The intention of key Western states – including France, the UK, and Canada – to recognize a Palestinian state at the upcoming UN General Assembly presents not only a diplomatic challenge for Israel, but also a strategic opportunity. Instead of merely issuing condemnations, Israel should seize the moment by promoting an alternative policy: ending the prospect of a Palestinian state and advancing full Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, alongside offering a framework of self-governance for the local Arab population.

The European-led initiative should not be taken lightly – even if it does not immediately alter the facts on the ground. The Palestinian Authority clearly lacks the minimal conditions required for statehood: it has no defined borders, no security control over its purported territory, and no capacity to enter into and uphold international agreements. However, recognition still carries long-term psychological and political significance. From Israel’s perspective, this move is a hostile act that could damage its international and regional standing and lead to security threats.

Israeli responses

Therefore, Israel must respond with concrete actions rather than just statements. Declaring its intention to apply sovereignty over the entire area of Judea and Samaria – and doing so immediately in key strategic areas such as the Jordan Valley, the E1 area, and the major settlement blocs – would make it unequivocally clear that the idea of a Palestinian state is no longer on the table.

This is not only a necessary response to the current diplomatic wave, but also an essential step in the wake of the October 7 attack. Just as steps to promote a Palestinian state would constitute a strategic victory for Hamas, steps that eliminate any possibility of Palestinian statehood would constitute a strategic defeat for Hamas.

Moreover, since the attack, Israeli public opinion has shifted, and today only a minority still supports the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. It is now widely understood that such a state would pose a far greater security threat than Gaza did before the war.

But equal in importance to rejecting Palestinian statehood is the positive alternative: Israel has no interest in directly managing the daily lives of the Arabs in the West Bank. Therefore, it is appropriate to promote a structure of decentralized self-governance based on municipal and regional divisions – in contrast to the current centralized and corrupt rule of the PA. In this model, Palestinians would be granted a significant degree of self-determination, but without the establishment of an independent state.

What would the consequences be?

Would such a move undermine the prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia? It is important to understand that Saudi Arabia has already hardened its conditions for normalization, demanding a firm commitment to a process leading to Palestinian statehood. This means that as things stand, the Saudis are currently insisting on something that Israel simply cannot offer, and this is unlikely to change even after the fighting in Gaza ends.

Paradoxically, a unilateral Israeli move to eliminate the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state – combined with the advancement of a Palestinian self-governance plan – might eventually allow the Saudis to walk back their demands. In the short term, it may provoke significant criticism, but, over time, it could provide Riyadh with an off-ramp and allow normalization to move forward nonetheless.

It must be recalled that after the achievements in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran – and once Israel secures victory in Gaza – a major war front remains in the West Bank. The current situation is unstable: the PA may collapse, terrorism is a daily threat, and there is widespread illegal Arab encroachment on territory.

The war, which to a large extent began as a result of the Oslo Accords and the Gaza withdrawal, should conclude with a historic shift away from the Oslo trajectory – driving the final nail into the coffin of the idea of a Palestinian state.

Only if this is clear to Israel itself, might it become clear to the French, British, and Canadians.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, On August 6, 2025.

There is a stark difference between the war zones of Lebanon and Gaza: in Lebanon, civilians can flee when fighting erupts. In Gaza, they are trapped. Hamas identified this and turned it into its greatest strength: civilians became its doomsday weapon.

Recognizing the IDF’s core advantage – long-range precision firepower – Hamas devised three tactics to neutralize it: using tunnels for maneuver and combat, turning civilians into human shields, and controlling humanitarian aid to feed its logistics and dictate the war’s duration.

Despite massive damage, Hamas has so far prevented Israel from achieving its two central war objectives: returning the hostages and dismantling it as a governing and military power. At the same time, through false claims of famine and mass civilian deaths, Hamas generated a collapse in Israel’s international legitimacy and unleashed an unprecedented wave of antisemitism.

The use of civilians

The IDF appears not to have anticipated Hamas’s use of civilians as a strategic weapon – neither before the war nor at its outset. Only after the new IDF chief of staff took command was a clear concept developed in Operation Gideon’s Chariots: severing Hamas from Gaza’s civilian population.

The proposed method: redirecting humanitarian aid to safe, organized distribution zones and transferring civilians to them, rather than allowing Hamas to control the aid. This would have enabled encirclement, starvation, and defeat of Hamas, while providing protection to civilians.

According to media reports, this effort was blocked after three reserve officers claimed the civilian transfer violated international law. If true, this reflects a grave misunderstanding. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits forced deportation but explicitly permits – and even mandates – temporary evacuation for life-saving purposes. Voluntary, protected relocation is not a war crime. It is a legal and moral duty.

Jerusalem’s historical parallels

If this legal argument blocked the IDF from neutralizing Hamas’s human shield, it reflects a tragic failure: rigid obedience to the law without understanding its purpose. The result may be failure to defeat Hamas – just as rigid legalism once led to Jerusalem’s destruction.

The Talmud recounts how Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkolas refused a Roman sacrifice due to a minor legal flaw. The refusal sparked rebellion and led to catastrophe. Rabbi Yohanan lamented: “His scrupulousness destroyed our Temple, burned our sanctuary, and exiled us from our land.” Excessive legalism, detached from moral responsibility, proved ruinous.

Israel could have presented the world with a moral and strategic precedent: Britain’s World War II Operation Pied Piper, which evacuated 3.5 million civilians, including 1.5 million children, from cities like London to safe zones. Churchill didn’t wait for mass death – he acted preemptively. His aim: protect lives and enable effective warfare.

Gazan civilians, held hostage by Hamas and used as shields, deserve similar protection. Like the Israeli hostages, they too are captives.

As the proposed “Witkoff Deal” is hopefully soon agreed upon, Israel may gain the hostages’ return – at the cost of abandoning its second war goal. But if the deal fails, combat will resume under worsening conditions. Then, like Churchill – not Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkolas – Israel must act: evacuate civilians, reclaim battlefield initiative, and fulfill its moral and strategic duty. The choice will be clear: defeat Hamas – or watch Israel undo itself.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, on August 5, 2025.

French Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron didn’t have to wait long for it to come. Razi Hamad, a senior official in Hamas’ political bureau based in Qatar, rushed to take credit on behalf of Hamas for the Palestinian statehood recognition initiative. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, he claimed this development was “one of the fruits of the October 7 attack” and clarified that “resistance weapons are the essence of the Palestinian issue – we in Hamas are committed to this and will not hand over even a single empty bullet.”

For those having trouble remembering, this is the same Hamad who, days after the massacre, explained in media interviews that Israel is “a state we want to bring down” and promised: “The Al-Aqsa Flood is only the first time. There will be a second, third, and fourth time. We have the resilience and capability to fight and pay the price.” It’s hard to understand why the long arm of Israeli security mechanisms hasn’t reached him, but it’s still not too late.

Hamas draws encouragement from the success of the “hunger in Gaza” campaign and the responses it generated worldwide and in Israel. They are also pleased with the connection made between the Palestinian statehood recognition initiative and the war in the Strip. The timing of its launch, as well as the connection some Western leaders created between it and the situation in Gaza, turned this initiative in the public’s eyes into a political achievement for Hamas. Suppose we add to this the easing of military pressure and the pipelines opened to flood the Strip with food and civilian supplies. In that case, we can understand the arrogance displayed by the terror organization.

Hamas’ demands

When this is how things stand, and when Israel’s leadership is under attack from all sides, they see no reason to be flexible. Threats to open the gates of hell against them provoke laughter. In contrast, the growing pressure in Israel, especially after the publication of videos of starving hostages, creates the impression among them that Israeli stubbornness is cracking.

Despite upheavals in negotiations throughout the months of war, the four basic demands Hamas set as conditions for returning all hostages have not changed: international guarantee for a complete and absolute cessation of fighting by Israel; withdrawal of IDF forces to October 6 lines; opening of border crossings and creating conditions that would enable the Strip’s reconstruction; and release of terrorists imprisoned in Israel according to an agreed-upon formula. If Israel responds to these demands, it will end the war without achieving its goals and will not only leave Hamas as the central power factor in the Strip but also enable it to rearm and strengthen again, paving its way to take control of the West Bank as well – where it already enjoys great popularity.

Apart from the possibility of ending the war on Hamas’ terms, Israel faces two additional alternatives: conquering the Strip and imposing temporary military rule, or continuing efforts to free some hostages through a combination of pressure and negotiations, without giving up on toppling Hamas and its disarmament. The Diplomatic-Security Cabinet will need to decide between the three alternatives.

Avenues of action

In its current approach, Israel first seeks to ease international pressure even at the cost of reducing pressure on Hamas. But this leads to stagnation of the situation on the ground, leaves the initiative in Hamas’ hands, strengthens its confidence, causes confusion on the Israeli side, and also doesn’t provide an answer to the hostage issue.

Israel has additional means at its disposal, even in the current interim situation, that should be activated. For example, striking Hamas leadership abroad, which continues to enjoy immunity and conduct political activity uninterrupted. Neutralizing them could also damage Hamas’ post-war reconstruction efforts. Another action: complete severing of internet, networks, and communications in Gaza. These are the tools through which Hamas maintains its governance. Through them, it consolidates its situational picture, transmits information and instructions to the public.

In addition to this, accelerating the establishment of the humanitarian city and promoting US President Donald Trump’s initiative for voluntary migration of the population – this is the real solution to Gaza’s fundamental problems and also an answer to the desire of tens of thousands of residents, as various surveys show. This is the move Hamas fears most of all.

In light of the deliberate starvation of the hostages, and despite the assumption that Hamas has an interest in preventing their deaths, Israel must set a real price tag and clarify that the death, God forbid, of any hostage will trigger automatic activation of drastic measures such as expelling hundreds of Hamas operatives (whose names will be published) and their families. This, too, should be included in the basket of measures.

Published in  Israel Hayom, August 04, 2025.

As of this writing, Israel has recalled its negotiating team from Qatar “for consultations” after receiving Hamas’s latest response to the updated compromise proposal. This reply came after considerable foot-dragging, tougher demands, and even mocking public remarks by Hamas spokesmen in recent days.

The terrorist group has been buoyed by global reactions to the “starvation in Gaza” campaign and plans to exploit it further to pressure Israel into easing its terms for ending the war. In the meantime, Hamas is leveraging this narrative to pursue three immediate goals: reducing Israeli military pressure in Gaza, reasserting its control over civilian aid entering the Strip, and bolstering its public standing by rallying support around what it presents as a grassroots and media-driven struggle under its auspices.

In an official statement, Hamas called for mass protest actions “in all capitals and cities around the world on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday until the siege is lifted and the starvation ends.” It’s safe to assume Hamas won’t let this opportunity slip by and would rather have images of Gaza’s suffering dominate global news broadcasts, even at the cost of delaying immediate relief for the civilian population.

Hamas’s success in thrusting the Gaza issue back into the global spotlight, after being eclipsed by the war in Iran and developments in southern Syria, has reinforced within the group’s leadership the sense that the overall momentum is shifting against Israel and in its favor. “We are in the midst of a war of attrition. Hamas’s tools, combined with our religious faith, offset the IDF’s power. Time and attrition work in our favor,” senior Islamic Jihad official Mohammad al-Hindi told Al Jazeera recently. While not a member of Hamas, his comments reflect the prevailing mood at the top of the organization.

Hamas is paying close attention to reports from Israel about signs of fatigue and growing public sensitivity to IDF casualties. They’ve also picked up on indications of impatience from US President Donald Trump, who appears to view the war in Gaza as a hindrance to his broader regional ambitions.

The terror group’s leaders are also monitoring developments inside Israel and consider early elections a real possibility. They assume Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will want to enter that campaign with achievements such as the return of hostages and further normalization agreements. Linking those achievements to a ceasefire strengthens Hamas’s bargaining position.

A mental safety net

Conditions in Gaza are difficult for Hamas operatives on the ground, but not unbearable. Their main task is survival, aided by tunnels and humanitarian aid. The organization’s leadership knows it can end the suffering at any time by agreeing to a deal, thereby buying itself time to regroup. This awareness serves as a mental safety net, protecting them from collapse.

Judging by its behavior, Hamas seems to believe the threat to its survival has lessened, though it hasn’t disappeared entirely. Despite the challenges, the group still functions as an organization, managing effective coordination between its leadership factions and various arms.

Hamas remains the dominant power in Gaza, shaping the narrative through its operatives and media channels, disseminating instructions to the public via Telegram, and enforcing its authority, albeit partially, through semi-official violent mechanisms. There is no alternative to its rule, and despite the hardships, it still enjoys considerable support. The hostages it holds fuel the hope among its ranks of regaining full control of Gaza and rebuilding its devastated infrastructure.

From this analysis, Hamas concludes that compromise is unwise at this stage. Its leadership believes that the more complicated the Gaza situation becomes for Israel, the more pressure Netanyahu will face, internally and externally, to show flexibility. To achieve this, Hamas is acting on multiple fronts: on the ground, by intensifying attacks on IDF troops and attempting kidnappings; diplomatically, by amplifying public protests and international criticism of Israel over deaths and alleged “starvation”; and within Israeli society, by waging psychological warfare over the hostages.

Israel’s own “Sumud”

So what should Israel do in response? First and foremost, it should practically advance President Trump’s initiative for the voluntary migration of Gaza’s population. This is not only a genuine solution to the Strip’s fundamental problems and backed by polls indicating high demand among Gazans themselves, it’s also the move Hamas fears most. The initiative could also alleviate the humanitarian crisis and serve as a counter to Israel’s critics.

Second, Israel should implement a total shutdown of internet and communications in Gaza. Despite much talk, little has been done. These are the very tools that allow Hamas to maintain its grip on the Strip, building its narrative, directing civilians, managing media campaigns, and enforcing control.

Third, humanitarian aid should be limited to designated safe zones only. Aid must not be delivered to areas from which civilians have been instructed to evacuate. These zones should be encircled, allowing for attrition of Hamas fighters who remain behind.

Fourth, Hamas leadership abroad must be physically targeted. For reasons that remain unclear, the group’s external leaders continue to operate freely, directing the organization’s political strategy without interference. Neutralizing them is essential to significantly hindering Hamas’s ability to recover post-war.

No less important, Israel must minimize the risks of IDF troop abductions or casualties in Gaza. Despite international criticism, the IDF must be supported in maintaining the intensity of its operations. Israel must not adopt any measures that would increase risks to its soldiers simply to placate foreign critics.

Hamas views “sumud”, Arabic for steadfastness, as the key to victory. But Israel, too, must display resolve. The many gains achieved through the Swords of Iron War, hard-won at great cost, have brought Israel closer to its goals. With strategic cunning, persistence, and confidence in the justness of its cause, Israel can achieve them all.

Published in  Israel Hayom, July 27, 2025.

This week, the world was fed another lie: that Israeli troops deliberately opened fire on Palestinians waiting for food in Gaza.

The usual chorus responded on cue — crying “massacre” and “war crime” — while much of the media once again acted as an amplifier for Hamas propaganda.

The reality couldn’t be more different.

Not only was there no massacre, but the Israel Defense Forces were actively securing a humanitarian corridor to enable deliveries by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a US-Israeli initiative designed to get aid directly to civilians.

And for the first time since Hamas started the war on Oct. 7, the terror group was losing control over the distribution of humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

The GHF was created to bypass Hamas entirely — cutting it out of the aid supply chain it has long exploited as a tool of war.

Hamas has operated like a terrorist mafia: hijacking trucks, stockpiling supplies for its fighters and then inflating prices to fund its war effort, and violently punishing any Gazan who dares to take food outside its control.

In its first full week of operation, the GHF distributed nearly 7 million meals, on average a million a day.

Tens of thousands of Gazans received food safely and without incident — no Hamas middlemen, no inflated black market and no political strings.

The GHF is now working to open more distribution sites to reach even more Gazans in need.

This is the first serious, large-scale aid operation that undermines Hamas’ most powerful weapon: control over the people of Gaza.

And Hamas is panicking.

Why? Because food has long been part of its arsenal.

Hamas has used aid as leverage — diverting, distributing and denying it as a means to enforce loyalty and preserve power.

The GHF threatens to dismantle that system by delivering directly to civilians, bypassing the terror group that has used starvation as a strategy.

So Hamas has turned to a two-pronged response.

First, disruption on the ground: sending armed operatives to provoke chaos at aid sites, firing on civilians attempting to access food and deliberately manufacturing volatility.

Second, disinformation: flooding social media and compliant news outlets with false casualty counts, doctored images and fabricated narratives — all to paint Israel as the aggressor and itself as the victim.

This isn’t theory. It’s strategy. It’s textbook Hamas. And more than 600 days into a war they began, too much of the world’s media still parrots its talking points without question. That’s not journalism — it’s complicity.Yes, the suffering in Gaza is real.

But its cause is not Israel’s military operations or efforts to rescue the hostages Hamas still holds; it’s Hamas’ own strategy of exploitation and terror.

Meantime, the international community, led by UNRWA, had been the primary source of humanitarian assistance in Gaza and for years willfully turned a blind eye to Hamas’ exploitation of aid — failing to enforce meaningful oversight, even employing Hamas members (many who took part in the Oct. 7 attacks) as local staff and using its facilities to hoard aid for terror operations.

Now, UNRWA would seemingly rather see the GHF fail, and the people of Gaza actually starve, so it can continue using the Jewish state as its forever-scapegoat.

Israel has taken unprecedented steps to minimize civilian harm, facing an enemy that embeds in civilian areas, hoards humanitarian aid and sacrifices its own people to gain global sympathy.

Humanitarian aid must never be a bargaining chip for terrorists.

But by insisting on a system that leaves aid in Hamas’ hands, much of the international community has allowed exactly that.

Hamas would rather starve its own people than lose control over them.

Those who truly care about the welfare of Palestinian civilians must support a system that bypasses Hamas altogether.

That system is the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

The GHF is delivering what countless international actors have failed to provide: direct, accountable, large-scale humanitarian assistance that does not empower a terrorist group.

It breaks Hamas’ monopoly over aid and strips it of one of its most dangerous tools — using food as a means of control.

That’s why Hamas is trying to sabotage this initiative.

Supporting the GHF means more than feeding the hungry.

It means breaking Hamas’ grip on Gaza’s civilians.

It means dismantling the group’s strategy of domination through deprivation.

And it means backing a bold US-Israeli initiative that delivers not only food — but hope.

The article was written together with John Spencer is chairman of urban-warfare studies at West Point’s Modern War Institute, host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast” and co-author of “Understanding Urban Warfare.”

Published in New York Post, June  3, 2025.

The world has witnessed the horrors that can unfold when poverty, oppression, and terrorism converge in a closed and hopeless environment. Indeed, the people of Gaza have lived for years in unrelenting misery, devoid of any real prospect for a better future.

Out of this abyss, a rare and historic opportunity has emerged, perhaps the most consequential since the founding of the State of Israel. This is a humanitarian, strategic, and diplomatic initiative to enable the voluntary emigration of up to one million Palestinians from Gaza to countries across the globe.

This initiative is neither naive nor detached from reality. It is grounded in empirical data. According to public opinion surveys conducted by Palestinian pollster Dr. Khalil Shikaki, approximately 49% of Gazans wish to emigrate. Among educated youth, this exceeds 54%. Many are even willing to leave without official documents, driven by profound despair and a genuine yearning for a better future.

Creating the framework

Israel’s role is to provide the practical framework that enables these individuals to exercise their right to choose – to choose a life beyond endless conflict and stagnation, to exit the status of perpetual refugees, and to enter a future of dignity and opportunity. The plan rests on five core pillars: freedom, rehabilitation, partnership, legitimacy, and discretion.

This is not just a humanitarian gesture; it is a strategic maneuver with far-reaching implications. The departure of hundreds of thousands from Gaza will significantly ease overpopulation, diminish the recruitment base for terror organizations, strip the Arab world of its long-standing “refugee card” against Israel, and challenge the two-state solution, which long has rested on an unviable status quo.

The role of international cooperation

International cooperation will be critical to success. Destination countries may include nations in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Canada, and even the Middle East. Families must be offered comprehensive support: departure grants, housing assistance, vocational training, and community integration services.

International organizations such as the UN, the International Organization for Migration, and countries like the UAE, Egypt, the US, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia can serve as essential partners. Washington should play a key diplomatic role in advancing the plan.

The goal is not merely to transform Gaza but to spark hope across the Arab world and redefine regional thinking. The enclave must be released from its function as a “black pawn” in the diplomatic chessboard and transformed into a living example of what is possible when moral courage meets strategic vision, especially after a brutal conflict.

Again, the solution here is not forced “transfer” or “expulsion” but rather a moral, legal, and diplomatic plan that will allow Gazans to attain what has been denied to them all their lives: the freedom to choose, the freedom to build a future outside the cycles of statelessness, violence, and despair.

In the end, history will remember the leaders who recognized this moment and chose liberty over another war, dignity over hatred, and civilian empowerment over the containment of enemies. This is not only Israel’s moral responsibility. It is also its strategic prerogative – to reshape reality for itself and the entire region.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June  5, 2025.

The launch of Operation “Chariots of Gideon” in Gaza this week against Hamas marked another phase in the prolonged battle against the terror organization in the strip, which has been ongoing intermittently – except for ceasefires – for nearly a year and eight months. However, one thing Israel lacks is surplus time, as the extended war weighs heavily on the home front and reserve system, erodes its political capital, damages its economy, and also reduces public determination and resilience to fight the Gaza terrorists.

The question of how the Israel Defense Forces reached this situation, when time is running out, becomes even sharper when comparing what’s happening in the Gaza Strip with the IDF’s battle against Hezbollah in Lebanon – a campaign that once it began intensively, ended within just a few months. How is it possible that the IDF defeated the terror organization considered the strongest in the Middle East so quickly, while it’s been mired in the Gaza mud for so long, struggling against a weaker terror organization? What are the differences between the two theaters that caused this?
Indeed, many similarities exist between the two theaters that opened against Israel on October 7 and 8. In both, the IDF fought against an Islamist terror organization supported by Iran, and our soldiers succeeded in eliminating almost all of their political and military leadership. Moreover, in both cases, Israel delivered a decisive military blow against its enemies, emerged from the crisis with them, and severely damaged their rocket capabilities, thus largely neutralizing the long-term threat against it. Many enemy fighters were killed in Lebanon and Gaza, and the enemy was pushed back from its border line with us in both cases.
Alongside this, there are also many differences between the theaters, related to objective conditions, our conduct toward them, the goals we set, and more. We’ll present only a partial list of these differences, but they’re sufficient to teach about the great challenge facing Israel in Gaza, and also to explain what we still need to deal with to finish the campaign there.
Before diving deep into the analysis, we must warn and say that any measurement of such a campaign cannot produce a binary equation, absolute victory or defeat. Perhaps the government also erred when it tried to present the goal in the strip in such a way. Eliminating Hamas, its operatives, and weapons is a binary outcome – yes or no. But “victory” is a much more ambiguous concept, and it’s difficult to define it clearly.
Therefore, it’s possible that even looking at what’s happening in Gaza – similar to examining the other theaters Israel fights against – we must honestly admit that the situation in the strip is not similar to what it was on the eve of the war, and not even three weeks after its opening. The IDF worked very hard in Gaza; the situation there is very different from what it was, and from Israel’s perspective, it’s more positive in many ways. The bottom line is that Hamas’ strategic threat to Israel has been removed; it’s almost unable to launch rockets at us, doesn’t carry out infiltration attacks, and doesn’t endanger civilians in the rear. This doesn’t mean Hamas has been defeated, but there’s certainly a change here.

Victory or threat elimination?

The differences between the basic situation in fighting in Gaza and the campaign against Hezbollah can be divided into several types – geographical reasons, setting different types of goals, differences in the enemy’s internal politics, different consciousness here in Israel, a political alternative, and more.
First of all, preparedness – Israel came to the war against Hezbollah after preparing for it for many years. In some ways, after internalizing the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, the IDF and the entire system began preparing the ground for a return confrontation with the Shiite terror organization, and to that end, built complex scenarios, established intelligence systems, wrote operational plans, and more. Hamas, on the other hand, was always perceived as an enemy against whom, at most, a short-term campaign would be conducted, in an attempt to reach understandings that would lead to containment and calm. It’s not that the security establishment ignored its existence and didn’t prepare against it, as evidenced by the attempt to hit the “Metro” in Gaza in May 2021, but there wasn’t the same approach as with Hezbollah. The IDF prepared for the campaign in Lebanon, and in Gaza, it tried to buy quiet through prosperity and welfare.
Moreover, there’s a difference in operational coping with Hezbollah and Hamas – the Lebanese organization was built in recent years with many characteristics of an organized army, and therefore it’s easier to identify its sites and targets, its weapon caches and strategic assets, and of course this allows building plans to strike them. Hamas, on the other hand, established for itself a fighting framework of brigades and battalions, but it quickly crumbled, its fighters dug into tunnels and moved to guerrilla warfare. The organization hides its systems under hospitals, inside clinics and schools, and among the civilian population. This makes it much harder to hit it, and many attacks are also canceled due to concern about harming innocents.
Another major gap between the strip and southern Lebanon relates to the geographical characteristics of these areas – Gaza is a narrow, closed strip, sealed on one side by the Egyptian border from the south – where the leadership in Cairo was not eager to open it for mass Palestinian flow – the Mediterranean Sea from the west and Israel from the north and east. Residents there have nowhere to flee, and no one allows them to leave. In Lebanon, on the other hand, residents in the south of the country moved north and went to safe places, and thus could avoid IDF bombardments or ground entry.
Hamas, of course, understands this issue. It hides within the civilian population, and therefore, Israel often also harms residents who are not armed. Due to this, the number of civilians killed in Gaza is immeasurably higher than residents in Lebanon – hundreds of civilians in the northern theater, compared to many thousands in the strip. The IDF was also forced to find creative solutions for the population during the fighting – moving it, evacuation to demarcated areas, and even fighting inside populated buildings.
This is also the background to the question of the siege on Gaza and the “starvation” campaign conducted abroad against the IDF. Hamas deliberately hoards food and doesn’t distribute it to residents, who often have no other sources for purchasing food. Although many argue that there’s still no real food shortage in Gaza, this campaign pressured Israel due to the basic fact that the strip is closed and there’s no exit or entry from it. In Lebanon, such a campaign could not have existed. If we go back even further, this is also the source of the legal claim by the International Court of Justice in The Hague that Israel still “occupies” Gaza, even though it evacuated its soldiers from there in the disengagement. The judges believed that Israel’s control over exit and entry from the strip effectively makes it an occupying force.
Another significant difference between the two campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah relates to the goals Israel set – in Lebanon the IDF didn’t try to eliminate Hezbollah, but only to push it back from the border area and thwart its ability to pose a threat to Israel, with the aim of returning northern residents to their homes safely. The derivative of this goal was ultimately not taking control of southern Lebanon or attempting to stay there for a long time, and even after the ceasefire, it included only staying at five strategic points along the border.
In Gaza, however, the situation is different. The government aspires to emerge with “absolute victory” over Hamas, which includes disarming the organization, eliminating it as an active fighting force, killing its commanders, or getting them to agree to leave Gaza for exile. This is a much more ambitious task, more complex, requiring greater resources than pushing terrorists back from the border and denying their ability to cause damage.

Political and diplomatic struggle

The nature of IDF activity in Gaza and Lebanon is very different, derived among other things from differences in physical and operational characteristics between the two theaters. There are, of course, additional reasons for this, and one can focus, for example, on reasons taken from the world of domestic and international politics.
Thus, for example, in Lebanon, the IDF succeeded in reaching a situation where a political alternative faced Hezbollah. The battles Israel conducted in Lebanon disrupted the political balance that had prevailed in the country until then, and suddenly it became clear that there was another address in Beirut that could be approached to manage affairs. The war actually triggered a powerful social change in Lebanon, at the end of which it’s possible that perhaps the new state institutions, those that arose in response to the great destruction the country experienced in the war, will succeed in disarming Hezbollah.
In Gaza, the situation is very different. The Palestinian Authority is not perceived as a relevant option for managing the strip in the eyes of the government in Israel, and as long as no other international body is found that will take upon itself the management of the strip – a task no one is interested in as long as Hamas holds enough power to demonstrate its strength against any such factor – no potential alternative to the terror organization’s rule over residents will arise. Hamas doesn’t agree to loosen its control over Gaza, whether behind the scenes or openly, and won’t consent to accept a body that doesn’t answer to its authority as a factor for managing affairs there.
Another matter relates to international pressure applied to Israel. Not only does the government in Jerusalem face claims, threats, and condemnations from countries on specific issues, like bringing in aid or harming civilians, but generally, the international community perceives the conflict with the Palestinians differently from the struggle in the northern theater. Hezbollah is not found in the consensus of foreign countries, but rather the opposite. Its war with Israel is not viewed favorably, and is perceived as a struggle whose end is to bring destruction upon Lebanon. The northern theater, therefore, didn’t stand at the heart of petitions filed with courts in The Hague against the security establishment and government.
The Palestinian struggle receives “legitimacy” in the world, an action that has justification due to the Israeli “occupation.” Palestinian supporters in the Western world are very numerous, and they see before their eyes the image that is well-marketed by interested parties regarding Palestinian “victimization,” the dangers, and the perception that they are David fighting Goliath. This situation puts Israel under pressure in its actions, specifically in this theater, and even the credit Israel gained as a result of the horrors Hamas committed on October 7 was quickly eroded. This is the background now, for example, to the starvation campaign against the siege on Gaza, which aroused messages even from Trump’s White House against Israel. Due to this, Israel’s options for action are shrinking, and it always fights with a political hourglass hanging over it.
World countries also often try to preserve the framework plans they’ve stuck to in the region, especially the two-state solution for two peoples. Thus, when France, for example, speaks with Israel about the war in Gaza, it still operates from the assumption that it wants to advance recognition of Palestinians. Therefore, in the middle of the war, when many hostages were still held in Hamas’ dark tunnels, Ireland, Norway, and Spain officially announced recognition of a Palestinian state. Such consciousness can explain, for example, why this week’s announcement by France, Britain, and Canada against Israel, while threatening sanctions against it, combined both the continuation of the war in Gaza and “construction in settlements.” This is also the reason that, parallel to the British announcement about stopping discussions on a trade agreement with Israel due to the operation in Gaza, personal sanctions were imposed on settlement people in Judea and Samaria due to the alleged harassment of Palestinians.
This trend also connects to the internal political dispute in Israel – many in Israel still adhere to the two-state solution and believe this is the correct way to exit the deadlock with the Palestinians. They give backing in a certain sense to European moves on the matter, and become justification for actions whose purpose is to try to preserve this idea as a practical possibility. On the other hand, there’s no movement in Israel calling to reach a political solution with Hezbollah, among other things due to understanding the futility of such an act, especially after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and the fact that it seems the Shiite organization is only looking for excuses to justify its aggression toward the IDF.
The analysis up to this point didn’t touch on one of perhaps the most important issues that constitutes the difference between the situation in the northern and southern theaters – the hostage issue. Hamas didn’t just take Israeli civilians and soldiers to Gaza’s dark tunnels as hostages, but understood very well the implications this would have on Israel’s options for action. In the operational dimension, for example, this means the IDF isn’t free to operate freely in all of Gaza’s terrain cells, since there are places where there’s concern that its activity will lead to harming hostages – whether from bombardments or as revenge by their captors. Soldiers also operate throughout the strip with a dual mission – on one hand turning over every stone to free the hostages, and on the other hand destroying Hamas in the process. These are tasks that sometimes clash with each other, and within Israel, there’s disagreement between the operational level and decision-makers on which goal comes first.
This dilemma is also reflected in public opinion in the country and in the political pressure it creates among the leadership. There wasn’t a large internal movement in Israeli society to stop the fighting against Hezbollah, but this isn’t the case in Gaza. Wide segments of Israeli society believe that freeing hostages comes before continuing the war, and think there should be an agreement – even if it’s not clear how – with Hamas to stop the campaign, withdraw from Gaza, rehabilitate it, and give the terror organization the possibility to rearm. All in exchange for returning the hostages to their homes or graves.

Cumulative effect

There are many differences between Gaza and Lebanon, and the enemy is not the same enemy. The variance between the basic equation in both theaters stands at the foundation of the fact that the IDF hasn’t yet succeeded in achieving final victory in Gaza, but on the other hand it doesn’t constitute an excuse for the current situation, where the campaign in the strip has been characterized too many times since the beginning of the war mainly by stagnation.

On the other hand, this doesn’t mean Israel won’t ultimately achieve victory over Hamas, or at least in a model similar to the defeat we inflicted on Hezbollah. The campaign hasn’t ended, and it’s difficult to predict where it will develop. This also depends, among other things, on defining goals as finally as possible, on the tension found between the military and political levels, on specific successes that will create an inertia of events, and more. The elimination of Mohammed Sinwar, for example, if it indeed occurred, might be such an event – the brother of the October 7 attack’s architect is considered an extremist symbol in Hamas, alongside being the senior commander and operational brain currently, and his removal from the theater might lead the way to compromises by the terror organization, even if for now it appears that talks between the sides about releasing additional hostages have stalled.

We must understand that the war also creates a cumulative effect on our enemies, and actions are sometimes evident only in the long term. Here, for example, is one interesting point from recent days – in one of the conversations an unidentified “Palestinian senior” conducted with foreign press, the source mentioned conditions Hamas set for Israel to end the war. In these conditions, for the first time to the best of my memory, a demand for safe passage from Gaza for Hamas seniors.

Before celebration, we must remember to take this statement with very limited credibility, and it’s not clear who said it, what their organizational and political affiliation is, and what exactly the source saw in their vision. But nonetheless, there’s innovation in this demand, an echo of an Israeli goal that didn’t previously appear on the Palestinian side. It perhaps teaches that pressure is also working on Hamas and Gaza residents, and that it’s possible that in the future we’ll be able to realize the goals we set for ourselves.

The meaning is that there’s a possibility here to make a change in reality, but it also depends on us in many ways. Will we know how to continue to the end and persevere under pressure? Will our leaders be brave enough to make difficult decisions, despite the difficulties and limitations? Will we have political, military, and human resources for realizing our goals? On these questions, Israel will be tested in the coming months.

Published in Israel Hayom, May 23, 2025

On March 23, the Israel Defense Forces made a tragic error in Gaza, resulting in the deaths of nine humanitarian aid workers, along with six Hamas terrorists who were embedded among them. An investigation into the incidentwas immediately undertaken, and officers found to have been responsible were disciplined soon after.

But while all war is a tragedy, not all tragedies are war crimes.

What happened that night was an operational error in a combat zone—not a war crime. And the investigation that resulted in that conclusion wasn’t reached in a vacuum. It came after a comprehensive, independent fact-finding process led by senior experts outside the chain of command, reviewed by the chief of the General Staff, and subject to further legal scrutiny.

Outrage—along with misleading or outright false images—has overtaken social media. A global mob mentality has formed. Fortunately, the manipulations of social media are not a substitute for international law. Calling something a war crime doesn’t make it so. War crimes require specific evidence of intent—not viral videos, emotional overlays, or instant judgment by influencers or pundits acting as judge and jury.

International humanitarian law clearly defines war crimes as intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units, or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance, provided they retain protected civilian status.

In other words, for an act to constitute a war crime, there must be intent to commit the violation—an element entirely absent in this case.

The IDF’s internal investigation concluded that the killings resulted from a series of operational errors and professional failures. IDF elements were operating in a “hostile and dangerous combat zone” and believed there to be a “tangible threat.” Soldiers misidentified the convoy of vehicles, assessing that they were being used by Hamas insurgents—a tactic the group has systematically employed since Oct. 7, 2023.

Hamas has made a practice of blurring the lines between combatant and civilian, systematically exploiting ambulances, hospitals, and humanitarian symbols for military purposes. This tactic forces troops into impossible split-second decisions under fire—precisely the kind of dilemma that international law accounts for, but online critics ignore.

International humanitarian law also recognizes that tragic mistakes can happen during active combat, especially when insurgents like Hamas use protected facilities and vehicles to launch or shield attacks. Such conduct undermines the protections that civilians and humanitarian actors are entitled to.

No army—American, British, or Israeli—is immune to errors in war. What matters is what follows: transparency, investigation, disciplinary action, and institutional learning. That is the measure of a professional military in a democratic society.

In the IDF incident, surveillance indicated that five vehicles approached rapidly and stopped near IDF troops, with passengers quickly disembarking. The deputy battalion commander assessed the situation as a credible Hamas threat and ordered fire. Though that judgment proved incorrect, the belief was reasonable under the circumstances, including poor nighttime visibility, and which only underscored that the IDF complied with the rule of distinction under law of armed conflict.

The examination into the incident was conducted by the IDF General Staff Fact Finding Mechanism, a professional team outside the operational chain of command. Their findings were presented to the chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, and included operational breaches, failures to follow orders, and reporting deficiencies. As a result, the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade was dismissed, and the commander of the 14th Brigade was severely reprimanded. The case is also being reviewed by the IDF Military Advocate General’s Office for potential legal proceedings.

The IDF expressed deep regret for the civilian harm and emphasized that the investigation is part of an ongoing commitment to learn from operational failures and reduce the risk of recurrence.

In short, the IDF acted exactly as a military in a democracy should: it investigated, acknowledged fault, and held individuals accountable.

There must also be a clear distinction between errors made in the course of legitimate military operations and intentionally directing attacks against civilians, which is Hamas’ standard practice and a blatant war crime.

Israel mourns every innocent life lost. Hamas counts every innocent death as a victory. That is not just a moral difference—it is the difference between law and lawlessness, between a tragedy and a crime.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky in collaboration with John Spencer, and Brian Cox.

Published in Newsweek, April  22, 2025.

Following Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7, 2023 massacre—which killed over 1,200 people in Israel, most of them civilians, including women, children and the elderly, with over 250 taken hostage—Israel launched a large-scale military campaign in Gaza. The scope and intensity of the response were unprecedented, but so too was the attack that prompted it.

Since then, there has been no shortage of uninformed actors, like comedian Dave Smith, or malign parties weaponizing international law to question whether Israel’s military actions in Gaza have been proportionate, lawful and ultimately, even necessary.

At the heart of that last question lies a critical misunderstanding. “Necessity” in war has two distinct meanings, and conflating them—morally and legally—leads to flawed assessments and misleading narratives.

Two necessities: one moral, one legal

1. Moral necessity — the just war tradition

The first concept of necessity comes from just war theory, an ethical framework developed over centuries to evaluate whether the use of force can be morally justified (jus ad bellum).

One of its core tenets is necessity:

War must be a last resort, undertaken only after all nonviolent alternatives—diplomacy, deterrence, sanctions, international mediation—have been exhausted.

In the case of Israel, the record speaks for itself. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, dismantling all civilian and military infrastructure. In the years that followed, Hamas seized power in a violent coup, launched tens of thousands of rockets and rejected every meaningful effort at peaceful coexistence. Despite periodic ceasefires and repeated international mediation, Hamas remained committed not to a Palestinian state alongside Israel—but to Israel’s destruction.

On Oct. 7, Hamas made its intentions unmistakable. It crossed the border not to challenge Israeli soldiers, but to massacre civilians. It filmed the atrocities and vowed to do it again. In that context, the claim that Israel’s military response lacked moral necessity ignores the facts and defies common sense.

2. Legal necessity — the law of armed conflict

The second form of necessity is not philosophical but legal. It belongs to the realm of international humanitarian law (IHL)—the rules governing the conduct of war (jus in bello).

Military necessity permits only those actions required to achieve a legitimate military objective.

This principle—codified in the Geneva Conventions, Hague Regulations and customary international law—does not allow destruction for its own sake. It does not excuse harm to civilians unless it is incidental to a lawful strike. And it certainly does not override the obligations to distinguish between military and civilian targets or to avoid disproportionate attacks.

Every Israeli military operation in Gaza is bound by this standard. It is not enough to identify a Hamas presence in a building or a neighborhood. To strike lawfully, the target must provide a concrete and direct military advantage, and every feasible precaution must be taken to mitigate civilian harm.

Israel’s military attorneys and commanders operate within this framework. Target selection, weapon choice, timing of attack, and warning mechanisms are scrutinized in real time. The Israel Defense Forces not only operates under legal necessity—it documents and reviews its actions at a level few modern militaries do, particularly when fighting a terrorist group embedded in a civilian population.

The bridge vs. the bakery

A useful example from the laws of war helps clarify this distinction.

Destroying a bridge used to transport enemy weapons is a lawful act of military necessity. It offers a clear operational advantage and directly degrades enemy capability. By contrast, destroying a bakery in a residential neighborhood simply because enemy fighters may stop there for food is not. The bakery is not a military objective, and its destruction would serve no legitimate military purpose.

This distinction matters in urban warfare. In Gaza, where Hamas routinely embeds its military assets within civilian areas—using schools, homes and mosques—Israel faces extraordinary challenges. But the legal standards do not change. Every action must meet the test of military necessity. Every strike must be tied to a legitimate objective. The presence of civilians demands restraint, even when facing an adversary that deliberately exploits them.

Necessary war, constrained conduct

So, was Israel’s war against Hamas necessary?

That depends on which kind of necessity you mean. But in truth, it meets both tests:

Was the war morally necessary? After Oct. 7—following the deliberate massacre of civilians, the kidnapping of hostages, and Hamas’s declared intention to repeat those atrocities—the answer is unequivocally yes.

Are Israel’s military operations legally necessary? While each strike must meet specific legal thresholds, the IDF operates under one of the most stringent legal and ethical frameworks in modern warfare. It is bound by the law of armed conflict and has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to minimizing harm, even while engaging an enemy that hides among civilians and violates every rule of war.

A war can be both morally justified and legally constrained. Israel’s campaign against Hamas is exactly that. It was not launched lightly or recklessly—it was waged in defense of life, sovereignty and the rule of law.

Anyone asking whether Israel’s war was necessary should first understand what they are really asking—and then recognize that the answer, by every standard that matters, is yes.

The article was written by Arsen Ostrovsky together with retired United States Army major and urban warfare expert John Spencer John Spencer.

Published in JNS, April  20, 2025.