The deal laid out by US President Joe Biden in his May 31 address on the war in Gaza is disingenuous and disastrous. His remarks reflect the failed paradigms, illusions, and wishful thinking that led to October 7. The plan he described, if implemented, would create an existential threat to the State of Israel.

President Biden’s deceptive and dangerous claims are numerous. Here are a few of the most egregious: The US president began his remarks by declaring that his goal is an end to the war, “one that… creates a better ‘day after’ in Gaza without Hamas in power…” However, the rest of his speech included no concrete steps or road maps for removing Hamas from power. The opposite was true. The proposed outline would ensure that Hamas remained in power and was able to rebuild its military strength.

President Biden assured that “Palestinian civilians would return to their homes… in all areas of Gaza, including the North.” He seemed to be claiming that it would only be civilians that would return to northern Gaza. But the fact is that there would be no way to ensure that Hamas fighters did not return there as well. These fighters aren’t wearing uniforms and their guns are hidden in the hundreds of tunnels that still exist in northern Gaza.

With this plan, Hamas would quickly reassert its control over every inch of the Strip.

Biden then made a statement of unparalleled chutzpah: “The people of Israel should know they can make this offer without any further risk to their own security because they’ve already devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months…” The reality is that Hamas still has many intact fighters and senior leadership – even if it is now operating as smaller terror cells rather than battalions, or laying low until the IDF withdraws.

Once reconstruction began in Gaza, the Islamist terror group would quickly rebuild its capabilities. The idea that leaving Hamas in power does not constitute a severe risk to Israel’s security, especially to those Israelis in the western Negev region, is ludicrous.

President Biden suggested that the United States would “help forge a diplomatic resolution, one that ensures Israel’s security” and that “with a deal, a rebuilding of Gaza will begin… in a manner that does not allow Hamas to re-arm.”

He ignores the inconvenient truth that diplomatic resolutions have failed time and again. They failed to prevent Hezbollah from greatly increasing its arsenal following the Second Lebanon War – and they failed to prevent the massive smuggling of weapons to Hamas from Egypt following the previous rounds of fighting in Gaza.

Likewise, the idea that with Hamas still in power, reconstruction could take place without enabling the terrorist group to rearm, is simply laughable. The current war in Gaza has revealed the far-reaching extent to which supplies that entered Gaza over the years, including for humanitarian purposes, were used first and foremost by Hamas, to build its terror infrastructure.

With regard to those who would oppose such a plan, Biden claimed that “the hostages are not a priority for them.”

This was a false and outrageous statement.

The fact that there are those who recognize that leaving Hamas in power will destroy Israel’s deterrence and encourage countless murderous attacks and kidnappings of Israelis does not mean that they care any less about the hostages. They simply believe that the efforts to free the hostages must take place on the basis of a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East, and of the psychopathic but intelligent enemy that Israel faces.

It is important to realize that while Hamas may be willing to release some of the hostages, it will never release all of them, as they serve as a human shield for its leadership. Under the deal that Biden describes, a ceasefire will continue, and Hamas will remain in power, as long as negotiations over the second stage of the hostage release continue – negotiations that can drag on for years.

Biden then assured that the “United States will always ensure that Israel has what it needs to defend itself.”

Let there be no mistake, however. Biden did not say that he supports Israel’s right to destroy the genocidal terrorist organizations bent on its destruction.

He said that Israel will have the right to shoot down rockets fired at its cities, while its citizens hide in shelters. This is the Biden doctrine with regards to Israel: Defense, yes. Offense, no.

President Biden concluded his remarks with the sentence: “It’s time for this war to end and for the ‘day after’ to begin.” This sentence encapsulated the failed paradigms that led to October 7. The idea that if we just stop fighting, the ‘day after’ can begin, is entirely false.

If the fighting stops with Hamas in power, the ‘day after’ will never begin. We will simply return to October 6. Only this time, with zero deterrence, an emboldened ring of terror along all of Israel’s borders, and large swaths of Israel’s territory in the South and North abandoned due to the ongoing terror threats.

To be fair – the degree to which Biden is accurately describing an outline that Israel proposed, and to what degree he is putting his own spin on the deal, is unclear. If an Israeli leader believes that it is necessary and correct to let Hamas win in order to return some of the hostages, then that leader should stand up and say so clearly.

The dilemma is a heart-wrenching one.

The fact is that the deal, as described by President Biden, would create an existential threat to Israel’s very existence. It would lead to countless terror attacks, kidnappings, instability, and war. Israel’s decisions must be based on a clear-sighted recognition of reality, however harsh.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2024.

On May 15, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav said that if no alternative to Hamas rule is presented for Gaza, only two options would remain: Hamas rule or Israeli military rule. “Both alternatives are bad,” he said.

“I will not agree to Israeli military rule in in Gaza, Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza…I call on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make a decision and declare that Israel will not establish civilian control over the Gaza Strip and that Israel will not establish military governance in Gaza,” he said.

He further noted that “the end of the military campaign must come together with political action” and said that “the day after Hamas will only be achieved with Palestinian entities backed by Arab countries taking control of Gaza. This is in Israel’s interests in order to achieve our goals.”

He did not specify which Palestinian entities should control Gaza, or how to get such elements to control Gaza.

It is true that the military campaign must be accompanied by political action to stabilize Gaza and bring about a situation in which it no longer poses a security threat to Israel. For several reasons however, there is still a long way to go until we reach this goal.

First, the fighting is far from over. The IDF is currently operating throughout the Gaza Strip, including in places it has already occupied and partially mopped up. The scope of the terrorist infrastructure built by Hamas  above and below ground is unprecedented, and the quantity and dispersal of weapons enormous. Cleansing the Gaza Strip of this infrastructure will require time, and so Gaza will continue to be a combat zone for the near future.

Second, despite the extensive damage inflicted on it, Hamas has managed to partially rehabilitate itself in some places. The Israel Defense Forces has succeeded in dismantling most of Hamas’ military apparatus; its command-and-control systems and organized units (brigades, battalions, companies) are no longer functioning, or only partially functioning. At this time, several organized battalions remain in Rafah and the central camps.

Hamas, however, is rehabilitating local networks in order to conduct guerilla attacks on IDF forces and from time to time to launch high-trajectory fire at communities near the Gaza Strip and even locations farther away. In addition, since Hamas is deeply embedded amid the Gazan population, in many cases “civilians” not officially belonging to Hamas’s military organization also operate against the IDF. As a result, the IDF has had to return to many areas in the Gaza Strip to disrupt terrorist networks.

Third, Hamas has managed to retain civilian and governmental capabilities. It has done so by taking control of the humanitarian aid reaching Gaza, using it to deepen its control over the population; it sells this aid at exorbitant prices to the civilian population.

Hamas thus sends a message to the population that it intends to remain in control and that they would be well advised to cooperate with it. Hamas’s continued civilian control even in areas where the IDF has dealt it heavy blows allows it to rehabilitate its military capabilities as well. The preservation of Hamas’s civilian and governmental capabilities thus perpetuates the continuation of the fighting. The key to destroying Hamas’s military capabilities permanently thus lies in taking away its civil and governmental capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

A governmental alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip requires the destruction of Hamas’s military, as well as civil and governmental capabilities. Only after this will it be possible to achieve a governmental alternative to Hamas. The group will not disappear voluntarily; it can only be removed by force.

In the interim, there is no non-Hamas-affiliated entity willing to accept civilian control of the Gaza Strip. Only the IDF can do it. Therefore, as part of the military effort, the IDF needs to assume civilian control in areas in which it has military control. This will allow the emergence of elements in Gaza not under Hamas’s control. After this interim period, and only after the complete removal of Hamas from the civilian power centers in the Gaza Strip, permanent governmental alternatives can be examined.

Establishment of an alternative to Hamas in the Gaza Strip will have to lean on several principles. The first is that the only armed element operating in Gaza be the IDF. Civilian entities can operate only with the means to maintain public order and carry out basic policing activity. Israel must strictly enforce this principle to prevent a slow spillover of  “police” mechanisms toward  military capabilities, such as the commando forces (the Dayton Force established with American funding, training, and equipment) of the Palestinian Authority, established in violation of the Oslo agreements.

The second principle is the maintenance of IDF’s operational freedom of action throughout the Gaza Strip.

The third principle is Israeli control of all crossings into the Gaza Strip (including the Rafah crossing and the Philadelphi Corridor).

After implementing these principles, civil alternatives in the Gaza Strip can be examined.

The first alternative is the emergence of local elements that will operate either in the entire Gaza Strip or parts of it. This alternative can exist under the guidance and mentoring of international and/or regional powers. Another alternative which has been raised is the return of the P.A. to Gaza. Without addressing the conditions that P.A. officials have set for such a return, it should be remembered that the P.A. is corrupt and supports terrorism.

In addition, senior P.A. officials have expressed support for Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre. Indeed, P.A. officials regard Hamas as a legitimate member of the Palestinian political body. The legitimacy of the P.A. among the Palestinian population is extremely low, and there is no reason to bring the problems that the P.A. has created in Judea and Samaria into Gaza. In effect, this is the replacement of an element hostile to Israel with another hostile element. Add to this the fact that all the U.S. demands that the P.A. carry out in-depth reforms have been met with lip service only.

A third option is transferring control to local Fatah elements in the Gaza Strip, or alternatively bringing Mohammed Dahlan back to take control of the Strip. This would be extremely dangerous for Israel. These elements would most likely operate under the control of Hamas, which would build a model similar to the Lebanese one, in which Hezbollah is “not involved” in the state system but controls it in practice. This would be dangerous for Israel as in such a scenario, if it attempted to take action against terror networks in Gaza it would be perceived as interfering with the development  of the alternative governmental structure.

Another alternative is the deployment of international forces (Arab, European, American) in Gaza. This alternative, too, is problematic, because it will be extremely difficult for the IDF to maintain operational freedom of action with such a force on the ground. It would further cause constant friction with the governments of the countries that have deployed troops to Gaza. An international actor can only play a role in mentoring and directing the alternative civil framework in Gaza, but cannot replace it.

The only relevant alternative from Israel’s perspective, it seems, is the emergence of local elements in Gaza. Defense Minister Gallant noted this option, but without addressing the conditions that would be required for such an alternative to be put in place. It is noteworthy here that there is a public administration in Gaza (municipalities, various ministries) that is not entirely affiliated with Hamas, and from whose ranks it will be possible to find elements that can operate in the Strip.

No matter which alternative is ultimately chosen, the prerequisite for all of them is the elimination of Hamas’s military and civil capabilities. Achieving this will require an interim stage of Israeli civilian control of Gaza during which Israel expands civil responsibility in the areas under its military control. The northern Gaza Strip is suitable for this purpose.

The implementation of the proposed framework in the northern Gaza Strip will serve as an operational pilot to deny Hamas governmental capabilities, while at the same time making a concentrated military effort to demilitarize the territory. This will be done through IDF civil control first in the northern Gaza Strip, and later, depending on the circumstances, in other areas.

Some 200,000 Gazans remain in northern Gaza, including hundreds of operatives of Hamas and other organizations who constitute a fighting force and are a threat to Israeli troops. The American pier has begun working in the area and will serve as an anchor for humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in general and the north in particular. The IDF maintains forces in the northern Gaza Strip to control the area and conduct mop-up operations. Therefore, it is possible to devise methods of action that will further destroy Hamas’s military capabilities coupled with establishing  civilian control in the area.

The IDF will assume responsibility for providing humanitarian aid to the civilian population while preventing Hamas from taking control of the aid. The actual distribution will be conducted by international aid organizations, assisted, if necessary, by the IDF. The IDF’s duty, as long as the area is a combat zone, is to provide only basic humanitarian assistance, subject to military necessity. Israeli civilian control of the area will also make it clear to the population that the era of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is over. Israel has the operational and organizational capability to exercise such civilian control and assume responsibility for managing the territory and its population.

Removing Hamas from civilian centers of power will help locate elements in the population that can contribute to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The implementation of this process will first require an understanding among decision makers in Israel, especially the defense minister and defense establishment officials, that there is no other way to find governmental alternatives without an intermediate stage in which Israel holds civil responsibility. This will also require coordination and cooperation with the United States and international organizations to channel relief efforts through the IDF’s temporary civil control.

Published in JNS, June 3, 2024.

The ramming attack near Nablus that claimed the lives of two IDF soldiers, as well as the shooting incidents and drone flights toward Israeli towns near the Seam Zone, momentarily drew public attention to the simmering Judea and Samaria arena. While defined as a secondary front in the multi-arena campaign Israel is waging, the threats emanating from it continue to be a source of concern for the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency.

So far, two factors have somewhat restrained the potential for terror from Judea and Samaria. The first is the shock and dismay that gripped the terrorist elements and the Palestinian public in this area following Oct. 7. The fear that Israel might unleash its wrath over the horrific massacre on anyone who provokes it has caused some terrorist elements to be more hesitant. Even the worsening economic situation due to the ongoing closure has not shattered this psychological barrier. The second factor, which came in parallel, is the intensive activity of the security establishment. This has been characterized to a much greater extent by proactive friction and aggression, leading to thousands of arrests, thwarting numerous attacks, and dismantling parts of the terrorist infrastructure.

However, the audacity displayed by terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria in recent times likely indicates the dissipation of the first factor’s influence and an adaptation to the IDF’s current modus operandi. Against this backdrop, terrorist elements in Judea and Samaria have begun adopting an approach of initiating attacks against communities, apparently inspired by Hamas’ Oct. 7 onslaught.

Even if their performance currently seems far from mimicking that attack, the very intention to emulate this pattern, with necessary adaptations in the Judea and Samaria arena, must be viewed with utmost seriousness.

The security establishment must take steps to make this course appear futile and hopeless in the eyes of the Palestinians. Consideration should be given to defining a special regime, including unique open-fire instructions for the Seam Zone, and to nip in the bud any attempt to act in this direction, even through the use of targeted prevention measures.

Enforcement must be exhausted, and administrative measures taken against anyone involved in these ideas – perpetrators, accomplices, suppliers of means (such as drones), transporters of wanted individuals, and their employers. In the face of this dangerous pattern, it is appropriate to consider using sweeping measures against areas from which attacks or preparations for them originate. This must be a top priority for IDF forces, the Shin Bet, Border Police, and the police in this sector.

The large accumulation of events unfolding simultaneously across seven geographical arenas (the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and above all, Iran), the international legal arena (the courts in The Hague), and the political arena could create the impression of “the Philistines are upon you, Samson.”

The protracted war, the direct and indirect costs paid thus far, the disputes over its continuation, the dead-end regarding the hostages, and the uncertainty of the evacuated northern residents regarding their future – all contribute to a sense of stagnation. The high cost of living, economic hardships, as well as the resurgence of political issues and internal divisions on the agenda, add to the general concern. It can be assumed that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas are closely following developments in Israel, hoping that these trends will erode national resilience and lead to a change in its positions. The concept of a multi-arena war with Israel was also aimed at this. The basic perception in these circles is that the ultimate weapon against the West, including Israel, is steadfastness over time. As  Secretary-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah has said, Israel is weary of wars and lacks the resilience and fortitude to withstand a bloody struggle and sustain casualties.

And yet, Israel’s conduct during the eight months of war has slapped them in the face. Despite internal and external challenges, Israel persists in resolutely striving to achieve all its objectives.

At this juncture, given the challenges that still lie ahead, the political leadership should invest in strengthening national resilience alongside the ongoing efforts on the military and diplomatic fronts. It is appropriate to minimize public uncertainty as much as possible, bolster economic continuity, alleviate the economic burden, avoid or postpone addressing divisive issues, and strive for broad consensus.

The Israeli public, accustomed to living in the light of a grand vision, also needs this. At this point, the American proposal for a new regional order meets the authentic yearning for an organizing idea, but Israel cannot afford the accompanying price tag. For the time being, the organizing principle for Israel’s conduct is simpler but faithful to reality: We are acting to ensure our existence so that, when the time comes, we can fulfill the vision that will be agreed upon.

Published in  Israel Hayom, June 2, 2024.

The reported deaths of several dozen civilians in an Israeli air strike on Hamas terror targets in Rafah this week was a profound tragedy.

One cannot be human without feeling both empathy and outrage — empathy that innocent people, especially children, died, and outrage that Hamas would cynically and deliberately put them in such a situation.

It is important to remember that we are only in this awful situation because of the heinous acts committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, as well as the organization’s ongoing holding of hostages in Gaza and continued use of civilians as human shields. This has been noted by world leaders including President Biden.

There are those who, without pause or consideration, have immediately sought to ascribe blame and intention upon Israel, alleging that the Israel Defense Forces either knowingly or recklessly targeted civilians. That could not be further from the truth.

For Israel, every civilian death is a tragedy. For Hamas, civilian death is their strategy.

Experts such as John Spencer, who heads up the urban warfare program at the West Point military academy, and Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, note that Israeli forces have gone to lengths not seen in the history of modern warfare to avoid harm to civilians and abide by the laws of war.

It is an inevitable consequence of war that in the fog of battle, especially in a dense and challenging urban battlefield, errors will occur.  But under international law, not every error is necessarily a war crime. To say so only demeans real victims of war crimes.

In the case of the Rafah attack this week, Israel specifically targeted senior Hamas terrorists Yassin Rabia and Khaled Nagar, who are responsible for numerous attacks on Israelis. This was therefore a legitimate military operation. It did not, contrary to Hamas’s lies and media misinformation, target a refugee or tent camp, nor did they hit the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Area, which was at least a mile away from the intended target.

According to preliminary indications, as well as U.S. officials, it appears that there was a secondary explosion from a Hamas ammunition warehouse near the compound, where Israel targeted the Hamas terrorists, that might have ignited the fire and resulted in the loss of civilian lives.

Immediately following the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted that, “despite [Israel’s] utmost effort not to harm non-combatants, something unfortunately went tragically wrong,” and that “we are investigating the incident.”

Israel has also announced that the incident is being investigated by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, an independent and professional body, including what caused the ignition of the fire beyond the target and the tragic result, despite the precautionary measures, including surveillance, precise munitions and additional intelligence to limit civilian casualties.

This is how a democracy operates — when mistakes are made, however unintended, they are admitted. People take responsibility and appropriate lessons are learnt.

The response by the international community to the incident in Rafah has also been telling, with immediate worldwide condemnations and the United Nations Security Council already scheduling an emergency session. One cannot help but wonder, where was this same international community when a video was released last week of five terrified young Israeli girls, bloodied, beaten and being abducted by Hamas, with horrific threats of being impregnated? Where was the international community when Hamas rained down a barrage of rockets from Rafah on central Israel, including Tel Aviv?

We would not be in this situation at all were it not for Hamas carrying out the October 7 massacre and continuing to hold in Gaza more than 100 hostages, including five U.S. nationals.

This of course does not absolve Israel of its obligation to abide by the rules of war and international humanitarian law — a duty it has fulfilled and in many documented respects exceeded. However, it is Hamas, an internationally designated terrorist group, that continues to willfully violate every imaginable international law, including embedding combatants in civilian areas.

It is therefore Hamas that bears ultimate responsibility for every innocent life lost, Palestinian and Israeli. The West’s failure to make this distinction only emboldens Hamas and perpetuates the violence.

Published in The Hill, May 29, 2024.

Back in 2013, the IDF chief-of-staff promulgated a multi-year plan for the Israeli military called “Teuzah” (prowess or fearlessness). That plan accepted a significant decrease in overall funding to the IDF and shifted priorities away from the ground forces in favor of air force and cyber capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, and stand-off precision fire. This came atop a cut of 25 percent in the ground forces budget between 2002 and 2006.

The IDF chief of staff at the time was Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.

According to Amir Rapaport, publisher and editor of the military industry-leading Israel Defense magazine, Gantz accepted the relative weakness of the maneuvering capabilities of the ground forces as a given. He did not think that the IDF would need to fight conventional army forces in the foreseeable future, nor have to conduct large-scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Obviously, Gantz and his predecessors and successors (Mofaz, Halutz, Yaalon, Ashkenazi, Eisencott, and Kochavi) – all of whom were party to this grand conceptual error to one degree or another – were dead wrong. It is today quite clear that Israel will likely fight several wars in enemy-held territory over the coming decade.

Responding to Gantz’s mistaken plan in 2013, Dr. Eitan Shamir and Dr. Eado Hecht of the BESA Center warned that “Neglect of the IDF’s ground forces poses a risk to Israel’s security. There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies.” But back then nobody was listening.

Today it is clear that the IDF needs to knock-back the Iranian-proxy armies and jihadist militias camped on our borders. It needs to go house-by-house and tunnel-by-tunnel to ferret-out and eliminate terrorist cells in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It may need to “decommission” Iran’s nuclear enrichment and bomb-making facilities.

Consider the situation in Lebanon. To rout Hezbollah and destroy its missile stockpiles in the coming war Israel will have to reconquer southern Lebanon. Even with the Israel Air Force working intensively from above (including massive leveling of Lebanese infrastructures), Israel could be facing months weeks of real and unrelenting ground combat in the deep valleys and steep mountains of Lebanon where Hezbollah is well dug in. (The Iranian-built and -funded terror army sits on a tunnel and bunker array that reportedly makes the Hamas military infrastructure in Gaza seem like child’s play).

Given America’s stampeding retreat from overseas commitments, the creeping repeal of an American protective diplomatic umbrella for Israel by presidents Obama and Biden, and the newest restrictions on use of US weaponry – Israel may be fighting truly alone.

UNDERSTANDING THIS is particularly relevant as Israel prepares to replace its military and intelligence leadership.

Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva has just resigned for his role in the gargantuan failure of October 7, appropriately so. Soon, IDF Chief-of-Staff Herzi Halevi, OC Southern Command Chief Yaron Finkelman, Mossad Chief Dedi Barnea, General Security Service Chief Ronen Bar, and dozens of other senior defense establishment leaders are expected to resign or be sacked, appropriately so.

The question is not only who will replace them but what sort of operational prisms their replacements will bring to the task. And what conceptual prisms will Israel’s politicians lay out for them. (A new set of politicians is necessary too!) And what budgets Israel’s prime minister and defense and finance ministers will allocate for the defense establishment.

Here is a brief list of necessary fixes:

* Manpower: Over the past 40 years, the IDF has shrunk from 15 to 10 divisions. It now needs to grow by at least three divisions. That is 50,000 soldiers more, and tons and tons of military equipment.

* Training: A gargantuan increase in the training of front-line troops is necessary. It is a well-known secret that many of the infantry and armored forces that went into Gaza over the past half-year were insufficiently trained for combat in built-up areas.

It is actually a miracle how well the IDF has fought in Gaza, with mid-level military commanders in the field (the lieutenant colonels, battalion commanders; and the colonels, brigade commanders) learning on the go and quickly bringing their troops up to speed. They are among the true heroes of the current war.

Alas, training is expensive, especially for combined arms high intensity conflict – which involves multiple branches of the military working together. Training of the reserve forces is even more expensive. And unfortunately, budget lines for training are usually the first thing to be cut when the overall military budget is slashed – as it has been in recent decades.

* Platforms: The army needs to reverse the demobilization of armored formations and buy and deploy many more “Namer” armored personnel carriers equipped with the “Iron Fist” active defense system; “Merkava” main battle tanks with the “Trophy” system; and self-propelled artillery guns with the “Thundermaker” system. This will cost hundreds of millions of shekels.

* Ammunition: The IDF used up much of its ammunition reserves over the past six months, especially its stocks of shells for the ground forces and precision-guided missiles for the air force.

While the US has rushed tons of weaponry to Israel, Washington also has held up resupply of some of these munitions at certain times, and there is anyway a global shortage of some firepower like 155mm artillery shells (with the war in Ukraine soaking-up much of the available weaponry). As mentioned above, Israel also now faces increasing restrictions on its use of US-supplied weaponry.

The takeaway is that Israel needs to self-manufacture and the IDF needs to stockpile much larger reserves of weaponry for the lengthy wars of the future with Hezbollah and Hamas. Again, this requires more money with guaranteed funding over a multi-year plan.

Reportedly, Prime Minister Netanyahu has ordered a massive build-up, eight times over the current manufacturing capacity of the Israeli defense industries. Let’s see whether this order is implemented and budgeted appropriately by the next Israeli governments.

* Navy: Elements of radical Islam are gaining control across the eastern Mediterranean basin, from Libya to Syria and Turkey. Israel and Greece are the only Western-oriented countries in the region.

Former Israeli Naval Chief, Admiral (res.) Eliezer “Chiney” Marom, argues that Israel needs a much more powerful navy, with a long reach, to counter the strategic realignments underway, and to protect from terrorist attack the substantial natural gas fields we have discovered at sea.

The Israel Navy wants more than $5 billion in new ships, submarines, weapons systems. and personnel over the next decade for this.

* West Bank: Given that security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority essentially has collapsed, and Mahmoud Abbas’ forces are no match for Hamas and other terrorist mini-armies that have entrenched themselves across Judea and Samaria – Israel needs to pour more troops into policing the territory. This is a big drain on the military system, but without it nobody in greater Tel Aviv or Jerusalem will be safe.

The fact is that Palestinian terrorism is off the charts with organized battalions of terrorist commandoes operating openly in dozens of cities and refugee camps. Take, for example, Nur Shams, a tinpot refugee camp adjacent to Tulkarem in central Israel just over the security barrier. The IDF operated there for four days last week and was unexpectedly met by insane quantities of Palestinian firepower.

(So much for dreams of a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority that would not only truly combat terrorism in the West Bank but also assume responsibility for administering, demilitarizing, and deradicalizing Gaza. Hah!)

* Jordan Valley: Many voices in the defense establishment are calling for the building of a well-fortified security fence along Israel’s long border with Jordan, as has been done along the Sinai, Lebanese, and Golan borders; alongside the permanent stationing of more troops along this strategic seam line.

Iran is actively seeking to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and take advantage of the porous border between Israel and Jordan to ship weaponry into the West Bank. The fluidity of the political and security situation to our east requires a military buildup in the Jordan Valley, and this needs to be budgeted for expeditiously.

* Iran: If worse comes to worse (and every day indeed it seems that worse news comes from Iran about its nuclear advances and from Washington about its strategic capitulation to Iran), the IDF and IAF may have to act against Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities. Then Israel will have to deal with the fallout from Iran’s retaliation – and the country had better be ready both militarily and on the home front.

This month’s unprecedented Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel proves that Israel needs quite a few more Arrow 2 and 3 anti-missile defense arrays. A small fortune.

Israel’s independence depends on robust defense readiness. And on new military-intelligence leaders with clear-eyed understanding of the situation.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 26, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

As signs of an imminent IDF operation in Rafah intensify, there is growing concern that Israel will unnecessarily exercise self-imposed restraint by acting with insufficient force, so as not to upset the Biden administration, the Egyptians, or the ICC prosecutor at The Hague.

Meanwhile, Hamas is presumably exploiting the prolonged waiting period and preparing well for the ground operation in this sector, which will undoubtedly pose complex operational challenges for the IDF. Despite the political pressures, Israel’s decision-makers must make it a top priority to attain the objectives with minimal risk to the security of our forces.

The deadlock in negotiations for the release of Israeli captives held by Hamas, coupled with American accusations against the group, has paved the way for Israel to launch the Rafah offensive. The recent de-escalation with Iran allows Israel to shift its focus, without forfeiting political gains made, while continuing the fight against Hezbollah and dismantling terrorist networks in the West Bank.

In this operation, the security establishment will be required to achieve five objectives: Dismantling Hamas’ regional brigade, with its four battalions: eliminating or arresting its commanders and most of its personnel, seizing or destroying its command centers, strategic assets, weapons, and production facilities – both above or below ground. Eliminating or arresting senior members of Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad who fled from other areas to Rafah and found refuge there.
Ending Hamas’ civilian control in this area: striking Hamas’ governing mechanisms, including police and internal security forces, prisons, and courts, as well as “civilian” committees for managing emergency affairs.

Taking control of smuggling routes and shaping a new security reality along the border strip, preventing smuggling from Sinai to the Gaza Strip.
Advancing the release of the captives– either by seizing opportunities during the fighting or through negotiations following increased pressure on Hamas.
The IDF and Hamas: Starting Conditions

The IDF’s starting position for this operation is better than those at the beginning of the campaign in the northern Gaza Strip or the Khan Younis area. The enemy will now be entering combat with a command echelon that has been depleted, with many fighters dead, injured, or arrested. Second, its stockpile of weapons and ammunition has dwindled. Third, the ability to strike the Israeli home front with rocket fire is rather limited. And fourth, the IDF will have already replenished its forces, updated its intelligence, and improved its fighters’ operational combatworthiness through lessons learned from previous stages of the fighting.

However, from the enemy’s perspective, the overall picture also has some bright spots. Their force deployment in the combat zone has not only remained intact but has also been reinforced with operatives from other areas. Their logistical preparedness has improved thanks to humanitarian aid entering the Strip, and they are equipped with fuel and food that allow prolonged survival in tunnels.

Additionally, they draw encouragement from the pressures exerted on Israel to minimize casualties and benefit from the involvement of Iran and its proxies, as well as the political support of Turkey and other countries. Above all, they are emboldened by their demonstrated ability to survive the IDF onslaught so far and the fact that even after 200 days of fighting, Hamas continues to be the central power in the Gaza Strip.

Alongside its offensive capabilities, the IDF will also need to strengthen its defense against various forms of attacks on its forces or on the home front that exploit proximity to borders or the use of tunnels. The same applies to the possibility that Hamas may carry out provocations in the border fence area and towards Sinai, aiming to create tensions between Israel and Egypt. Hints of this could be found in a statement issued this week by the “Palestinian factions.” The IDF’s well-oiled war machine has proved itself, and there is no doubt as to its ability to successfully handle this challenge as well. On the political level, maximum support and freedom of action are required to allow the IDF to employ intense firepower that will reduce the risk to our soldiers and bring about the swiftest possible defeat of the enemy.

Meanwhile, the IDF will need to continuously examine how the combat situation can be leveraged to advance the release of the captured individuals.
The Rafah operation will not complete the task of decisively defeating Hamas. Even after it is over, much more work, and a deeper impact, will be needed inside the territory before Hamas’ remaining capabilities are destroyed and a new reality emerges. This was also the case following Operation Defensive Shield, which began exactly 22 years ago. It will not be quick and easy, but it is necessary and possible.

Published in Israel Hayom, April 28, 2024.

Reading the Israeli and global media, one would think that this week Israel achieved its greatest victory since the Six Day War, successfully stymieing a massive Iranian missile attack. With dozens of videos and hagiographic pilot profiles, the IDF is busy pumping out its technological prowess. In religious circles, there are a thousand memes and essays circulating asserting a divine miracle, no less.

This is poppycock. At best, Israel can record a defensive tactical achievement, perhaps indeed blessed, but not a strategic win. On a strategic level, Israel suffered a whopping loss as Iran pierced, with apparent impunity, American and Israeli deterrence frameworks.

The US president in Washington barked “don’t,” and Jerusalem didn’t believe that Iran would dare to attack Israel directly, but Iran nevertheless dared to do so. The ayatollahs brazenly launched a colossal Russian-style strike package intended to cause considerable damage – the largest one-night drone and missile barrage ever launched in history by one nation against another.

The fact that the attack failed – with 50% of the missiles failing to launch or crashing before reaching their target and 49% more impressively being intercepted by Israel and its allies – is irrelevant from a strategic perspective.

The screeching strategic reality is that Iran has catapulted its 40-year-long war against Israel – a war that has been underway via proxies ever since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – to a new, stratospheric plateau (literally so, with ballistic missiles flying from Iranian soil through space to hit Israel).

When one realizes what a dramatic watershed moment this is, the fact that the strike did amazingly little damage fades into the background. It is not a pertinent consideration in determining how and with what ferocity Israel should respond.

That is why President Biden’s reported advice to Israel – to “take the win,” as it were, to suck up its indignation, to rely on Western sanctions against Iran alone as “smart retaliation,” and in general to “avoid escalation” – is outrageous and dangerous nonsense.

And compounding his failure to deter Iran from directly attacking Israel, Biden has now added to the potential further collapse of any deterrence against Iran by declaring that he seeks no confrontation with Iran and will not participate in any Israeli retaliatory strike at Iran. This is strategic insanity of grandiose proportions!

When America fears escalation more than Iran does, the path towards grand Western defeat is clear. If Israel fears escalation more than Iran does, Tehran will march all the way to Jerusalem with even greater and grander attacks.

One can be certain that Tehran can and will build more successful strike packages in the future designed to overwhelm Israel’s defenses. It will try again and again, just as Hamas has launched repeated rocket wars against Israel over the past 20 years, each time with a larger number of longer-range and more accurate rockets.

Imagine if only one of the eight ballistic missiles (out of 120) that managed to penetrate Israeli defenses last Saturday night had fallen not in and around a well-protected airbase in the barren Negev but on a high-rise building in Tel Aviv? What if that one ballistic missile had hit the nuclear reactor in Dimona, which is near that airbase? What if that one ballistic missile had been nuclear tipped? What if Israel had no advance notice of another such Iranian attack (which it did have this time) in order to mount a robust air-defense plan?

Remember that every single warplane in the Israeli arsenal was in the air for eight straight hours this past Saturday night, along with warplanes and flying intelligence platforms from four Western air forces and reportedly several allied Arab air forces, plus all reserve components of Israel’s air defense array (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2 and 3, and the like). This is certainly not something that will necessarily be in place every time Iran decides to take a direct, unannounced poke at Israel in the future.

DETERRENCE is a tricky task, a defense and diplomatic act that is hard to achieve. It is a construct that requires constant maintenance or else it dissipates. Psychologically, deterrence is measured by “subsequent behavior,” meaning that the Iranian attack will be considered successful if it dissuades Israel from future attacks against Iranian leaders and assets.

Conversely, the Iranian attack will be considered unsuccessful – not because the damage it intended was prevented – if Israel continues to target Iranian leaders and assets inside Iran and around the region. Such offensives are necessary to prevent Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions and nuclear military effort.

The worst possible thing for Israel’s deterrent posture is for a perception of Israel “being stuck” to take root in Tehran and/or around the world. The unhealthiest situation involves Israel being “stuck,” not moving forward, in crushing Hamas in Gaza (Rafah), in confronting Hezbollah in Lebanon, in suppressing terror cells in Judea and Samaria, in targeting IRGC emplacements in Syria, and in sabotaging nuclear facilities in Iran.

Being stuck in a situation in which Israel is diplomatically or militarily hampered in every direction by well-meaning but weak allies or by supremely confident Shiite mullahs and their Russian ally is an unacceptable and perilous position for Israel. Instead, Israel needs to become “unstuck” to free itself from stale strategic paradigms and insufferable diplomatic handcuffs that dominated before October 7 and April 14 – two dates that constitute watershed moments for Israel.

IN GENERAL, I sense that Israel’s strategic goals have become too limited in recent decades, hamstrung by the failed Oslo peace process with Palestinians and the failed Obama peace process with Iranians. These gambits emphasized quiet, co-option, deflation, and survival at the expense of principle, dominance, and victory. They brought about cowering postures instead of the appropriately necessary offensive postures.

As a result, at this very moment, Israel is being pressed by its fainthearted friends to abandon its goal of liquidating Hamas, to instead prioritize humanitarian provisions for the enemy population, to downgrade its rage over the invasion, murder, abuse, and humiliation of its citizens, including kidnapped Israelis held hostage for more than six months, and to acquiesce in the release of Palestinian terrorists and butchers (including the “Nukhba” marauders of Hamas.

Israel is also being pressed to absorb Hezbollah’s continued blows, including the depopulation of northern Israel, to settle for another worthless, airy-fairy diplomatic “settlement” that will only perpetuate the Iranian threat from southern Lebanon, and to refrain from “escalatory retaliation” for the April 14 earthquake-level Iranian assault on Israel.

Were they to be adopted, these policies, taken together, would amount to a grand strategic defeat for Israel. They would constitute a straitjacket that puts Israeli survival – yes, Israel’s very survival! – at risk, which brings into question Israel’s power to persevere as an independent nation in the Middle East. Were they to be adopted by Israel, these policies, taken together, would inevitably crash Israel as a resilient, buoyant society and a prosperous, leading economy that contributes so much to the world.

The Biden administration’s current campaign to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further military conquest in Gaza and to delay, dissuade, and eventually preclude further confrontation with Iran, accompanied by persistent threats to deny Israel diplomatic backing and weapons if Jerusalem does not heed Washington’s warnings, are formulas for grand defeat. As such, they must be resisted.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, April 20, 2024; and Israel Hayom, April 21, 2024.

According to unassailable and well-reported Israeli and American intelligence estimates, the monarchy of Qatar has provided at least $2 billion to its Moslem Brotherhood affiliate Hamas in recent years. The vast majority of this funding has been invested in building terror attack tunnels and manufacturing rockets and missiles for war against Israel.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post of Friday, April 5. Instead, 7,000 words of reporting from the capital of Qatar by the newspaper’s editor-in-chief (see here and here) would have you believe that “the humanitarian aid” and financial support Qatar has provided to the Gazans is “commonly misinterpreted.”

Qatar’s billions for Gaza, according to the Post, “often labeled as aid to Hamas,” has in fact “been actions taken at the request of the Israeli and US governments, targeted specifically at the poorest families in Gaza” and “meticulously coordinated” with the IDF Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories to reach them. All this is designed, so Qatar says, to “foster dialogue rather than support Hamas ideologies and actions.”

The Post even offers its readers a lengthy primer in Qatari mathematical chicanery, to wit $10 million a month flows from Doha to poor families in Gaza, $20 million a month is dedicating to purchasing fuel for Gaza, and $35 is transferred monthly to pay the salaries of supposedly more acceptable Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in Gaza (none of whom actually work in government in Gaza). The Post does not bother to do the elementary math which would expose the millions more lavished on Hamas’ military.

In the massive array of Hamas subterranean terror attack tunnels in Gaza that the IDF has entered over the past six months, Israel has found thousands of pieces of weaponry, technological hardware, and documentary evidence of Iran’s material supply networks and military training regimes for Hamas, and Qatar’s multi-layered funding channels for Hamas.

This includes full access to Doha’s banking and investment sectors for globally sanctioned Hamas operatives and money men, as well as luxurious refuge for Hamas leaders.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, according to the JPost articles Qatar is a benevolent and honorable country “striving for a larger purpose on the world stage.”

Qatar actively backs terrorist groups across the Middle East and around the world including the Taliban, Hezbollah, Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda) in Syria, the Houthi in Yemen, Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIS and Iran’s man Shiite proxies in Iraq, and terrorist groups in Libya and Algeria. It also funds radical Moslem Brotherhood groups in Europe and America.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, we are told that the al-Thani kleptocracy merely “aims at fostering stability in a tumultuous region,” almost heroically “facilitates sustainable solutions from Afghanistan to Yemen and Lebanon,” and plays a helpful, “intricate” role in global security.

The Qatar-based and fully funded Al Jazeera television network is an evil empire. It glorifies Hamas, including its “heroic” massacres of October 7 and ongoing “resistance” against Israel, and all forms of Iranian proxy terrorism against Israel. It aids Hamas by reporting on IDF troop movements in Gaza and on IDF forces concentrated along the Gaza border. It actively drums-up terrorism against Israelis in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv too, with special efforts during Ramadan. Al Jazeera also is a reliable platform for naked antisemitism and explicit Holocaust denial.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. All you would know is that Qatar is blandly “influential through its Al Jazeera Media network.” (A sidebar article by another Post reporter gently allows that Al Jazeera reports lies about Israel and Jews.)

Instead, the Post offers-up an unnamed senior American diplomatic source to tell us that Qatar “is one of the good guys,” that Qatar is “crucial,” no less, for Israel’s security and existence, and that Israel “won’t be able to survive” without cooperating with Qatar.

Wow. Good that the Post reports this, because I really did not know that Israel’s very existence depends on the good graces of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

In the horrible, ongoing saga of trying to obtain release of the more than one hundred Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, Qatar has acted a go-between mediator. Since it funds Hamas and hosts Hamas “political” leadership in Doha, it purportedly has channels of communication to Hamas and influence over Hamas.

But had Qatar really wanted to pressure Hamas into a hostage release deal, it might have, for example, threatened to expel Hamas leaders from Doha or cut-off their funding. There is no indication that Sheikh Al Thani has even contemplated this.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Instead, we were fed Qatari propaganda about a deal for the hostages that supposedly was obtainable in the first or second week of the war but was ignored by Israel.

The “viable deal” that was “missed” by Israel would have freed all (at least civilian) hostages while leaving Yihye Sinwar and his henchmen in charge of Gaza without any Israeli military action, alongside the release of thousands of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli jails. It was all in hand, thanks to the wise and so-well-meaning Qataris; just dumb Israel rejected the magnanimous deal.

The Jerusalem Post ran this Qatari fiction in its lead headline. (Again, in a sidebar article, some skepticism of this ridiculous report was allowed to creep into the newspaper, but the masthead told the Qatari tale.)

Qatar has invested many tens of billions of dollars in Western cultural, sporting, and academic institutions, and bought-up vast tracts of American and European real estate, all in a quite successful attempt to immunize itself from criticism and to very successfully distort teachings and research about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Awash in Qatari cash, US university campuses in particular have become incubators for Moslem Brotherhood interests and radical Islamic indoctrination. The wild anti-Israel riots of recent months on these campuses are a direct result of long-term Qatari influence. The rise of antisemitic and genocidal-against-Israel rhetoric in American academia has gone hand-in-hand with Qatari funding.

But you would not know this from reading The Jerusalem Post last Friday. Not at all. None of this rated even a whisper of a mention in the profile published about Qatar. Nor were Qatar’s super-tight ties with Iran and its proven money-laundering for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Qods Force commandoes.

All this has been documented by the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI), the Counter Extremism Project, the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, the Misgav Institute for National Security, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and other solid sources. But there was no room over 7,000 words and three full pages of Post reporting to refer to this.

The bottom line: Qatar is a fundamentally dangerous and disingenuous actor which falsely presents itself as an honest broker, a moderating influence, and a friend of the West, even of Israel. Israeli newspapers ought not fall hook, line, and sinker for this sinister fairytale.

Published in The Jerusalem Post 12.04.2024 and Israel Hayom 15.04.2024

The security tensions following the assassination in Damascus of Gen. Mohamed Reza Zahedi have again turned the spotlight toward Tehran. This comes after a period in which Iran enjoyed the benefit of having the world preoccupied with its proxies and various hotspots that are not directly related to it. 

Until Zehdi’s death, Israel has allegedly struck a series of Iranian officers and “advisors” in attacks it has carried out in Syria over recent months. However, the figures killed in those attacks allowed Tehran to swallow its pride and make do with measured responses that didn’t embroil it in a wider campaign.

In contrast, the assassination of Zahedi, for which Israel hasn’t officially claimed responsibility, took out a senior command in the Revolutionary Guard. It’s perceived as an escalation by Israel – exacerbating the regime leadership’s dilemma: How to respond without getting sucked into a mess it can’t get out of. 

From Iran’s perspective, too weak a response would project weakness. A harsh response could lead to an expansion of the war, endanger strategic assets on its soil and across the Middle East, and also risk dragging it into direct confrontation with the US.

In the days leading up to its attack on Israel during the weekend, there was no need to belabor the potential response scenarios. They are described extensively in the media, and the very discussion allows spokespeople for the Islamic regime to portray Israel as deterred and fearful, seeing it as a down payment on the price it’s yet to pay.

In fact, the current development places the Islamic Republic in a situation it sought to avoid when creating the model of deploying proxy forces. This allowed Iran to reap the successes of the front-line groups without paying the price or suffering failures.

Iran has managed to have the world let the orchestrator off the hook despite sending proxies to do its bidding. This has had it invest in building such forces in the Mideast and other regions – training, equipping, financing them – turning them into key players in their countries and attack dogs against common enemies nearby. It did this without a nuclear umbrella, and it knows full well what having one would have meant in terms of its security. 

Iran has long ceased being just a local or regional problem; it is now a global matter. The US needs to spearhead the effort to counter it, regarding not only the nuclear aspect but also its weapons proliferation, subversion, proxy deployment, funding terrorism, and fueling it. The Biden administration can view this as an opportunity to set new boundaries for Tehran’s conduct, now in the final stretch before presidential elections.

Against the backdrop of Iran’s Ukraine war involvement and partnership in the anti-US, anti-West axis, there lies an opportunity for the US to restore its stature in the Middle East, strengthen the pro-Western front, and impact the global order.

Those who might be concerned in Washington that such a policy would embroil the US in an undesired war should think about the prospect that could occur without such action: An expansion of the war in the Middle East that could drag the US into it. In the eyes of the ayatollahs, Israel is the “little satan.” It stands at the tip of the spear of Western civilization in this region. There is no need to guess who the “great satan” is.

Published in  Israel Hayom, April 14, 2024.

The poll conducted at the beginning of March by the Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research (PCPSR) headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, and whose findings were published towards the end of March, highlights the consciousness of struggle and resistance in Palestinian society and its rigid and unwavering collective psychological foundations. The Center has published quarterly polls since the mid-1990s, with each poll including several identical questions about the respondents’ political preferences and priorities regarding Palestinian national goals and the fundamental pressing problems that need to be addressed. The poll also includes specific questions that change depending on the different contexts following significant events.

The results of the identical questions allow for systematic tracking and comparison over many years, as well as detection of trends and changes, if there are any. The respondent population is broad and represents Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria, with the polls conducted by data collectors physically interviewing the respondents in their homes, not an online or telephone poll. Due to the conditions in the Gaza Strip following the war, only Palestinians living in relatively safe places in southern Gaza were polled, and the pollster notes the possibility of certain biases in the results.

The important issues examined in this poll, as well as in the previous poll conducted in December 2023, were the respondents’ position regarding the murderous attack on October 7, the level of support for Hamas and for Yahya Sinwar, the responsibility for the outbreak of the war and for the humanitarian conditions of the population in Gaza, the identity of those who committed war crimes, and expectations and preferences regarding the governing body in the Gaza Strip after the war. The respondents were also asked the identical questions included in all prior polls.

Some of the findings reflect a Palestinian dialectic that needs to be explained beyond the poll findings. Thus, for example, support for Hamas and preference that it remain the sovereign governing entity after the war, alongside harsh criticism of Hamas regarding fair distribution of humanitarian aid, or increased support of a two-state solution. Some will view the increased support of a two-state solution as an awakening realization on the part of the Gazan public, and recognition of the damage brought upon them by the war launched by Hamas. However, past experience shows that support of a two-state solution for the most part expresses a general position that does not address and take into account the essence of such a solution. Other polls conducted by the PCPSR presented the respondents with the elements of a two-state solution, in which case support of this idea and solution declined sharply.

The poll results indicate a growing trend of radicalization, or at least more extreme and militant positions of the Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria compared to those in the Gaza Strip. The explanation, at least in part, appears to stem from the deep disappointment of the Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria with the Palestinian Authority and its President. Hamas, on the other hand, is viewed as successful in producing change, in reviving international attention to the Palestinian issue and in restoring Palestinian national honor by the mere damage it caused Israel. The fact that the residents of Judea and Samaria are far from the battlefield allows for such a position, as it is easier to be nationalistic and unwavering when you don’t have to pay the price of the war or experience it first-hand.

The trends emerging from the poll reflect Palestinian willingness to justify the massacre and atrocities of October 7, as well as their inability to take responsibility for their actions. This, in addition to the stance that prefers inflicting continued damage on Israel instead of a political process or building state, economic and civil society institutions on the path to independence. This approach is part of the Palestinian collective consciousness which chooses “resistance” over negotiation, and views the right of return as the ultimate goal. Accordingly, entities representing these values such as Hamas enjoy broad Palestinian support, while the Palestinian Authority is seen as having abandoned the path of resistance in favor of a political process that does not advance Palestinian national goals, and despite the failure continues to maintain security cooperation with Israel. In effect, the Palestinian Authority is perceived as serving the goals of the “occupation” while it itself is corrupt, excludes local leaders and fails to function as a governing entity.

Support of the October 7 Atrocities

The poll results reflect the problematic psychological foundations of Palestinian society, as revealed with respect to the atrocities carried out on October 7, almost a half year after they took place. The Palestinians, it appears, do not take responsibility for their actions, and prefer to focus on damaging Israel instead of on building a civil society, institutions and its economy on the path towards its independence. As they see it, they will achieve their goals by waging an armed struggle against Israel, and therefore give their support to those who espouse and act on this plan and position.

Thus, for example, 71% of the Palestinians think that the decision to launch the surprise attack on October 7 was correct and justified – 1% less than the results of a similar poll conducted in December 2023. In the Gaza Strip, support of the massacre increased from 57% to 71%, whereas in Judea and Samaria support of the attack decreased from 82% to 71% compared to December. At the same time, only 19% responded that the attack was incorrect compared to a higher portion of respondents, 22%, in the prior poll. The cumulative significance of the last two findings indicates broader support of the Hamas attack, despite the terrible price the Palestinians have paid.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 5

Worse still, a majority in fact blames Israel for the current suffering of Palestinians: 64% think that Israel is responsible, compared to 52% in December. Only 7% place the blame for the Palestinian suffering on Hamas, and 6% on the Palestinian Authority. The percentage of Gazans who blame Hamas dropped from 19% in December to only 9% in March, indicating that they have not internalized what the Hamas wrought upon them, mainly showing the breadth and depth of the support for Hamas and for the October 7 attack.

The poll results also show the Palestinian’s inability to take responsibility for their actions, despite the extensive documentation. According to the poll, 90% of the Palestinians think that Israel is the one committing war crimes, and only 5% think Hamas committed war crimes during the current war. The operating mode of the Hamas terror organization – in other words, armed resistance, including acts of massacre and using the civilian population as a human shield – is considered legitimate.

In the long-term as well, the poll results show that the Palestinians are not interested in a solution of peace with Israel. Thus, for example, despite a slight increase in support of the idea of a two-state solution, especially among the respondents in Gaza – supposedly a relatively positive finding, reflecting a realization that Israel will not disappear off the map, as well as a certain duality towards the Hamas – armed struggle still remains the preferred method among all Palestinians (46% among the total population, 51% in Judea and Samaria and 39% in the Gaza Strip) as a means of establishing a Palestinian state and ending the “occupation”. Much smaller support, 18% of respondents, selected non-violent resistance, and only a quarter of the Palestinians that answered the poll selected negotiations with Israel as a means of achieving Palestinian goals. Even worse, exactly one third of the Palestinians believe that the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return for 1948 refugees – a finding reflecting the significance of this element in the national ethos and in the Palestinian collective psychological foundations. The significance of realizing the right of return in practice means denying Israel’s right to exist and its elimination as the nation state of the Jewish people.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 24

Trends in support of armed struggle are also found in Palestinian support of external actors during the current war: among the Arab/regional actors, the highest level of public satisfaction was found with the performance of the Houthis. 83% support the Iranian arm in Yemen that led to the blocking of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and attacks on Israel. This is followed by satisfaction with the performance of Qatar (56%), but also with Hezbollah (48%) and Iran (30%). Jordan and Egypt (22% and 12% respectively) lag far behind. A mirror image of these poll results is satisfaction with the non-regional international actors: the highest level of satisfaction is with Russia (19%), while the US, which seeks to advance negotiation and establish a democratic Palestinian state, received only 1%.

One of the only rays of light in the poll, in addition to the slight increase in support of the two-state solution, is the drop in support of an armed struggle. Since December there has been a decline in support of terror by all Palestinians from 46% to 35%, and even in Gaza support fell from 56% to 39%. There was a similar drop in Judea and Samaria, from 68% to 51%. Nonetheless, it still remains the most preferred means among all Palestinians compared to the other means presented in the poll. If this trend continues to grow, it may indicate the initial effect of the war in Gaza on the Palestinian position on this issue. Conversely, strong support of armed struggle among the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria signals radicalization trends impacted by the war in Gaza, but no less owing to the Israeli war on terror in the Judea and Samaria territories, which is exacting a high price from the Palestinians, in addition to deep disappointment with the Palestinian Authority.

Continued Support of the Hamas

The poll highlights a concerning phenomenon regarding the collective consciousness of the Palestinian public: despite the fact that Hamas has taken a beating in the war, and despite the suffering and destruction the October 7 attack caused Gaza, the terror organization continues to enjoy widespread popularity among the population in Judea and Samaria, and even in Gaza itself. Moreover, and following justification of the massacre and its goals, the Palestinians in general are satisfied with the functioning of the Hamas and with the way it is conducting the war against Israel. They are unable to see the destruction around them as too high of a price, and prefer to uphold terror despite its ramifications. As noted, this is part of the same consciousness that has not changed, despite the war and its costs.

Thus, for example, 70% of the poll respondents are satisfied with the role of Hamas in the current war – satisfaction that remains stable and is identical to the result in December, reflecting a continuing trend. Regarding specific Palestinian actors, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of the Hamas in Gaza, enjoys strong support for his role: 61% are satisfied with his performance. This shows that Sinwar understands the strong public support for him and for the terror organization he leads, as well as for the trajectory he chose to take on October 7, despite its price. Accordingly, he can toughen his position in the negotiations, and place his survival and that of the organization as the sovereign in the Gaza Strip as the first and foremost goal in the hostage negotiations.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 16

Taking a forward-looking view, a large majority (78%) of the respondents indicated that the war in Gaza will revive international attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and could lead to increased recognition of Palestinian statehood. This result explains why the war is ‘worthwhile’: it reflects the belief that justifies the violent course chosen by Hamas as a means of achieving the political goal of Palestinian independence, and should therefore be supported. At the same time, the results show that the residents of Gaza prefer the Hamas as the governing entity at the end of the war – when asked about their preference, more than 50% of the Gazans support continued Hamas control over Gaza, an increase compared to the poll in December.

Another poll result reflects the Gazan population’s involvement in Hamas activity: according to Hamas data, a total of about 32 thousand Palestinians have been killed so far in the war in Gaza, and according to various estimates about 13 thousand of them are terrorists. At the same time, 80% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip reported that at least one family member (the degree of kinship is unclear from the wording of the question) was killed or injured during the current war. Despite the lack of clarity regarding the figure, and inability to obtain more accurate data, clearly a very large number of families have relatives who were killed or injured and were among Hamas operatives who were killed. This means that very many families are actively and significantly connected to Hamas.

The results indicate how deeply Hamas is embedded in the civilian population in Gaza. The widespread support for Hamas, and the clear and prominent preference to see it as the governing body in the Gaza Strip after the war, points to a society that is mobilized to the struggle and to resistance. This society is not averse to Hamas or feels that it is repressed by the organization. To the contrary, it views Hamas as a torch bearer that is loyal to its cause, and the population is therefore willing to collaborate with the terrorist organization. This is important to bear in mind and to emphasize as part of Israel’s advocacy and awareness-raising efforts against assertions regarding civil society or uninvolved civilians killed or injured in the war. There are of course those who oppose Hamas and do not collaborate with it, but in general this is a mobilized collective that willingly collaborates with Hamas. This enabled the terrorist organization to deepen its hold on civilian life and to operate from civil infrastructures and facilities, as well as from civilian homes.

Nevertheless, and in line with the duality developing in Gaza towards Hamas, certain criticism is evident in Gaza regarding some aspects of the terror organization’s activity in Gaza. Thus, for example, when asked whether the process of aid distribution by Hamas or UNRWA – an organization whose activity in Gaza is to a large degree controlled by Hamas – is fair or discriminatory on political grounds, many residents expressed dissatisfaction. 56% indicated that Hamas distribution was “discriminatory” compared to 41% who said that the terror organization’s aid distribution is “fair”. UNRWA received even a lower percentage: 70% indicated that the agency’s aid distribution is discriminatory.

As for the humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, the poll results contradict the commonly held accounts about heavy famine in Gaza. While almost half the respondents in Gaza said that they have food sufficient for a day or two, almost 80% noted that if they need food or water there is a place they can reach that can provide the assistance, but “at a risk” or with “great difficulty”. Only 4% said that there is no place they can reach where they can have access to food. A particularly high percentage noted that they have access to medical care and electricity to charge a phone.

Extremism and Weakness of the Palestinian Authority

A clear trend that emerged from the poll results is the irrelevance of the Palestinian Authority in the eyes of most of the population, including in Judea and Samaria. The Authority’s weakness stands out both compared to Hamas and overall. Abu-Mazen’s government is viewed as illegitimate and as a burden on the Palestinian people. A vast majority of Palestinians want Abu-Mazen, the President of the Palestinian Authority, to resign. Another worrying trend is the troubling share of support for Hamas particularly among respondents in Judea and Samaria – a percentage even higher than that among the population in Gaza.

An absolute majority of Palestinians does not believe there will be any change in the Palestinian Authority’s policy or in the living conditions in Judea and Samaria as a result of the appointment of Mohammad Mustafa as Prime Minister, and even opposes change of leadership in Ramallah. An even greater majority thinks that the Palestinian Authority is a huge burden. Thus, Palestinian support goes to Hamas: in Judea and Samaria support for the terrorist organization is 35%, compared to 44% in December. At the same time, support for the Fatah is only 12%. In Gaza the secular Fatah organization in fact receives greater support than in Judea and Samaria, 25%, compared to 34% support for Hamas. Overall, Hamas is considered a more popular alternative.

The poll results also show that Abu-Mazen, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, is not at all popular. His support among the Palestinians is especially low: 16% are satisfied with his performance in the war compared to 81% who are dissatisfied. In Judea and Samaria satisfaction with Abu-Mazen stands at only 8% – a drop from 10% in the December poll. Moreover, 84% of the respondents, including 93% in Judea and Samaria, want the elderly Palestinian leader to resign. In the eyes of the Palestinians, Abu-Mazen is not considered an option in order to continue the struggle for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This can be seen from the percentage of support among the respondents as to the preferred scenario in the day after the war, with the return of the Palestinian Authority under Abu-Mazen receiving only 18%, compared to 63% who prefer continued control of the Hamas in Gaza.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 20

Moreover, this trend is also reflected in the poll question regarding hypothetical presidential elections if they were to take place today. The only candidate that could beat Ismail Haniyeh in these elections would be Marwan Barghouti, who is in jail in Israel. Abu-Mazen, Mohammad Mustafa, as well as former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, would lose to the leader of the Hamas if they ran against him.

March poll: PCPSR, p. 18

Accordingly, while 62% of the respondents in Gaza indicated they were satisfied with the role of Hamas in the war, a higher percentage, 75%, of the respondents in Judea and Samaria are satisfied. This is also the case regarding satisfaction with the role played by Yahya Sinwar: 52% in the Gaza Strip, but 68% of the respondents in Judea and Samaria. At the same time, a higher percentage of respondents who would prefer to see continued control of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is found in Judea and Samaria – 64%,overall.

As noted above, the positions reflected in the poll results are related to the perception of the Palestinian Authority as an irrelevant and corrupt entity, while the residents of Judea and Samaria suffer less than the Gazans from Israeli operations and therefore do not direct their anger at Hamas or think that its decision to launch the October 7 attack was wrong. However, the results indicate a more serious trend: not a steady trend but a trend that is growing stronger, with increased radicalization in Judea and Samaria in espousing an ideology of an armed struggle and support for Hamas. According to the poll, the differentiation Israel tried to make between the residents of Judea and Samaria and those in Gaza in order to manage the conflict is not working. This is the case since in the eyes of the residents of Judea and Samaria the two-state solution is not the preferred solution. Instead, they prefer the Hamas and an armed struggle against Israel. Therefore, if the Hamas terrorist organization were to take control of the Palestinian Authority now, it is not at all certain that it would receive a cold shoulder from the local residents, as they also support the organization and believe in its doctrine and ideology.

Summary

The PCPSR March poll results provide findings about the position of the Palestinian public, both in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip, on a wide range of current issues. Beyond this, they also tell a story and paint a clear picture of the Palestinian collective consciousness regarding the conflict with Israel and its solution. The results point to a rigid Palestinian ideology, an idée fixe that prefers extreme action over moderation and pragmatism, while persistently and defiantly rejecting self-examination.

The poll shows that despite specific criticism of Hamas on particular issues, such as the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza, overall the respondents are satisfied with its functioning as an organization and with its leaders. Furthermore, the Palestinians do not turn their back on Hamas and in fact support it in large numbers, despite the suffering caused them by the war. The respondents’ answers demonstrate the scale and scope of the involvement of the Gazan population in Hamas activity, and how deeply and ubiquitously Hamas is embedded in the civilian population in Gaza and enjoys its support – the same population that is considered “innocent” or “uninvolved”. Concomitantly, the Palestinians give their support to external entities operating in a similar manner and promoting terror and attacks against Israel, whether these are the Houthis or Hezbollah, while they loath the Palestinian Authority which they see as corrupt and detached. If Palestinian elections were held today, the only probable winners would be the leaders of the Hamas or the convicted Marwan Barghouti.

This collective Palestinian approach, as inferred from the poll results, stems from their inability to take responsibility for acts of terror, such as the atrocities of October 7, while placing the blame on others – such as the “occupation” or Israel, which is the only one blamed for committing war crimes. The Palestinians, so it seems, also think that the changing reality perpetuated by Hamas is preferable to the stagnation and unchanging conservatism represented by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The poll respondents believe that this change is the optimal way to awaken and drive the world to help them and to grant them what they want. Therefore, among the Palestinians there is a clear preference for terror and destruction, which as they see it brings about rapid and significant change in reality, as opposed to slow, often difficult and prolonged constructive building of state institutions, conducting a political dialog and diplomacy.

Therefore, despite a certain decline in support of armed struggle according to the poll results, and even a slight increase in support of the two-state solution – two seemingly encouraging results, that may even signal the beginning of a genuine trend stemming from internalization of the lessons of the war – the majority of the Palestinians still show a preference for an armed struggle against Israel in order to gain their independence. A third of the Palestinians even extol the right of return as the ultimate goal, which means the elimination of the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and not recognizing its right to exist as such. At the same time, the poll shows sharp radicalization among the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, those who do not live under control of Hamas and whose attitude towards the issue is more extreme than that of the residents in Gaza. Regardless of the reasons, the widespread support of terror in Judea and Samaria, and worsening radicalization on a host of current issues, must raise a red flag and be seen as a warning sign by Israel and the Western countries.

In summary, the poll results point to a worrying phenomenon among the Palestinian public: an armed struggle consciousness, support for the Hamas, weakness of the Palestinian Authority and support of the October 7 atrocities – as part of the collective psychological foundations of this population. Palestinian society upholds the idea of the elimination of the State of Israel by means of violence and terror, and of realizing the right of return as a goal that is more important than the establishment of an independent and functioning Palestinian state achieved by peaceful means. Therefore, any progress towards the vision of two nation states, peacefully living side by side, requires deep and profound change in the collective psychological foundations of Palestinian society and its leaders. The poll results show that we still have a long way to go and are still very far from the hoped-for change.