The India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor

  • The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) initiative holds the potential to transform global trade, strengthen regional cooperation, and catalyze international economic growth.
  • In the words of the September 2023 IMEC MOU, signed by the EU, Germany, France, Italy, UAE, Saudi Arabia, India and the U.S., the corridor “will increase efficiencies, reduce costs, enhance economic unity, generate jobs, and lower greenhouse gas emissions – resulting in a transformative integration of Asia, Europe and the Middle East.”
  • IMEC is envisioned to include two separate corridors – the East Corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf and the Northern Corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe.
  • In addition to a sea-rail trade route, the IMEC vision includes trans-regional infrastructure for electricity, green hydrogen and digital connectivity.
  • Despite the tremendous potential of IMEC, there have been relatively few in-depth studies of its specific components, projected benefits, costs and obstacles. This study aims to assist in filling this gap, and to provide concrete recommendations for advancing implementation.
  • Drawing on precedents such as the Hejaz Railway and Israel’s Tracks for Regional Peace proposal, IMEC gained momentum following the 2020 Abraham Accords. Despite regional tensions following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, terror attack, IMEC partner countries continue to advance the initiative.
  • IMEC has taken on increasing importance as a result of the growth in EU-India trade, the desire of the EU and U.S. to reduce dependence on China, and disruptions to Red Sea shipping.
  • Following the return of President Trump to the White House, IMEC has seen renewed momentum.
  • While official statements indicate that IMEC could provide a 40% time savings on transit from India to Europe, this study finds that expected time savings may be even greater, exceeding 50%. The potential time savings for UAE-Israel trade are even more dramatic, ranging from 65%-93%.
  • In terms of the expected volume of trade utilizing IMEC, this study considers that EU-India trade reached €124 billion in 2023, that EU imports from India grew at an annual rate of 13.2% while exports grew at a rate of 6.1%, and that approximately 90% of EU-India trade is containerized.
  • It also considers that trade between the UAE and Israel has grown by more than 165% since the signing of the Abraham Accords.
  • Therefore, even if only a limited percentage of Europe-India and intra-Middle East trade utilizes IMEC, this would have significant economic benefits for IMEC countries in terms of direct revenues, employment, infrastructure and technological development.
  • IMEC will enable the EU to decrease its dependency on China in critical areas such as pharmaceuticals, electronics and textiles.
  • European nations, such as Germany, can leverage their expertise in transportation, logistics and infrastructure to play a key role in the development of the corridor.
  • Additional country-specific benefits include the opportunity for the UAE and Saudi Arabia to strengthen their position as global logistics hubs, for Jordan to realize its long-planned national railway project, for Israel to expand its regional integration, for India to accelerate the growth of key domestic industries, and for the West to counter-balance initiatives such as BRI and INTSC, dominated by China, Iran and Russia.
  • Given that sea transport will remain generally less expensive than overland freight, this study examines which types of goods, such as time-sensitive and high-value items, and those with high inventory costs, would be likely to utilize IMEC.
  • The study also maps out projected rail routes, key ports and border crossings, in order to identify where the necessary freight infrastructure currently exists, and where it is missing.
  • The paper also considers potential funding sources for IMEC, and examines projected costs.
  • The study concludes with fifteen recommendations for advancing IMEC in an efficient and expedited manner.
  • These recommendations include the convening of an IMEC Leaders Forum in 2025, and the establishment of an IMEC Secretariat and four Working Groups in the fields of Infrastructure, Financing, Security and Regulations.
  • The U.S. and EU should designate IMEC as a priority initiative within the ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment’ and ‘Global Gateway’ frameworks, and diverse public-private partnerships should be advanced.
  • China’s involvement in key nodes along the corridor should be mitigated.
  • Countries along the IMEC route should enhance cooperation to ensure customs and standards integration, a shared legal framework, the implementation of best-in-class trade technologies, and robust physical and cyber-security protocols.
  • This cooperation on overland trade can then be leveraged to advance IMEC-related energy, electricity and digital connectivity as well.


To read the full article




Israel’s Preemptive Strikes Were Legal And Necessary. You’re Welcome

Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian terrorist infrastructure have predictably reignited debates about the legality of preemptive self-defense under international law. Let’s dispense with the posturing: these strikes were not only lawful, they were necessary, and there is nothing controversial about what happened — legally, morally, or strategically.

The concept of preemptive self-defense has long occupied a contested space in legal scholarship. Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms that:

Critics argue that this language imposes a strict temporal requirement: self-defense can only begin after an armed attack has already occurred. But this interpretation has always been tenuous — and increasingly divorced from operational realities. The law is not meant to incentivize victimhood, which is why many scholars, more rooted in reality, point out that waiting for a missile to land before acting is not international law — it’s international suicide.

That debate, however, is irrelevant here. Because Israel’s right to self-defense is not merely being invoked preemptively.

For decades Iran has openly vowed to destroy the State of Israel, and they have taken many steps to assure the world that they actually mean it. Since October 7, Iran and its proxy forces — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Syria and Iraq — have launched thousands of missiles and rockets at Israeli population centers. Each launch was not merely a political provocation, but a war crime: a direct attack on civilians. Under any reading of Article 51, these constitute armed attacks in the strictest legal sense.

And that brings us to the next question: Once the right to self-defense has been triggered, what exactly are its limits?

Customary international law, particularly as articulated in the Caroline doctrine, imposes two key conditions: necessity and proportionality. As Professor Amos Shapira has explained, the central issue is “the dimensions of the risk created by the adversary and the means reasonably necessary to repel, or remove, that risk.” Likewise, Hans Kelsen rightly warned that a right to self-defense that does not allow for the neutralization of the underlying threat is no right at all.

Israel’s response to persistent attacks falls squarely within this framework. The threat is not hypothetical. It is ongoing, declared, and demonstrated. Iran has openly vowed to destroy the State of Israel. Its proxies act constantly to make good on that promise. In recent days Iran has enriched enough uranium to build 15 nuclear bombs. The existential threat is, as the law requires, “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

In that context, Israel’s latest actions were proportionate and disciplined. Legally, Israel would have been justified in going much further. But it chose targeted, calibrated strikes instead — demonstrating not only military precision, but also strategic restraint.

Some commentators will nonetheless characterize these operations as escalatory or destabilizing. But that critique inverts the causality. The destabilization began with Iranian aggression. Israel’s actions are a stabilizing response — aimed at restoring deterrence and preventing further loss of life.

History has made one lesson painfully clear: peace is not the product of goodwill gestures or international declarations. It is secured by credible deterrence. The idea of peace through strength — long dismissed by the willfully naive — has never been more relevant. Israel’s recent actions embody this principle. When faced with an implacable adversary whose stated goal is your annihilation, strength is not a provocation; it’s a prerequisite for survival. And demonstrating that strength, responsibly and with restraint, is not just a legal right — it is a moral obligation to one’s citizens and allies.

To be clear, deterrence only works if it is believable. That is why the Israeli response was not just defensive—it was declarative. It sent a message not only to Tehran, but to every state and non-state actor watching: We are not passive targets. We will not wait quietly for missiles to rain down or for uranium to be weaponized. We will act, decisively and proportionately, to protect our people. That is how peace is preserved — not by appeasement, but by the unmistakable resolve to uphold red lines and enforce consequences.

There are only two sides in this war: Those who want to kill millions of innocent people, and those who do not. Each person must choose who they want to stand with. But regardless, the international legal system recognizes the right of states to defend themselves. That right is not a theoretical construct, nor is it a suicide pact. It exists for precisely moments like this one.

If the international community is genuinely committed to law and order, then Israel’s actions should not just be understood. They should be affirmed. In addition, Iranian leaders and regime-aligned institutions have repeatedly issued statements calling for the destruction or downfall of both America and Europe. If anything, the world should say thank you.

The article was written together with John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point and host of the ”Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He is the co-author of ”Understanding Urban Warfare” and Mark Goldfeder that he is Director of the National Jewish Advocacy Center and a law professor at Touro University.

Published in Daily Wire, June  14, 2025.




Recognising a Palestinian state should follow reforms, not terror

Some 13 conservative MPs and peers wrote to Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer last week, urging him to recognise a Palestinian state. The push followed French President Macron’s revival of the idea of unilateral recognition last month, which prompted several Labour MPs, including Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Emily Thornberry, to call on the British government to join the French.

Such a step would not only be a strategic mistake – it would be a tragedy for the Palestinians, for Israel, and for all who seek a future of peace in the Middle East.

Those advocating for recognition must ask themselves: what kind of Palestinian state do they envision? A peaceful, democratic state living side by side with Israel? Or a radical Islamist entity, indoctrinating youth to hatred, glorifying terror, and perpetually at war with the Jewish state?

The Palestinian Authority stands at a critical crossroads. President Mahmoud Abbas, 89, is in the 20th year of his four-year term. The question of who will lead the Palestinian political system in the post-Abbas era is wide open. Abbas’ government is riddled with corruption, and his security forces proved unable to take back parts of the northern West Bank from terror groups and militias, forcing Israel to intervene. According to a survey published this month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah, 81 per cent of Palestinians want him to resign.

The main challenger to Abbas and his Fatah party is Hamas. The October 7 massacres have led to a surge in Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank. Even 19 months into the war, 59 per cent of West Bank Palestinians still believe Hamas was right to launch the attacks, and 67 per cent are satisfied with Hamas’ performance, according to PCPSR. In fact, polling shows that support for Hamas in the West Bank more than tripled between September 2023 and September 2024.

Hamas’ favorability numbers stem not only from support for terror, but from the belief that its violence may yield diplomatic gains. Sixty-four per cent of West Bank Palestinians said the war in Gaza “may lead to increased recognition of the Palestinian state”.

If the UK were to recognize a Palestinian state now, it would produce absolutely no positive changes on the ground. But it would validate the dangerous narrative that mass murder brings diplomatic reward, and lead to a further spike in Hamas’ popularity. In 2007, Hamas brutally seized control of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in just six days after Israel withdrew. Recognition now would all but ensure Hamas’ dominance over the entire Palestinian arena in the post-Abbas era.

The rise of Hamas in the West Bank would not only increase terror against Israel. It would doom Palestinians to repression under a totalitarian Islamist regime. It would also threaten the stability of moderate Arab governments – many of which, like Jordan and the UAE, are intensifying their campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organization. Just last month, Jordan banned the Muslim Brotherhood after arresting members of the Islamist group on suspicion of planning rocket and drone attacks. Hamas’ survival in Gaza and victory in the West Bank would inspire violent Islamist movements across the region.

British recognition would also destroy the already fragile incentive for Palestinian reform. Under pressure from Israel, the US, and the EU, the PA has faced mounting calls to abolish terror payments, improve governance, and halt incitement. So far, it has responded with token changes and bureaucratic tricks. Rewarding the PA with recognition would signal to Palestinian leaders that reforms are unnecessary, and that their choice to enable and fund terror, hate education, and corruption is no obstacle to international legitimacy.

Such a move would also fatally undermine prospects for a negotiated peace. It would sideline negotiations and entrench maximalist demands. It would further convince Palestinians that they can make political gains without renouncing violence or abandoning the extremist goal of erasing Israel from the map.

After October 7, the vast majority of Israelis are no longer persuaded by the arguments that incitement should be ignored or that territorial concessions will bring peace. Without the defeat of Hamas and a fundamental transformation on the Palestinian side, calls to hand over the strategic hilltops overlooking Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport to a Palestinian entity will be flatly rejected.

And there is a more basic question: what, exactly, would Britain be recognizing?

Gaza and the West Bank have been ruled since 2007 by different leaders hostile to each other. More than a dozen reconciliation attempts between Hamas and Fatah have failed. The idea of a unified Palestinian entity is becoming more fictional by the day – undermined not by Israel, but by the Palestinians themselves.

Recognition of a Palestinian state under these conditions is not brave diplomacy. It is reckless virtue-signaling, disconnected from reality and blind to consequences.

If the UK wants to support a peaceful future for both peoples, it should take a different course. It should demand that the PA end its payments to convicted terrorists, implement real reforms, and replace incitement and hate education with a culture of peace. At the same time, Britain ought to support Israel’s efforts to eliminate Hamas as the military and governing power in Gaza, proving that terrorism leads to defeat, not reward. To bring about positive change, the UK should encourage initiatives for economic cooperation and dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians and back the expansion of the Abraham Accords, which have created unprecedented momentum for regional integration and stability.

This is the real path to a viable and lasting peace.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, May 15, 2025.




The Houthi Strike on Ben-Gurion: A Joint U.S.-Israel Imperative to Confront Iran’s Proxy War

Earlier this morning, a ballistic missile launched by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi terror group struck near Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport, injuring several people and causing significant disruptions to air traffic.This brazen attack on Israel’s primary international gateway underscores the growing danger of Iran’s proxy war against the West, and reinforces the urgent need for a strategic shift, from reactive restraint to overwhelming deterrence against the Houthis.Since the October 7th attacks by Hamas, the Houthis have escalated their attacks on Israel, ostensibly in solidarity with Palestinians, however undeniably as one of the proxy groups at the behest of the Iranian regime.Most Houthi strikes to date, armed by advanced Iranian technology, including ballistic missiles and drones capable of striking over 2,000 miles away, have been intercepted by Israel’s arrow missile defense system and the U.S.-deployed THAAD, however, today’s missile managed to circumvent the defenses.The attack on Ben-Gurion Airport – Israel’s primary international gateway – was a calculated attack, that represents a grave national security threat to the Jewish state. It is also a clear Crime of Aggression, pursuant to both the UN Charter and Rome Statute, and a War Crime under the Laws of Armed Conflict and Geneva Conventions, given that a civilian airport with no military utility was deliberately targeted.No nation—not Israel, the United States, or any other—can accept a slow drip of ballistic missile attacks against its civilians and vital infrastructure.Thus far, Israel’s response to Houthi attacks, has been relatively restrained, with some exceptions, deferring largely to Washington’s strategic prioritization of the situations in Gaza and Lebanon, allowing the United States to lead the charge against Houthi aggression from the U.S. Central Command.However, today’s attack, which exposed some vulnerabilities in Israel’s air defenses, demands an urgent reassessment. Israel should launch targeted strikes on Houthi leadership, missile sites, command centers, and supply lines in Yemen, prioritizing the destruction of their Iranian-supplied weaponry. Such operations, while logistically complex, are within the Israel Defense Forces’ reach, as demonstrated by previous long-range strikes on Houthi targets in December 2024. The IDF must also bolster its multilayered defense systems, addressing gaps revealed by the failure to intercept today’s missile. Iran’s export of advanced weapons to non-state actors like the Houthis is not a localized problem—it is part of a region-wide strategy to undermine sovereign nations and destabilize the Middle East.The United States, under President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, also has a critical stake in this fight—not only as Israel’s closest ally, but because America’s own security, economic and maritime interests, and global credibility, are directly threatened by Iran’s expanding proxy network.

Since mid-March, the U.S. military has conducted over

1,000 precision strikes on Houthi targets, primarily aimed at protecting Red Sea maritime traffic, which has declined by 90% since late 2023 due to Houthi interference. President Trump’s March 15 announcement

of “decisive and powerful” military action and “overwhelming lethal force”, along with his warning to Iran to cease support for the Houthis, signaled a robust posture, however, it may be time to reassess that, and up the ante, given it appears the message has not been received in Yemen, or Tehran.

Ultimately, whether it’s rocket fire from Hamas, missiles from Hezbollah, or drones from the Houthis, make no mistake: the common thread that weaves all this together, is the Iranian regime pulling the terror strings from Tehran.

In a subsequent March 17th statement, President Trump was unequivocal, when he stated: “Let nobody be fooled! The hundreds of attacks being made by Houthis … all emanate from, and are created by, IRAN” and that “every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible.”

Going forward, Washington, in close collaboration with Israel, and other regional allies, should intensify its strikes, particularly targeting Houthi leadership and the Iranian logistical supply chains that enable their missile program.In the meantime, the United States should recalibrate its diplomatic approach to Iran, making clear that continued support for proxy attacks—like those by the Houthis—will carry real consequences. As President Trump warned on March 17, any further Houthi aggression will be viewed as an attack orchestrated by Iran itself, warranting direct and decisive response. The international community must stop pretending that the Houthis are a localized Yemeni movement. They are an expeditionary arm of the Islamic Republic’s war machine.Ultimately, without confronting Iran’s role, any response to the Houthis will be incomplete. Today’s strike on Ben-Gurion Airport is a wake-up call not just for Israel, but for the entire international community.The time for half-measures is over. Israel must act decisively to eliminate the threat, and the United States must continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally in this mission.This article was written with John Spencer, executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute.Posted on Twitter on May 4, 2025




Coordination Between Israel and the US Regarding Nuclear Talks with Iran

“If the Americans continue to adopt a constructive approach and refrain from making unreasonable demands, we will reach a good agreement,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi last week, on the eve of his visit to China to renew Beijing’s support for Tehran’s position.

President Trump’s conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and his subsequent statement that “we are on the same side on all issues,” did not cause any particular concern in the palace of the Supreme Leader. Neither did the postponement of the technical team meeting, originally scheduled for last week, now set for this coming Saturday alongside the meeting of the heads of delegations.

From the Iranian perspective, the mere continuation of negotiations yields several benefits:

  1. Immunity from military attack on Iran for as long as negotiations continue.
  2. Precious time to restore air defense capabilities damaged by the Israeli strike in October and to increase stockpiles of offensive weapons.
  3. A potential escape route from fateful decisions for Iran that may emerge from the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9. That discussion is expected to determine whether Iran is meeting its commitments under the nuclear agreement. Based on its conclusions, a decision may be made to activate the snapback mechanism to reimpose the sanctions lifted following the 2015 agreement.
  4. Erosion of US opening positions against it. Iran already can count as a success the limitation of the negotiations to the nuclear issue alone and American willingness to discuss approval of a civilian nuclear program in Iran.
  5. Moral reinforcement for regime elements and possible relief from domestic pressure due to the encouraging message the talks convey about the prospect of developments that might bring a positive change to the economic situation.
  6. A temporary (at least) boost to Iran’s regional and diplomatic status due to diminished expectations of a military resolution.
  7. Creation of (real or simulated) tension between Jerusalem and Washington, especially with such a pro-Israel administration at the start of its term.In this situation, Israel needs to coordinate with the US on three key issues: 1. The red lines for an agreement. 2. The timetable for concluding the talks. 3. The measures to be taken if no agreement is reached.

    The “red lines” must include the complete elimination (destruction or removal from Iranian hands) of capabilities that could be used for a military nuclear program – materials, components, and facilities; the imposition of restrictions on Iran’s missile program; establishment of an effective inspection mechanism and automatic penalties for violations; and restrictions and penalties for involvement in terrorism, weapons proliferation, and the use of proxy forces.

All of this must be permanent and without an expiration date.

Regarding a timetable, the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on June 9 should serve as the deadline. It would be prudent to agree on this while the US continues its efforts to activate the snapback option for renewed sanctions.

As for measures if no agreement is reached, it would be wise to minimize public discussion and reserve this for internal deliberations.

Israel’s concern over the possibility of a bad agreement is understandable, but it should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. Trump understands the risks of such a deal. After all, he was the one who labeled the JCPOA of 2015 a “terrible agreement” and detailed its weaknesses.

The arguments against that agreement have only grown stronger since then. One does not need a vivid imagination to understand the danger posed by a radical Islamic regime with advanced missile technology and nuclear capabilities.

If the diplomatic channel does not yield the expected results from Trump’s perspective (assuming they reflect Israel’s position as well), this would not only justify but obligate other courses of action to remove the Iranian threat. And for that as well the US and Israel must prepare.




The UK can’t back human rights and Qatar

In 2022 Sir Keir Starmer, then leader of the opposition, boycotted the football World Cup in Qatar due to the country’s appalling human rights record. Two years later, he invited the Emir to tea and scones at 10 Downing Street, hosting his first state visit as Prime Minister.

During that meeting, Starmer hailed the “strong relationship” between the two countries, commending “Qatar’s leadership” in the Middle East. The meeting came on the back of a £1 billion Qatar investment in British climate technology.

As Britain trumpets its role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, while repeatedly lecturing Israel on international law, it shows a remarkable tolerance for Qatar’s rather questionable role in the region and dubious human rights record at home.

Qatar likes to present itself as an honest broker and partner for peace but the reality is rather different. Doha is an enabler of Islamic extremism, the primary patron of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, by offering Qatar as a base and providing financial, ideological and media support, while also serving as a leading purveyor of anti-Western propaganda through its sponsorship of Al Jazeera. It is the very antithesis of what this British government purports to stand for.

Qatar’s duplicity became particularly evident after the October 7 massacre, when Hamas launched the deadliest single-day attack against Jews since the Holocaust. As the world recoiled in horror, as Israeli (and British) hostages remained captive and with Gaza in ruins, Hamas leaders watched it all unfold from the comfort of five-star hotels in Doha, providing a safe haven for those who orchestrated the carnage.

We need to be crystal clear: Qatar is no bystander here. Along with Iran, it is the leading patron and financial sponsor of Hamas, funneling at least £1.5 billion to the UK-designated terror group since 2012, according to a Deutsche Welle investigation. Hamas spent billions to build its terrorist infrastructure, including tunnels, weapons and October 7 war plans.

While states like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are forging ahead with normalisation plans and regional integration with Israel under the Abraham Accords, Qatar remains intransigent in its rejectionism, inflammatory rhetoric and support for Hamas.

As foreigners often confuse Qatar’s glitzy skyscrapers with Western values, the country’s human rights records is deplorable. While Qatari citizens are among the wealthiest in the world, most of the population are non-citizens with no political rights and few civil liberties, according to Freedom House, which calls Qatar one of the least free countries in the world. Leading human rights organisations have also accused Qatar of “slavery” and “forced labour”, particularly prior to the 2022 FIFA World Cup, where it is estimated that some 6,500 migrants died in preparation of the tournament and events.

Meanwhile, the Gulf behemoth continues to buy up real estate, turning parts of London into “Little Doha”, to pour billions of pounds into British investments and universities, and to disseminate extremist propaganda through its state-funded Al Jazeera channel, broadcasting freely from London.

At the same time Israel, a loyal and democratic ally in the fight of her life to rescue hostages being held captive by Qatari-sponsored Hamas jihadists, is bearing the brunt of British lecturing on compliance with international law, sanctions and arms embargoes – none of course which apply to Qatar.

This is not only a moral contradiction, but a glaring policy failure, that undermines Britain’s own national security and stated commitment to promoting peace in the Middle East.

Given the flood of money into the UK from Doha, the Starmer government and the British parliament ought to initiate an inquiry into Qatari funding, to ensure transparency and safeguard against foreign influence operations, in a similar way they had done against Russia.

At the same time Al Jazeera, which has already been banned by a number of Gulf and other Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE over supporting incitement and terror, as well as Israel, after Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists were caught by the IDF masquerading as journalists, cannot continue operating unabated in the UK.

The UK should also insist that Qatar take verifiable steps to improve its abysmal human rights record and pressure Hamas to release the remaining hostages.

Simply put, the UK cannot credibly claim to oppose terrorism while embracing those who promote extremism. Nor can it support peace and stability in the Middle East while turning a blind eye to those who bankroll terrorists.

If Britain is serious about standing up for the rule of law and promoting peace in the Middle East, it must stop courting Qatar and start treating it as the duplicitous actor it is.

Published in The Jewish Chronicle, April  07, 2025.




Trump strikes Houthis, sending clear message to Tehran

Unafraid to use force:The US military operation in Yemen serves as a direct signal to Iran, indicating a shift in American policy. This is an exceptionally forceful military campaign designed to achieve tangible results, rather than merely sending a message. Meanwhile, Iranian officials are attempting to distance themselves, claiming, “We are not involved in setting Ansar Allah’s policy.” The latest escalation presents an opportunity to dismantle Iran’s proxy model and reshape the regional order.

The Houthis have given Trump an opportunity to showcase his administration’s shift in Middle East policy and to demonstrate that he is unafraid to use military force to establish a new regional order. These messages serve the White House’s strategic positioning on the global stage, but they are especially aimed at Tehran in light of tensions over Iran’s nuclear program and its sponsorship of proxy groups.

Even if the process takes time, dismantling Iran’s proxy model and holding Tehran accountable for its operatives’ actions remain key objectives in the US and its allies’ strategy to counter the axis of evil. Now is the time to target not only the proxies but also the hand that controls them.

US goal: Eliminating threats

“Iran is not involved in setting the national policy of any faction in the resistance front, including Ansar Allah in Yemen,” said Major General Hossein Salami, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), following the extensive US attack on Yemen and Trump’s warning against supporting the Houthis.

Salami responded to these warnings by stating that Iran would react “decisively and destructively” against any enemy that turns threats into action.

This is not the first time Tehran’s leadership has attempted to downplay Iran’s involvement in the activities of its proxies. In recent months, Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran does not control proxy forces but rather supports groups that share its ideological beliefs and operate independently in their respective countries. Regardless, the US offensive against this stronghold of the “resistance axis” has heightened concerns in Tehran.

While Washington’s stated goal in attacking the Houthis is to remove threats to maritime traffic and ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to Europe, the operation also serves broader strategic interests for the Trump administration.

First and foremost, the campaign signals a decisive shift in American policy and a proactive approach to shaping the new regional order. Secondly, it aims to restore the confidence of Middle Eastern allies, who had distanced themselves due to President Biden’s policies and sought closer ties with Russia and China. Thirdly, it delivers a clear message to Iran about Trump’s resolve to achieve his objectives, including through military force.

The Yemen operation is unusual not only in the scale of firepower and number of targets struck but also in the deliberate targeting of senior figures during the attack. Reports from US officials suggest that airstrikes will continue for several more days, indicating Washington’s determination to secure concrete achievements rather than merely sending a warning.

Economic pressure and curbing Iranian oil exports

This escalation coincides with rising tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. The Trump administration is ramping up economic pressure on Tehran, seeking to minimize its oil exports and aggressively enforce sanctions. The latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report highlighted Iran’s nuclear advancements and the alarming quantity of 60%-enriched uranium in its possession. According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, “No non-nuclear state produces such quantities.”

Iranian officials, for their part, insist that they will not submit to external dictates or agree to a deal under pressure. They appear to be testing Trump’s resolve, further underscoring the significance of the Yemen operation.

Assuming the attack on the Houthis is just the beginning of a broader campaign, Trump is positioning himself as the leader in confronting IRGC-backed forces that threaten global trade routes and respond only to force. Early in his presidency, the Houthis have presented the American leader with an opportunity to correct a long-standing distortion that allowed Iran to deploy proxies to achieve its destructive ambitions without facing consequences.

For Israel, the Houthis’ threats must be taken seriously, whether they materialize through drones, rockets, missiles, or other methods, some of which have been showcased in the group’s propaganda videos.

While Israel must continue defending itself against this threat, it should also actively engage in countermeasures, either independently (in coordination with Washington) or as part of US-led operations. It is essential to increase offensive efforts and target energy infrastructure, electricity grids, ports, economic assets, and water supplies. While the Israeli Air Force plays a central role, other military branches must also contribute.

Following the Iranian axis’s setbacks, including Hezbollah’s defeat in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and the dismantling of Hamas’s military framework in Gaza – this moment presents an opportunity to neutralize the Yemeni branch of Iran’s proxy model and bring about its complete collapse.

Published in  Israel Hayom, March 17, 2025.




Legal Analysis of Israel’s Gaza Aid Halt

An international law summary regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu’s announcement that “the entry of all goods and supplies to the Gaza Strip will be halted.”

In short, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law.

Israel is not obliged to provide aid to an enemy in time of war, especially when it has been shown to be used for military purposes.

Under customary international law, Israel’s obligations are limited to not unreasonably hampering or preventing the entry of aid by third parties … unless there are valid reasons for doing so.

In the present circumstances, Article 23 of the 4th Geneva Convention is the only applicable provision that governs Israel’s obligation to allow free passage of humanitarian supplies.

However, Art. 23 is extremely limited in both scope and application and only obliges Israel to allow the free passage of supplies to a limited category of persons, including medical supplies necessary for the purposes of religious worship or food for children under the age of 15. HOWEVER, this is provided there are no serious reasons to believe these supplies are being diverted from their destination or used for military purposes.

Both the U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual and the UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict reiterate and mirror Art. 23 of 4th Geneva Convention.

In this regard, there has been ample evidence that since the beginning of the Oct 7th war initiated by Hamas, and including following the commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage – ceasefire deal, Hamas has continued to both syphon / divert aid, and usurp it for military purposes and to maintain the ongoing captivity of hostages.

Notwithstanding Israel is at war in Gaza, it is not occupying Gaza, so we can dismiss this claim altogether and the responsibilities that entails, not least given Hamas still remains the de-facto rulers in the Gaza Strip.

Israel is also entirely permitted to halt the supply of aid into Gaza, provided that doing so is not intended to starve the local civilian population (see Geneva Conventions, U.S. Defense Department Law of War Manual, UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, The Hague Convention IV, plus Customary Int’l Law). In this regard, it is important to underscore that there is no starvation in Gaza. Since commencement of Phase 1 of the hostage – ceasefire deal on Jan 19th, over 25,000 trucks have entered Gaza (about 600 per day), carrying a total of 57,000 tons of food. This is at a greater level to pre-war aid deliveries. Meantime, water continues to be provided through Israeli pipelines as well. It is estimated, that based on current provisions, there is at least 4 months adequate supply of aid in Gaza.

In summary, Israel’s actions in halting aid are entirely just and legitimate under international law.

Those who seek a resumption of further aid into Gaza, would be well advised to direct their outrage and pressure on Hamas (and their sponsor Qatar) to accept the Witkoff framework for the continuation of a temporary ceasefire during the Ramadan and Passover period, and to demand the immediate and unequivocal release of all the remaining hostages being held captive in Gaza.




US-Turkey ties: How Trump and Erdogan’s new and old problems may impact Israel

Despite past claims of a strong working relationship and personal rapport, several contentious issues strained ties between President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during Trump’s first term. Now, as the US president embarks on his second term, many of these key disputes remain unresolved, while new frictions have emerged – some of which could significantly impact Israel.

Turkey’s support of Hamas and opposition to Gaza relocation plan

The most pressing issue at present is Trump’s vision for relocating Gaza’s population and reconstructing the enclave as the “Riviera of the Middle East.” Predictably, Turkey’s fierce opposition was swift. Erdogan dismissed the proposal as “unworthy of discussion,” asserting that “no one has the authority to uproot the Palestinians from their homeland.”

A staunch supporter of Hamas, Erdogan may leverage Turkey’s NATO membership to pressure US officials into dropping the plan. Given the widespread opposition to Trump’s Gaza statements among even moderate Arab states – alongside German-Turkish efforts to revive the two-state solution – Israel must highlight Turkey’s deep ties to Hamas and ensure these pressures do not cause Trump to abandon his initiative, reducing it to a mere rhetorical threat against the terrorist group.

Trump’s potential pullout of Syria

FOR NEARLY A decade, America has supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – an offshoot of Ankara’s arch-enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2019, as Turkey prepared to invade Syria, Trump initially refrained from intervention, ordering the withdrawal of US troops from northern Syria, only to later reverse course.

Today, however, Trump appears far less hesitant on the matter. Pentagon officials are reportedly drafting plans for a complete US withdrawal from Syria, a process expected to take up to three months.

For Israel, this development is deeply concerning. An American pullout would facilitate the expansion of pro-Turkish Islamist forces and other hostile actors in neighboring Jordan – a country already threatened by Iran’s ambitions to destabilize the monarchy and launch attacks on Israel from the east bank of the Jordan River.

In light of this, Israel must insist on maintaining at least a partial US military presence in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan border triangle.

Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system

Another major point of friction between Washington and Ankara has been Turkey’s controversial purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. Following the delivery of the first batch in July 2019, Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet production program and canceled the planned sale of 100 F-35s to Ankara.

Erdogan further antagonized NATO by obstructing Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance for an extended period, only relenting after securing what appears to be an American concession – a deal to upgrade Turkey’s air force with 40 new F-16 fighter jets.

IN LIGHT OF these developments, Israel would be well advised to urge the US to curtail Turkey’s increasingly destabilizing behavior – both in its backing of Hamas and in the Syrian theater, where Erdogan is spearheading a radical Sunni Muslim Brotherhood axis, supported by Qatar.

One potential pressure point would be reinstating high tariffs on Turkish aluminum and steel imports, a measure Trump previously implemented. Given Turkey’s fragile economic recovery from a prolonged financial crisis, such a move could serve as a significant leverage tool.

Additionally, Israel and the US must closely monitor Turkey’s evolving relationship with Iran. Despite their historic rivalry, particularly in light of the recent weakening of the Shi’ite axis in Syria, Ankara and Tehran have demonstrated their ability to set aside differences and collaborate when mutual interests align.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, February 23, 2025.




Disarmament is the key to a new regional order

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump are set to meet in Washington next week. The significance of this meeting cannot be overstated. Beyond the message it conveys by taking place just two weeks after Trump’s inauguration, and being his first meeting in this term with a foreign leader, the meeting’s objectives and expected outcomes are of critical importance. The two leaders will engage in strategic coordination on a wide array of bilateral and regional issues with far-reaching short- and long-term implications. The directives stemming from this meeting will guide the efforts of the political and security establishments in both countries.

Netanyahu will arrive at the White House with a long list of thanks for the steps and decisions Trump has already taken in his first days in office. In addition to the hostage deal, this list includes the decision to unfreeze the delivery of heavy bombs and bulldozers to Israel, sanctions imposed on the International Criminal Court in The Hague, the reversal of sanctions that the Biden administration had placed on Israeli organizations and individuals, the halting of US funding to UNRWA, and, of course, the invitation extended to Netanyahu for this visit.

Trump, who has already demonstrated in his early days that he is unafraid to break conventions and paradigms, will seek a clear Israeli stance on his initiative to resettle Palestinians from Gaza in other countries. While he will understand Israel’s official silence on the matter, he will emphasize that Israeli support is a prerequisite for his administration’s efforts to explore this course of action.

The core of the visit will focus on two major issues – Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, it will quickly become evident that everything is interconnected, making it difficult to separate these matters from those concerning Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon.

Regarding Saudi Arabia, its demands for a defense pact with the US and for civilian nuclear capabilities appear solvable. The obstacles to normalization are tied to the issues of Gaza and the West Bank. Netanyahu will be asked to prioritize between resuming military operations in Gaza and completing the next phase of the hostage deal, as well as advancing negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Any formula that aims to achieve all three goals must also take into account the element of timing and its implications.

Another hurdle is Saudi Arabia’s demand for the opening of a “political pathway leading to a Palestinian state.” Netanyahu will likely make clear that in the wake of October 7, any talk of a “Palestinian state” would be a reward for Hamas. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority itself indirectly supports terrorists and struggles to combat terror even in the areas under its control, as evident in Jenin and Tulkarem.

Returning to Gaza: Statements from senior US officials that Hamas will not rule the Strip are important, but they require two presidential clarifications. First, the fight must not be limited to toppling Hamas rule; the more crucial objective is the complete demilitarization of Gaza, eliminating any military capabilities or future threats to Israel. Second, the US must not support any governance model that allows Hamas to operate from behind the scenes under its protection. Israel has already seen this play out in Lebanon, and the lessons remain fresh.

Above all, there is Iran. The US must immediately change its approach toward Tehran. The Biden administration’s diplomatic overtures toward Iran have only emboldened the regime and weakened America’s regional standing. In Tehran, these gestures were interpreted as weakness and as an insurance policy against the use of force. At the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran is “stepping on the gas pedal” in its uranium enrichment efforts. Iran poses a threat to global peace and stability, as evidenced by its recent missile attacks on Israel. However, Israel’s successes and Iran’s domestic turmoil provide reason for optimism in the just fight against the regime.

Trump is determined to advance regional peace, but he will not be able to achieve this without addressing the Iranian issue. He must set a deadline for diplomatic efforts, especially ahead of the upcoming “snapback” mechanism deadline in October, and continue building on the progress he made at the end of his first term.

Published in  Israel Hayom, January 15, 2025.