On March 23, the Israel Defense Forces made a tragic error in Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine humanitarian aid workers, along with six Hamas terrorists who were embedded among them. An investigation into the incidentwas immediately undertaken, and officers found to have been responsible were disciplined soon after.

But while all war is a tragedy, not all tragedies are war crimes.

What happened that night was an operational error in a combat zone—not a war crime. And the investigation that resulted in that conclusion wasn’t reached in a vacuum. It came after a comprehensive, independent fact-finding process led by senior experts outside the chain of command, reviewed by the chief of the General Staff, and subject to further legal scrutiny.

Outrage—along with misleading or outright false images—has overtaken social media. A global mob mentality has formed. Fortunately, the manipulations of social media are not a substitute for international law. Calling something a war crime doesn’t make it so. War crimes require specific evidence of intent—not viral videos, emotional overlays, or instant judgment by influencers or pundits acting as judge and jury.

International humanitarian law clearly defines war crimes as intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance, provided they retain protected civilian status.

In other words, for an act to constitute a war crime, there must be intent to commit the violation—an element entirely absent in this case.

The IDF’s internal investigation concluded that the killings resulted from a series of operational errors and professional failures. IDF elements were operating in a “hostile and dangerous combat zone” and believed there to be a “tangible threat.” Soldiers misidentified the convoy of vehicles, assessing that they were being used by Hamas insurgents—a tactic the group has systematically employed since Oct. 7, 2023.

Hamas has made a practice of blurring the lines between combatant and civilian, systematically exploiting ambulances, hospitals, and humanitarian symbols for military purposes. This tactic forces troops into impossible split-second decisions under fire—precisely the kind of dilemma that international law accounts for, but online critics ignore.

International humanitarian law also recognizes that tragic mistakes can happen during active combat, especially when insurgents like Hamas use protected facilities and vehicles to launch or shield attacks. Such conduct undermines the protections that civilians and humanitarian actors are entitled to.

No army—American, British, or Israeli—is immune to errors in war. What matters is what follows: transparency, investigation, disciplinary action, and institutional learning. That is the measure of a professional military in a democratic society.

In the IDF incident, surveillance indicated that five vehicles approached rapidly and stopped near IDF troops, with passengers quickly disembarking. The deputy battalion commander assessed the situation as a credible Hamas threat and ordered fire. Though that judgment proved incorrect, the belief was reasonable under the circumstances, including poor nighttime visibility, and which only underscored that the IDF complied with the rule of distinction under law of armed conflict.

The examination into the incident was conducted by the IDF General Staff Fact Finding Mechanism, a professional team outside the operational chain of command. Their findings were presented to the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, and included operational breaches, failures to follow orders, and reporting deficiencies. As a result, the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade was dismissed, and the commander of the 14th Brigade was severely reprimanded. The case is also being reviewed by the IDF Military Advocate General’s Office for potential legal proceedings.

The IDF expressed deep regret for the civilian harm and emphasized that the investigation is part of an ongoing commitment to learn from operational failures and reduce the risk of recurrence.

In short, the IDF acted exactly as a military in a democracy should: it investigated, acknowledged fault, and held individuals accountable.

There must also be a clear distinction between errors made in the course of legitimate military operations and intentionally directing attacks against civilians, which is Hamas’ standard practice and a blatant war crime.

Israel mourns every innocent life lost. Hamas counts every innocent death as a victory. That is not just a moral difference—it is the difference between law and lawlessness, between a tragedy and a crime.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky in collaboration with John Spencer, and Brian Cox.

Published in Newsweek, April  22, 2025.

Following Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023 massacre—which killed over 1,200 people in Israel, most of them civilians, including women, children and the elderly, with over 250 taken hostage—Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza. The scope and intensity of the response were unprecedented, but so too was the attack that prompted it.

Since then, there has been no shortage of uninformed actors, like comedian Dave Smith, or malign parties weaponizing international law to question whether Israel’s military actions in Gaza have been proportionate, lawful and ultimately, even necessary.

At the heart of that last question lies a critical misunderstanding. “Necessity” in war has two distinct meanings, and conflating them—morally and legally—leads to flawed assessments and misleading narratives.

Two necessities: one moral, one legal

1. Moral necessity — the just war tradition

The first concept of necessity comes from just war theory, an ethical framework developed over centuries to evaluate whether the use of force can be morally justified (jus ad bellum).

One of its core tenets is necessity:

War must be a last resort, undertaken only after all nonviolent alternatives—diplomacy, deterrence, sanctions, international mediation—have been exhausted.

In the case of Israel, the record speaks for itself. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, dismantling all civilian and military infrastructure. In the years that followed, Hamas seized power in a violent coup, launched tens of thousands of rockets and rejected every meaningful effort at peaceful coexistence. Despite periodic ceasefires and repeated international mediation, Hamas remained committed not to a Palestinian state alongside Israel—but to Israel’s destruction.

On Oct. 7, Hamas made its intentions unmistakable. It crossed the border not to challenge Israeli soldiers, but to massacre civilians. It filmed the atrocities and vowed to do it again. In that context, the claim that Israel’s military response lacked moral necessity ignores the facts and defies common sense.

2. Legal necessity — the law of armed conflict

The second form of necessity is not philosophical but legal. It belongs to the realm of international humanitarian law (IHL)—the rules governing the conduct of war (jus in bello).

Military necessity permits only those actions required to achieve a legitimate military objective.

This principle—codified in the Geneva Conventions, Hague Regulations and customary international law—does not allow destruction for its own sake. It does not excuse harm to civilians unless it is incidental to a lawful strike. And it certainly does not override the obligations to distinguish between military and civilian targets or to avoid disproportionate attacks.

Every Israeli military operation in Gaza is bound by this standard. It is not enough to identify a Hamas presence in a building or a neighborhood. To strike lawfully, the target must provide a concrete and direct military advantage, and every feasible precaution must be taken to mitigate civilian harm.

Israel’s military attorneys and commanders operate within this framework. Target selection, weapon choice, timing of attack, and warning mechanisms are scrutinized in real time. The Israel Defense Forces not only operates under legal necessity—it documents and reviews its actions at a level few modern militaries do, particularly when fighting a terrorist group embedded in a civilian population.

The bridge vs. the bakery

A useful example from the laws of war helps clarify this distinction.

Destroying a bridge used to transport enemy weapons is a lawful act of military necessity. It offers a clear operational advantage and directly degrades enemy capability. By contrast, destroying a bakery in a residential neighborhood simply because enemy fighters may stop there for food is not. The bakery is not a military objective, and its destruction would serve no legitimate military purpose.

This distinction matters in urban warfare. In Gaza, where Hamas routinely embeds its military assets within civilian areas—using schools, homes and mosques—Israel faces extraordinary challenges. But the legal standards do not change. Every action must meet the test of military necessity. Every strike must be tied to a legitimate objective. The presence of civilians demands restraint, even when facing an adversary that deliberately exploits them.

Necessary war, constrained conduct

So, was Israel’s war against Hamas necessary?

That depends on which kind of necessity you mean. But in truth, it meets both tests:

Was the war morally necessary? After Oct. 7—following the deliberate massacre of civilians, the kidnapping of hostages, and Hamas’s declared intention to repeat those atrocities—the answer is unequivocally yes.

Are Israel’s military operations legally necessary? While each strike must meet specific legal thresholds, the IDF operates under one of the most stringent legal and ethical frameworks in modern warfare. It is bound by the law of armed conflict and has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to minimizing harm, even while engaging an enemy that hides among civilians and violates every rule of war.

A war can be both morally justified and legally constrained. Israel’s campaign against Hamas is exactly that. It was not launched lightly or recklessly—it was waged in defense of life, sovereignty and the rule of law.

Anyone asking whether Israel’s war was necessary should first understand what they are really asking—and then recognize that the answer, by every standard that matters, is yes.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with retired United States Army major and urban warfare expert John Spencer John Spencer.

Published in JNS, April  20, 2025.

The expansion of IDF ground operations in the southern Gaza Strip, which includes evacuating the population to the humanitarian zone in al-Mawasi and capturing the Morag Corridor that separates Khan Younis from Rafah, is designed to increase pressure on the Hamas leadership to accept Israel’s demands regarding the hostages. Simultaneously, it will support the major ground operation expected if negotiations fail.

Together with expanded operations in the Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun sectors, intensified targeted airstrikes throughout Gaza, and the blockade that is beginning to affect the public in Gaza, this action is intended to push Hamas to enable another release phase with a larger number of living hostages (than in Hamas’ proposal) without an Israeli commitment to end the war.

For now, Hamas’ behavior, at least outwardly, shows concern about the situation, but nothing beyond that. Hamas spokespeople continue to blame Israel for sabotaging negotiations and emphasize – even in light of its recent moves – their willingness to reach an agreement. In their view, the hostages in the organization’s possession are the only weapon it has left to impose its four demands on Israel, a commitment backed by international guarantees against resuming fighting, IDF withdrawal to the October 6 lines, commitment to allow Gaza rehabilitation, and the release of additional terrorists from Israeli prisons in exchange for returning hostages, according to a formula agreed upon by both sides.

Room for flexibility not yet exhausted

Seemingly, Israel’s intention to receive the hostages while continuing to fight stands in complete contradiction to Hamas’ interests. So what is the basis for thinking that pressure could drive Hamas to change its position? It can be assumed that the assessment in Israel is that Hamas has room for flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, allowing it to implement additional deals without giving up all the cards it holds. This is apparently what Israel’s current efforts are aimed at.

Regarding Gaza’s internal situation, it can be assumed that Israel’s actions will increase anger and encourage protests against Hamas by some of the public. However, one should not pin excessive hopes on this. The authentic protests that developed in the past two weeks did not create a real challenge to Hamas rule. The protesters are not organized under a unified leadership, and they lack the capabilities and means to escalate their struggle. Against them stands Hamas – a large, strong, skilled, and armed force with the ability to suppress any organization that poses a threat to it.

“The enemy will not achieve through war and destruction what it failed to achieve through negotiations,” Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau promised, with the resumption of fighting in the current phase. It must be admitted, the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents – surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power in Gaza – reduces the options available to Israel.

The conditions under which Israel must operate today to achieve its goals are incomparably better than they were at the beginning of the war, the backing from the Trump administration and the umbrella it provides against the international political system and institutions, the change in the balance of power in the Middle East, the situation in other combat zones, the experience and confidence gained by IDF forces, and conversely – Hamas’ condition as well.

Published in Israel Hayom, April  03, 2025.

The Israeli strikes on the Gaza Strip are primarily intended to break the stalemate that has developed following the deadlock in hostage release negotiations, a stalemate in which Hamas has been enjoying a de facto extension of the ceasefire, reorganizing its forces and strengthening its governance, without returning additional hostages or paying any other price.

An additional goal of the operation is to preserve Israel’s commitment to achieving all war objectives, in light of the questions raised regarding this, following the prolonged ceasefire and the gap between threats to have all hell break loose and the actual reality.

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the political leadership to formulate a series of Draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

The attack on the Gaza Strip last night signaled the failure of Israel’s current negotiation efforts to bring Hamas to agree to additional hostage releases under the terms and prices of Phase I. Hamas, whose self-confidence and capabilities have strengthened considerably since the beginning of the ceasefire, rejected Israel’s demand. In its view, the hostages in its possession are the only weapon it has left to impose its four demands regarding the end of the war:

• Israeli commitment with international guarantees not to resume fighting.
• IDF withdrawal to the October 6 lines.
• Israeli commitment to allow the Gaza reconstruction process.
• Release of additional terrorists from Israeli prisons, in exchange for returning hostages, according to an agreed formula.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

Hamas is currently preparing for all possibilities. The organization’s leadership is investing efforts to restrain Israel through international diplomatic pressure, against the backdrop of the large number of casualties and while stressing its desire to continue on the ceasefire path toward ending the war. It is not impossible that it will also pass “positive signals” to the “mediators” about willingness to continue discussing “small” deals, as a tactic to break Israel’s offensive momentum.

“The enemy will not achieve through war and destruction what it failed to achieve through negotiation,” promised Eizat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, in response to the IDF attack. We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents – surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza – limits its options. The conditions under which it is required to operate to achieve its goals today are incomparably better than those at the beginning of the war: the backing from the Trump administration and the umbrella it provides against the diplomatic system and international institutions, the change in the Middle East balance of power, the situation in other combat zones, the state of Hamas and, distinctly, the experience and confidence gained by IDF forces.

Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible. In addition, it is right to shut down internet activity in Gaza – which helps Hamas apparatuses control the situation and maintain their governance – and to continue targeting efforts against senior organization officials abroad.

In view of the danger to the hostages’ wellbeing and alongside the steps presumably being taken in Israel’s proactive operations, it would be appropriate for Israel’s leadership to consider immediately approving a series of Draconian measures (such as the permanent deportation of Hamas leaders from the West Bank and imposing the death penalty on terrorists) and to declare that they will be implemented if harm comes to the hostages.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 18, 2025.

On March 2, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would halt the entry of all goods and supplies to Gaza. This decision came after Hamas rejected a framework proposed by U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff intended to continue the hostage-ceasefire talks—a framework Israel had already agreed to.

Of course, it was not long until the usual politicians, pundits and armchair quarterbacks playing lawyer started accusing Israel of the war crime of starvation. And, as usual, they did so with vague references to unspecified provisions of “international law.”

For the record, international law is very clear on this point: Israel is not obligated to provide aid that will be used by an enemy in a time of war, and anyone who argues differently is either illiterate or willfully ignorant.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt certainly were not expected to provide aid to Nazi Germany during WWII, yet there is a systematic double standard and misapplication of the law against the Jewish state.

To begin, those who ignorantly claim that all blockades are automatically a war crime, are simply wrong. Blockades, which are a lawful military tactic in the course of war, are regulated by international humanitarian law, but are not prohibited by it, as long as it is not used to intentionally starve the local civilian population. To that end, siege law does have humanitarian aspects, namely the requirement of facilitating the passage of food and medicine by third parties, which is governed by Article 23 of the 4th Geneva Convention.

Article 23 is very explicit in outlining that a High Contracting Party, such as Israel, shall allow the free passage of humanitarian supplies, but that is if, and only if, there are no serious reasons to believe these supplies are being diverted from their destination or used for military purposes.

Nor are these points controversial; for example, both the U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual and the UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict reiterate and mirror Article 23 of 4th Geneva Convention. So where does that leave Israel?

There has been indisputable and overwhelming evidence that Hamas systematically steals the aid, and uses it to advance their military goals, including the ongoing captivity of hostages. Everyone from The New York Times to the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations has reported on this fact for years. And if that’s not enough, even Hamas themselves has admitted it.

It is also imperative to dismiss the libelous charge that by halting the aid, Israel is committing the war crime of starving the civilian population of Gaza, which is patently untrue here.

Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute explicitly defines the crime of starvation as: “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”

Israel has made well-documented and extensive efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza, even though it does not have to (as it is not legally occupying Gaza), and even under the extraordinary challenge of Hamas’s systematic theft and weaponization of such supplies since they initiated the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre.

Since the commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage-ceasefire deal on Jan. 19, more than 25,000 trucks have entered Gaza (about 600 per day), carrying a total of 57,000 tons of food. This is at a greater level than pre-war aid deliveries. Meantime, water continues to be provided through Israeli pipelines as well. It is estimated that, based on current provisions, there is at least four to five months adequate supply of aid in Gaza.

There is apparently so much extra food, in fact, that Hamas can afford to have drones drop candy for the massive crowds that gathered to watch them parade innocent tortured Israeli civilian hostages and murdered Jewish babies in front of a jeering crowd before their release in a macabre celebration.

As President Joe Biden even clearly stated on Oct. 18, 2023, that, “If Hamas diverts or steals the assistance, they will have demonstrated once again that they have no concern for the welfare of the Palestinian people and it will end. As a practical matter, it will — it will stop the international community from being able to provide this aid.”

Any accusation therefore that Israel’s objective here is to starve innocent civilians—rather than to compel the surrender of Hamas combatants—is not merely unfounded but a libelous distortion of truth.

In summary, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law. Those who seek a resumption of further aid into Gaza, would be well advised to direct their outrage and pressure toward Hamas (and their sponsor Qatar) to accept the Witkoff framework for the continuation of a temporary ceasefire during the Ramadan and Passover period, and to demand the immediate and unequivocal release of all the remaining hostages being held captive in Gaza.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with Mark Goldfeder, a law professor and CEO of the National Jewish Advocacy Center.

Published in Nwesweek, March 10,  2025.

Prof. Kobi Michael: There will be no aid outside the humanitarian zones. This will prevent Hamas from continuing to steal all the humanitarian aid and will increase pressure on the group through the local population.

Published in The Washington Free Beacon, February 27, 2025.

As soon as the first three young female Israeli hostages were finally released from Hamas captivity as part of the latest deal, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was already lauding themselves for their role in the transfer.

The reality, however, is that the Red Cross utterly and unconscionably abandoned the hostages to the dungeons of Gaza — and now to the preying mobs surrounding them during their release.

In almost 500 days of captivity, under the most horrific of conditions, including torture, starvation, and sexual violence, not once has the Red Cross visited a single hostage or provided any proof of life for their families. The relatives of one of the released captives from November 2023, Elma Avraham, 84, who spent four months in the hospital upon her return, heartbreakingly described how the Red Cross refused to even accept the medicine they tried to give them to deliver to their elderly mother in Gaza.

Simply put, the Red Cross’ role has been relegated to no more than that of a glorified Uber driver, ferrying the hostages from Gaza into the hands of the IDF. But they cannot do even that while providing the hostages with even a shred of dignity. Instead, they have aided Hamas in turning the whole release of the hostages — including terrified young girls — into a propaganda circus, with sickening images of Hamas terrorists standing on top of Red Cross vehicles with guns and cameras, while Red Cross officials now routinely join Hamas on stage in these obscene ceremonies and parades.

One of the released hostages, Gadi Mozes (80), described how, at one point during his time in captivity, he was held in a truck right under the offices of the Red Cross in Gaza. Mozes was also in “mortal fear” during the release that he and fellow hostage Arbel Yehoud would be lynched by the frenzied mob around them.

Just this week we witnessed with absolute horror the release of three starved, emaciated male hostages, in scenes, as President Trump himself noted, were unmistakably reminiscent of the Holocaust. These scenes only underscore the chilling effects of the Red Cross’s abandonment. Inexcusably, instead of condemning Hamas, one member of the Red Cross was seen happily shaking hands with the masked Hamas terrorist on stage, as the three hostages were about to be gruesomely paraded.

It is also telling that whilst the Red Cross has managed to express “outrage” at the way Palestinian prisoners were released from Israel — even though it was fully in accordance with international law, and bearing in mind that unlike the innocent Israeli hostages coming home these were terrorist murderers with blood on their hands being let out of prison — they have refused to condemn Hamas over the obscene spectacles of the hostage releases in Gaza, instead jumping on stage with them for photo-ops. So much for that famous ‘neutrality’ they like to extol so much.

So much for that famous “neutrality” the Red Cross likes to extol. And, although the Red Cross likes to note that they have repeatedly (if passively) called for the hostages’ release, or that the macabre displays during the hostage release are outside of their control, that is woefully and pathetically inadequate, as is the excuse that they cannot do anything in the absence of an agreement between Hamas and Israel.

The fact that Hamas does not abide by any norms of international law or human dignity, or that they repeatedly rejected prior hostage release and ceasefire deals, does not absolve the Red Cross of their mandate under the Geneva Conventions to provide “humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict,” as well as ensuring that the hostages’ release transfers “take place in a way that is both safe and dignified.” Nor is it enough to merely politely ‘call’ for the hostages’ release and then just give up when Hamas says no.

The Red Cross prides itself on being unwaveringly neutral, but when it comes to Israeli and Jewish lives, they are just unwaveringly absent.

In addition to the hostages kidnapped on October 7, Hamas is also still holding the body of IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, who was killed and taken captive during the 2014 war with Israel, and two civilians, Avner Mengistu, a 37-year-old Israeli with mental health issues, who has been held hostage by Hamas also since 2014, and Hisham al-Sayed, a Bedouin Israeli, who is seriously ill and has been held hostage since 2015.

Not once has the Red Cross seen any of these men in captivity.

And the entire time former IDF soldier Gilad Shalit was held captive in Gaza for almost 6 years, until finally his release in 2011, the Red Cross never once visited or provided him humanitarian assistance.

The reality is, when it comes to Israeli lives, the Red Cross is just nowhere to be seen. Nor is this the first time that the ICRC has failed Jews: the organization has already acknowledged and apologized for its abject failure to help protect the millions of Jews who were exterminated in the Nazi death camps. They used the same excuse back then that they are using now – they asked the Germans for permission, and were told no, so they just backed off.

Unforgivable.

As it relates to Gaza, not only have they failed to see even a single hostage, they have also ignored the irrefutable evidence right under their noses that Hamas is systematically using hospitals and UN sites as terrorist staging grounds.

With a new U.S. Administration in the White House, the Red Cross must be held accountable for their wholesale abrogation of duty.

On his first day in office, President Trump signed an Executive Order stating that “no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.”

The United States is currently the single largest state donor to the Red Cross, contributing about $550 million in 2023. Given the Red Cross’s abandonment of the hostages, including American nationals still being held in hellish terror dungeons, and their effective whitewashing of Hamas’ crimes, not only does ongoing funding of the Red Cross not align with the foreign policy of the President of the United States, it runs entirely and dangerously counter to it.

Accordingly, if President Trump and the U.S. seek to eliminate wasteful spending, including under the newly created Department of Government Efficiency, they should cut funding to the Red Cross entirely — at least until they are restructured — and use some of that money instead to help the families of those whom the Red Cross has abandoned.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with Mark Goldfeder that he is a law professor and CEO of the National Jewish Advocacy Center.

Published in DAILYWIRE, February 10, 2025.

Arsen Ostrovsky: Einstein’s famous definition is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. And for many, many years, including since October 7, the international community at large has had the same failing strategy with respect to Gaza that essentially allows Hamas to remain in power, and that we know is simply unacceptable.

What President Trump has spoken about is the intention to create, essentially, a set of circumstances and conditions to allow Gazans to voluntarily choose to move to conditions that are better elsewhere.

I would actually go one step further and suggest that those that are perhaps in fact guilty here of violating international law are the ones that are insisting that the Gazans stay there. Because by doing so, including whilst Hamas is still in power, they’re essentially calling for the Gazans to stay in an active war zone and essentially be continued to be used as human shields by Hamas.

Published in YNET February 09, 2025.

When a force’s role is simple and clear, even within a complex overall plan – this embodies the principle of “simplicity,” established as one of the IDF’s core combat principles. This holds true at all levels, becoming increasingly vital as complexity grows. In the intricate reality that has emerged in Gaza, where issues of the ceasefire agreement, resumption of fighting, return of hostages, and “the day after” are intertwined, clarity becomes essential for achieving both military and political objectives while maintaining domestic and international legitimacy. Israel’s strategic security objective in Gaza can be defined in a single word: demilitarization. No philosophical debates or confusion needed.

Hamas begins rehabilitation

The ceasefire agreement has breathed new fighting spirit into Hamas’ leadership and members. “This is the result of our people’s steadfast stance over more than 15 months,” declared Khalil al-Hayya – head of Hamas’ political bureau who led the organization’s negotiating team. The source promised the struggle would continue until complete victory.

We must assume Hamas in Gaza isn’t resting on its laurels and has already begun rehabilitating its military capabilities. They will exploit the ceasefire to revitalize their personnel, smuggle and manufacture weapons, reassert control over the population, and maximize political gains from the release of operatives in Gaza, the West Bank, and regionally.

In any reality, Israel cannot allow the existence of combat forces, means, and military capabilities that threaten its citizens’ security. Complete demilitarization of Gaza means denying Hamas and other organizations their military operational capabilities. This doesn’t negate efforts to topple Hamas’ rule, but clarifies that ideas like “a Palestinian national unity government” or “international management committee” presented as alternatives to this regime won’t be acceptable to Israel until demilitarization is achieved. The defense establishment’s role will be to destroy existing capabilities and prevent their long-term renewal. The pursuit of demilitarization will be the compass guiding all efforts in this arena, at least for the foreseeable future.

The Gazafication of Jenin

And not just in Gaza. Operation Iron Wall currently underway in the Jenin sector reminds us of the Gazafication process this area has undergone. For the umpteenth time, the IDF returns to this terror incubator to remove threats limiting its operational freedom, strike terror infrastructure, and arrest operatives. This time it comes shortly after Palestinian Authority mechanisms conducted an operation of unusual scope in this area, “Defending the Homeland,” lasting about six weeks. Elite PA units participated, and from declarations surrounding it, one might have thought a new dawn was about to break in Jenin. The operation ended with reconciliation between the mechanisms and the “Jenin Battalion,” providing another proof of the PA’s limited capabilities. This is the same “Authority” that some believe could, in an “improved version,” be the solution to Gaza’s problem.

In any case, what’s happening in Jenin reflects rising tensions across the West Bank following the signing of the Gaza ceasefire agreement. Hamas spokespeople are riding the wave of joy and elation following the release of operatives from Israel and calling for “escalation of resistance” from the West Bank. The fact that those released belong to all organizations contributes to the national image Hamas strives to cultivate. Into this fire, additional oil is poured by those senior officials abroad whom Israel’s hand didn’t reach in this war, like Zaher Jabarin who declared on Al-Jazeera: “Just as we defeated Netanyahu in Gaza, we will defeat him in the West Bank.”

Despite the declared ceasefire in various arenas, the days ahead are far from promising quiet. Amid the joy over the hostages’ return and alongside diplomatic activity with the Trump administration, the refreshing and reorganization of combat forces, it’s appropriate to maintain the alertness and operational sharpness we’ve adopted over the past 15 months. We can assume we’ll need them.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 26, 2025.

Donald Trump’s warning on Truth Social that there would be “hellish consequences in the Middle East” if the hostages were not released by his inauguration on January 20 is significant for four reasons.

First, it demonstrates the depth of his commitment to resolving this issue and his willingness to put his full weight and prestige behind it. Saturday’s announcement appointing Adam Boehler, a close associate of the president, as special envoy for the hostages issue reinforces this impression.

Second, it establishes a clear and urgent timeline for resolution. Third, the stern message signals that the era of the Biden administration’s nuanced diplomacy is coming to an end. Fourth, it comes at one of Hamas’s lowest points in the war. From the Palestinian terrorist organization’s perspective, the sequence of events and developments in the regional and global arena has worsened the conditions under which Hamas operates.

The “unity of fronts” against Israel is dissipating: Hezbollah broke its promises, contained its fire, and left Hamas alone in the battle. Iran is preoccupied with its own problems, trying to reach an understanding with the US ahead of the Trump administration’s entry, and therefore shows relative restraint.

The war in Syria is pushing Gaza from the spotlight while drawing some of the “axis of resistance” forces to its territory. The Houthis from Yemen currently pose more of an annoyance than a real threat to Israel, and while the West Bank situation is simmering, it remains under control.

Egypt, Qatar, and other regional countries are eager to curry favor with Trump and will therefore strive to please him. The IDF can now allocate more resources to the Gaza front and will soon be able to increase its intensity by removing the constraints placed by the Biden administration. All this occurs while Hamas in Gaza fights for survival, its leadership abroad faces threats of expulsion, living conditions in the Strip worsen, and international pressure on Israel diminishes. Under these conditions, the only card remaining in Hamas’s hands to change the situation is the hostages.

Hamas is making adjustments for the Trump era. The organization likely understands that Trump’s declaration practically means at least a green light for Israel (when he takes office) to control humanitarian aid distribution, keep it at the legally required minimum, and increase combat intensity in Gaza. This is in addition to unfreezing measures that the Biden administration is delaying, while providing full backing for its activities against actions taken by international institutions. Furthermore, Hamas understands that Trump can also exert heavy pressure on countries hosting Hamas leaders and even take measures against the latter.

Hamas’s decision to release hostage videos providing proof of life to Israel without receiving anything in return could indicate that the terrorist organization also reads the situation this way and is interested in a deal that would extract it from its predicament. Will this lead to flexibility in its positions?

Hamas has made four demands since the war’s beginning as conditions for releasing the hostages. First, a complete and comprehensive cessation of the war with international guarantees. Second, IDF withdrawal to the October 6 lines. Third, Israeli agreement to a reconstruction process and return of displaced persons to their homes in Gaza. Fourth, the release of imprisoned terrorists in exchange for released hostages, according to an agreed-upon ratio between the parties. The essence of the dilemma that faced and still faces the Israeli government is how to save the hostages without saving Hamas.

Disagreements regarding ending the war and IDF withdrawal led to the idea of a multi-phase deal, where the final stage would mark the war’s end, but until then Israel would supposedly have an opportunity to achieve its objectives. Even if Hamas agrees to the principle, complex negotiations on the details and implementation process would still be required, and this is before the internal discussion in Israel regarding the price.

Either way, to improve the chances for a deal and reduce the price, it would be prudent for Israel to show flexibility and perhaps even initiate willingness to provide compensation abroad (for example, agreeing to permanently transfer a certain number of Hamas terrorists to Qatar) to reduce the demanded compensation on the ground. The impact of the latter on Hamas’s survival and its status and capabilities in Gaza and the West Bank would be more difficult for Israel.

No one in Israel doesn’t yearn for the release of the hostages from Hamas, just as there is no one who doesn’t want the complete defeat of this monstrous terrorist organization. Resolving the tension between these two objectives is a matter of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” Any decision the government makes is legitimate as long as its costs are very clear.

Published in  Israel Hayom, December 07, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**