a walk on an excessively thin tightrope in the face of the threats on the ground. A large share of the IDF’s attention and resources is rightly directed toward Iran and Lebanon. This is precisely the space in which the Shin Bet and IDF Southern Command can step in, since they do not bear the operational burden on the Iranian and northern fronts and can bring their capabilities to bear in the Gazan arena, where it all began.

This is not only about thwarting weapons smuggling and production or cutting off Hamas’ takeover of resources intended for Gaza’s civilian population. It is also about initiating offensive operations against members, infrastructure, weapons stockpiles, tunnels, governing facilities and the like. Such operations would force Hamas to invest its resources in escape and concealment rather than reconstruction.

A string of successful counterterrorism operations in the Gaza Strip, without interfering with efforts on other fronts, is the mission Israel’s political and security leadership should assign to the Shin Bet and IDF Southern Command. That is what is needed at the national level. The indirect benefit would be restoring the Shin Bet’s reputation, channeling its positive forces into the operational sphere, and restoring the reputation it lost.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 12, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

To read the full study

This study addresses the question of what security doctrine is appropriate for the State of Israel at this time, particularly in light of the events of October 7 and the multi-front war that erupted thereafter.

The article seeks to answer this question from a mountaintop perspective, through a comprehensive overview, rather than within the specific context of a particular arena and its current circumstances. To tackle this challenge, the article employs a methodology that delves into the roots of Israel’s historical security doctrine — commonly known as the “Three Pillars” doctrine — which remains dominant to this day.

It examines the doctrine’s foundational assumptions and the strategic environment in which it was originally shaped, assesses which of these elements are still relevant today, and identifies the changes they have undergone. Based on this analysis, a new doctrine is developed from a “Tabula Rasa” standpoint, tailored to the current strategic environment and based upon updated fundamental assumptions.

To read the full study

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.