This week, the world was fed another lie: that Israeli troops deliberately opened fire on Palestinians waiting for food in Gaza.

The usual chorus responded on cue — crying “massacre” and “war crime” — while much of the media once again acted as an amplifier for Hamas propaganda.

The reality couldn’t be more different.

Not only was there no massacre, but the Israel Defense Forces were actively securing a humanitarian corridor to enable deliveries by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a US-Israeli initiative designed to get aid directly to civilians.

And for the first time since Hamas started the war on Oct. 7, the terror group was losing control over the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

The GHF was created to bypass Hamas entirely — cutting it out of the aid supply chain it has long exploited as a tool of war.

Hamas has operated like a terrorist mafia: hijacking trucks, stockpiling supplies for its fighters and then inflating prices to fund its war effort, and violently punishing any Gazan who dares to take food outside its control.

In its first full week of operation, the GHF distributed nearly 7 million meals, on average a million a day.

Tens of thousands of Gazans received food safely and without incident — no Hamas middlemen, no inflated black market and no political strings.

The GHF is now working to open more distribution sites to reach even more Gazans in need.

This is the first serious, large-scale aid operation that undermines Hamas’ most powerful weapon: control over the people of Gaza.

And Hamas is panicking.

Why? Because food has long been part of its arsenal.

Hamas has used aid as leverage — diverting, distributing and denying it as a means to enforce loyalty and preserve power.

The GHF threatens to dismantle that system by delivering directly to civilians, bypassing the terror group that has used starvation as a strategy.

So Hamas has turned to a two-pronged response.

First, disruption on the ground: sending armed operatives to provoke chaos at aid sites, firing on civilians attempting to access food and deliberately manufacturing volatility.

Second, disinformation: flooding social media and compliant news outlets with false casualty counts, doctored images and fabricated narratives — all to paint Israel as the aggressor and itself as the victim.

This isn’t theory. It’s strategy. It’s textbook Hamas. And more than 600 days into a war they began, too much of the world’s media still parrots its talking points without question. That’s not journalism — it’s complicity.Yes, the suffering in Gaza is real.

But its cause is not Israel’s military operations or efforts to rescue the hostages Hamas still holds; it’s Hamas’ own strategy of exploitation and terror.

Meantime, the international community, led by UNRWA, had been the primary source of humanitarian assistance in Gaza and for years willfully turned a blind eye to Hamas’ exploitation of aid — failing to enforce meaningful oversight, even employing Hamas members (many who took part in the Oct. 7 attacks) as local staff and using its facilities to hoard aid for terror operations.

Now, UNRWA would seemingly rather see the GHF fail, and the people of Gaza actually starve, so it can continue using the Jewish state as its forever-scapegoat.

Israel has taken unprecedented steps to minimize civilian harm, facing an enemy that embeds in civilian areas, hoards humanitarian aid and sacrifices its own people to gain global sympathy.

Humanitarian aid must never be a bargaining chip for terrorists.

But by insisting on a system that leaves aid in Hamas’ hands, much of the international community has allowed exactly that.

Hamas would rather starve its own people than lose control over them.

Those who truly care about the welfare of Palestinian civilians must support a system that bypasses Hamas altogether.

That system is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

The GHF is delivering what countless international actors have failed to provide: direct, accountable, large-scale humanitarian assistance that does not empower a terrorist group.

It breaks Hamas’ monopoly over aid and strips it of one of its most dangerous tools — using food as a means of control.

That’s why Hamas is trying to sabotage this initiative.

Supporting the GHF means more than feeding the hungry.

It means breaking Hamas’ grip on Gaza’s civilians.

It means dismantling the group’s strategy of domination through deprivation.

And it means backing a bold US-Israeli initiative that delivers not only food — but hope.

The article was written together with John Spencer is chairman of urban-warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute, host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast” and co-author of “Understanding Urban Warfare.”

Published in New York Post, June  3, 2025.

The world has witnessed the horrors that can unfold when poverty, oppression, and terrorism converge in a closed and hopeless environment. Indeed, the people of Gaza have lived for years in unrelenting misery, devoid of any real prospect for a better future.

Out of this abyss, a rare and historic opportunity has emerged, perhaps the most consequential since the founding of the State of Israel. This is a humanitarian, strategic, and diplomatic initiative to enable the voluntary emigration of up to one million Palestinians from Gaza to countries across the globe.

This initiative is neither naive nor detached from reality. It is grounded in empirical data. According to public opinion surveys conducted by Palestinian pollster Dr. Khalil Shikaki, approximately 49% of Gazans wish to emigrate. Among educated youth, this exceeds 54%. Many are even willing to leave without official documents, driven by profound despair and a genuine yearning for a better future.

Creating the framework

Israel’s role is to provide the practical framework that enables these individuals to exercise their right to choose – to choose a life beyond endless conflict and stagnation, to exit the status of perpetual refugees, and to enter a future of dignity and opportunity. The plan rests on five core pillars: freedom, rehabilitation, partnership, legitimacy, and discretion.

This is not just a humanitarian gesture; it is a strategic maneuver with far-reaching implications. The departure of hundreds of thousands from Gaza will significantly ease overpopulation, diminish the recruitment base for terror organizations, strip the Arab world of its long-standing “refugee card” against Israel, and challenge the two-state solution, which long has rested on an unviable status quo.

The role of international cooperation

International cooperation will be critical to success. Destination countries may include nations in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Canada, and even the Middle East. Families must be offered comprehensive support: departure grants, housing assistance, vocational training, and community integration services.

International organizations such as the UN, the International Organization for Migration, and countries like the UAE, Egypt, the US, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia can serve as essential partners. Washington should play a key diplomatic role in advancing the plan.

The goal is not merely to transform Gaza but to spark hope across the Arab world and redefine regional thinking. The enclave must be released from its function as a “black pawn” in the diplomatic chessboard and transformed into a living example of what is possible when moral courage meets strategic vision, especially after a brutal conflict.

Again, the solution here is not forced “transfer” or “expulsion” but rather a moral, legal, and diplomatic plan that will allow Gazans to attain what has been denied to them all their lives: the freedom to choose, the freedom to build a future outside the cycles of statelessness, violence, and despair.

In the end, history will remember the leaders who recognized this moment and chose liberty over another war, dignity over hatred, and civilian empowerment over the containment of enemies. This is not only Israel’s moral responsibility. It is also its strategic prerogative – to reshape reality for itself and the entire region.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June  5, 2025.

The launch of Operation “Chariots of Gideon” in Gaza this week against Hamas marked another phase in the prolonged battle against the terror organization in the strip, which has been ongoing intermittently – except for ceasefires – for nearly a year and eight months. However, one thing Israel lacks is surplus time, as the extended war weighs heavily on the home front and reserve system, erodes its political capital, damages its economy, and also reduces public determination and resilience to fight the Gaza terrorists.

The question of how the Israel Defense Forces reached this situation, when time is running out, becomes even sharper when comparing what’s happening in the Gaza Strip with the IDF’s battle against Hezbollah in Lebanon – a campaign that once it began intensively, ended within just a few months. How is it possible that the IDF defeated the terror organization considered the strongest in the Middle East so quickly, while it’s been mired in the Gaza mud for so long, struggling against a weaker terror organization? What are the differences between the two theaters that caused this?
Indeed, many similarities exist between the two theaters that opened against Israel on October 7 and 8. In both, the IDF fought against an Islamist terror organization supported by Iran, and our soldiers succeeded in eliminating almost all of their political and military leadership. Moreover, in both cases, Israel delivered a decisive military blow against its enemies, emerged from the crisis with them, and severely damaged their rocket capabilities, thus largely neutralizing the long-term threat against it. Many enemy fighters were killed in Lebanon and Gaza, and the enemy was pushed back from its border line with us in both cases.
Alongside this, there are also many differences between the theaters, related to objective conditions, our conduct toward them, the goals we set, and more. We’ll present only a partial list of these differences, but they’re sufficient to teach about the great challenge facing Israel in Gaza, and also to explain what we still need to deal with to finish the campaign there.
Before diving deep into the analysis, we must warn and say that any measurement of such a campaign cannot produce a binary equation, absolute victory or defeat. Perhaps the government also erred when it tried to present the goal in the strip in such a way. Eliminating Hamas, its operatives, and weapons is a binary outcome – yes or no. But “victory” is a much more ambiguous concept, and it’s difficult to define it clearly.
Therefore, it’s possible that even looking at what’s happening in Gaza – similar to examining the other theaters Israel fights against – we must honestly admit that the situation in the strip is not similar to what it was on the eve of the war, and not even three weeks after its opening. The IDF worked very hard in Gaza; the situation there is very different from what it was, and from Israel’s perspective, it’s more positive in many ways. The bottom line is that Hamas’ strategic threat to Israel has been removed; it’s almost unable to launch rockets at us, doesn’t carry out infiltration attacks, and doesn’t endanger civilians in the rear. This doesn’t mean Hamas has been defeated, but there’s certainly a change here.

Victory or threat elimination?

The differences between the basic situation in fighting in Gaza and the campaign against Hezbollah can be divided into several types – geographical reasons, setting different types of goals, differences in the enemy’s internal politics, different consciousness here in Israel, a political alternative, and more.
First of all, preparedness – Israel came to the war against Hezbollah after preparing for it for many years. In some ways, after internalizing the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, the IDF and the entire system began preparing the ground for a return confrontation with the Shiite terror organization, and to that end, built complex scenarios, established intelligence systems, wrote operational plans, and more. Hamas, on the other hand, was always perceived as an enemy against whom, at most, a short-term campaign would be conducted, in an attempt to reach understandings that would lead to containment and calm. It’s not that the security establishment ignored its existence and didn’t prepare against it, as evidenced by the attempt to hit the “Metro” in Gaza in May 2021, but there wasn’t the same approach as with Hezbollah. The IDF prepared for the campaign in Lebanon, and in Gaza, it tried to buy quiet through prosperity and welfare.
Moreover, there’s a difference in operational coping with Hezbollah and Hamas – the Lebanese organization was built in recent years with many characteristics of an organized army, and therefore it’s easier to identify its sites and targets, its weapon caches and strategic assets, and of course this allows building plans to strike them. Hamas, on the other hand, established for itself a fighting framework of brigades and battalions, but it quickly crumbled, its fighters dug into tunnels and moved to guerrilla warfare. The organization hides its systems under hospitals, inside clinics and schools, and among the civilian population. This makes it much harder to hit it, and many attacks are also canceled due to concern about harming innocents.
Another major gap between the strip and southern Lebanon relates to the geographical characteristics of these areas – Gaza is a narrow, closed strip, sealed on one side by the Egyptian border from the south – where the leadership in Cairo was not eager to open it for mass Palestinian flow – the Mediterranean Sea from the west and Israel from the north and east. Residents there have nowhere to flee, and no one allows them to leave. In Lebanon, on the other hand, residents in the south of the country moved north and went to safe places, and thus could avoid IDF bombardments or ground entry.
Hamas, of course, understands this issue. It hides within the civilian population, and therefore, Israel often also harms residents who are not armed. Due to this, the number of civilians killed in Gaza is immeasurably higher than residents in Lebanon – hundreds of civilians in the northern theater, compared to many thousands in the strip. The IDF was also forced to find creative solutions for the population during the fighting – moving it, evacuation to demarcated areas, and even fighting inside populated buildings.
This is also the background to the question of the siege on Gaza and the “starvation” campaign conducted abroad against the IDF. Hamas deliberately hoards food and doesn’t distribute it to residents, who often have no other sources for purchasing food. Although many argue that there’s still no real food shortage in Gaza, this campaign pressured Israel due to the basic fact that the strip is closed and there’s no exit or entry from it. In Lebanon, such a campaign could not have existed. If we go back even further, this is also the source of the legal claim by the International Court of Justice in The Hague that Israel still “occupies” Gaza, even though it evacuated its soldiers from there in the disengagement. The judges believed that Israel’s control over exit and entry from the strip effectively makes it an occupying force.
Another significant difference between the two campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah relates to the goals Israel set – in Lebanon the IDF didn’t try to eliminate Hezbollah, but only to push it back from the border area and thwart its ability to pose a threat to Israel, with the aim of returning northern residents to their homes safely. The derivative of this goal was ultimately not taking control of southern Lebanon or attempting to stay there for a long time, and even after the ceasefire, it included only staying at five strategic points along the border.
In Gaza, however, the situation is different. The government aspires to emerge with “absolute victory” over Hamas, which includes disarming the organization, eliminating it as an active fighting force, killing its commanders, or getting them to agree to leave Gaza for exile. This is a much more ambitious task, more complex, requiring greater resources than pushing terrorists back from the border and denying their ability to cause damage.

Political and diplomatic struggle

The nature of IDF activity in Gaza and Lebanon is very different, derived among other things from differences in physical and operational characteristics between the two theaters. There are, of course, additional reasons for this, and one can focus, for example, on reasons taken from the world of domestic and international politics.
Thus, for example, in Lebanon, the IDF succeeded in reaching a situation where a political alternative faced Hezbollah. The battles Israel conducted in Lebanon disrupted the political balance that had prevailed in the country until then, and suddenly it became clear that there was another address in Beirut that could be approached to manage affairs. The war actually triggered a powerful social change in Lebanon, at the end of which it’s possible that perhaps the new state institutions, those that arose in response to the great destruction the country experienced in the war, will succeed in disarming Hezbollah.
In Gaza, the situation is very different. The Palestinian Authority is not perceived as a relevant option for managing the strip in the eyes of the government in Israel, and as long as no other international body is found that will take upon itself the management of the strip – a task no one is interested in as long as Hamas holds enough power to demonstrate its strength against any such factor – no potential alternative to the terror organization’s rule over residents will arise. Hamas doesn’t agree to loosen its control over Gaza, whether behind the scenes or openly, and won’t consent to accept a body that doesn’t answer to its authority as a factor for managing affairs there.
Another matter relates to international pressure applied to Israel. Not only does the government in Jerusalem face claims, threats, and condemnations from countries on specific issues, like bringing in aid or harming civilians, but generally, the international community perceives the conflict with the Palestinians differently from the struggle in the northern theater. Hezbollah is not found in the consensus of foreign countries, but rather the opposite. Its war with Israel is not viewed favorably, and is perceived as a struggle whose end is to bring destruction upon Lebanon. The northern theater, therefore, didn’t stand at the heart of petitions filed with courts in The Hague against the security establishment and government.
The Palestinian struggle receives “legitimacy” in the world, an action that has justification due to the Israeli “occupation.” Palestinian supporters in the Western world are very numerous, and they see before their eyes the image that is well-marketed by interested parties regarding Palestinian “victimization,” the dangers, and the perception that they are David fighting Goliath. This situation puts Israel under pressure in its actions, specifically in this theater, and even the credit Israel gained as a result of the horrors Hamas committed on October 7 was quickly eroded. This is the background now, for example, to the starvation campaign against the siege on Gaza, which aroused messages even from Trump’s White House against Israel. Due to this, Israel’s options for action are shrinking, and it always fights with a political hourglass hanging over it.
World countries also often try to preserve the framework plans they’ve stuck to in the region, especially the two-state solution for two peoples. Thus, when France, for example, speaks with Israel about the war in Gaza, it still operates from the assumption that it wants to advance recognition of Palestinians. Therefore, in the middle of the war, when many hostages were still held in Hamas’ dark tunnels, Ireland, Norway, and Spain officially announced recognition of a Palestinian state. Such consciousness can explain, for example, why this week’s announcement by France, Britain, and Canada against Israel, while threatening sanctions against it, combined both the continuation of the war in Gaza and “construction in settlements.” This is also the reason that, parallel to the British announcement about stopping discussions on a trade agreement with Israel due to the operation in Gaza, personal sanctions were imposed on settlement people in Judea and Samaria due to the alleged harassment of Palestinians.
This trend also connects to the internal political dispute in Israel – many in Israel still adhere to the two-state solution and believe this is the correct way to exit the deadlock with the Palestinians. They give backing in a certain sense to European moves on the matter, and become justification for actions whose purpose is to try to preserve this idea as a practical possibility. On the other hand, there’s no movement in Israel calling to reach a political solution with Hezbollah, among other things due to understanding the futility of such an act, especially after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and the fact that it seems the Shiite organization is only looking for excuses to justify its aggression toward the IDF.
The analysis up to this point didn’t touch on one of perhaps the most important issues that constitutes the difference between the situation in the northern and southern theaters – the hostage issue. Hamas didn’t just take Israeli civilians and soldiers to Gaza’s dark tunnels as hostages, but understood very well the implications this would have on Israel’s options for action. In the operational dimension, for example, this means the IDF isn’t free to operate freely in all of Gaza’s terrain cells, since there are places where there’s concern that its activity will lead to harming hostages – whether from bombardments or as revenge by their captors. Soldiers also operate throughout the strip with a dual mission – on one hand turning over every stone to free the hostages, and on the other hand destroying Hamas in the process. These are tasks that sometimes clash with each other, and within Israel, there’s disagreement between the operational level and decision-makers on which goal comes first.
This dilemma is also reflected in public opinion in the country and in the political pressure it creates among the leadership. There wasn’t a large internal movement in Israeli society to stop the fighting against Hezbollah, but this isn’t the case in Gaza. Wide segments of Israeli society believe that freeing hostages comes before continuing the war, and think there should be an agreement – even if it’s not clear how – with Hamas to stop the campaign, withdraw from Gaza, rehabilitate it, and give the terror organization the possibility to rearm. All in exchange for returning the hostages to their homes or graves.

Cumulative effect

There are many differences between Gaza and Lebanon, and the enemy is not the same enemy. The variance between the basic equation in both theaters stands at the foundation of the fact that the IDF hasn’t yet succeeded in achieving final victory in Gaza, but on the other hand it doesn’t constitute an excuse for the current situation, where the campaign in the strip has been characterized too many times since the beginning of the war mainly by stagnation.

On the other hand, this doesn’t mean Israel won’t ultimately achieve victory over Hamas, or at least in a model similar to the defeat we inflicted on Hezbollah. The campaign hasn’t ended, and it’s difficult to predict where it will develop. This also depends, among other things, on defining goals as finally as possible, on the tension found between the military and political levels, on specific successes that will create an inertia of events, and more. The elimination of Mohammed Sinwar, for example, if it indeed occurred, might be such an event – the brother of the October 7 attack’s architect is considered an extremist symbol in Hamas, alongside being the senior commander and operational brain currently, and his removal from the theater might lead the way to compromises by the terror organization, even if for now it appears that talks between the sides about releasing additional hostages have stalled.

We must understand that the war also creates a cumulative effect on our enemies, and actions are sometimes evident only in the long term. Here, for example, is one interesting point from recent days – in one of the conversations an unidentified “Palestinian senior” conducted with foreign press, the source mentioned conditions Hamas set for Israel to end the war. In these conditions, for the first time to the best of my memory, a demand for safe passage from Gaza for Hamas seniors.

Before celebration, we must remember to take this statement with very limited credibility, and it’s not clear who said it, what their organizational and political affiliation is, and what exactly the source saw in their vision. But nonetheless, there’s innovation in this demand, an echo of an Israeli goal that didn’t previously appear on the Palestinian side. It perhaps teaches that pressure is also working on Hamas and Gaza residents, and that it’s possible that in the future we’ll be able to realize the goals we set for ourselves.

The meaning is that there’s a possibility here to make a change in reality, but it also depends on us in many ways. Will we know how to continue to the end and persevere under pressure? Will our leaders be brave enough to make difficult decisions, despite the difficulties and limitations? Will we have political, military, and human resources for realizing our goals? On these questions, Israel will be tested in the coming months.

Published in Israel Hayom, May 23, 2025

On March 23, the Israel Defense Forces made a tragic error in Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine humanitarian aid workers, along with six Hamas terrorists who were embedded among them. An investigation into the incidentwas immediately undertaken, and officers found to have been responsible were disciplined soon after.

But while all war is a tragedy, not all tragedies are war crimes.

What happened that night was an operational error in a combat zone—not a war crime. And the investigation that resulted in that conclusion wasn’t reached in a vacuum. It came after a comprehensive, independent fact-finding process led by senior experts outside the chain of command, reviewed by the chief of the General Staff, and subject to further legal scrutiny.

Outrage—along with misleading or outright false images—has overtaken social media. A global mob mentality has formed. Fortunately, the manipulations of social media are not a substitute for international law. Calling something a war crime doesn’t make it so. War crimes require specific evidence of intent—not viral videos, emotional overlays, or instant judgment by influencers or pundits acting as judge and jury.

International humanitarian law clearly defines war crimes as intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance, provided they retain protected civilian status.

In other words, for an act to constitute a war crime, there must be intent to commit the violation—an element entirely absent in this case.

The IDF’s internal investigation concluded that the killings resulted from a series of operational errors and professional failures. IDF elements were operating in a “hostile and dangerous combat zone” and believed there to be a “tangible threat.” Soldiers misidentified the convoy of vehicles, assessing that they were being used by Hamas insurgents—a tactic the group has systematically employed since Oct. 7, 2023.

Hamas has made a practice of blurring the lines between combatant and civilian, systematically exploiting ambulances, hospitals, and humanitarian symbols for military purposes. This tactic forces troops into impossible split-second decisions under fire—precisely the kind of dilemma that international law accounts for, but online critics ignore.

International humanitarian law also recognizes that tragic mistakes can happen during active combat, especially when insurgents like Hamas use protected facilities and vehicles to launch or shield attacks. Such conduct undermines the protections that civilians and humanitarian actors are entitled to.

No army—American, British, or Israeli—is immune to errors in war. What matters is what follows: transparency, investigation, disciplinary action, and institutional learning. That is the measure of a professional military in a democratic society.

In the IDF incident, surveillance indicated that five vehicles approached rapidly and stopped near IDF troops, with passengers quickly disembarking. The deputy battalion commander assessed the situation as a credible Hamas threat and ordered fire. Though that judgment proved incorrect, the belief was reasonable under the circumstances, including poor nighttime visibility, and which only underscored that the IDF complied with the rule of distinction under law of armed conflict.

The examination into the incident was conducted by the IDF General Staff Fact Finding Mechanism, a professional team outside the operational chain of command. Their findings were presented to the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, and included operational breaches, failures to follow orders, and reporting deficiencies. As a result, the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade was dismissed, and the commander of the 14th Brigade was severely reprimanded. The case is also being reviewed by the IDF Military Advocate General’s Office for potential legal proceedings.

The IDF expressed deep regret for the civilian harm and emphasized that the investigation is part of an ongoing commitment to learn from operational failures and reduce the risk of recurrence.

In short, the IDF acted exactly as a military in a democracy should: it investigated, acknowledged fault, and held individuals accountable.

There must also be a clear distinction between errors made in the course of legitimate military operations and intentionally directing attacks against civilians, which is Hamas’ standard practice and a blatant war crime.

Israel mourns every innocent life lost. Hamas counts every innocent death as a victory. That is not just a moral difference—it is the difference between law and lawlessness, between a tragedy and a crime.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky in collaboration with John Spencer, and Brian Cox.

Published in Newsweek, April  22, 2025.

Following Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023 massacre—which killed over 1,200 people in Israel, most of them civilians, including women, children and the elderly, with over 250 taken hostage—Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza. The scope and intensity of the response were unprecedented, but so too was the attack that prompted it.

Since then, there has been no shortage of uninformed actors, like comedian Dave Smith, or malign parties weaponizing international law to question whether Israel’s military actions in Gaza have been proportionate, lawful and ultimately, even necessary.

At the heart of that last question lies a critical misunderstanding. “Necessity” in war has two distinct meanings, and conflating them—morally and legally—leads to flawed assessments and misleading narratives.

Two necessities: one moral, one legal

1. Moral necessity — the just war tradition

The first concept of necessity comes from just war theory, an ethical framework developed over centuries to evaluate whether the use of force can be morally justified (jus ad bellum).

One of its core tenets is necessity:

War must be a last resort, undertaken only after all nonviolent alternatives—diplomacy, deterrence, sanctions, international mediation—have been exhausted.

In the case of Israel, the record speaks for itself. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, dismantling all civilian and military infrastructure. In the years that followed, Hamas seized power in a violent coup, launched tens of thousands of rockets and rejected every meaningful effort at peaceful coexistence. Despite periodic ceasefires and repeated international mediation, Hamas remained committed not to a Palestinian state alongside Israel—but to Israel’s destruction.

On Oct. 7, Hamas made its intentions unmistakable. It crossed the border not to challenge Israeli soldiers, but to massacre civilians. It filmed the atrocities and vowed to do it again. In that context, the claim that Israel’s military response lacked moral necessity ignores the facts and defies common sense.

2. Legal necessity — the law of armed conflict

The second form of necessity is not philosophical but legal. It belongs to the realm of international humanitarian law (IHL)—the rules governing the conduct of war (jus in bello).

Military necessity permits only those actions required to achieve a legitimate military objective.

This principle—codified in the Geneva Conventions, Hague Regulations and customary international law—does not allow destruction for its own sake. It does not excuse harm to civilians unless it is incidental to a lawful strike. And it certainly does not override the obligations to distinguish between military and civilian targets or to avoid disproportionate attacks.

Every Israeli military operation in Gaza is bound by this standard. It is not enough to identify a Hamas presence in a building or a neighborhood. To strike lawfully, the target must provide a concrete and direct military advantage, and every feasible precaution must be taken to mitigate civilian harm.

Israel’s military attorneys and commanders operate within this framework. Target selection, weapon choice, timing of attack, and warning mechanisms are scrutinized in real time. The Israel Defense Forces not only operates under legal necessity—it documents and reviews its actions at a level few modern militaries do, particularly when fighting a terrorist group embedded in a civilian population.

The bridge vs. the bakery

A useful example from the laws of war helps clarify this distinction.

Destroying a bridge used to transport enemy weapons is a lawful act of military necessity. It offers a clear operational advantage and directly degrades enemy capability. By contrast, destroying a bakery in a residential neighborhood simply because enemy fighters may stop there for food is not. The bakery is not a military objective, and its destruction would serve no legitimate military purpose.

This distinction matters in urban warfare. In Gaza, where Hamas routinely embeds its military assets within civilian areas—using schools, homes and mosques—Israel faces extraordinary challenges. But the legal standards do not change. Every action must meet the test of military necessity. Every strike must be tied to a legitimate objective. The presence of civilians demands restraint, even when facing an adversary that deliberately exploits them.

Necessary war, constrained conduct

So, was Israel’s war against Hamas necessary?

That depends on which kind of necessity you mean. But in truth, it meets both tests:

Was the war morally necessary? After Oct. 7—following the deliberate massacre of civilians, the kidnapping of hostages, and Hamas’s declared intention to repeat those atrocities—the answer is unequivocally yes.

Are Israel’s military operations legally necessary? While each strike must meet specific legal thresholds, the IDF operates under one of the most stringent legal and ethical frameworks in modern warfare. It is bound by the law of armed conflict and has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to minimizing harm, even while engaging an enemy that hides among civilians and violates every rule of war.

A war can be both morally justified and legally constrained. Israel’s campaign against Hamas is exactly that. It was not launched lightly or recklessly—it was waged in defense of life, sovereignty and the rule of law.

Anyone asking whether Israel’s war was necessary should first understand what they are really asking—and then recognize that the answer, by every standard that matters, is yes.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with retired United States Army major and urban warfare expert John Spencer John Spencer.

Published in JNS, April  20, 2025.

The expansion of IDF ground operations in the southern Gaza Strip, which includes evacuating the population to the humanitarian zone in al-Mawasi and capturing the Morag Corridor that separates Khan Younis from Rafah, is designed to increase pressure on the Hamas leadership to accept Israel’s demands regarding the hostages. Simultaneously, it will support the major ground operation expected if negotiations fail.

Together with expanded operations in the Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun sectors, intensified targeted airstrikes throughout Gaza, and the blockade that is beginning to affect the public in Gaza, this action is intended to push Hamas to enable another release phase with a larger number of living hostages (than in Hamas’ proposal) without an Israeli commitment to end the war.

For now, Hamas’ behavior, at least outwardly, shows concern about the situation, but nothing beyond that. Hamas spokespeople continue to blame Israel for sabotaging negotiations and emphasize – even in light of its recent moves – their willingness to reach an agreement. In their view, the hostages in the organization’s possession are the only weapon it has left to impose its four demands on Israel, a commitment backed by international guarantees against resuming fighting, IDF withdrawal to the October 6 lines, commitment to allow Gaza rehabilitation, and the release of additional terrorists from Israeli prisons in exchange for returning hostages, according to a formula agreed upon by both sides.

Room for flexibility not yet exhausted

Seemingly, Israel’s intention to receive the hostages while continuing to fight stands in complete contradiction to Hamas’ interests. So what is the basis for thinking that pressure could drive Hamas to change its position? It can be assumed that the assessment in Israel is that Hamas has room for flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, allowing it to implement additional deals without giving up all the cards it holds. This is apparently what Israel’s current efforts are aimed at.

Regarding Gaza’s internal situation, it can be assumed that Israel’s actions will increase anger and encourage protests against Hamas by some of the public. However, one should not pin excessive hopes on this. The authentic protests that developed in the past two weeks did not create a real challenge to Hamas rule. The protesters are not organized under a unified leadership, and they lack the capabilities and means to escalate their struggle. Against them stands Hamas – a large, strong, skilled, and armed force with the ability to suppress any organization that poses a threat to it.

“The enemy will not achieve through war and destruction what it failed to achieve through negotiations,” Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau promised, with the resumption of fighting in the current phase. It must be admitted, the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents – surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power in Gaza – reduces the options available to Israel.

The conditions under which Israel must operate today to achieve its goals are incomparably better than they were at the beginning of the war, the backing from the Trump administration and the umbrella it provides against the international political system and institutions, the change in the balance of power in the Middle East, the situation in other combat zones, the experience and confidence gained by IDF forces, and conversely – Hamas’ condition as well.

Published in Israel Hayom, April  03, 2025.

The Israeli strikes on the Gaza Strip are primarily intended to break the stalemate that has developed following the deadlock in hostage release negotiations, a stalemate in which Hamas has been enjoying a de facto extension of the ceasefire, reorganizing its forces and strengthening its governance, without returning additional hostages or paying any other price.

An additional goal of the operation is to preserve Israel’s commitment to achieving all war objectives, in light of the questions raised regarding this, following the prolonged ceasefire and the gap between threats to have all hell break loose and the actual reality.

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the political leadership to formulate a series of Draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

The attack on the Gaza Strip last night signaled the failure of Israel’s current negotiation efforts to bring Hamas to agree to additional hostage releases under the terms and prices of Phase I. Hamas, whose self-confidence and capabilities have strengthened considerably since the beginning of the ceasefire, rejected Israel’s demand. In its view, the hostages in its possession are the only weapon it has left to impose its four demands regarding the end of the war:

• Israeli commitment with international guarantees not to resume fighting.
• IDF withdrawal to the October 6 lines.
• Israeli commitment to allow the Gaza reconstruction process.
• Release of additional terrorists from Israeli prisons, in exchange for returning hostages, according to an agreed formula.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

Hamas is currently preparing for all possibilities. The organization’s leadership is investing efforts to restrain Israel through international diplomatic pressure, against the backdrop of the large number of casualties and while stressing its desire to continue on the ceasefire path toward ending the war. It is not impossible that it will also pass “positive signals” to the “mediators” about willingness to continue discussing “small” deals, as a tactic to break Israel’s offensive momentum.

“The enemy will not achieve through war and destruction what it failed to achieve through negotiation,” promised Eizat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, in response to the IDF attack. We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents – surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza – limits its options. The conditions under which it is required to operate to achieve its goals today are incomparably better than those at the beginning of the war: the backing from the Trump administration and the umbrella it provides against the diplomatic system and international institutions, the change in the Middle East balance of power, the situation in other combat zones, the state of Hamas and, distinctly, the experience and confidence gained by IDF forces.

Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible. In addition, it is right to shut down internet activity in Gaza – which helps Hamas apparatuses control the situation and maintain their governance – and to continue targeting efforts against senior organization officials abroad.

In view of the danger to the hostages’ wellbeing and alongside the steps presumably being taken in Israel’s proactive operations, it would be appropriate for Israel’s leadership to consider immediately approving a series of Draconian measures (such as the permanent deportation of Hamas leaders from the West Bank and imposing the death penalty on terrorists) and to declare that they will be implemented if harm comes to the hostages.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 18, 2025.

On March 2, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would halt the entry of all goods and supplies to Gaza. This decision came after Hamas rejected a framework proposed by U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff intended to continue the hostage-ceasefire talks—a framework Israel had already agreed to.

Of course, it was not long until the usual politicians, pundits and armchair quarterbacks playing lawyer started accusing Israel of the war crime of starvation. And, as usual, they did so with vague references to unspecified provisions of “international law.”

For the record, international law is very clear on this point: Israel is not obligated to provide aid that will be used by an enemy in a time of war, and anyone who argues differently is either illiterate or willfully ignorant.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt certainly were not expected to provide aid to Nazi Germany during WWII, yet there is a systematic double standard and misapplication of the law against the Jewish state.

To begin, those who ignorantly claim that all blockades are automatically a war crime, are simply wrong. Blockades, which are a lawful military tactic in the course of war, are regulated by international humanitarian law, but are not prohibited by it, as long as it is not used to intentionally starve the local civilian population. To that end, siege law does have humanitarian aspects, namely the requirement of facilitating the passage of food and medicine by third parties, which is governed by Article 23 of the 4th Geneva Convention.

Article 23 is very explicit in outlining that a High Contracting Party, such as Israel, shall allow the free passage of humanitarian supplies, but that is if, and only if, there are no serious reasons to believe these supplies are being diverted from their destination or used for military purposes.

Nor are these points controversial; for example, both the U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual and the UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict reiterate and mirror Article 23 of 4th Geneva Convention. So where does that leave Israel?

There has been indisputable and overwhelming evidence that Hamas systematically steals the aid, and uses it to advance their military goals, including the ongoing captivity of hostages. Everyone from The New York Times to the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations has reported on this fact for years. And if that’s not enough, even Hamas themselves has admitted it.

It is also imperative to dismiss the libelous charge that by halting the aid, Israel is committing the war crime of starving the civilian population of Gaza, which is patently untrue here.

Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute explicitly defines the crime of starvation as: “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”

Israel has made well-documented and extensive efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza, even though it does not have to (as it is not legally occupying Gaza), and even under the extraordinary challenge of Hamas’s systematic theft and weaponization of such supplies since they initiated the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre.

Since the commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage-ceasefire deal on Jan. 19, more than 25,000 trucks have entered Gaza (about 600 per day), carrying a total of 57,000 tons of food. This is at a greater level than pre-war aid deliveries. Meantime, water continues to be provided through Israeli pipelines as well. It is estimated that, based on current provisions, there is at least four to five months adequate supply of aid in Gaza.

There is apparently so much extra food, in fact, that Hamas can afford to have drones drop candy for the massive crowds that gathered to watch them parade innocent tortured Israeli civilian hostages and murdered Jewish babies in front of a jeering crowd before their release in a macabre celebration.

As President Joe Biden even clearly stated on Oct. 18, 2023, that, “If Hamas diverts or steals the assistance, they will have demonstrated once again that they have no concern for the welfare of the Palestinian people and it will end. As a practical matter, it will — it will stop the international community from being able to provide this aid.”

Any accusation therefore that Israel’s objective here is to starve innocent civilians—rather than to compel the surrender of Hamas combatants—is not merely unfounded but a libelous distortion of truth.

In summary, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law. Those who seek a resumption of further aid into Gaza, would be well advised to direct their outrage and pressure toward Hamas (and their sponsor Qatar) to accept the Witkoff framework for the continuation of a temporary ceasefire during the Ramadan and Passover period, and to demand the immediate and unequivocal release of all the remaining hostages being held captive in Gaza.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with Mark Goldfeder, a law professor and CEO of the National Jewish Advocacy Center.

Published in Nwesweek, March 10,  2025.

Prof. Kobi Michael: There will be no aid outside the humanitarian zones. This will prevent Hamas from continuing to steal all the humanitarian aid and will increase pressure on the group through the local population.

Published in The Washington Free Beacon, February 27, 2025.

As soon as the first three young female Israeli hostages were finally released from Hamas captivity as part of the latest deal, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was already lauding themselves for their role in the transfer.

The reality, however, is that the Red Cross utterly and unconscionably abandoned the hostages to the dungeons of Gaza — and now to the preying mobs surrounding them during their release.

In almost 500 days of captivity, under the most horrific of conditions, including torture, starvation, and sexual violence, not once has the Red Cross visited a single hostage or provided any proof of life for their families. The relatives of one of the released captives from November 2023, Elma Avraham, 84, who spent four months in the hospital upon her return, heartbreakingly described how the Red Cross refused to even accept the medicine they tried to give them to deliver to their elderly mother in Gaza.

Simply put, the Red Cross’ role has been relegated to no more than that of a glorified Uber driver, ferrying the hostages from Gaza into the hands of the IDF. But they cannot do even that while providing the hostages with even a shred of dignity. Instead, they have aided Hamas in turning the whole release of the hostages — including terrified young girls — into a propaganda circus, with sickening images of Hamas terrorists standing on top of Red Cross vehicles with guns and cameras, while Red Cross officials now routinely join Hamas on stage in these obscene ceremonies and parades.

One of the released hostages, Gadi Mozes (80), described how, at one point during his time in captivity, he was held in a truck right under the offices of the Red Cross in Gaza. Mozes was also in “mortal fear” during the release that he and fellow hostage Arbel Yehoud would be lynched by the frenzied mob around them.

Just this week we witnessed with absolute horror the release of three starved, emaciated male hostages, in scenes, as President Trump himself noted, were unmistakably reminiscent of the Holocaust. These scenes only underscore the chilling effects of the Red Cross’s abandonment. Inexcusably, instead of condemning Hamas, one member of the Red Cross was seen happily shaking hands with the masked Hamas terrorist on stage, as the three hostages were about to be gruesomely paraded.

It is also telling that whilst the Red Cross has managed to express “outrage” at the way Palestinian prisoners were released from Israel — even though it was fully in accordance with international law, and bearing in mind that unlike the innocent Israeli hostages coming home these were terrorist murderers with blood on their hands being let out of prison — they have refused to condemn Hamas over the obscene spectacles of the hostage releases in Gaza, instead jumping on stage with them for photo-ops. So much for that famous ‘neutrality’ they like to extol so much.

So much for that famous “neutrality” the Red Cross likes to extol. And, although the Red Cross likes to note that they have repeatedly (if passively) called for the hostages’ release, or that the macabre displays during the hostage release are outside of their control, that is woefully and pathetically inadequate, as is the excuse that they cannot do anything in the absence of an agreement between Hamas and Israel.

The fact that Hamas does not abide by any norms of international law or human dignity, or that they repeatedly rejected prior hostage release and ceasefire deals, does not absolve the Red Cross of their mandate under the Geneva Conventions to provide “humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict,” as well as ensuring that the hostages’ release transfers “take place in a way that is both safe and dignified.” Nor is it enough to merely politely ‘call’ for the hostages’ release and then just give up when Hamas says no.

The Red Cross prides itself on being unwaveringly neutral, but when it comes to Israeli and Jewish lives, they are just unwaveringly absent.

In addition to the hostages kidnapped on October 7, Hamas is also still holding the body of IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, who was killed and taken captive during the 2014 war with Israel, and two civilians, Avner Mengistu, a 37-year-old Israeli with mental health issues, who has been held hostage by Hamas also since 2014, and Hisham al-Sayed, a Bedouin Israeli, who is seriously ill and has been held hostage since 2015.

Not once has the Red Cross seen any of these men in captivity.

And the entire time former IDF soldier Gilad Shalit was held captive in Gaza for almost 6 years, until finally his release in 2011, the Red Cross never once visited or provided him humanitarian assistance.

The reality is, when it comes to Israeli lives, the Red Cross is just nowhere to be seen. Nor is this the first time that the ICRC has failed Jews: the organization has already acknowledged and apologized for its abject failure to help protect the millions of Jews who were exterminated in the Nazi death camps. They used the same excuse back then that they are using now – they asked the Germans for permission, and were told no, so they just backed off.

Unforgivable.

As it relates to Gaza, not only have they failed to see even a single hostage, they have also ignored the irrefutable evidence right under their noses that Hamas is systematically using hospitals and UN sites as terrorist staging grounds.

With a new U.S. Administration in the White House, the Red Cross must be held accountable for their wholesale abrogation of duty.

On his first day in office, President Trump signed an Executive Order stating that “no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.”

The United States is currently the single largest state donor to the Red Cross, contributing about $550 million in 2023. Given the Red Cross’s abandonment of the hostages, including American nationals still being held in hellish terror dungeons, and their effective whitewashing of Hamas’ crimes, not only does ongoing funding of the Red Cross not align with the foreign policy of the President of the United States, it runs entirely and dangerously counter to it.

Accordingly, if President Trump and the U.S. seek to eliminate wasteful spending, including under the newly created Department of Government Efficiency, they should cut funding to the Red Cross entirely — at least until they are restructured — and use some of that money instead to help the families of those whom the Red Cross has abandoned.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with Mark Goldfeder that he is a law professor and CEO of the National Jewish Advocacy Center.

Published in DAILYWIRE, February 10, 2025.