The future of Gaza: Israel must implement Trump’s plan gradually, safely

The ceasefire that came into effect on the basis of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, leading to the release of all living hostages and 26 of the 28 deceased hostages, constitutes a significant achievement for Israel, all the more so given that it was secured while the country continued to hold 53% of the Gaza Strip at this stage.

The plan, subsequently endorsed in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, mandates the disarmament of Hamas, the demilitarization of the enclave, the establishment of a technocratic government backed by an international stabilization force under the guidance of a Board of Peace, and the exclusion of Hamas from governance and from the reconstruction process.

On paper, full implementation of the plan would deliver all the objectives of the war. In practice, however, the likelihood of implementing the plan and the UN resolution with Hamas’s cooperation is nearly nonexistent. Consequently, Israel faces three possible scenarios.

Three possible scenarios for Gaza’s future

The first scenario envisions implementation of the Trump plan only after the IDF – in the absence of any other actor that has both the will and the capability – resumes fighting against Hamas, effectively freezing Phase B of the plan. The IDF would become the sole actor responsible for dismantling Hamas’s military capabilities, enforcing demilitarization, and creating the conditions for the plan’s eventual execution, with maximum operational freedom.

The second scenario would see gradual implementation, beginning with reconstruction efforts and the establishment of a stabilization mechanism east of the Yellow Line, alongside the resumption of IDF operations against Hamas in the western Gaza Strip to dismantle it and demilitarize the area until conditions are set for expanding the mechanism’s responsibility to the entire enclave.

The third scenario involves only partial and inadequate implementation. Under this scenario, Israel would face restraints and operational limits in its campaign against Hamas, resulting in a de facto division between eastern Gaza and western Gaza, with Hamas remaining in control west of the Yellow Line. This would effectively cement a new border and stall progress toward realizing the plan.

Each scenario presents Israel with challenges and tensions vis-à-vis core national interests. Since full implementation of the 20-point plan would meet all war objectives as defined by the Israeli government, the preferred scenario from Israel’s perspective is the second, provided it can be reached quickly and backed by American support for renewed military action.

However, if the United States is slow to conclude that Hamas cannot be disarmed or Gaza demilitarized through cooperation with Hamas or via Turkish and Qatari pressure and that only renewed IDF action can achieve these goals, then the first scenario becomes more favorable to Israel. This would entail an intensive military campaign aimed at dismantling Hamas and fully demilitarizing the enclave, potentially leading to a significant crisis with Washington.

In our assessment, the scenario that would entrench a divided Gaza – east under IDF control and west under Hamas – is both the most likely and the most problematic, as it would almost certainly lead to another round of fighting. Only this time, Hamas would enter that conflict from a strengthened position, having rebuilt its military and governing capabilities in the territory under its control and having eroded some of the gains Israel accumulated over two years of fighting.

Therefore, at this juncture, and in order to create the conditions that would increase the likelihood of the preferred second scenario, it is in Israel’s interest to allow the United States the space and time to act according to its own approach, until Washington reaches the inevitable conclusion that Hamas cannot be disarmed or Gaza demilitarized through persuasion alone.

Until then, Israel should avoid becoming an obstacle and instead deepen coordination and mutual understandings with the US, including limiting the roles and influence of Turkey and Qatar, preventing any Turkish military presence in Gaza, preserving American backing for disproportionate responses to Hamas violations of the agreement, and building legitimacy for renewed military action to complete the task, meet the war’s objectives, and enable fuller implementation of the Trump Plan.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, December 03, 2025.




The day before the day after in Gaza

PRIOR TO October 7, 2023, most people – Jews and Israelis included – believed that atrocities like the ones perpetrated were an unimaginable nightmare.

Now we are all a little wiser. This means that any physical rebuilding of the Gaza Strip must rest on the following three essential pillars:

First, Hamas and other terror groups must be disarmed, their terror tunnels destroyed, and a new educational system firmly established.

Second, the world – and especially the US – must work to curb Qatar’s influence, as it remains the leading state sponsor of Muslim Brotherhood radical ideology worldwide.

Third, there must be an end to all forms of indoctrination and incitement against US, Israel, Jews, and other minorities in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank.

In today’s interconnected world, hate knows no borders. Even if Gaza undergoes major reform and rebuilding, genuine and enduring change will remain elusive so long as that hatred continues to spread across the region.

Disarming Hamas

Without the full disarmament of Hamas – a condition outlined in President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza ceasefire deal – the situation would remain perilous, not only for Israelis or for Gazans but also for any external forces tasked with managing the territory’s rehabilitation.

Simply asking Hamas or other terror groups in Gaza to lay down their weapons is futile. Terrorists simply do not do such things – even if they say they do. Rather, Hamas must be forcefully disarmed by the only military force able and willing to do so: the IDF.

The terror group’s network of tunnels must also be completely neutralized. It serves no other purpose than to allow murderous terrorists to murder again.

The most crucial step toward lasting reform in Gaza is ending indoctrination in schools, media, mosques, and politics throughout the Arab world.

Only once these steps are completed can outside forces safely enter the Gaza Strip to begin the next phase: overhauling Gaza’s educational system. Newer schools must be physically rebuilt. This will be the cornerstone of de-radicalizing an intensely indoctrinated population.

Gazans unwilling to wait for this essential “cleaning process” should be invited to emigrate. The rest should be granted access to an educational model similar to that of the United Arab Emirates, which has reformed its education to promote tolerance and progress.

If the economic lure of rebuilding Gaza tempts investors to overlook the need to disarm Hamas, eliminate its tunnels, and establish a UAE-style educational framework, the entire effort will be nothing more than yet another expensive exercise in futility.

Without these foundational changes, Gaza’s reconstruction will again be reduced to rubble the next time Hamas or another extremist faction attacks Israel.

Weakening Qatar

Another vital step before the “day after” in Gaza is confronting Qatar’s duplicity.

Since October 7, Doha’s role has become unmistakably clear. Its funding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical ideology and its influence within the West can no longer be ignored.

This should compel Washington to reconsider rewarding Qatar with military protection or the presence of American bases.

Although relocating American forces from Qatar is costly, maintaining a military presence there will, over time, prove far more expensive – particularly in human lives.

Western governments must also take legislative measures to limit Doha’s reach. They should outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood as many Arab and Muslim states have already done.

Additionally, laws must be enacted to ensure full transparency regarding Qatari funding of Western institutions and individuals.

End to indoctrination

The final and perhaps most crucial step toward lasting reform in Gaza is ending indoctrination in schools, media, mosques, and politics throughout the Arab world.

The amount of hatred expressed in Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank is staggering. Without putting an end to such rhetoric, no meaningful reconstruction of Gaza can succeed.

After a brutal two-year war with immense human suffering and loss of life, we stand at a crossroads – a rare opportunity to effect genuine change in Gaza and across the region.

Instead of rushing into another shallow, temporary arrangement, leaders must seize this moment to craft a new and lasting legacy.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, November 19, 2025.




Israel’s Rafah test could show path to toppling Hamas

The debate over the fate of Hamas terrorists trapped in tunnel networks under IDF-controlled territory in Rafah may seem like a minor incident amid the constant flow of events, but its outcome could decisively shape how our enemies and regional states assess whether Israel is truly determined to dismantle its adversaries or can be appeased with superficial fixes.

Hamas’ military wing made clear early this week that fighter surrender or weapons abandonment remain off the table. Mohammad Nazzal, a senior Hamas official abroad, rejected exile outside Gaza and urged mediators to intervene.

Turkey wasted no time seizing this as another diplomatic opportunity, with sources saying it is “working to ensure safe passage for approximately 200 ‘Gazan civilians’ trapped in Rafah tunnels” – as if 200 civilians simply got stuck in underground passages.

The deteriorating relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem, sparked by Turkish arrest warrants and Israel’s response, combined with Israeli opposition to Turkish participation in Gaza’s multinational force, will feature in Jared Kushner’s discussions with Netanyahu, though not as the central focus.

Washington’s primary objective is stabilizing the ceasefire. Meeting this goal requires advancing to stage two of the Trump plan and generating implementation momentum. With everyone occupied by processes and mechanisms, reality on the ground will shift toward non-combat, enabling Trump to pursue his broader diplomatic ambitions.

From Israel’s perspective, however, the ceasefire is not the end goal. Particularly not now, after recovering living hostages and most deceased remains. Eliminating enemy capabilities and removing weapons from the territory remain Israel’s core objectives, which cannot be sacrificed to ceasefire demands or satisfied through cosmetic arrangements.

Furthermore, Israel’s approach in Gaza will directly impact Hezbollah arrangements (and the reverse), leaving no room for creative half-measures that sound good but deliver nothing.

Even without this consideration, regional discourse is already showing such formulas emerging. Examples include attempts to limit disarmament definitions to offensive weapons only – excluding tunnels, personal arms, and other capabilities from discussion. Another involves establishing an “administrative committee” for civilian Gaza governance, supposedly without Hamas participation, when the terror group already influences personnel selection and will clearly control such governance as the Strip’s dominant force.

Returning to the besieged in Rafah – their number remains unclear. Media reports citing Israeli sources estimate 150 to 200. Foreign press mentioned lower figures, while Hamas websites simply stated the military wing withholds information due to sensitivity, describing them as “Qassam elite” facing high risk “while contending with medical supply shortages, electricity deficits, and the need to secure tunnels after extensive war damage.”

Hamas spokesmen have raised no claims about broken commitments on this matter. They frame the connection to recovering IDF soldier Hadar Goldin’s remains through humanitarian considerations and stability interests.

Given these circumstances, Israel possesses every advantage to transform this incident into a powerful symbol of its Hamas dismantlement commitment. Time favors us here, and provided our forces can block attacks from the besieged or other directions, no rush exists. Regardless, this event’s conclusion must be decisive – mass surrender, detention or terrorist deaths. Images and publicity carry value. This is how regimes fall. Exile, as some mediators suggest, while not inherently rejected, should only acceptable as a post-surrender, post-arrest step, never as a replacement.

Al-Resalah Hamas website editorial characterized the besieged issue as testing Hamas’ capacity for post-war challenges. “It combines military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aspects and conveys an important message to the Palestinian public and the world regarding Hamas’s ability to protect its people and manage humanitarian crises, in an extremely complex environment and under international supervision.” This equally tests Israeli determination, providing further reason Israel cannot accept any solution Hamas would claim as an achievement.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 11, 2025.




The dilemma of victory: Israel, Hamas, and Trump’s role in Mideast peace

In recent speeches, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emphasized that the second stage of the Trump-Netanyahu framework – disarming Hamas – can proceed in one of two ways:

“By peaceful means,” namely, that Hamas voluntarily lays down its arms; or by force, if Hamas refuses to disarm peacefully.

It is worth recalling that in the first days after the Hamas attack, the prime minister made it clear that Israel was in a state of war, not merely another “round” of hostilities. In subsequent phases, he repeatedly stressed that the objective of Israel’s military action is complete victory: “My main expectation,” he said in January 2024, “is complete victory. Nothing less. There is no substitute for victory.”

What is victory?

“Victory” in war, certainly complete victory, is not an abstract notion. It has clear parameters: unconditional surrender; regime change; alterations of the constitutional order of the defeated entity; constraints on its ability to rebuild military power; and a transformation from militant, militaristic conduct to a commitment to peace. Such were the outcomes of the First and Second World Wars.

In the current war against Hamas, after more than two years of intense fighting, Israel has not yet achieved victory – certainly not “complete victory.” It is doubtful, in our view, that the defense minister’s emphatic declaration this week that “we have defeated Hamas” is grounded in reality.

Despite the heavy blows it has sustained, Hamas is far from accepting unconditional surrender. It continues to demonstrate resilience, retains control over large areas of the Gaza Strip, and is treated as a legitimate partner for negotiations.

Under these circumstances, Israel finds itself in a tacit confrontation with the US administration. It appears that President Donald Trump’s administration shares, to one degree or another, the approach of the “mediating states,” which seek to prevent Israel from realizing a comprehensive victory.

Against this backdrop, Trump said in his speech to the Knesset on October 13, 2025: “Israel, with our help, has won all that they can by force of arms. You’ve won. I mean, you’ve won. Now it’s time to translate these victories against terrorists on the battlefield into the ultimate prize of peace and prosperity for the entire Middle East. It’s about time you were able to enjoy the fruits of your labor.”

Israel has not achieved victory

In our assessment, under current conditions, achieving Hamas’s disarmament “by peaceful means” may be viewed as an important Israeli accomplishment – but not as an Israeli victory. In that scenario, the “crown of victory” would, to a considerable extent and with some justification, be placed on Trump’s head. Israel would emerge from the campaign feeling it had not fully achieved its principal objective: complete victory over Hamas.

The conclusion apparently taking shape within the Israeli government is this: To realize complete victory over Hamas, Israel must continue along the military path, against the backdrop of Hamas’s refusal to honor its commitment to disarm.

Israel’s relationship with the United States now depends, to a great extent, on Hamas’s conduct. If Hamas persistently refuses to disarm, it is reasonable to assume that Washington will grant Israel authorization to resume the war, thereby preserving Israel’s option of achieving complete victory.

By contrast, if Hamas agrees to disarm in a manner that satisfies the administration, Israel will face a difficult dilemma: whether to resume the war in order to impose a tangible defeat on Hamas – at the risk of a confrontation with Washington – or to end the war with “half its desire fulfilled” and turn to the path of peace in light of Trump’s vision, which presently appears uncertain.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, November 05, 2025.




What’s really happening at Gaza’s new command center?

The international command for the Gaza Strip, the – Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) – rapidly established in Kiryat Gat, is becoming a pilgrimage destination for American officials visiting Israel and sparking interest through the diverse composition of nations represented within it. Yet it remains completely unclear how this facility is meant to assist in achieving Israel’s primary objectives concerning Gaza.

One can reasonably estimate that its primary preoccupation will involve coordinating civilian aid entry into the Strip and preventing escalations that threaten the ceasefire. In both domains, Israel will probably be the principal address for pressure. Conversely, it’s challenging to envision this headquarters accomplishing anything beyond declarations concerning the more crucial areas for Israel: stripping Hamas of weaponry, preventing smuggling operations, and demilitarizing the Strip.

During a weekend interview with Al-Jazeera, Khalil al-Hayya, the Hamas leader, referenced the international forces’ role as providing separation and border supervision, along with managing ceasefire monitoring. He indicated his organization seeks elections leading to unified government, and presently doesn’t dismiss transferring “administrative control” to a mutually agreed committee and managing the Strip through “a national figure residing in Gaza.” One needn’t be an expert to comprehend which options this criterion eliminated.

Al-Hayya proceeded to lament Gaza’s humanitarian conditions and stressed it requires 6,000 aid trucks each day, plus entry of specific materials Israel currently prohibits. One can anticipate this message will reach mediating nations and every international actor. Winter’s approach will likely bring an accompanying “Gaza is freezing to death” campaign.

Hamas refuses to disarm

Concerning Hamas disarmament? Al-Hayya responds diplomatically, “The matter remains under discussion with factions and mediators,” and lest we harbor false expectations he clarifies, “Hamas’ weapons are connected to occupation and aggression’s existence. Should the occupation conclude, the weapons will transfer to the (Palestinian) state.”

Similar statements have been audible throughout recent periods from the organization’s spokespeople and senior officials. They’ve consistently emphasized: Our weapons are legitimate, we won’t disarm . Admittedly, in formal announcements they carefully stress their commitment to the agreement and avoid provocative declarations that might antagonize President Trump and his administration or mediating nations, but regarding the disarmament provision they leave no ambiguity about their stance.

While the Kiryat Gat headquarters continues taking shape and determining its functions and operational approaches, Hamas in Gaza has regained its footing. It operates efficient command and control systems, is restoring order throughout Gaza’s devastated streets, suppressing opposition, deterring and dominating. It allows everyone to debate agreement details’ interpretation and drafters’ intentions while concentrating on fundamentals: strengthening its position, replenishing forces, securing supplies, planning reconstruction.

It presumes Gaza remains lodged like a bone in Trump’s and other regional leaders’ throats, who seek to dispose of it as swiftly as possible to advance implementing major regional initiatives. Its expectation is that under these conditions they’ll accept a formula offering the semblance of resolution and permit it to capitalize on the “gaps” within it and the exhaustion from interminable debates regarding its interpretations.

Despite the intense desire to advance peace visions, we cannot compromise on critical matters for us in the Gaza Strip. We must eliminate the vagueness concerning headquarters and mediation and coordination entities, and also explain to the public what these will ultimately contribute toward accomplishing Israel’s objectives.

The rearming issue under humanitarian aid and reconstruction means’ cover demands particular Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee oversight and public reporting, preventing us from burying our heads in the sand and exploiting the secrecy veil typically covering this activity.

MK Amit Halevi’s public announcement about intensifying rules of engagement for IDF forces regarding Strip suspects requires IDF response and clarifications. It’s completely inappropriate to heighten risks merely from ceasefire collapse fears. Even those concerned about this should recognize that harming our soldiers could similarly cause that, beyond the immediate price paid.

Furthermore, rather than awaiting agreements and mechanisms, we should shape reality. Hamas tunnels should face attack not solely responding to harm against us. If avoiding casualties is desired, we can provide advance warning. We must leverage Hamas’ weakened position and all living hostages already being in Israel. Such an approach could enhance Israel’s and mediators’ negotiating position regarding weapons disarmament.

Concerning the international headquarters for the Gaza Strip, we must acknowledge this mechanism’s risks and also that participating in it might constrain the IDF and direct it toward preferring dialogue channels as default over operational activity. We need to establish what Israel gains from this mechanism, and concurrently determine rules now for our conduct within it, in ways that diminish its risks.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October 27, 2025.




Hamas racing to entrench itself in Gaza as ‘dark cycle’ continues

Prof. Kobi Michael: Hamas showed every sign of racing to redefine the reality on the ground in post-war Gaza so as to make them impossible to dislodge, whatever the Trump plan says.

Every day they are making lots of progress. Hamas has not changed its DNA; they do not intend to disarm themselves. They do not intend to leave the Gaza Strip and not be part of the day after.

I don’t think they take it too seriously because they understand President Trump. They see that he is mainly interested in the first phase, the end of the war, and he will leave the details of the second and third stages to the professionals, to the clerks.

Published in The Telegraph, October 25, 2025.

Hamas racing to entrench itself in Gaza as ‘dark cycle’ continues shutterstock - Anas-Mohammed




Ceasefire or Mirage?

Prof. Kobi Michael: The deal is not really fleshed out enough to be called a plan. It is a framework, principles that pave the way toward a general vision of President Trump to create a new regional architecture.

Published in Ami Magazine, October 21, 2025.

Ceasefire or Mirage? shutterstock - Gaza - Survival Journey




Two years to October 7: The Strategic Costs of the IDF’s Operational Inadequacy

Main Points

  • Israel neutralized Hezbollah’s missile threat but failed to dismantle its ground forces or Hamas’s rule in Gaza.
  • The IDF lacks a coherent concept of operational maneuver – the coordinated use of ground forces to destroy enemy capabilities and achieve strategic goals.
  • Brilliant air and intelligence operations were not matched by decisive ground campaigns, leaving enemy forces largely intact.
  • Operations in both Gaza and Lebanon unfolded too slowly, allowing the enemy to recover and denying Israel strategic momentum.
  • The IDF repeatedly fought over the same areas instead of seizing and controlling critical ground to deny Hamas sanctuary and supply.
  • These operational shortcomings weakened Israel’s deterrence and may embolden regional actors, notably Egypt, to reassess Israel’s military credibility.
  • The IDF must relearn the art of operational maneuver – integrating speed, initiative, and decisive ground action – to transform tactical superiority into strategic victory.


Press here to read the full publication




Bury past proposals: A future solution for Palestinians needs a new paradigm

A Palestinian state, in the sense of a sovereign entity responsible for its own military build-up and deployment, borders, airspace, electromagnetic spectrum, and treaties with foreign powers, would pose an existential threat to Israel. 
It would lead to severe and repeated conflict in the region, undermine the stability of moderate Arab states, and imperil key US interests. The idea of enabling the establishment of a fully independent Palestinian entity that could lead to another October 7-scale attack against Israel’s major metropolitan centers must be rejected.
The sooner that idea is relegated to the dustbin of failed proposals, the sooner a constructive discussion can begin on new paradigms for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Palestinian future.

Experience and reality

The determination that an independent Palestinian state would pose an existential threat to Israel and constitute a source of severe regional instability is not based on conjecture but on experience and current realities.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has existed since 1994. The more than three decades since the Oslo Accords provide a clear indication of the nature and characteristics of a future Palestinian state. Only those whose political worldview remains mired in wishful thinking or illusions can ignore the evidence.

In a best-case scenario, a future Palestinian state would be controlled by the non-Hamas factions that make up the PA. 
The PA, contrary to the moderate image it attempts to project in the West, continues to glorify and reward terrorism, portray the mass murderers of Jews as national heroes, and promote the belief that Israel will soon be wiped off the map.
Dozens of PA schools, summer camps, and streets are named after terrorists responsible for the cold-blooded murder of Jews. Official Palestinian Authority media repeats again and again the message that incarcerated and “martyred” terrorists are role models.
Another core element of Palestinian national discourse and education is the so-called “right of return,” the idea that the descendants of Arabs who left Israel in 1948 have the right to return to their former homes.
The result, of course, of millions of Palestinians “returning” to Israel would be to erase Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. PA President Mahmoud Abbas even wore a key-shaped pin during his 2025 United Nations address in order to emphasize this national aspiration.
The most prominent example of the PA’s encouragement of terror is the “pay to slay” system, in which it sends hundreds of millions of dollars to incarcerated terrorists and the families of terrorists who were killed.
Following international pressure, the PA carried out a bureaucratic reorganization with the aim of whitewashing such payments via a non-governmental organization.
However, 10 out of the 11 board members of this supposedly “independent” organization are PA employees and representatives, which include a PA minister and six undersecretaries.
The systemic Palestinian terror incitement leads to terror attacks. Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem attempted to carry out more than 1,250 serious terror attacks in 2024, with approximately 80% being foiled by Israel’s security services – an impressive record but far from perfect.
Not only did the PA fail to prevent these attacks, but some of them were carried out by members of the PA security forces themselves.

Hamas would dominate

The most likely scenario in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state is that it would quickly be dominated by Hamas and other Islamist terror groups. Hamas is the most popular political party in the West Bank.

A Palestinian poll from May 2025 revealed that Hamas is approximately 50% more popular than Abbas’s Fatah faction and that 59% of West Bankers still believe that Hamas’s decision to launch the October 7, 2023, attack was correct.
It must be recalled that in 2007, Hamas took over Gaza in six days, as PA and Fatah leaders fled. It is highly likely that Hamas would take over all or parts of a future Palestinian state.
The PA’s inability to clamp down on terrorist groups that take over its territory has already been demonstrated. In late 2024, armed Palestinian gangs seized the Jenin refugee camp, and the PA proved unable to retake control. Israel was eventually forced to intervene.
It is even less likely that the PA would be able to retake cities dominated by heavily armed Hamas battalions.
Given these realities, it is clear that a Palestinian state situated on the strategic hilltops overlooking Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Ben-Gurion Airport would be an existential threat to Israel.
The distance from the Palestinian city of Tulkarm in the West Bank to the Mediterranean coastline of Netanya is only nine miles. Several major Israeli population centers are only one to three miles from Palestinian cities.
A Palestinian state would enable the launching of rockets and missiles with almost no warning at Israel’s major metropolitan areas and critical infrastructure.
Indeed, in September 2025, the IDF broke up a terror cell near Ramallah that was developing rockets for precisely this purpose.
Pickup trucks of terrorists could roll into Israeli cities to carry out rampages of murder, kidnapping, and rape, just as they did on October 7. A sovereign Palestinian entity could disrupt Israel’s communications and threaten both civilian and military aircraft.

Regional threat

In light of such a threat, Israel would have no choice but to intervene forcefully, leading to repeated conflict. Such conflict would derail, time and again, progress toward regional cooperation and normalization.

Given the threat that the Muslim Brotherhood already poses to the Hashemite Kingdom in Amman and the [Egyptian] government in Cairo, a Hamas-infused Palestinian state would pose a grave threat to the stability of Jordan and Egypt.
An independent Palestinian state, capable of making concessions to foreign powers, would threaten critical US interests in other ways as well. In June 2023, Abbas traveled to Beijing to sign a China-PA “Strategic Partnership.”
The Palestinian Investment Fund announced plans for Chinese investments in infrastructure, manufacturing, and energy projects.
In July 2024, Abbas’s Fatah party, Hamas, and 12 other Palestinian factions went to China to sign a “national unity” agreement under Chinese auspices. Palestinian polls show that China is extremely popular in the West Bank.
A Palestinian state deeply compromised by Chinese state companies, investments, and infrastructure could pose a threat to critical US assets in Israel, Jordan, and beyond.
In addition to its support of terror, all evidence indicates that a Palestinian state would be a corrupt autocracy with little respect for human rights, freedom of expression, or the rule of law.
In 2025, Freedom House ranked the PA as Not Free, noting, “The PA governs in an authoritarian manner, engaging in repression against journalists and activists who present critical views on its rule.”
The PA suffers from systemic corruption and mismanagement, and all calls for reform have failed to produce real change.

Alternative solutions

The question then is, what is the alternative? While space here does not allow for a thorough analysis of that question, a few brief points are in order.

The first is that there is no reason to assume that one uniform arrangement would exist throughout the West Bank. Israel could extend its sovereignty to certain strategic areas like the Jordan Valley, potentially offering citizenship or permanent residency to the Palestinian residents there.
Other areas could be controlled by regional or local authorities with different degrees of autonomy, based on their commitment to peaceful coexistence and combating terror.
The second important point is that there are numerous examples worldwide of states or regions that have varying degrees of independence or autonomy, where citizens vote only in their own elections, despite another state controlling elements of their security and external affairs.
Such arrangements, for example, in Palau, Monaco, and Macau, are considered legal and legitimate. Across the globe, and particularly in the Middle East, the realization of the principle of national self-determination takes varied forms.
A Palestinian state would be an existential threat to Israel and a disaster for the region. Israel cannot risk another October 7 and must ensure its own security.
The international community will need to pressure the Palestinians to abandon their culture of terror and embrace one of coexistence and cooperation. It would then be possible to shape a stable, peaceful, and prosperous future for Palestinians and the Middle East.Published in The Jerusalem Post, October 16, 2025.



As Gaza is rebuilt, the toxic Unrwa structure must be dismantled

As the world turns its attention to Gaza’s ruins and the growing calls for reconstruction, a familiar cycle threatens to repeat itself. The guns fall silent, aid convoys roll in, diplomats speak of “political horizons” – and within a few years, or sometimes even less, rockets once again rain on Israel.

If the war that began on 7 October, 2023 is not to become yet another round in this endless loop, one lesson must be faced with honesty: what Gaza desperately needs is deradicalisation.

No amount of reconstruction will bring peace if the ideological foundations of Hamas – and of Palestinian society more broadly – remain untouched. The massacre of October 7 was not an aberration born of despair; it was the logical outcome of an idea that has animated Palestinian politics for a century: the refusal to accept Jewish sovereignty anywhere between the river and the sea. Until that changes, no peace plan will succeed, and no ceasefire will hold.

For decades, Western diplomats have misdiagnosed the conflict as a territorial dispute – about borders, settlements, and security arrangements. Yet at its core, for the Palestinians, it is about legitimacy: Israel is viewed not the homeland of the Jewish people but an alien colonial implant. Jews are viewed not as an indigenous nation returning home but as foreigners who imposed themselves through force. Like the French in Algeria, they are expected to leave. At best, they might be tolerated as a religious minority under Muslim rule – never as a nation entitled to self-determination.

This ideology has not only survived for more than a century but been institutionalised and sustained – through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, or Unrwa. Created in 1949 as a temporary body to assist the roughly 700,000 Palestinians displaced during Israel’s War of Independence, Unwra has become a permanent agency with a single overriding purpose: to perpetuate the refugee status of Palestinians indefinitely. Whereas the role of the international community should be to create the circumstances for enhancing peace, in this case it did the exact opposite.

Unlike the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which resettles refugees and ends their statelessness, Unrwa enshrines it. Only in the Palestinian case is refugee status permanent and passed down to descendants for eternity. The result: the number of Palestinian “refugees” has swelled from 700,000 to some six million (Palestinian leaders routinely claim eight or nine million). In reality, more than 95 per cent of them were never displaced from anywhere. They were born in Gaza, Ramallah, Amman, or Beirut.

Unrwa has become a symbol, in the eyes of Palestinians, of their desire to “return” – in space, to their previous homes inside Israel (most of which do not exist any longer), and in time, to an era before the creation of the Jewish state. Given the demographics, such a “return” would mean the end of the Jewish state. Under the auspices of the international community, Unrwa has become the political vehicle through which the number of Palestinian “refugees” has been exponentially inflated, to serve the political goal of “return” and, ultimately, of undoing Israel’s existence.

This political mechanism has devastating consequences. It teaches generation after generation that their homes lie not in Gaza or Nablus but in Haifa and Jaffa – that their birthright is to “return” to cities inside Israel, and that Israel’s very existence is a temporary injustice waiting to be undone.

In Unrwa schools, textbooks glorify “martyrs,” maps erase Israel, and pupils are taught that “return” – meaning the destruction of Israel – is not a dream but a duty. Unrwa has become part and parcel of Palestinian rejectionism.

The leaders of Hamas, including Yahya Sinwar, spoke openly in the days before October 7 of an imminent “return” – a chilling reminder that the concept is not a metaphor but a call to violent action.

If Gaza is to have a future different from its past, Unrwa must be dismantled and the very concept of a “Palestinian refugee” in Gaza must disappear. One cannot be a refugee from the place one was born.

The message should be clear: you can live next to Israel in peace, but not instead of it.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be explicitly conditional. Any new governing authority – whether local Palestinians, a joint Arab body, or an international trusteeship – must adhere to a few non-negotiable principles: recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people and a formal end to the state of war against it; renunciation of claims inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders; acceptance that Gaza’s residents are not refugees and that they do not possess a “right of return”; and a firm commitment to demilitarisation, with all aid monitored to prevent its diversion into weapons or tunnels.

These are not maximalist demands but the bare minimum for any sane policy. Without ideological surrender, military defeat is meaningless. Israel can destroy Hamas’s arsenal, but if children are still taught that Jews have no right to be there, a new Hamas – or any other organisation different only in name – will rise from the rubble.

For too long, Western diplomacy has tiptoed around these truths, preferring to pour concrete and hope for moderation. But real hope for a different future will come only when Palestinians choose life over grievance, reality over myth, and coexistence over the dream of “return” and erasure. The war will end only when the ideology that caused it ends.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle,  October 16, 2025.