“The growing discourse in Israel about the acceleration of Hamas’ military force buildup in Gaza is intended only to justify continued Israeli aggression in this area,” Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem charged at the beginning of the week. He stressed that his organization remained committed to the ceasefire agreement and called on the mediating countries to pressure Israel to stop its violations.

Hamas’ leadership is troubled by the spotlight being turned back on the Gaza front. The wars in Iran and Lebanon, which drew most of Israel’s attention and military capabilities, eased some of the pressure on Hamas. It stabilized its systems, further entrenched its governance and stepped up efforts to restore its military capabilities. The series of targeted killings in its ranks has returned it to its grim reality and sent its senior officials back deep into the tunnels.

Reports that the Board of Peace quietly approved Israel’s policy of targeted killings and reducing Hamas-controlled territory are troubling the terrorist organization’s leaders. They are pulling out the creative formulas they prepared in advance to mislead the public and the mediating countries, but without any intention of disarming. They do not intend to accept even the softer formula proposed by Nikolay Mladenov, who was temporarily willing to settle for the “concentration, storage or freezing of the use of weapons.”

The growing list of operatives killed provides Hamas with a demonstration not only of Israeli intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities, but also of its success in carrying out this policy despite the restrictive arrangements that Hamas and the mediating countries tried to impose on it.

From Israel’s perspective, there is also something less encouraging about this list: It illustrates the growing threat from inside the Gaza Strip.

The wording of the IDF Spokesperson’s announcements on the targeted killings offers hints of this. A large share of the terrorists killed were those who “advanced terrorist plots against our forces operating in the Gaza Strip.”

Some of the strikes targeted underground infrastructure that Hamas tried to restore after the ceasefire, as well as launch shafts and launchers used by the organization. These too can be added to the indications of the terrorist organization’s reconstruction efforts.

Do not allow Hamas to copy Hezbollah

Over the years, the Lebanese front has provided Hamas with countless strategic lessons about building its force and confronting Israel militarily. These include, among other things, the establishment of Hamas’ army, the concept of underground warfare, which Hezbollah pioneered through its “nature reserves” in southern Lebanon, and the adoption of the principle of transferring the fighting into enemy territory. Hamas studied Hezbollah’s models and adapted them to its own constraints and to the unique characteristics of the Gaza front.

It does not take an overactive imagination to guess what is going through the minds of Hamas leaders when they see the videos Hezbollah is distributing about the use of drones, and when they hear about the damage this weapon is causing Israel.

Hamas, which proved its capabilities in this field during the Oct. 7 attack and even before it, may see drones as the operational solution to the constraints it currently faces.

The path to building a significant threat of this kind could be short if the smuggling routes are not blocked. This is the most important preventive measure against the development of such a capability. In addition, it is vital to attack and destroy everything connected to the drone field: weapons, equipment, facilities and the people involved.

Instead of basking in the glow of an occasional counter-smuggling success, Israel should be asking what it is not managing to intercept. More broadly, amid the conflicting reports regarding Hamas’ condition, it would be useful for an official source to present the public with a clear and detailed picture, not of the operatives and capabilities Israel has destroyed, but of what Hamas still has: its order of battle, the number and length of tunnels, weapons by type and quantity, weapons production infrastructure and more. We do not know everything, and not everything that is known can be reported. Even if the picture is incomplete, it would still be better than fragments of information, speculation or commissioned commentary.

Netanyahu vs. Trump

Three events could influence Israel’s security policy in the near future and perhaps even endanger its achievements.

The first is the US midterm elections and the desire of President Donald Trump and his team to preserve maximum stability, at least until Nov. 3.

The second is the negotiations between the US and Iran over a nuclear agreement, and the attempts the regime in Tehran will make to use them as leverage against Israel through the Americans, in order to restrict Israeli activity and perhaps even its presence in the various fronts.

The third is Israel’s election campaign.

The mistake that allowed the US to link the Lebanese front to the ceasefire with Iran must stand before Israel’s decision-makers as a reminder in how to conduct themselves with Washington. With regard to Gaza, this means Israel must beware of any initiative or move that would link it to other regional issues.

It is right to be highly suspicious about the chances of activating a “technocrats’ committee” or other mechanisms supposedly free of Hamas in a reality in which Gaza is still Hamas.

In the front where it all began, Israel cannot compromise on achieving all its objectives. Removing the threat from this front is an important achievement, but not enough. Preventing the threat from being rebuilt, completely dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities, and demilitarizing the area are goals Israel must achieve. Until then, Gaza must remain an active front.

Published in Israel Hayom, on July 7, 2026. 

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Executive Summary

• The ongoing debate over which Israeli authority should appoint a commission of inquiry into the collapse on October 7, 2023, is important for maintaining public confidence in the investigative process. However, this debate overlooks an equally important question: How the investigation itself should be conducted.
• The model of commissions of inquiry traditionally employed in Israel closely resembles judicial proceedings. Such commissions are typically chaired by judges and conduct public hearings, allow legal representation, issue formal warnings to individuals who may be adversely affected by their findings, hear witness testimony, and permit cross-examination.
• This model is ill-suited to investigating a systemic failure on the scale of the October 7 attack. Its quasi-judicial structure risks producing an inquiry that is unnecessarily slow, procedurally cumbersome, and overly focused on assigning responsibility rather than deeply understanding the underlying causes of failure.
• Investigations of this nature should instead prioritize establishing an accurate factual record, reconstructing the sequence of events, identifying systemic failures, and generating lessons capable of preventing future catastrophes. These objectives are more consistent with the methodology employed in aviation accident investigations.
• Judges and legal professionals are not necessarily the most suitable individuals to lead such an inquiry. The adversarial methodology of legal proceedings differs fundamentally from the interdisciplinary, research-based, and system-oriented approach required to investigate complex organizational failures.
• This paper therefore proposes an alternative model based on multidisciplinary investigative teams operating in a manner similar to aviation accident investigation agencies and military operational debriefings. Such teams would be supported by experts in intelligence, military operations, organizational behavior, technology, weapons systems, human factors, and related disciplines.
• This proposal does not advocate abandoning either individual or public accountability. Rather, it argues that the institutional process of learning from failure should be separated from the mechanisms responsible for determining personal, command, and political responsibility.

Introduction

Since the October 7 attack, public debate has focused primarily on the question of who should appoint the members of the commission charged with investigating the attack and the massacre. This is an important issue. Public confidence in those conducting the investigation is essential if both the investigative process and its conclusions are to command legitimacy. Without such confidence, the investigation is unlikely to produce lessons that Israel’s political and security leadership will be willing to implement. Only under these conditions can investigative findings be translated into meaningful institutional reform capable of reducing the risk of future catastrophes.

Yet this debate has obscured another question that deserves equal—if not greater—attention: how should the investigation itself be conducted?

This article argues that the investigative model traditionally employed in Israel—referred to here as the judicial model—is poorly suited to inquiries into systemic failures such as the October 7 attack. Instead, Israel should adopt an investigative framework modeled more closely on aviation accident investigations and military operational debriefings, while adapting these approaches to the unique characteristics of a national security catastrophe.

The Judicial Model

For the purposes of this discussion, I refer to the traditional Israeli approach to commissions of inquiry as the judicial model because it closely resembles judicial proceedings. This characterization applies to both principal forms of inquiry recognized under Israeli law: the Commission of Inquiry (commonly referred to as the “State Commission of Inquiry,” although this term does not appear in the statute) and the Governmental Commission of Examination (officially termed a Governmental Examination Committee).¹

The similarities between these commissions and courts are substantial. They are ordinarily chaired by sitting or retired judges,² and their membership typically consists of an odd number of commissioners, reflecting the practice of judicial panels.³ Their proceedings are generally conducted in public, consistent with the principle of open justice.⁴ Knowingly providing false testimony before a commission constitutes perjury to the same extent as false testimony before a court.⁵ Individuals who may be adversely affected by the commission’s findings are entitled to prior warning, and anyone whose interests may be affected may be represented by legal counsel throughout the proceedings.⁶ Through their attorneys, such individuals may also cross-examine witnesses.

Like courts, commissions of inquiry possess extensive coercive powers, including the authority to compel testimony, require the production of documents, and seize relevant materials.⁷ Their reports are published pursuant to statute and may include dissenting opinions. In some instances, their conclusions have influenced subsequent legal and public understandings of responsibility in a manner resembling judicial precedent. The Kahan Commission, for example, articulated the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility among Israeli public officials.⁸

The judicial orientation of these commissions has both historical and institutional roots. The framers of the Commissions of Inquiry Law presumably believed that appointing judges to lead such inquiries would enhance their objectivity and impartiality while reinforcing public confidence in their conclusions. At the time the legislation was enacted, the judiciary enjoyed broad public trust, making judges a natural choice to chair commissions of national importance (as opposed to current low levels of public trust in the judicial branch). The resemblance between commissions of inquiry and judicial proceedings may also reflect the intuitive assumption that both institutions seek to reconstruct disputed events and reach authoritative conclusions regarding responsibility. Moreover, the commissions’ statutory coercive powers naturally reinforce their resemblance to courts.

Institutional design, however, shapes institutional behavior. Organizations tend to adopt the professional norms and methodologies of those who lead them. It is therefore unsurprising that commissions chaired predominantly by judges have evolved according to judicial methods of reasoning and procedure. Had engineers, military investigators, or systems analysts traditionally chaired such commissions, they would almost certainly have developed a markedly different investigative methodology and character.

Cumbersome, Inefficient, and Ill-Suited to the Search for Truth

The judicial model is fundamentally ill-suited to investigating systemic failures such as the October 7 attack and the massacre that accompanied it. Even at an intuitive level, this conclusion is difficult to avoid. Few people would be comfortable boarding an aircraft if aviation accident investigations were conducted according to procedures modeled on Israeli commissions of inquiry.⁹

The first difficulty is institutional. Compared with professional accident investigation agencies, commissions operating under the judicial model are procedurally cumbersome. Their quasi-judicial structure imports many of the inefficiencies associated with litigation. Extensive participation by legal counsel, public hearings, procedural safeguards, formal witness examinations, and cross-examination inevitably lengthen the investigative process and divert attention from its central objective.

These procedural safeguards serve an important purpose in judicial proceedings, where protecting the rights of individuals who may be adversely affected is paramount. Yet the principal objective of a national inquiry into a catastrophe such as October 7 is fundamentally different. As with aviation accident investigations, its overriding purpose should be to establish an accurate factual record, identify the systemic causes of failure, and generate recommendations capable of preventing future disasters. Procedures designed primarily to safeguard adversarial fairness should not be permitted to undermine those objectives.

With all due respect to the judiciary, the routine appointment of judges to chair commissions of inquiry further limits their suitability for investigating systemic organizational failures. This is not a criticism of judges themselves, but rather a recognition that professional expertise is context dependent. Judges are trained to resolve legal disputes through established rules of evidence and procedure. Investigating a complex institutional failure requires a fundamentally different set of skills.

The methodological contrast is particularly striking. Israeli legal proceedings are fundamentally adversarial. Courts generally occupy a relatively passive position while opposing parties present competing factual narratives. The judge’s role is to evaluate the evidence placed before the court rather than to conduct the investigation itself.

Professional accident investigators operate according to an entirely different logic. They actively direct the investigative process, identify missing information, formulate and test hypotheses, integrate evidence from multiple disciplines, and continuously refine their reconstruction of events. Rather than acting as neutral arbiters between competing narratives, they assume primary responsibility for uncovering what actually occurred.

This methodological difference extends beyond institutional procedure to modes of reasoning. Legal analysis focuses primarily on determining responsibility and applying legal doctrines to established facts. Investigations of systemic failures, by contrast, require empirical, interdisciplinary inquiry. They demand an understanding of the complex interactions among organizational structures, technological systems, intelligence processes, human decision-making, cognitive bias, and institutional culture.

Events such as the October 7 attack therefore require the use of methods extending well beyond legal reasoning. Effective investigation depends upon contributions from specialists in intelligence, military operations, systems engineering, organizational behavior, human factors, decision-making under uncertainty, communications technology, cyber capabilities, and related disciplines. A commission designed primarily around judicial methods is not naturally equipped to integrate these diverse forms of expertise into a coherent investigative framework.

The Alternative: An Investigative Model

The shortcomings of the judicial model become even clearer when contrasted with a more suitable alternative. In my view, Israel should establish a professional investigative body modeled on aviation accident investigation agencies while incorporating selected elements of the military operational debriefing process.

The team’s primary responsibility should be the systematic reconstruction of the events surrounding the October 7 attack. Its central mission would be rigorous fact-finding: establishing as accurately as possible what occurred, why it occurred, and how the various failures interacted to produce the catastrophe.

As in aviation accident investigations, the investigative team should be supported by specialists drawn from all relevant disciplines. Depending on the issues under examination, these could include experts in intelligence collection and assessment, weapons systems, surveillance technologies, communications, cyber operations, command and control, organizational behavior, human factors, systems engineering, and any other fields necessary to reconstruct the events and identify their underlying causes.

Similarly, following the model of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the investigative body could convene multidisciplinary hearings involving experts and institutional representatives from the relevant organizations. Unlike judicial proceedings, however, these sessions would not be adversarial. Their purpose would be collaborative fact-finding aimed at developing the most accurate and comprehensive understanding of the vents.

The composition of the investigative body should reflect the principal purpose of the inquiry. If the primary objective is to assign blame or determine legal or personal liability, procedures resembling judicial proceedings are appropriate because they provide essential procedural protection for those whose interests may be adversely affected.

If, however, the principal objective is institutional learning and the prevention of future failures, the investigative process should be designed accordingly. Questions of legal, disciplinary, command, and political responsibility can be addressed through separate institutional mechanisms. Free from the procedural constraints inherent in quasi-judicial proceedings, investigators would be able to employ a more flexible methodology, draw upon a broader range of expertise, and conduct a more efficient inquiry. Such an approach would maximize the investigation’s capacity to achieve its central public purpose: preventing future national catastrophes.

Conclusion

The argument advanced in this paper should not be understood as suggesting that responsibility for the October 7 attack and the ensuing massacre should be ignored. On the contrary, accountability remains an essential component of democratic governance. The central claim is instead that determination of responsibility should be institutionally separated from the principal fact-finding process.

Within the Israel Defense Forces and the various security agencies, each organization should evaluate the factual findings relating to its own personnel and determine whether disciplinary, professional, or command measures are warranted. With respect to political leaders and former officeholders, the public should be presented with a comprehensive factual record and allowed to reach its own judgments through the ordinary mechanisms of democratic accountability.

The principal purpose of a national inquiry into an event such as the October 7 attack should not be to replicate the functions of a court of law. Courts exist to resolve disputes and assign legal responsibility. A commission established in the aftermath of an unprecedented national catastrophe should serve a different institutional function: to establish the factual record, identify the systemic failures that made the catastrophe possible, and generate the knowledge necessary to reduce the likelihood of similar failures in the future.

Achieving these objectives requires an investigative methodology fundamentally different from the traditional judicial model. The inquiry should be led by professionals with expertise in complex systems, intelligence, military operations, technology, organizational analysis, and interdisciplinary investigation, operating according to methodologies that have proven effective in fields where learning from catastrophic failure is paramount—most notably aviation safety.

Only by distinguishing between the objectives of learning and accountability can a national investigation maximize its contribution to institutional resilience. Accountability is indispensable, but it should not come at the expense of understanding. Where the overriding objective is to prevent future catastrophes, rigorous fact-finding must take precedence over the procedural framework of adjudication.

Footnotes

1. Nevertheless, the judicial model is considerably less applicable to parliamentary commissions of inquiry.
2. In the case of a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the President of the Supreme Court, the chairperson must, by law, be a judge (Section 4(b) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968). With respect to a Governmental Commission of Examination, the commission enjoys statutory powers only if its chairperson is a judge (Section 8A(a) of the Government Law, 5761–2001).
3. Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
4. Section 18 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
5. Section 237 of the Penal Law, 5737–1977.
6. See, for example, Section 15 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
7. See, for example, Sections 9, 11, and 12 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729–1968.
8. The Commission nevertheless emphasized that “It is not our function, as a commission of inquiry, to establish the precise legal basis for this indirect responsibility.” Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut (Sabra and Shatila) (1983), 65–73.
9. A similar insight underlies Professor Boaz Sangero’s argument that the criminal justice system should, at least in part, adopt investigative and safety methodologies developed in aviation and medicine. See Boaz Sangero, Safety from Wrongful Convictions (2023).

In a joint operation by the Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet security agency, a weapons production site belonging to Islamic Jihad was destroyed over the weekend in the northern Gaza Strip, the IDF Spokesperson said. He added that the site belonged to Islamic Jihad but had recently also been used by Hamas to manufacture explosive devices and store weapons “intended to harm IDF troops operating in the yellow line area and Israeli civilians.”

In a separate statement, the IDF Spokesperson said Sunday that forces under the command of the Kfir Brigade had destroyed two underground tunnel routes in which several living quarters and weapons were found. During searches in the area, the forces found dozens of rockets and explosive devices.

The two fairly routine statements provide official confirmation of media reports about the rearmament processes taking place in the Gaza Strip, to which the public is not exposed and whose scale it cannot even assess.

Under cover of the war against Iran and Hezbollah and the ceasefire in Gaza, figures who until recently were mentioned almost daily in military correspondents’ reports have disappeared from Israeli consciousness.

One example is Izz al-Din al-Haddad, who assumed command of the military wing in Gaza after the elimination of Mohammed Deif and Raad Saad, and who is considered one of the surviving architects of the Oct. 7 massacre. Others include Mohammed Oudeh, commander of the northern brigade; Tawfiq Abu Naim, head of Hamas’ security apparatuses and a member of the terrorist organization’s founding generation; Ali Amoudi, one of the senior leaders in Gaza; and other operatives who have lowered their media profile and are operating under a heavy cloak of secrecy.

The deadline set for Hamas to disarm expired, was extended, and no one is following its renewed validity anymore. Hamas political bureau member Basem Naim stressed a few days ago that it was impossible to discuss the ceasefire agreement because of “violations by Israel.” He made clear that “resistance” is the Palestinian people’s “right” and that weapons are an inseparable part of that “resistance.”

Earlier, the spokesman for Hamas’ military wing claimed that the demand to disarm was “a scandalous attempt by the occupation to achieve through negotiations what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” Hamas’ position on the issue of weapons does not need to be read between the lines.

Alongside the restoration of governance, Hamas is continuing its military entrenchment. Although for now it is projecting a desire for quiet that will allow it to rebuild, it will not miss any opportunity that comes its way to abduct soldiers or carry out an offensive operation if it believes its chances of success are reasonable.

Israeli counterterrorism efforts in Gaza are far from keeping pace with Hamas’ reconstruction and reflect a walk on an excessively thin tightrope in the face of the threats on the ground. A large share of the IDF’s attention and resources is rightly directed toward Iran and Lebanon. This is precisely the space in which the Shin Bet and IDF Southern Command can step in, since they do not bear the operational burden on the Iranian and northern fronts and can bring their capabilities to bear in the Gazan arena, where it all began.

This is not only about thwarting weapons smuggling and production or cutting off Hamas’ takeover of resources intended for Gaza’s civilian population. It is also about initiating offensive operations against members, infrastructure, weapons stockpiles, tunnels, governing facilities and the like. Such operations would force Hamas to invest its resources in escape and concealment rather than reconstruction.

A string of successful counterterrorism operations in the Gaza Strip, without interfering with efforts on other fronts, is the mission Israel’s political and security leadership should assign to the Shin Bet and IDF Southern Command. That is what is needed at the national level. The indirect benefit would be restoring the Shin Bet’s reputation, channeling its positive forces into the operational sphere, and restoring the reputation it lost.

Published in  Israel Hayom, May 12, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

To read the full study

This study addresses the question of what security doctrine is appropriate for the State of Israel at this time, particularly in light of the events of October 7 and the multi-front war that erupted thereafter.

The article seeks to answer this question from a mountaintop perspective, through a comprehensive overview, rather than within the specific context of a particular arena and its current circumstances. To tackle this challenge, the article employs a methodology that delves into the roots of Israel’s historical security doctrine — commonly known as the “Three Pillars” doctrine — which remains dominant to this day.

It examines the doctrine’s foundational assumptions and the strategic environment in which it was originally shaped, assesses which of these elements are still relevant today, and identifies the changes they have undergone. Based on this analysis, a new doctrine is developed from a “Tabula Rasa” standpoint, tailored to the current strategic environment and based upon updated fundamental assumptions.

To read the full study

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

PRIOR TO October 7, 2023, most people – Jews and Israelis included – believed that atrocities like the ones perpetrated were an unimaginable nightmare.

Now we are all a little wiser. This means that any physical rebuilding of the Gaza Strip must rest on the following three essential pillars:

First, Hamas and other terror groups must be disarmed, their terror tunnels destroyed, and a new educational system firmly established.

Second, the world – and especially the US – must work to curb Qatar’s influence, as it remains the leading state sponsor of Muslim Brotherhood radical ideology worldwide.

Third, there must be an end to all forms of indoctrination and incitement against US, Israel, Jews, and other minorities in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank.

In today’s interconnected world, hate knows no borders. Even if Gaza undergoes major reform and rebuilding, genuine and enduring change will remain elusive so long as that hatred continues to spread across the region.

Disarming Hamas

Without the full disarmament of Hamas – a condition outlined in President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza ceasefire deal – the situation would remain perilous, not only for Israelis or for Gazans but also for any external forces tasked with managing the territory’s rehabilitation.

Simply asking Hamas or other terror groups in Gaza to lay down their weapons is futile. Terrorists simply do not do such things – even if they say they do. Rather, Hamas must be forcefully disarmed by the only military force able and willing to do so: the IDF.

The terror group’s network of tunnels must also be completely neutralized. It serves no other purpose than to allow murderous terrorists to murder again.

The most crucial step toward lasting reform in Gaza is ending indoctrination in schools, media, mosques, and politics throughout the Arab world.

Only once these steps are completed can outside forces safely enter the Gaza Strip to begin the next phase: overhauling Gaza’s educational system. Newer schools must be physically rebuilt. This will be the cornerstone of de-radicalizing an intensely indoctrinated population.

Gazans unwilling to wait for this essential “cleaning process” should be invited to emigrate. The rest should be granted access to an educational model similar to that of the United Arab Emirates, which has reformed its education to promote tolerance and progress.

If the economic lure of rebuilding Gaza tempts investors to overlook the need to disarm Hamas, eliminate its tunnels, and establish a UAE-style educational framework, the entire effort will be nothing more than yet another expensive exercise in futility.

Without these foundational changes, Gaza’s reconstruction will again be reduced to rubble the next time Hamas or another extremist faction attacks Israel.

Weakening Qatar

Another vital step before the “day after” in Gaza is confronting Qatar’s duplicity.

Since October 7, Doha’s role has become unmistakably clear. Its funding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical ideology and its influence within the West can no longer be ignored.

This should compel Washington to reconsider rewarding Qatar with military protection or the presence of American bases.

Although relocating American forces from Qatar is costly, maintaining a military presence there will, over time, prove far more expensive – particularly in human lives.

Western governments must also take legislative measures to limit Doha’s reach. They should outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood as many Arab and Muslim states have already done.

Additionally, laws must be enacted to ensure full transparency regarding Qatari funding of Western institutions and individuals.

End to indoctrination

The final and perhaps most crucial step toward lasting reform in Gaza is ending indoctrination in schools, media, mosques, and politics throughout the Arab world.

The amount of hatred expressed in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank is staggering. Without putting an end to such rhetoric, no meaningful reconstruction of Gaza can succeed.

After a brutal two-year war with immense human suffering and loss of life, we stand at a crossroads – a rare opportunity to effect genuine change in Gaza and across the region.

Instead of rushing into another shallow, temporary arrangement, leaders must seize this moment to craft a new and lasting legacy.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, November 19, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.

The debate over the fate of Hamas terrorists trapped in tunnel networks under IDF-controlled territory in Rafah may seem like a minor incident amid the constant flow of events, but its outcome could decisively shape how our enemies and regional states assess whether Israel is truly determined to dismantle its adversaries or can be appeased with superficial fixes.

Hamas’ military wing made clear early this week that fighter surrender or weapons abandonment remain off the table. Mohammad Nazzal, a senior Hamas official abroad, rejected exile outside Gaza and urged mediators to intervene.

Turkey wasted no time seizing this as another diplomatic opportunity, with sources saying it is “working to ensure safe passage for approximately 200 ‘Gazan civilians’ trapped in Rafah tunnels” – as if 200 civilians simply got stuck in underground passages.

 The deteriorating relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem, sparked by Turkish arrest warrants and Israel’s response, combined with Israeli opposition to Turkish participation in Gaza’s multinational force, will feature in Jared Kushner’s discussions with Netanyahu, though not as the central focus.

Washington’s primary objective is stabilizing the ceasefire. Meeting this goal requires advancing to stage two of the Trump plan and generating implementation momentum. With everyone occupied by processes and mechanisms, reality on the ground will shift toward non-combat, enabling Trump to pursue his broader diplomatic ambitions.

From Israel’s perspective, however, the ceasefire is not the end goal. Particularly not now, after recovering living hostages and most deceased remains. Eliminating enemy capabilities and removing weapons from the territory remain Israel’s core objectives, which cannot be sacrificed to ceasefire demands or satisfied through cosmetic arrangements.

Furthermore, Israel’s approach in Gaza will directly impact Hezbollah arrangements (and the reverse), leaving no room for creative half-measures that sound good but deliver nothing.

Even without this consideration, regional discourse is already showing such formulas emerging. Examples include attempts to limit disarmament definitions to offensive weapons only – excluding tunnels, personal arms, and other capabilities from discussion. Another involves establishing an “administrative committee” for civilian Gaza governance, supposedly without Hamas participation, when the terror group already influences personnel selection and will clearly control such governance as the Strip’s dominant force.

Returning to the besieged in Rafah – their number remains unclear. Media reports citing Israeli sources estimate 150 to 200. Foreign press mentioned lower figures, while Hamas websites simply stated the military wing withholds information due to sensitivity, describing them as “Qassam elite” facing high risk “while contending with medical supply shortages, electricity deficits, and the need to secure tunnels after extensive war damage.”

Hamas spokesmen have raised no claims about broken commitments on this matter. They frame the connection to recovering IDF soldier Hadar Goldin’s remains through humanitarian considerations and stability interests.

Given these circumstances, Israel possesses every advantage to transform this incident into a powerful symbol of its Hamas dismantlement commitment. Time favors us here, and provided our forces can block attacks from the besieged or other directions, no rush exists. Regardless, this event’s conclusion must be decisive – mass surrender, detention or terrorist deaths. Images and publicity carry value. This is how regimes fall. Exile, as some mediators suggest, while not inherently rejected, should only acceptable as a post-surrender, post-arrest step, never as a replacement.

A Al-Resalah Hamas website editorial characterized the besieged issue as testing Hamas’ capacity for post-war challenges. “It combines military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aspects and conveys an important message to the Palestinian public and the world regarding Hamas’s ability to protect its people and manage humanitarian crises, in an extremely complex environment and under international supervision.” This equally tests Israeli determination, providing further reason Israel cannot accept any solution Hamas would claim as an achievement.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 11, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.

The international command for the Gaza Strip, the – Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) – rapidly established in Kiryat Gat, is becoming a pilgrimage destination for American officials visiting Israel and sparking interest through the diverse composition of nations represented within it. Yet it remains completely unclear how this facility is meant to assist in achieving Israel’s primary objectives concerning Gaza.

One can reasonably estimate that its primary preoccupation will involve coordinating civilian aid entry into the Strip and preventing escalations that threaten the ceasefire. In both domains, Israel will probably be the principal address for pressure. Conversely, it’s challenging to envision this headquarters accomplishing anything beyond declarations concerning the more crucial areas for Israel: stripping Hamas of weaponry, preventing smuggling operations, and demilitarizing the Strip.

During a weekend interview with Al-Jazeera, Khalil al-Hayya, the Hamas leader, referenced the international forces’ role as providing separation and border supervision, along with managing ceasefire monitoring. He indicated his organization seeks elections leading to unified government, and presently doesn’t dismiss transferring “administrative control” to a mutually agreed committee and managing the Strip through “a national figure residing in Gaza.” One needn’t be an expert to comprehend which options this criterion eliminated.

Al-Hayya proceeded to lament Gaza’s humanitarian conditions and stressed it requires 6,000 aid trucks each day, plus entry of specific materials Israel currently prohibits. One can anticipate this message will reach mediating nations and every international actor. Winter’s approach will likely bring an accompanying “Gaza is freezing to death” campaign.

Hamas refuses to disarm

Concerning Hamas disarmament? Al-Hayya responds diplomatically, “The matter remains under discussion with factions and mediators,” and lest we harbor false expectations he clarifies, “Hamas’ weapons are connected to occupation and aggression’s existence. Should the occupation conclude, the weapons will transfer to the (Palestinian) state.”

Similar statements have been audible throughout recent periods from the organization’s spokespeople and senior officials. They’ve consistently emphasized: Our weapons are legitimate, we won’t disarm . Admittedly, in formal announcements they carefully stress their commitment to the agreement and avoid provocative declarations that might antagonize President Trump and his administration or mediating nations, but regarding the disarmament provision they leave no ambiguity about their stance.

While the Kiryat Gat headquarters continues taking shape and determining its functions and operational approaches, Hamas in Gaza has regained its footing. It operates efficient command and control systems, is restoring order throughout Gaza’s devastated streets, suppressing opposition, deterring and dominating. It allows everyone to debate agreement details’ interpretation and drafters’ intentions while concentrating on fundamentals: strengthening its position, replenishing forces, securing supplies, planning reconstruction.

It presumes Gaza remains lodged like a bone in Trump’s and other regional leaders’ throats, who seek to dispose of it as swiftly as possible to advance implementing major regional initiatives. Its expectation is that under these conditions they’ll accept a formula offering the semblance of resolution and permit it to capitalize on the “gaps” within it and the exhaustion from interminable debates regarding its interpretations.

Despite the intense desire to advance peace visions, we cannot compromise on critical matters for us in the Gaza Strip. We must eliminate the vagueness concerning headquarters and mediation and coordination entities, and also explain to the public what these will ultimately contribute toward accomplishing Israel’s objectives.

The rearming issue under humanitarian aid and reconstruction means’ cover demands particular Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee oversight and public reporting, preventing us from burying our heads in the sand and exploiting the secrecy veil typically covering this activity.

MK Amit Halevi’s public announcement about intensifying rules of engagement for IDF forces regarding Strip suspects requires IDF response and clarifications. It’s completely inappropriate to heighten risks merely from ceasefire collapse fears. Even those concerned about this should recognize that harming our soldiers could similarly cause that, beyond the immediate price paid.

Furthermore, rather than awaiting agreements and mechanisms, we should shape reality. Hamas tunnels should face attack not solely responding to harm against us. If avoiding casualties is desired, we can provide advance warning. We must leverage Hamas’ weakened position and all living hostages already being in Israel. Such an approach could enhance Israel’s and mediators’ negotiating position regarding weapons disarmament.

Concerning the international headquarters for the Gaza Strip, we must acknowledge this mechanism’s risks and also that participating in it might constrain the IDF and direct it toward preferring dialogue channels as default over operational activity. We need to establish what Israel gains from this mechanism, and concurrently determine rules now for our conduct within it, in ways that diminish its risks.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 27, 2025.

The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the speakers’ alone.