Executive Summary

• The United Nations was founded to advance peace, security, international cooperation, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Those aims remain worthy. But the UN system increasingly does the opposite: it gives authoritarian regimes decisive influence over norms, mandates, and institutional priorities while undermining the goals, positions, and national security interests of democracies.
• The UN’s core problem is structural. Under its one-country-one-vote system, a liberal democracy has the same vote as a regime that suppresses freedoms, criminalizes free speech, and engages in gross violations of human rights.
• Authoritarian blocs shape agendas, create politicized mechanisms, and dilute attempts at reform, while democracies provide the majority of the funding for the system that undermines their interests, positions, and goals.
• China has become particularly effective at exploiting this structure. Through the “G77 and China” grouping, Beijing is able to leverage an organized voting bloc encompassing 69 percent of the General Assembly. It has repeatedly used its influence over member states to shield itself from scrutiny and advance its agenda. For example, in 2022, after the UN human rights office found possible crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, China was able to use its influence to prevent the Human Rights Council (HRC) from even holding a debate on the report.
• Through its recurring resolutions on “mutually beneficial cooperation,” Beijing has used the HRC to advance an alternative conception of human rights, one that emphasizes dialogue among governments, state consent, sovereignty, and non-interference rather than independent scrutiny and accountability for abuses.
• China’s influence affects a broad range of democratic interests. For example, due to Chinese pressure, Taiwan has been excluded from the World Health Assembly, despite its importance to global health. The UN system has embraced China’s Belt and Road Initiative, helping legitimize Beijing’s geopolitical infrastructure strategy.
• Russia has similarly used UN forums to weaponize historical memory, including its annual resolution on the glorification of Nazism, distorted to support its claim that its invasion of Ukraine was a campaign of “denazification.”
• The composition of the HRC further illustrates this absurdity. In addition to China and Russia, it has counted countries such as Cuba, Burundi, Sudan, Venezuela, and Egypt among its members in recent years. Iran chaired the Council’s 2023 Social Forum. Elsewhere in the UN system, North Korea presided over the 2022 Conference on Disarmament, Syria joined the World Health Organization Executive Board, and China, Cuba, Eritrea, and Nicaragua were elected to the UN Committee on NGOs. These bodies allow human rights abusers to shape the standards by which others are judged.
• Democracies also face sustained UN campaigns against vital tools of national security. In 2024, the General Assembly adopted a resolution seeking to recast lawful unilateral sanctions as a human rights abuse, despite opposition from the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Australia, and most European democracies. Six months later, it went a step further and created an annual International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures.
• A similar dynamic is evident with regards to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In 2016, the General Assembly launched the process that produced the treaty despite opposition from the U.S., UK, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, Australia, NATO allies, and other democracies that rely on nuclear deterrence for their security. These governments argued that the initiative ignored the security conditions that make deterrence necessary, lacked a credible verification and enforcement mechanism, and risked weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime.
• Israel is the clearest case of the UN’s institutional double standard and bias. More than thirty UN bodies and mechanisms form a permanent infrastructure of anti-Israel condemnation. Israel alone is subject to a dedicated HRC agenda item, a standing commission of inquiry, and specialized General Assembly bodies, databases, and recurring resolutions.
• From 2015 through May 2026, the General Assembly adopted 187 condemnatory resolutions against Israel, compared with 33 against Russia, 12 against Syria, 11 against Iran, and none against China. This is not normal scrutiny. It is structural discrimination.
• This discrimination is a challenge not only for Israel but for all democracies facing threats from terror. The machinery created to attack Israel can be repurposed against other democracies conducting counterterrorism operations, defending territorial claims, applying sanctions, or resisting transnational political pressure.
• After eighty years, it is clear that the UN has failed at its primary purpose: maintaining international peace and security. While regular and peacekeeping budgets grew, the number of global conflicts rose. For example, in 2024, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program recorded 61 active state-based conflicts, the highest number since records began in 1946, despite UN peacekeeping budgets reaching record heights in the preceding years. From Rwanda and Srebrenica to Syria, the DRC, Lebanon, and beyond, the UN repeatedly failed to prevent mass atrocities, wide-scale displacement, sexual violence, and the build-up of terrorist armies.
• UNIFIL and UNRWA further illustrate the failure of UN bodies to ensure security or counter terrorism. UNIFIL failed to prevent Hezbollah’s military build-up in southern Lebanon despite millions in Western funding. UNRWA was penetrated by Hamas, provided salaries to terror operatives, and allowed Islamic terror organizations to exploit its infrastructure for military purposes. Too often, the UN substitutes reports, meetings, and mandate renewals for enforcement, deterrence, and real results.
• While failing to achieve its founding objectives, the UN has become a caricature of institutional sprawl, bloat, and waste. Its own review found more than 40,000 mandates issued since the organization’s founding, with 85 percent of active mandates lacking a sunset clause or termination review. In 2024, the Secretariat supported more than 27,000 meetings and processed an average of 2,300 pages of documentation every day. Democracies provide the majority of the financing for this wasteful and unaccountable system, yet are routinely outvoted by states that contribute little to its budget or to the pursuit of its founding values.
• The answer is not isolationism but rather renewed international leadership, accountability, and initiative. Democracies should end broad, automatic support for failed UN institutions. Funding should be conditional, transparent, limited, and revocable. States should withhold support from bodies that enable terrorism, institutionalize discrimination, or advance legal and economic warfare against democracies. If calls for true reform go unanswered, contributions should be cut.
• Democratic countries should work together to create alternative structures that replace failed UN bodies through bilateral agreements, capable regional coalitions, targeted diplomatic initiatives, rigorously vetted local partners, faith-based networks, private-public partnerships, and mission-specific frameworks. In this manner, they can advance international cooperation based on measurable results, funding accountability, equal treatment, and coalitions willing to defend freedom and peace.

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Executive Summary:

• UNRWA’s sui generis criteria for defining Palestinian refugee status fundamentally diverges from the approach employed by the international community with regards to other refugee populations around the world. UNRWA’s approach has inflated the number of individuals classified as Palestinian refugees, by a factor of nearly 1,000.
• UNRWA’s definition serves only to perpetuate conflict and entrench rejectionist attitudes among much of the Palestinian population, threatening Israel’s security, encouraging terror, and undermining the chances for advancing regional stability.
• Palestinian refugee status must be brought into alignment with internationally-accepted standards. The current exceptionalism runs counter to U.S. foreign policy interests.
• In order to advance U.S. interests, and promote regional stability, the U.S. should:
  • Apply internationally-accepted standards: Ensure that Palestinian refugees are treated under the same criteria as all other refugee populations.
  • Establish an official position on refugee numbers: The U.S. should adopt a formal position recognizing that, under international standards, approximately 7,500 individuals today qualify as refugees from the 1948 conflict.
  • The status of additional descendants should be assessed individually, based on dependency and other criteria, in line with global practices.
• The U.S. decision to cease funding of UNRWA was an extremely important step. By helping shape a new international norm whereby Palestinian refugee status is aligned with international standards, the U.S. can help remove one of the key obstacles to lasting stability in the region.

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The election of President Donald Trump to a second term presents an opportunity to take the US-Israel relationship to entirely new heights, in ways that advance the vital interests of both the United States and Israel. If the tremendous potential of the next four years is realized, the security, resilience and prosperity of both the US and Israel will grow exponentially, American technological leadership will be bolstered, and the Middle East will be put on the path towards a future of warm peace.

By deepening the US-Israel alliance, and advancing regional integration based on the principle of Peace through Strength, the Middle East can move from a reality of war and instability to one of cooperation and mutual prosperity. This will greatly decrease the likelihood of US troops becoming actively engaged in regional conflicts, enable the shift of US assets to other theatres, advance US-led economic development and technological breakthroughs, and counter the designs of hostile actors in the Middle East.

The following paper presents four key areas for strengthening US-Israel cooperation in the coming years, in line with the critical interests of the American and Israeli peoples. It then describes concrete steps and measures to be taken in each area, in order to realize their full potential. While these four areas certainly do not encompass the full range of strategic issues related to the US-Israel relationship, they are critical linchpins which can catalyze historic changes and produce far-reaching benefits for the US, Israel and Middle East. The four areas are:

1. Enhancing US-Israel defense, intelligence and technological cooperation.
2. Countering the shared threats from Iran and its proxies.
3. Expanding regional cooperation and the Abraham Accords.
4. Countering and defunding anti-American, anti-Israeli and pro-terror activity in international organizations.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author.

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It seems that not a day goes by without the discovery of another Middle Eastern country advancing its civilian nuclear ambitions. Indeed, the trend of establishing civilian nuclear programs for electricity production is sweeping across the Middle East. The Egyptians are currently building a nuclear power plant with Russian assistance, expected to supply up to half of the electricity needs of the Nile state. The Turks are also hard at work constructing the Akkuyu plant, with Ankara’s energy minister announcing this week that Turkey expects to begin operational tests as early as next year.

The Barakah power plant in the UAE, completed about three months ago, is the first nuclear power plant in the Arab world. It is expected to meet about a quarter of the country’s electricity demand. Iran operates the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which functions with the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and under its supervision. Currently, Iran is planning the construction of additional civilian reactors to address the country’s severe electricity issues.

Apart from these, other countries in the region have expressed interest in building similar facilities. Earlier this year, Iraq agreed with the IAEA to establish a civilian nuclear program, following the lead of other regional countries, including Saudi Arabia. According to reports, the Saudis have shown interest in developing a nuclear electricity program as part of the conditions for a formal normalization agreement with Israel. Last year, even Jordan, Israel’s neighbor to the east, announced that it was considering the purchase of small reactors, mainly for electricity production and water desalination.

The Middle Eastern trend is not without context. In recent years, there has been a renewed global interest in civilian nuclear energy, particularly against the backdrop of global warming and the pursuit of renewable energy sources to replace fossil fuels.

Nuclear energy is considered “green” and “sustainable,” and according to the IAEA, it can “help the energy sector transition away from fossil fuels more quickly and safely.” Currently, nuclear energy generates a quarter of the electricity produced with low emissions—evidence of its favorability compared to other alternatives to coal and oil. The European Union declared nuclear energy “green” about two years ago, and earlier this year, the Council of Europe designated it a “strategic tool” for reducing pollutant emissions on the continent.

Nuclear energy can help meet the rapidly growing global electricity demand driven by human population growth. Relatively new phenomena like Bitcoin mining or artificial intelligence applications consume enormous amounts of electricity, and as their usage grows, the demand for electricity is expected to increase—nuclear solutions could help alleviate the burden.

However, nuclear energy has gained a bad reputation. The Chernobyl reactor disaster in the 1980s or the meltdown and explosion at the Fukushima reactor in Japan in 2011 tarnished the reputation of nuclear energy and raised fears of accidents and safety failures causing significant damage, casualties, and radiation hazards. These disasters cannot be understated, but in general, nuclear power plants are considered in many countries—including the US and Canada, for example—as particularly safe compared to other industrial facilities. These accidents likely occurred due to poor design or negligence, and all these cases are being thoroughly investigated. Their lessons are recorded and applied in the construction of future reactors and in updating safety measures at existing reactors.

In fact, despite the extensive resonance of disasters originating from nuclear power plants, it is easy to forget that more than 400 nuclear power plants currently operate worldwide, supplying about 9% of global electricity production. Nevertheless, news headlines are not filled with reports of accidents at these sites, and demand for nuclear technology in electricity production is only increasing.

International restrictions

If everything is ideal, safe, efficient, and convenient to use, why doesn’t Israel have a nuclear power plant? What prevents the government from building one?

The issue of civilian nuclear energy in Israel has been discussed many times over the decades, but so far, no tangible program for building a civilian nuclear reactor has advanced. “In Israel, there are many discussions and study days on the subject,” says Col. (res.) Dr. Uri Nissim Levy, a nuclear defense expert, lecturer, and chairman of the global nuclear forum WNF-193. “Many leaders, former officials, and scientists, including from the Ministry of Energy, believe there is no reason not to advance nuclear energy in Israel.”

Recently, it was reported that the Energy Ministry is examining the possibility of building nuclear power plants in Israel by 2050 to replace the polluting fuels currently used in the country.

However, building a reactor is not similar to constructing other plants. It is a complex and expensive task, requiring expertise in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities that Israel currently lacks and is barred from acquiring from other countries. “This stems primarily from the fact that we are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), so we are not eligible to build civilian reactors,” explains Prof. Shaul Chorev, former head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and head of the Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center at the National Institute for Blue Economy.

According to Chorev, “Significant resources must be invested in building a civilian nuclear power plant. Currently, the program for nuclear engineering at the Technion no longer exists, unfortunately, and therefore we lack the industrial capacity and professional workforce to advance the construction of a civilian power reactor independently. Beyond that, obtaining nuclear fuel for a reactor in relatively large quantities is needed, unlike the small amount of fuel required for a research reactor, which operates at low output. Since we are not signatories to the NPT, no entity will be willing to supply us with fuel for such a reactor.”

To understand Chorev’s remarks, it is worth noting that Israel already operates two nuclear reactors. One is the Soreq Nuclear Research Center, and the other is the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona. The Soreq center includes a research reactor like the one Prof. Chorev mentioned and is under IAEA inspection. The Dimona reactor—allegedly used, according to foreign sources, for producing plutonium for nuclear bombs—is not subject to oversight.

Israel is not obligated to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection because it is one of the few countries not signed on the NPT, along with India, Pakistan, South Sudan, and North Korea—a country that was a signatory but withdrew and openly conducted nuclear tests. Thus, IAEA inspections of Soreq are conducted voluntarily.

The NPT governs two main areas of nuclear issues: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the proper use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. In an effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, the treaty allows only five countries—the permanent members of the Security Council, all of which conducted nuclear explosive tests before the treaty’s signing—to possess such weapons. Other countries that signed the treaty are prohibited from possessing nuclear bombs. Therefore, India and Pakistan did not sign the NPT, similar to Israel.

In exchange for refraining from developing nuclear weapons, the treaty allows countries not permitted to possess nuclear weapons to rely on the IAEA to develop civilian nuclear technologies and use them, including for building nuclear power plants. Israel, not being a signatory to the treaty, cannot rely on the IAEA for this purpose.

In the past, Israel had other options. According to Prof. Chorev, the array of rules and mechanisms in this field were not in effect before the mid-1970s. Back then, “The US administration allowed Israel to contract with Westinghouse to build a nuclear power plant in the country. The agreement was canceled after India’s first nuclear test in 1974, which led the nuclear powers to conclude that the NPT alone would not stop nuclear proliferation. To this end, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an organization of 48 countries, was established to operate according to guidelines for exporting nuclear technologies. Today, it refuses to transfer nuclear-related materials and equipment to Israel.”

Thus, Israel must consider another scenario: should it advance capabilities to build such a plant independently, despite the lack of industrial and professional infrastructure? In the past, the state allocated land in the Shdot Negev area for building such a power plant, so a site for construction already exists. However, it must first overcome the negative public perception of nuclear power plants. “There will be opposition from residents,” Prof. Chorev believes, “After the Fukushima disaster, the safety image of nuclear power plants is not good, although in recent years, there has been an improvement due to the integration of new safety measures and recognition that using nuclear energy for electricity production is one of the leading solutions for reducing polluting emissions.”

Dr. Levy agrees that public opinion is indeed changing, but he does not believe it will be an obstacle. “Public opinion is changing in Israel and worldwide. All the polls in the first half of 2024 in the US showed that more than 60% of Americans support nuclear energy, partly because the European Union classified nuclear energy as green energy a year and a half ago.” He believes this mindset is gaining traction in Israel and Europe: “In Belgium, which had four old reactors that were supposed to close at the end of 2023, the public protested against shutting them down, calling for extending their operation—contrary to logic,” says Dr. Levy. “This happened because electricity prices would have quintupled as a result.”

Terror concerns

Even if Israel could develop the expertise for a nuclear plant, the costs would be immense. Egypt committed to paying the Russians $30 billion to build its new reactor—a sum comparable to Israel’s entire defense budget. The government in Israel would likely need to invest an even larger sum to establish a power plant to compensate for the lack of expertise and experience in the field.

“The construction of a nuclear power plant is very expensive,” says Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, a nuclear technology and physics expert. “When you can produce electricity using means like oil or gas, it is much simpler and cheaper, and seemingly, there is no immediate need for nuclear. Israel also has five steam turbine power plants for electricity production, a form of renewable energy that is not as costly as nuclear. The cost of building and operating a nuclear power plant makes the idea insufficiently economically viable.”

Another complicating factor in establishing a nuclear power plant is security. “Given our situation in the Middle East, there is a risk that a nuclear power plant could be a target for bombing,” notes Dr. Ofek. “This is different from the reactors in Dimona or Soreq, which are smaller sites used primarily for research. A nuclear power plant is on a different scale—much larger, more prominent, and harder to defend.”

Prof. Chorev points out that this is indeed a significant concern: “Israel is a small country surrounded by threats, and a nuclear power plant could be an attractive target for attack, as we have recently experienced with Iran and Hezbollah. Even in the war between Russia and Ukraine, there were deep concerns about the possible consequences of damage to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear reactor.”

Dr. Levy believes that there are solutions to the security threats: “The fear of terrorism can be overcome. There are two dangerous parts in a reactor—the nuclear fuel storage area and the core. The core is strong, made of concrete, and well-protected,” he explains. “There is no perfect insurance, and it is complicated to protect such a plant, but that is not a reason not to build nuclear reactors—at least small or medium-sized ones.”

He also suggests that the economic obstacle could be resolved. “Building a reactor is expensive, but it could pay off in the long term,” says Levy. “We won’t do it alone, without help from the world. Israel is a technologically advanced country, but in our situation, it’s impossible to undertake such a project alone.”

Israel’s non-membership in the NPT complicates international cooperation in building a civilian reactor, but Levy believes that, theoretically, a way around this obstacle could be found. “Israel is not a signatory to the treaty due to its policy of nuclear ambiguity, which is now at the center of public debate about whether it is the correct policy. I believe it is appropriate to maintain ambiguity, but it is uncertain whether it will remain in place in the long term. In any case, even under conditions of ambiguity, cooperation with other countries is a solvable issue.”

Before that, he argues, Israel must make a definitive decision about whether it wants to promote a civilian nuclear energy policy: “First and foremost, a political decision must be made—not remain at the level of opinions and suggestions. If the state decides to pursue civilian nuclear energy, it will find a way,” he says confidently.

Prof. Chorev offers a relevant course of action on the matter. “India’s case, which was recognized by the US in 2002 as eligible for a civilian nuclear program due to American geopolitical considerations, should serve as a model for Israel,” he says. “This is a case of a country that gained recognition for a civilian nuclear program even though it is not a signatory to the NPT, and at the right time, the Americans agreed to grant it an ‘exemption.'”

“In my opinion, the State of Israel should act similarly. In one of the appropriate opportunities—such as when the Saudis raise their demands with the US for a civilian nuclear program as part of a normalization agreement with Israel—the government in Jerusalem should request US assistance in advancing a civilian nuclear program, similar to India.”

Until such an opportunity arises, Chorev suggests another possible course of action. “If a foreign company operates such a reactor outside the territorial waters of the state, meaning about 20 kilometers from the coast, it could meet the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since the reactors would be outside our sovereign territory,” he says.

The US, Russia, and China are competing to promote this advanced technology—floating reactors—and Russia has already operated the world’s first floating nuclear power plant, Akademik Lomonosov, for four years, generating 60 megawatts. The Biden administration has invested heavily in this nuclear pathway, which, in many ways, resembles the internal electricity production system of nuclear submarines.

The IAEA recognizes the potential of such facilities, which can assist in powering offshore gas and oil rigs, desalinating seawater, and conducting deep-water drilling. Is this a technology that could suit Israel in the near future? According to Prof. Chorev, this is the course of action that should be developed now: “Such floating reactors,” he says, “are the right future solution for Israel.”

Published in Israel Hayom, December 23, 2024.

**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Key Points:

• The incoming Trump Administration seeks allies who are willing to invest the resources necessary to meet their own security needs and defend themselves. This is particularly true as America makes East Asia the primary focus of its strategic and military resources.
• Israel can play a key role in America’s Middle East strategy as the bridgehead, together with the Gulf states, of the pro-American camp, aligned against the anti-Western axis led by Iran and backed by China and Russia.
• At the same time, US-Israel defense-industrial cooperation should transition from being based primarily on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Israel, toward greater Israeli independence in funding its own defense acquisitions and rebuilding its defense industrial base, as well as toward greater mutual cooperation in the realms of defense innovation and start-ups.
• While the aid has greatly contributed to Israel’s security and military build-up, the current framework of grants in the form of FMF has many drawbacks. It should be updated to reflect current American priorities, Israel’s economic development, and the broader strategic context.
• Historically, alongside helping build up Israel’s capabilities, the FMF framework has served to facilitate or encourage Israel’s surrender of various strategic territories. It also contributed to Israel’s adoption of a defensive and technology-focused security concept, whose weakness was exposed during the October 7^th attack; and had the effect of downgrading critical sections of Israel’s domestic military industry.
• However, in order to make the transition toward independently funding its security needs feasible, Israel must take steps to secure its borders and complete the change in the regional balance of power. Destroying Iran’s ‘ring of fire’ built up around Israel over the past two decades, alongside additional steps, will change the risk environment and make the necessary transition from patronage to partnership feasible.
• Achieving these goals will allow for a new US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which would: Reduce FMF grants gradually over the next decade from current levels to zero; maintain Israeli access to technology and parts; reconstitute Israel’s capacity for munitions production; and identify fields for mutual investment and expanded cooperation in development and production including UAVs, high-energy laser systems, offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, missile defense and subsystems for large combat platforms.

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**The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.**

Russian ships made an unusual stop in the southern Red Sea. It was late July, in the midst of the hot summer. Several individuals of Russian origin disembarked and were collected by Houthi operatives from Yemen, in boats that continued to the shores of the impoverished nation. These Russians carried suitcases and bags, though they didn’t appear large enough to contain weapons or military equipment. The Russians landed in Yemen and stayed for three days.

According to intelligence and security sources, this marked a concerning development in Russia-Houthi relations: reminiscent of the Cold War, Moscow had sent “military advisers” to assist the Shiite organization in its fight against Yemen’s central government. Moscow continued to deploy such advisers in the country, operating under the guise of “humanitarian aid” – exactly as Iranian advisers have done for many years.

In the past year, shortly after the outbreak of the Iron Swords war, ties between Russia and the Shiite rebels in Yemen began to strengthen. This is partly due to the convergence of interests between both sides but occurred primarily around the Kremlin’s growing closeness to Iran and its regional proxy organizations in recent years. As relations between Moscow and Tehran warmed, and as Russia became increasingly dependent on Iranian support in its war in Ukraine, it also began providing various types of assistance to regional organizations.

The peak of this process between the Kremlin and the Houthis, for now, was revealed in a report published by the Financial Times this week: according to the report, since July, the Houthis have helped Russia recruit hundreds of Yemeni men to fight on the front in Ukraine. They were smuggled into the country through deception, after being dazzled by promises of high wages and an interesting security position.

Yemen, as we recall, is one of the poorest countries in the world. When residents were offered money, they rushed to seize the opportunity. When told they would also receive Russian citizenship, no one hesitated anymore. Their surprise must have been great upon arrival in Russia, when they were forcibly recruited into the Russian army, dressed in uniforms, and sent to the front.

The new recruits had no prior military training. They signed contracts in a language they didn’t understand, after false promises silenced their suspicions. Since Russia needs as many able-bodied soldiers as possible, these young Yemenis served as “cannon fodder,” sent to traverse mine-filled forests – not knowing if their next step would be their last.

Tim Lenderking, the US special envoy for Yemen, noted that the Russians are currently discussing the transfer of advanced weapons with the Yemeni rebels, cultivating relationships through Moscow’s representatives in Sanaa. According to him, the type of weapons that Russians are considering transferring to the Houthis is “concerning.”

In fact, the transfer of such advanced weapons was likely prevented only at the last minute this year. In August, reports indicated that Russia had prepared a shipment of missiles and advanced equipment to Yemen but withdrew after quiet diplomatic activity by both Saudi Arabia and the United States. The ships were apparently already in the Red Sea, and the Kremlin ultimately settled for sending military advisers instead of transferring the weapons themselves.

Upon reflection, it’s hardly surprising to find Russian weapons in Houthi hands. According to testimonies from IDF soldiers in the past two months, they have encountered “large and high-quality weapons caches” of Russian origin in Lebanon, which Hezbollah used effectively. These weapons include Kornet anti-tank missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, and more. Soldiers report finding weapons still wrapped in their original packaging, still covered in plastic, and hidden in Hezbollah’s numerous hiding places in southern Lebanon.

If Russia assists Hezbollah in this way, why wouldn’t it help other organizations affiliated with Iran’s axis? Indeed, UN experts reported last November about attempts to smuggle anti-tank missiles, rifles, and other weapons to Yemen, likely manufactured in Russia.

The Deal with the “Merchant of Death”

The Houthis have received Russian support since the beginning of the war. Moscow does not condemn the ballistic missile launches from Yemen toward Israel, and on the other hand, acts decisively in the diplomatic arena against American and British attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen, criticizing them sharply.

The Kremlin isn’t satisfied with spiritual support and also works on the ground to help the Houthis. Even if Russia apparently cancelled the August shipment, it still found other ways to provide military assistance to the Shiite rebels, and apparently did transfer some weapons.

The first example is those military advisers mentioned above. Additionally, according to Western sources, the Russians ensured that the Houthis were equipped with light weapons and ammunition. One of the interesting stories in this context is the contact person who served the Russians in examining such procurement approval by the Houthis: Viktor Bout, known as the “Merchant of Death,” considered the world’s largest arms dealer, who served as inspiration for the infamous movie “Lord of War” starring Nicolas Cage.

Bout, who was arrested in Thailand in 2008 and extradited to the United States after lengthy delays, was sentenced to 25 years in prison after selling weapons to every possible rebel organization and dictator in Africa, Asia, and beyond. He served ten years until he was released two years ago as part of a deal between the Americans and Russians that included the release from detention of basketball star Brittney Griner. The athlete had played for several years for Russian teams until she was arrested in Moscow – on false pretenses, according to the Americans – and sentenced to nine years in prison for drug possession. As a famous and well-known personality in the United States, the negotiations for her release were intensive, and the price that included Bout’s release from prison was correspondingly high.

Early this year, it was reported that Bout had “returned to business” and began mediating between the Houthis and the Russian military, including attempts to purchase advanced automatic rifles in a deal worth $10 million. According to the report, this was a small initial deal, conducted with two Houthi officials who traveled to the Russian capital under the guise of merchants interested in purchasing vehicles and pesticides. During the conversation between the parties, the possibility of examining the purchase of anti-aircraft missiles, Kornet missiles, and more apparently arose.

According to the article then published in The Wall Street Journal, the weapons shipment was supposed to arrive at the port of Hodeidah under the guise of food starting in October. This port was chosen as the destination because Russia had already sent several containers of wheat there, and it regularly serves for Iranian smuggling to Yemen. In any case, it was probably just a coincidence that the Israeli Air Force bombed the port of Hodeidah on September 29 after several Houthi attacks toward our country, hit weapons warehouses, and caused “enormous damage” in a “series of explosions that shook the city.”

Last month, another development occurred, more concerning than a shipment of light weapons: according to US reports, Russia examined the possibility of transferring geographic information to the Houthis that would allow them to effectively and accurately attack ships in the Red Sea. This included satellite information that allows identifying the location of ships at sea, and also verifying the identity of those ships. This came, among other things, in the wake of a Houthi “mishap,” in which a Russian-owned vessel passing near Yemen was hit. Later, toward the end of the month, it was reported that the information had indeed been transferred to the Houthis, after being sent first to Revolutionary Guards personnel stationed in Yemen. This information was actually used to hit ships passing through the area.

Although the result of using this information is clear, the Russian motive is not definitively known. It could be that the goal was to prevent hitting Russian ships, not the desire to attack Western vessels. Apart from that incident in May, the Houthis managed to avoid attacking Chinese and Russian ships. In March, it was reported that these two countries had reached a secret agreement with the Shiite rebels, under which the Houthis committed to allowing Chinese and Russian ships to pass safely through the Red Sea.

However, the Shiite militia lacked the technology to distinguish with complete certainty between such ships and Western vessels. If the Russians transferred such satellite information to them, they can truly avoid accidents. By the way, it can be assumed quite safely that the information was passed long before last October, since in July it was reported that Russian tankers had returned to sailing Red Sea routes, despite the danger and even though one of those identified in the area had previously been attacked by the Houthis. The conclusion from this Russian audacity in this case is that the ship operators decided to take the risk to increase their profit, despite concerns about being hit – or that they knew with certainty they would not be attacked, due to secret contacts we weren’t exposed to. The Russians, as is known, have a proven history of success in building mechanisms to prevent friction.

Another recent development is very concerning: Iran has begun mediating between Russia and the Houthis on the possibility of transferring advanced Yakhont anti-ship missiles to them. Not only does this event emphasize the strengthening ties between Tehran and the Kremlin, but it poses a real tangible danger to ships in the Red Sea. Yakhont missiles are extremely fast and precise, and lethally effective even against naval vessels. They have a range of more than 186 miles, and the parties have already met twice to discuss the possibility of purchasing several dozen of them. We can recall how a missile of this type hit the Israeli Navy ship “Hanit” in the Second Lebanon War, leading to the deaths of four soldiers. This is no longer about light weapons, but heavy ammunition of the most lethal kind possible. Such weapons in Houthi hands are a very dangerous means.

Russia Accumulating Debts

The Iranian involvement in the connection between the Houthis and the Kremlin is not surprising, but it is concerning. In the past, Russian involvement in the Middle East could be attributed to other motives. For example, one possible motive for arming the Houthis might have been revenge against the West for how it transfers increasingly advanced weapons to Kyiv, including long-range missiles that allow Ukrainians to strike deep into Russian territory. Therefore, for instance, intelligence sources previously said they expected Russian President Vladimir Putin to choose which weapons to send to various actors in the Middle East based on what the West itself does in Ukraine. If you will, this is similar to Hezbollah’s equations: as the level of escalation rises, the other side responds with similar intensity.

But there are other reasons for Russian involvement in the Middle East: The first is that the Russians tried to cultivate regional relationships against the backdrop of the global inter-bloc struggle with the United States, thus supporting any group hostile to the US in the region. The second reason is that activity in an area like Yemen, which is not at the center of global attention, can serve the Russians to intensify the “quiet” confrontation with the US, but without fear of escalation. This is a way to increase pressure on the US and its allies, but not through direct means, rather indirectly. Another reason, of course, is the desire to increase power and influence.

However, now it seems that something fundamental in the Russian position has changed. If in the past it seemed that the Kremlin had little to gain from a real flare-up in any conflict in the Middle East, and in the Red Sea in particular, it’s not certain that this is still the Kremlin’s position. Russian interests, it appears, have changed. Moscow apparently no longer cares now if the Houthis ignite a broader conflict, as long as they harm the US and its allies. More seriously, Russia has effectively brought its people into Yemen, putting them at risk of being harmed if the conflict in the country escalates. In fact, it has created a theoretical scenario where it could become one of the parties to the crisis itself.

In my view, the main change that has occurred recently is the strengthening of ties with Iran, and especially the dependence on it. The Russians rely significantly on the Iranians for continuing the war in Ukraine, receiving attack drones, ballistic missiles, and more from them. This means that Moscow now maintains reciprocal relations with Iran from a new position – it is accumulating debts toward it and needs to return favors in exchange. The relationship between the two is becoming much more complex now. This can explain, for example, the Russian willingness to launch Iranian satellites into space, sell Tehran advanced air defense systems and advanced fighter jets (and even allow them to build them in Iran itself), assistance to groups such as Hezbollah and also the Houthis – and the day may not be far when Russia might even agree to help Tehran in the nuclear field. At the current stage, the favors Moscow returns are embodied in advanced weapons being transferred to the wrong hands.

By the way, this is also true regarding the assistance the Kremlin receives from countries such as China and North Korea, which sent thousands of its soldiers to the Ukrainian front. Russia finds itself mired in the Ukrainian mud, and thus owes more and more favors to other actors in the “axis” it is sticking to. Moreover, if in the past it seemed that it was the spearhead of this axis, which includes China and Iran, among others, now it’s not certain that its geopolitical situation hasn’t actually turned it into a follower instead.

One thing is certain: This axis is now busy with three or four fronts of struggle against Western elements, with its various proxies cooperating together in this conflict. Thus, in the Ukraine war there are Iranian weapons, North Korean soldiers and Yemeni fighters, in Lebanon Russian and Chinese weapons stockpiles were found, and in the Red Sea the Houthis receive assistance from Iran and Russia, as well as from Hezbollah and Iraqi militias (who themselves might be sending Russian weapons to Yemen).

The significance of Russian assistance to the Houthis is that a major power, a permanent member of the Security Council, is helping an organization disrupt maritime transit routes, contrary to international law and also to its own commercial interests. It is helping it attack American, British, and other ships. It’s difficult to call this a “cold” war, and perhaps it’s better to judge the situation more severely, look at reality with cold eyes and understand: World War III has already broken out before our eyes.

The change of administration in the US, alongside the fact that current President Joe Biden is now a lame duck, is being exploited by the Russians and Iranians to improve positions, ahead of the great eruption that might still await us later. As all eyes in the world are fixed on January 20, many are trying to improve positions before President Donald Trump enters the White House. From a Russian perspective, this means a more powerful offensive in Ukraine, and also improving the situation of all its allies.

One of the last arenas that hasn’t yet erupted in this context is Taiwan, which stands under constant, growing Chinese threat. It’s worth noting in this context the words of the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister this week: The US is strengthening its security ties with Taipei and providing it with weapons, while ignoring the “One China” principle, he declared, noting that the reason for this is that the US wants to interfere in regional affairs and provoke conflict in Asia, according to its interests. What’s the connection between Russia and Taiwan, and how does the US even enter the story? The answer is that this is a war between two axes, and Taiwan is another arena that might become part of this struggle.

Israel too needs to look at this evolving reality with sober eyes. As a country that considers itself part of the Western bloc fighting Iran and its regional proxies, we need to understand that Moscow is no longer committed to those interests we once shared, and that it actively assists the Iranian ring of fire around us. In such a situation, we have no privilege to ignore the possibility that any Russian presence will necessarily aid our enemies. In fact, the Russians have largely become a hostile factor, perhaps even an adversary, that must be treated with great and increased caution. In parallel, the Kremlin must be made clear through various channels that any continuation of military involvement in the region, direct or through assistance to the Houthis and Hezbollah, could cost it – including military actions in Syria, in a way that would undermine the Russian position there.

Certainly, Israel must not give the Russians a prize for their order-undermining activity. Under no circumstances should Moscow now be designated a role in northern arrangements and not in Gaza either. After all, if Russian weapons were found in Lebanon even before the Kremlin’s forces were really there, there’s no knowing what will arrive in the country when it establishes itself there as a central factor. Similarly, the Russians cannot serve as fair mediators between Israel and Iran, a country with which it has now developed particularly great dependence. The regional reality after October 7 is different, and we are operating at a heavy blood price to tilt it in our favor. We must not fall into the trap again and allow hostile elements to be part of it.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 27 , 2024.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been one of the most notable technological advancements of the past decade, permeating many aspects of life and serving diverse purposes. Experts predict that as AI progresses, it will open new possibilities for humanity.

AI also plays a crucial role in security and defense. In Israel, it is used extensively for military purposes and in the fight against terrorism. According to various reports, AI technology has helped the IDF identify Hamas targets in Gaza for strikes and is also used to trace terrorist funding. The Israeli intelligence Unit 8200, known for signals intelligence (“SIGINT”), houses an AI center. During Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, the center’s commander stated that advanced technology enabled the IDF to sift through massive databases to extract information that led to identifying terrorists. One can only imagine the additional uses of these rapidly evolving tools within the IDF, and the entire security establishment.

However, AI’s rapid development also risks empowering enemies, terrorists worldwide, international criminals, drug cartels, and more. These advanced tools enhance the operations of such groups, making it easier to execute their agendas.

Rita Katz, head of the open-source intelligence group SITE, emphasized that AI is utilized by a range of extremist groups from Al-Qaeda to neo-Nazi networks. “It’s hard to grasp just how much of a gift AI is to terrorists and extremist communities,” she said.

Global intelligence agencies share this concern. Mike Burgess, head of Australia’s security intelligence organization, warned that “AI will likely make radicalization efforts faster and easier.” A UN task force on terrorism and technology reported that extremist networks are already using advanced AI tools for propaganda, manipulating narratives around real-world events, and swaying public opinion in their favor while undermining governments. These tools also assist in the targeted and effective recruitment of terrorists, supporters, and sleeper cells.

As AI capabilities develop, they offer terrorists additional applications. For example, while past technology was limited to basic text messages, AI can now produce images, videos, and audio recordings nearly indistinguishable from authentic content. Imagine a phishing scheme involving a voice message mimicking a loved one, pleading for money. Many would fall victim to such schemes, and it’s unclear if authorities could effectively counter these scams on a large scale.

Israel may not yet fully comprehend the scope of AI’s reach and its applications. Last June—a lifetime in terms of AI’s rapid advancements—State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman warned that “AI could lead to broad technological progress in many fields, but it also poses significant risks, including ‘fake news’ and misuse by terrorist and criminal elements.” Englman announced his intent to examine the government’s preparedness on this front and to assess how it safeguards its citizens by restricting harmful AI applications that could endanger the public.

An AI handbook for terrorists

In recent decades, terrorists have quickly adapted to advanced technologies, using them efficiently and lethally for their agendas. They have proven their determination to exploit the internet to further their goals.

Sophisticated AI models, like ChatGPT, incorporate rules preventing users from employing them for harmful purposes, such as learning how to avoid punishment for crimes. Tech giants like Microsoft have pledged to develop “responsible” AI guidelines based on principles of fairness, reliability, safety, privacy, transparency, and accountability. Yet, these guidelines are imperfect, and tech-savvy terrorists will quickly find ways to bypass and overcome these safeguards.

Terrorist organizations recognize the potential of familiarizing supporters with these tools. In February, an Al-Qaeda-linked group announced a virtual workshop on using advanced technological tools. Later, the same group distributed a manual—a lengthy guide for beginners on using “artificial intelligence intelligence tools.”

Propaganda is one of the primary ways terrorists use AI. All it takes is a computer, creativity, some talent, and basic knowledge of a few advanced software programs. For example, after the attack on a concert hall near Moscow last March, in which 140 people were killed by ISIS terrorists, the group released a video showing a news anchor celebrating the attack. The video looked authentic but was generated by AI-powered software.

Locally, Hamas terrorists have already been observed using AI software. Early in the war, Hamas produced fake images purportedly showing Israeli strikes on Gaza or videos of Gazan families combing through the rubble of their bombed homes—intended to evoke sympathy for Hamas and tarnish Israel and the IDF’s image. Other AI-generated videos depicted Israeli tanks moving through Gaza neighborhoods.

Using AI software, Hamas members create complex graphics aimed at inciting ideologically driven Palestinians to carry out attacks in its name, especially in the West Bank. Supporters post calls for violence against Israel and pro-Hamas propaganda widely on Telegram and social media, using bot-driven technology to inflame the masses.

Hezbollah, too, reportedly employs AI applications. The advanced drones it sends toward Israel likely incorporate AI. Hezbollah has long used psychological warfare, influence campaigns, and propaganda on social media and the internet, and it’s likely that in recent years, it has incorporated AI for these purposes.

The Zelensky effect

AI applications used by terrorists can be divided into “soft” and “hard” tools. The primary soft tool, as mentioned, is propaganda. AI offers numerous ways to quickly and effectively create and distribute content, allowing users to “play” with audience emotions using visuals, background music, and targeted messaging. Not only can advanced, seemingly real content be created, but fake users (“bots”) on social media can amplify it. The use of bots makes it harder for social media companies to identify and halt propaganda dissemination.

Propaganda is not only about promoting an organization’s ideology but can also involve false information designed to harm the enemy, weaken civilian morale, and mislead enemy commanders. The phenomenon of “deepfakes,” for instance, enables overlaying one person’s face onto another’s body or generating exact voice replicas to convincingly simulate speech, potentially deceiving viewers.

For example, Russian-affiliated actors released a video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, urging his fighters to lay down their arms. Zelensky’s face was overlaid on the speaking figure, and his voice featured in the video. However, the speaking body remained static, exposing the deception. But imagine a group of fighters crowded around a phone in a tense battlefield moment—would they notice such subtle details? How would such a video affect them? And how would Israelis react if Hamas used such videos to simulate hostages speaking for them?

Such campaigns can particularly influence targeted audiences, such as children and adolescents who spend significant time online and may be more susceptible to extreme indoctrination due to their young age.

Another way AI capabilities are used is for recruiting terrorists. Advanced AI-driven bots can interact with potential recruits, provide them with information tailored to their character, and assess their suitability for the organization. In Afghanistan, ISIS’s Khorasan Province operatives have tried using online connections with young Europeans to encourage them to join and carry out attacks in their home countries.

AI programs can also be used to raise funds. An Israeli study found that advanced platforms complied with researchers’ requests to assist in “fundraising for the Islamic State,” providing detailed instructions on managing a fundraising campaign and what to post on social media for success.

Alongside these, AI technology provides terrorists with “hard” tools as well. These include capabilities to transmit encrypted messages or obtain classified information through sophisticated means. As the British Home Secretary stated, advanced tools allow terrorists to plan more efficient and lethal attacks. One example is the ability to use simulators to plan drone flight paths for targeted attacks.

In general, the use of drones and other autonomous tools is rapidly advancing with the aid of AI. This allows terrorists to strike an enemy’s weak points and execute efficient attacks without risking their lives. The UN discussed this threat several years ago. According to experts, autonomous weapons that make split-second shooting decisions based on sensor data are becoming increasingly common on the battlefield. These tools can rely on AI for planning routes, navigation, advanced target recognition, and more. One major fear is the potential use of AI-driven vehicles loaded with explosives, programmed to target and “suicide bomb” enemies—similar to the IDF’s use of old armored vehicles in Gaza. Reports indicate that ISIS is working on developing such vehicles.

Another “heavy” AI application is conducting sophisticated cyberattacks, tasks that humans would struggle to perform in a short time. Such attacks can cause damage independently and serve as a kind of “preemptive strike”—a means of softening and confusing the enemy before physical attacks.

Shortly after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that terrorists might mimic the virus’s “success” by using AI and biotechnological developments to create lethal viruses targeting specific population groups based on their genetics to increase lethality. Although highly complex, this possibility, though still theoretical, remains feasible.

Influence on US elections

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has also recognized the advantages of the latest technological development, marking AI as a key target for Iran.

“We must master all aspects of AI technology before an international regulatory body like the IAEA is established, and we have to ask permission… In some matters, they will not give us permission,” Khamenei said last month in a speech posted on his website. “AI is advancing at an incredible pace today. It’s amazing to see the technology’s global impact and rapid progress. Our different sectors—security and military—use AI, but we must not make the mistake of only being end-users,” he added.

Khamenei’s mention of the IAEA was likely intentional. In his view, AI advancements might become a game-changing weapon, similar to a nuclear bomb. His remarks are part of a broader Iranian initiative to advance AI technology, which began during former President Ebrahim Raisi’s tenure. Iran discussed introducing digital currencies into its economy, helping it circumvent Western sanctions.

In July, Tehran launched the National AI Organization, aiming to position Iran among the world’s top ten AI leaders, specifically in governance, digital economy, and entrepreneurship. To achieve this, Iran has developed a detailed AI strategy document now being implemented. Reports indicate that Tehran already uses similar technology to monitor and suppress women’s rights. Simultaneously, OpenAI, developer of ChatGPT, noted that Iranian organizations have used its software to sway American public opinion ahead of the US presidential elections.

Once Iran attains expertise in AI, it will likely explore all relevant applications in security, missile development, influence operations, and even nuclear science, which stands to gain significantly from AI advancements. Iran is also expected to share AI-based knowledge and developments with its affiliates across the Middle East, similar to other weaponry provided to the Houthis or Hezbollah. This means that Hamas, for instance, will gain the know-how to best use advanced software—a significant challenge for Israel.

Israel must examine ways to leverage the AI tools in its arsenal—an area where it is considered a global leader—not only for offense but also for counterterrorism. In September, it was reported that Israel would join dozens of nations in signing an international AI treaty, ensuring transparency, privacy, and equality. Understandably, this treaty does not cover AI’s use in national security; otherwise, Israel likely would not have signed it.

Looking ahead, Israel must consider regulatory measures to manage AI applications that support terrorism, but without limiting the security establishment’s use of similar tools. It might also explore creating specialized working groups with its allies to share intelligence and expertise in specific cases to prevent harm to innocent civilians.

At the same time, Israel must maintain its qualitative edge in AI, explore innovations for its needs, and train the next generation of experts to support its security forces in using these applications offensively, defensively, and in safeguarding the Jewish people in their homeland.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 7, 2024.

In the Iron Swords War, the IDF was exposed to a different reality in Gaza from the one it once knew, or thought it knew, because IDF’s last maneuver in the field occurred a decade earlier, in Operation ‘Protective Edge’.

They knew that Gaza was networked with tunnels, but never imagined they would discover tunnels in such dimensions in terms of their scope, depth, system, and sophistication, including the connecting points between the various tunnels. They did not know that the underground network allowed Hamas terrorists to enter the tunnel in the Philadelphi corridor and end up above the ground in the northern part of the Gaza Strip. They did not realize that hostages could stay inside for a long period and did not know that they were connected to civilian infrastructures such as hospitals. The professional building of the tunnel network indicates that they used external help and expertise.

The IDF needed quite a long learning time to deal with the tunnels that were gradually unfolding, since entering the tunnels is complex to begin with – usually via hidden, narrow, and sometimes very deep shafts.

But over time they managed to deal with it, and could also tell the difference between tactical tunnels that were used for combat and attacks, and strategic tunnels that included equipped and advanced command and control rooms, which supported the tactical tunnels and were essential for Hamas activity.

The next challenge the IDF had to face was how to destroy the tunnels. After various strategies were examined, such as flooding, which was proved unsuccessful, other methods were developed, apart from the use of explosives. The IDF continues to this day to uncover the underground infrastructure, but it is complex due to the enormous number of tunnels and their ramified structure. Moreover, the tunnels must first be discovered.

The tunnel in Rafah where the bodies of the six hostages were found at the end of August, was unfolded almost by accident since its shaft was hidden inside a children’s room in a residential building. Imagine how many more shafts are out there, especially in densely populated or ruined areas.

However, the IDF has already learned about the close connection between the civilian.

Published in Ynet, October 24, 2024.

Israel and Iran have been clashing directly and through the Islamic republic’s proxies over the past year. These confrontations occur in the air, on land, at sea, and even in the cyber front, often unnoticed by those not directly involved.

One surprising, not very central, front operates far from daylight: underwater. This new front offers with many opportunities and risks, mostly far from Israel’s limited coastlines. Nevertheless, we are also involved, and our adversaries are not ashamed to extend their reach beneath the waves. For Israel, the main importance of this front lies in safeguarding strategic assets such as gas rigs in the Mediterranean Sea — Israel cannot afford to neglect this area.

The focus on the underwater front in the region began mainly after the Houthis’ attacks on shipping routes leading from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea. This was driven by two primary threats posed by the Yemeni rebels — attacks on ships using underwater means, and damage to the underwater communication cables that run from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea, from Asia to Europe.

In March, three of the 14 underwater communication cables in the Red Sea were cut, reportedly affecting 25 percent of the region’s internet traffic at the time. As a result, companies started exploring alternatives to bypass the Red Sea, considering re-routing network traffic through other regions.

One of the mysteries surrounding this event was how the Houthis allegedly managed to damage the cables, which lay on the seabed. It requires the ability to dive to depths of hundreds of meters, and even today, it’s unclear if the Houthis possess the means for such a task. Of course, they denied having targeted the cables. One possible explanation raised at the time was the deliberate dropping and dragging of anchors along the seabed until they hit the cables. It’s also possible that the cables were cut by the anchors of ships attacked by the Houthis.

At the time the cables were damaged, six additional cables were planned for installation in the region, where 90 percent of internet traffic between Asia and Europe is concentrated. It’s possible the conflict will now change the plans of some companies. However, since this is a vast network of cables, most of which do not pass through the Red Sea, there is no danger that intercontinental internet traffic will stop completely.

Even though it seems unlikely that the Houthis have the ability to dive hundreds of meters, they certainly possess the ability to operate below the surface. Evidence of this came a month earlier, when the Americans encountered an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) operated by the Yemeni rebels and destroyed it. According to them, this vessel, along with three anti-ship cruise missiles—whether the vessel launched them or they were part of another incident remains unclear—was intercepted “due to the threat they posed to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the area.”

That small Houthi submarine is what’s known as an “unmanned underwater vessel” (UUV) or “unmanned underwater vehicle” (UUV). While not much is known about the Houthis’ particular vessel, it’s believed to be a relatively unsophisticated autonomous vehicle. Nevertheless, even such a simple device can pose a significant threat to ships in the area and is a greater challenge than conventional threats like drones or surface vessels.

Such vessels can release mines, launch torpedoes, or carry explosives for “kamikaze” attacks on targets. Even if their range is only tens of kilometers, these submarines could still threaten ships entering the Red Sea. While they likely aren’t equipped with advanced guidance systems, they are extremely hard to detect. Most current defense systems in the region are simply not designed to deal with such threats, and sonar systems and other underwater tracking tools will be needed to combat them.

Where do the Houthis, operating in one of the world’s poorest countries, get such capabilities? As usual, the answer is, of course, Iran. In February, US Central Command intercepted a shipment of weapons from Iran to the Houthis, which included components for surface and underwater unmanned vehicles. According to images published by the Americans, the shipments contained propellers typically used for UUVs, which Tehran is known to have in its military.

Iranian UUVs, according to reports, resemble torpedoes in appearance but are slower. They are particularly effective against stationary or slow-moving ships. It’s believed they can be equipped with vision systems for target observation, and they may have been used in attacks on targets off the coast of the UAE.

Threats from the north and south

Iran’s military is no novice when it comes to underwater capabilities. Its first submarine series dates back to the 1990s, including three Russian-made “Kilo” class submarines. These are relatively old, but Iran has been working to refurbish them as of last year. Another series, Iran’s domestically produced “Ghadir” class midget submarines, is believed to include at least ten active vessels. These submarines, weighing 125 tons, are equipped with diesel engines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and torpedoes. These replaced Iran’s only other submarine from the “Nahang” class, a 115-ton midget submarine.

Iran’s most advanced submarine is the “Fateh” class, weighing around 600 tons, equipped with advanced sonar systems and four 533-mm torpedo tubes. It can also carry mines and anti-ship cruise missiles. According to local reports, this submarine can dive to a depth of 200 meters and remain at sea for up to five weeks without refueling. Currently, Iran is believed to be building three more of these submarines, but only one has been operational since 2019.

Aside from submarines, Iran also operates UUVs. These vehicles can reportedly dive to depths of 200 meters and stay underwater for up to 24 hours. They are capable of carrying mines and deploying them in deep waters to target enemy ships.

Tehran is also investing in underwater defense measures. Near strategic facilities, Iran maintains an underwater sensor network, sonar systems, advanced helicopters equipped with underwater tracking systems, torpedoes, and mines. All of these are in addition to air defense systems designed to protect these facilities from drone or cruise missile attacks.

Iran is not keeping these advanced capabilities only for its favored rebels in Yemen. Hamas, for example, has also begun building such underwater capabilities in recent years. In 2021, the IDF thwarted an attack by Hamas using such a vessel “launched toward Israel’s maritime territory.” The intended target was not specified, but in addition to Navy ships, it could have been aimed at Israel’s gas rigs, located dozens of kilometers from its coast.

In general, Hamas developed its underwater capabilities before the “Operation Guardian of the Walls” war. In addition to autonomous vessels, it trained divers and naval commando units, developed explosive boats, and more. During ground operations in Gaza, the IDF also discovered—sometimes within tunnels—workshops for producing additional such underwater vehicles. These are not advanced systems, and at this stage, they are likely torpedo-like missiles guided by GPS, packed with dozens of kilograms of explosives. Still, they pose a serious threat to both the Israeli Navy and Israel’s gas rigs.

The maritime threat is also present in the northern Israeli front. Hezbollah, as is well known, possesses anti-ship missiles, which it used with deadly effect against the Israeli Navy’s INS Hanit during the Second Lebanon War. It has naval commando units, and according to expert assessments, it may also possess versions of Iran’s Ghadir submarines and attack or “suicide” UUVs, which were smuggled into Hezbollah’s hands from Iran.

A different approach to armament

The underwater threat from Iran’s axis has not gone unnoticed by Western powers or even by countries friendly to the Islamic Republic. In recent years, Persian Gulf states have begun arming themselves with underwater capabilities in an effort to protect their coastlines against such threats.

The UAE, for example, began this year building and testing “Cronus” class midget submarines, which feature advanced mobility capabilities, diesel-electric engines, and torpedoes. These submarines can dive to depths of 100 meters and accommodate around ten crew members.

At the start of the year, Saudi Arabia signed a contract with the Thales company for the purchase of towed sonar systems, which can be connected to new patrol ships that the Saudis bought from Spain. Riyadh sees the Houthi underwater threat as a serious danger, requiring preparation in case the Yemen conflict erupts again. The Saudis are also negotiating with a Chinese company to purchase UUVs and are exploring possible avenues for acquiring light submarines for anti-ship operations and underwater surveillance.

Another country making moves in this field is Qatar. The Qataris purchased two small submarines from Italy, at a value of over $200 million, which will allow them to carry out covert missions on the seabed and even lay mines.

In addition to these countries, the anti-Houthi coalition, led by the United Kingdom and the United States—two traditional maritime powers—also operates in the region. The US, of course, has advanced underwater capabilities, but in recent years it has found itself lagging behind another naval power: China. The US has been responding to developments related to warfare in the Red Sea and monitoring events in Ukraine, where Kyiv and Moscow have been battling each other in the Black Sea.

At the same time, the US has been investing relatively little of its resources in the field of unmanned underwater vehicles. The budget for medium and small UUVs in the US this year stands at $172 million, and next year it will drop to just over $100 million. By comparison, the White House’s proposed budget for the entire US Navy next year amounts to $63 billion. It appears the US prefers to invest in building giant ships, even though market trends are moving towards autonomous vehicles.

What about Israel?

There’s no need to go into detail about Shayetet 13’s capabilities or the IDF’s submarine fleet, which includes five diesel-powered “Dolphin” class submarines. Additionally, Israel has developed a UUV called the “Blue Whale,” designed for intelligence gathering, submarine detection, and reconnaissance. This UUV is intended to be part of Israel’s defensive efforts against Iran’s increasing naval capabilities.

Meanwhile, Israel’s Navy must continue working hard to deal with the wide range of threats facing the IDF. For example, it’s unclear whether we have enough tools for prolonged and broad combat at sea. Experts estimate that the IDF needs to make adjustments to its naval defense systems, including for detecting and neutralizing UUVs, developing a coherent naval combat doctrine, and cooperating with other countries to share knowledge and experience for protecting strategic assets at sea.

Although drones currently pose a significant threat to Israel’s home front, Iran is undoubtedly a power in the naval front. The development of autonomous waterborne threats is not an unrealistic scenario, and we must prepare for it. Unlike the trend in the air, Israel might need to consider adopting a different approach at sea. Until now, Israel has invested heavily in developing precise and expensive systems to counter the Iranian threat, but from a budgetary standpoint, this is an unfair competition. The drones launched by Iran and its proxies are cheap, while Israel’s missiles and defense systems cost exponentially more. This cannot continue for long, and Israel eagerly awaits the completion of laser-based interception systems to change the situation fundamentally.

In the naval front, which is not necessarily Israel’s strongest area, we might need to consider a different approach. Perhaps we should initially focus on cheaper, less advanced, and less precise solutions that can be deployed on a larger scale. This would allow us to produce large quantities of low-cost defense systems and position them to counter any attempt to attack our strategic assets.

At the same time, Israel can and should cooperate with countries such as Ukraine, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia to develop, based on their shared experiences, the most suitable tools to combat these threats. The future of the maritime front is already here, and artificial intelligence will only exacerbate the dangers it poses to us. We must not neglect addressing the underwater front.

Published in  Israel Hayom, October  20, 2024.