For the Full Report

• The U.S. State Department’s Strategic Plan for 2026-2030 declares: “The Department will no longer fund or support international organizations that act contrary to America’s interests or that erode our sovereignty.” This statement reflects an important paradigm shift. International institutions are not ends in themselves. The United States should participate in them only when the benefits to American interests outweigh the costs.
• The traditional American approach treated the United Nations as flawed but necessary, assumed its defects could be addressed through reform, accepted America’s disproportionate financial burden as the price of leadership, and viewed continued participation as necessary to preserve influence. These assumptions no longer stand up to scrutiny.
• In reality, the UN repeatedly undermines American interests, advances the positions of China and other adversarial powers, fails to deliver international peace and security, and has become a caricature of bureaucratic waste and bloat.
• The central problems with the UN are structural. The UN’s core Charter, procedures, membership, political blocs, and incentives create a system which undermines American sovereignty and interests while generating institutional sprawl.
• The flaws begin with the UN’s one-country-one-vote structure. Every member of the General Assembly has one vote, regardless of population, power or contribution. From 2015-2024, U.S. taxpayers provided roughly 28 percent of all government contributions to the UN, equal to the contributions of 183 other member states combined. In 2024 alone, the United States provided $14.3 billion to the UN system. By contrast, the lowest-assessed countries are charged less than $40,000.
• It is a mistake to think that the one-country-one-vote principle shapes only unimportant General Assembly resolutions. It in fact affects a wide range of UN bodies, elections, decisions, budgets, initiatives, and norm-setting processes. States that pay little can expand budgets, preserve politicized bodies, create mandates, block reform, and advance anti-American positions, while American taxpayers fund the machinery.
• China has learned how to exploit this system. Through the G77 and China bloc, Beijing can influence the votes of nearly 70 percent of UN members. The result is a system in which China and other hostile powers use the language of multilateralism to advance strategic goals.
• The UN has therefore become a platform for attacks on U.S. sovereignty and national security, including efforts to delegitimize U.S. sanctions, undermine nuclear deterrence, and advance migration norms over U.S. objections.
• Nowhere are the UN’s politicization and double standards clearer than in its treatment of Israel, a country described by the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy as a “model ally” of the United States. Israel alone faces a permanent, multi-layered machinery of condemnation across dozens of UN bodies, councils, special procedures, commissions, secretariat units, databases, and recurring annual resolutions. This directly harms American interests and creates tools that can be turned against America itself, including politicized reports, committees, special rapporteurs, blacklists, lawfare campaigns, and international criminal accusations detached from reality.
• The UN has failed at its most basic purpose: maintaining international peace and security. While UN regular and peacekeeping budgets grew, the number of global conflicts increased. From Rwanda to Srebrenica, Syria, the DRC, Lebanon and beyond, the UN repeatedly failed to prevent massacres, wide-scale displacement, sexual violence, and the build-up of terror armies. With UNRWA, the UN created a massive bureaucracy that promotes radicalization, perpetuates conflict, and was thoroughly infiltrated by terrorists.
• By contrast, U.S.-led diplomacy, leverage, and frameworks have repeatedly produced outcomes and breakthroughs that the UN could not deliver.
• The UN cannot and will not carry out the fundamental reforms necessary to fix the organization. U.S. pressure can produce cost-cutting and administrative efficiencies, but it cannot change the UN’s basic structure or member-state incentives. This is because the very countries that benefit from bureaucratic sprawl, waste, and bloat are the ones with the authority to determine the extent and nature of reform. UN80, the UN’s latest reform initiative, proves this point.
• UN80 exposed absurd institutional sprawl. Since the UN’s founding, more than 40,000 mandates have been adopted by the UN’s main bodies. 86 percent of active mandates lack sunset clauses or termination reviews. The UN Secretariat processes an average of 2,300 pages of documentation every day. In 2024 alone, it supported more than 27,000 meetings and produced more than 1,100 reports. Processing these meetings and reports costs roughly $360 million annually, about 10 percent of the UN regular budget.
• The internal management picture is no better. Only about 40 percent of UN entities have strategic plans, and only 30 percent operate with frameworks that connect resources to results.
• S. pressure has helped secure some administrative and cost-cutting measures, including a 15 percent budget cut, which removed $570 million from the UN regular budget. But achieving deeper and more substantive reforms, such as retiring mandates, closing bodies, and ending the operation of duplicative, politicized, or wasteful mechanisms, would require the consent of the very states that benefit from their existence.
• For American policymakers, the central question is therefore not whether the UN can be made marginally more efficient, cost-effective, or unbiased. The question is whether the UN system can become sufficiently accountable and aligned with American interests to justify continued U.S. engagement on a broad scale. The answer is no.
• The United States should therefore adopt a new strategy with relation to the UN: “Disengage, Withdraw, and Replace.” The U.S. should maximally disengage and withdraw from the UN, and replace it wherever possible with better alternatives.
• This does not mean America should leave the world. It means America should lead more effectively by distinguishing necessary international functions from the failed institutions that currently perform them.
• Congress should establish a presumption of zero automatic funding for the UN system. No assessed or voluntary contributions should be made unless Congress specifically authorizes the payment’s amount, purpose, duration, and safeguards.
• The White House should create an interagency task force to manage lawful and orderly disengagement, while preserving case-by-case cooperation with the UN as necessary.
• The United States should be willing to allow its General Assembly vote to lapse if withholding assessed contributions triggers Article 19 of the UN Charter. America’s influence does not come from possessing one vote in a chamber where it is routinely outvoted by blocs of states with competing interests.
• Responsible withdrawal requires replacement where possible. The United States should build non-UN mechanisms for humanitarian delivery, global health cooperation, technology development and governance, security, counterterrorism, standard setting, legal coordination, and strategic development. It should rely on bilateral agreements, alternative diplomatic frameworks, vetted NGOs, faith-based organizations, private logistics firms, and mission-specific coalitions, while preserving genuinely useful technical cooperation with the UN.
• Congress and the administration should end the presumption that UN credentials, privileges, and immunities shield misconduct. Where appropriate, the United States should deny or revoke visas and impose personal sanctions on UN officials or affiliated personnel who support terrorism, abuse diplomatic privileges, or target U.S. personnel and allies through politicized legal campaigns. Congress should clarify that U.S. courts should not recognize UN privileges or immunities for personnel accused of terror-related offenses, corruption, gross violations of human rights, or other serious criminal conduct. In cases such as UNRWA, Congress and the administration should determine whether specific UN-linked offices, committees, unions, contractors, or personnel meet the criteria for terrorism-related sanctions or designation.
• Withdrawal must be durable. Congress should repeal or sunset outdated statutory authorizations for U.S. participation in UN bodies from which the United States has withdrawn, and require congressional approval before future reentry. Washington should also align foreign aid and trade benefits with countries’ behavior in international organizations.
• Disengagement from the UN does not mean America is leaving the world. It means America is leaving failed structures. The U.S. should not treat outdated commitments as permanent obligations. It should build a new architecture of international cooperation grounded in sovereignty, accountability, burden sharing, measurable results, coalitions of capable allies, and peace through strength.

For the Full Report

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

In recent years, Japan has gradually changed the language it uses when discussing China and Taiwan.

Executive Summary:

• Open relations and normalized ties between Indonesia and Israel would advance the vital national goals of both countries and the United States in economic growth, innovation-based development, geopolitical alignment, supply chain resilience, regional stability, and interfaith tolerance.
• Such a development would represent the expansion of the historic Abraham Accords to Southeast Asia and the world’s most populous Muslim country.
• The path towards Indonesia-Israel ties is not simple. In the face of longstanding ideological, societal, and political barriers, advancing normalization will require incremental, holistic, and discrete strategies, grounded firmly in the critical national interests of all parties.
• An Israel-Indonesia relationship already exists in shadow form: through discrete and indirect trade, quiet security contacts, third-country business channels, and limited people-to-people engagement. Before October 7, Israel and Indonesia came close to opening reciprocal interest offices that would have encompassed business, innovation, cultural, interfaith, and consular ties. The Gaza war froze that process, but did not erase the underlying logic of engagement.
• While Indonesia’s current president, Prabowo Subianto, has maintained Indonesia’s traditional support for the Palestinians, he has also adopted a more pragmatic tone, including public recognition that Israel’s security must be guaranteed as part of any viable peace.
• Normalization should be framed as a practical instrument for supporting Indonesia’s most important strategic development and national security goals, particularly within the context of advancing the “Golden Indonesia 2045” vision.
• There are several high-potential sectors in which cooperation can produce immediate benefits for Indonesia. The first is agritech and food security, especially in support of Prabowo’s flagship free-meals program and Indonesia’s broader need for enhanced agricultural productivity and distribution.
• Second is water management and climate resilience. Indonesia faces flooding, water stress, subsidence, pollution, and major adaptation pressures; Israeli strengths in water and climate technologies could help provide solutions to these challenges.
• Third is cybersecurity, AI, and digital infrastructure. As Indonesia’s digital economy expands rapidly towards a projected $300 billion by 2030, Israeli capabilities in cyber defense, AI-enabled monitoring, secure systems, and industrial protection could directly support Indonesia’s digital and manufacturing ambitions.
• Fourth is maritime security and defense modernization, including maritime domain awareness, infrastructure protection, and UAV technologies for border and homeland security.
• Several recent developments have made expanded cooperation and coordination increasingly important and necessary. These include Indonesia’s deepening economic ties with the U.S., the growing connection in U.S. policy between trade relations and strategic alignment (including in light of Indonesia’s continued strong economic ties with China), Jakarta’s goal of OECD accession, and new multilateral frameworks related to the future of Gaza.
• The U.S.-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), signed in February 2026, links trade decisions and considerations more closely to national security alignment. The U.S. should use the ART, sensitively but consistently, to signal that greater alignment and cooperation with key U.S. partners, including Israel, can improve Indonesia’s position in future national security-related economic, trade, and investment decisions.
• A second major lever is Indonesia’s OECD accession process. Because accession requires unanimity, Israel holds influence over one of Jakarta’s most important long-term economic goals. Israel should not use the OECD file as a blunt veto, but rather as phased diplomatic leverage, linking support to concrete incremental steps such as non-discriminatory treatment, improved visa access, working channels, and reciprocal interest offices.
• Regional partners can lower the political cost of normalization. The UAE is especially well positioned to serve as a bridge, given its strong ties with both Israel and Indonesia and its model of Abraham Accords engagement with Israel alongside continued support for the Palestinian cause.
• Singapore should remain a key intermediary business hub, while India can help embed Indonesia in a broader arc of Asian-Middle Eastern economic and technological frameworks aligned with the United States.
• An additional avenue for expanded coordination has been created by Indonesia’s acceptance of the role of Deputy Commander of the Board of Peace’s International Stabilization Force for Gaza, and its willingness to commit thousands of troops to such a mission. This role will require ongoing communication with Israeli authorities. While Hamas’ continued control over parts of Gaza makes the entrance of ISF troops risky at the current moment, now is the time for planning and dialogue between key stakeholders in order to facilitate a future successful deployment.
• Indonesia’s Papuan provinces constitute a key national security issue for Indonesia. As part of a broader geopolitical alignment that includes Indonesian integration into U.S.-led frameworks such as the Abraham Accords, the U.S. could help counter efforts to internationalize the Papua issue in ways that Indonesia deems contrary to its vital interests.
• The barriers to normalization are substantial. Israel has historically been framed in Indonesia as a colonial power, mandating a hostile attitude towards it due to Indonesia’s anti-colonial constitutional identity. On the level of domestic politics, major Islamic organizations can generate significant opposition to normalization, although they can also facilitate dialogue with Israel. The Gaza war has raised the political cost of overt movement towards greater ties. Bureaucratic, visa, and regulatory barriers also hinder progress.
• As a result, this paper recommends a phased roadmap towards normalization, moving from functional cooperation, to institutionalization, to formal diplomacy. This sequenced progress could advance according to the following four stages:
  • Stage 1: Strengthen quiet practical cooperation in food security, water, climate, digital security, cyber, industrial modernization, maritime resilience, and humanitarian technologies, using politically and commercially viable frameworks. While such cooperation should avoid drawing unnecessary headlines and should be carried out with sensitivity, it should not be clandestine.
  • Stage 2: Expand the broader ecosystem of ties through Track 1.5 and Track 2 channels, including business forums, innovation platforms, academic and medical partnerships, delegations, dialogues, interfaith discourse, tourism, sports, and civil society initiatives.
  • Stage 3: Translate practical ties into diplomatic infrastructure by establishing reciprocal interest offices, reforming visa procedures, creating coordination mechanisms, and setting up quiet official working groups in the most functional sectors.
  • Stage 4: Move from shadow ties to strategic normalization through formal diplomatic recognition, embassies, direct transport links, open sectoral agreements, and regular high-level dialogue.

Israel, Indonesia and the United States should pursue a disciplined, phased strategy that widens low-visibility cooperation, uses U.S. and OECD leverage carefully, takes advantage of trusted regional intermediaries, and translates functional success into formal diplomatic progress. If pursued with sensitivity, consistency, and strategic focus, Israel-Indonesia normalization is not a distant fantasy but a realistic objective with major benefits for mutually-beneficial peace, prosperity, security, and stability in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.

To read the full paper

In 1982, the Western world was shaped by two dominant leaders with a shared ideological outlook: US president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Both advanced a distinctly right-wing agenda grounded in free-market economics and a firm opposition to socialism.

Their ideological clarity, combined with strong political authority and broad public support, enabled an exceptionally close US-UK partnership throughout the 1980s.

This partnership was tested during the Falklands War. At the time, Argentina was ruled by a military junta led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, which governed through repression and the suppression of dissent. On April 2, 1982, Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands – territory under British control since 1833. Britain responded decisively, deploying a naval task force across roughly 13,000 kilometers.

After more than 70 days of fighting, British forces defeated the Argentinian military and restored control over the islands.

Since then, British control has become an established political reality. Although the United States never formally recognized British sovereignty, it effectively accepted Britain’s de facto control. For decades, the dispute remained largely dormant, with Argentina avoiding concrete efforts to alter the status quo.

Recent developments, however, suggest a shift. Under President Javier Milei, Argentina appears to be adopting a more assertive posture. Milei – who maintains close ties with US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – has signaled renewed intent to reclaim the islands.

This position was articulated by Argentinian Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno, who called for renewed bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom and demanded an end to British “colonialism.”

He reaffirmed Argentina’s sovereign claims and rejected the applicability of self-determination in this case, arguing that the islanders constitute an “implanted population” rather than a recognized people under international law. Accordingly, he framed any future settlement around territorial integrity rather than the will of the islanders.

At the same time, a subtle but meaningful shift appears to be underway in Washington. While no formal policy change has been declared, the United States has signaled a willingness to reconsider its traditional alignment with Britain. Reports of Pentagon discussions regarding a reassessment of diplomatic support for British sovereignty, alongside US openness to arms transfers involving Argentina, point to a broader recalibration.

US critical of Britain’s internal political trajectory

This emerging shift must be understood in the context of growing tensions within the US-UK relationship. First, at the ideological level, American officials – including Vice President JD Vance – have voiced criticism of Britain’s internal political trajectory, questioning its standing as a leading liberal democracy.

Second, disputes within NATO have intensified friction, particularly following Trump’s demand for significantly higher defense spending from alliance members. Third, and most consequentially, Britain’s reluctance to participate fully in US and Israeli military actions against Iran has been interpreted in Washington as a lack of strategic commitment.

Against this backdrop, a more transactional American approach to alliances appears to be taking shape. As articulated by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, alliances are no longer viewed as one-sided arrangements. Allies are expected not only to benefit from US security guarantees but also to actively support American strategic priorities. Failure to do so may carry consequences.

In this context, the Falklands issue can be understood as a potential lever of indirect pressure on London – an implicit signal that US support is neither automatic nor unconditional.

It is plausible that recent Argentinian and American moves have been coordinated, at least partially, with Netanyahu during Milei’s recent visit to Israel. For Israel, these developments carry clear strategic significance. They underscore the depth of coordination with Washington and reinforce Israel’s position as a central strategic partner of the United States.

More broadly, renewed tensions over the Falklands highlight how dormant disputes can reemerge when shifts occur in the balance of power. They also reflect a broader transformation in the international system, one in which alliances are increasingly conditional, interests often outweigh principles, and commitments are judged by actions rather than declarations.

From Israel’s perspective, the policy implications are clear. Maintaining close coordination with the United States must remain a top priority while avoiding unnecessary friction. At the same time, Israel should adopt a pragmatic approach consistent with Ben-Gurion’s doctrine – demonstrating flexibility on secondary issues while remaining firm on matters vital to its national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The current nuclear reality in East Asia is not the product of a sudden escalation, but rather the outcome of a cumulative process in which warning signs were identified in time, yet not translated into decisive action. North Korea’s nuclear program illustrates how delay, uncertainty, and reluctance to act can transform a preventable threat into a permanent and irreversible strategic condition.

The roots of the program lie in the decades following the Korean War. Already at an early stage, troubling indications emerged regarding technological progress with clear military potential. Nevertheless, the international community, particularly the United States, especially under the Clinton administration, refrained from taking decisive action. The combination of intelligence uncertainty and fear of regional escalation, above all – the prospect of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, led policymakers to favor a diplomatic track.

The agreements reached in the 1990s succeeded in slowing the program, but not in stopping it. In retrospect, they provided North Korea with valuable time, enabling it to develop alternative pathways and move closer to full nuclear capability. Once that capability was achieved, the strategic landscape changed fundamentally: the option of prevention largely disappeared, and the international community was forced to shift toward managing the threat through deterrence alone.

Subsequently, North Korea moved from concealment to demonstration. Missile launches became a central instrument of policy—not merely for technological testing, but as a means of political signaling and coercion. Some of these launches passed directly over Japanese territory, vividly illustrating the vulnerability of a modern state, even one protected by strong alliances with a superpower such as the United States.

Japan, as a key US ally and host of major American military bases, finds itself in a structurally complex position. On the one hand, it benefits from American protection; on the other, it is exposed to threats arising from the broader confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang. The quasi-pacifist doctrine Japan adopted after World War II, despite important modifications over time, continues to limit its ability to act independently and places its security largely on the credibility of US extended deterrence.

Against this backdrop stands the Israeli approach, which differs in fundamental ways. Since its establishment, Israel has developed a strategic doctrine based on self-reliance, early prevention, and a refusal to depend exclusively on external actors. The underlying assumption has been that existential threats cannot be managed once they mature; they must be neutralized at the earliest possible stage.

This approach has been applied over the years, particularly in relation to nuclear threats in Iraq and Syria. In recent years, Israel has defined Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and has consistently warned that delaying action could create an irreversible reality. Nevertheless, in recent years Israel itself has leaned toward managing the threat through agreements, covert operations, and deterrence rather than decisive early action.

From this perspective, a deeply troubling insight emerges. Looking back, especially in light of the extensive military actions recentlyu undertaken by the United States and Israel against Iran and its nuclear infrastructure, it is difficult not to wonder how close this reality came to becoming irreversible. A combination of factors, foremost among them – changes in leadership in the United States, appears to have prevented the crossing of the point of no return.

In retrospect, it is indeed chilling to consider how close we came, regarding Iran, to replicating the North Korean model.

In this sense, the Iranian case demands renewed reflection on the limits of restraint, the timing of action, and the responsibility of leadership in recognizing decisive moments.

Published in Israel Hayom, on April 23, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran stands at an inflection point. The Iranian people have risen up with extraordinary courage and on an unprecedented scale to demand a better future. The ayatollah regime has responded with lethal repression.

But the regime’s brutality cannot hide the fact that it has no answer to the forces driving the unrest: economic collapse, failure to provide basic services, and a society that increasingly rejects the regime’s ideology in favor of freedom, dignity, and human rights.

A new Iranian government that ends the export of terror, ceases its ambition for military nuclear power, and chooses constructive relations with the West rather than allying itself with America’s enemies would be one of the most consequential developments for Middle East and the global order in modern history.

President Donald Trump’s urging of Iranians to keep protesting, promising that “help is on its way,” while signaling that the United States is prepared to sustain and escalate pressure stands in stark contrast to the approach of recent administrations.

In 2009, Iranians filled the streets in the Green Movement with a simple question—“Where is my vote?”—and the regime answered with brutality.

Prioritizing a nuclear deal with the regime over the Iranian people’s democratic aspirations, the Obama administration all but ignored the protestors. In 2022, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement revealed once again the courage of Iran’s youth and women, but the regime survived through violence and fear, emboldened by Western inaction.

Today, however, Iran’s rulers face a new reality. Trump has restored American power and standing on the international stage. Internally, the country is gripped by skyrocketing inflation, deep corruption, and a catastrophic water crisis—problems driven by the regime’s mismanagement, its refusal to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and its determination to send billions of dollars to terror proxies abroad rather than invest in Iran’s own people.

Externally, the Islamic Republic’s moment of maximum regional power has passed. On Oct. 6, 2023, Tehran’s terror proxy network threatened Israel, destabilized Lebanon, endangered U.S. partners in the Gulf, and menaced global shipping lanes.

In the war that followed Hamas’ Oct. 7 massacre, Israel, with U.S. support, dealt devastating blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. American and Israeli strikes severely degraded the Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping and regional partners.

And the 12-day war, culminating in Operation Midnight Hammer, did not just destroy much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile arsenal, but dismantled key elements of Iran’s air defenses, leaving the regime in a state of heightened vulnerability.

In other words, the ayatollah emperor has been revealed to have no clothes. Yet even as the regime’s weakness is exposed and the people’s desire for change is unmistakable, the most important question remains unanswered: What comes next?

The best available data regarding the preferences of the Iranian people comes from the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran. Its June 2024 survey, based on anonymous responses from more than 77,000 respondents, found that 70% of Iranians explicitly oppose the Islamic Republic. An extraordinary 89% say they support a democratic system. Two-thirds reject governance based on religious law.

On the preferred alternative, Iranians are not unified around a single blueprint: about 26% favor a secular republic and around 21% support a constitutional monarchy. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former shah, remains the most popular opposition figure listed, enjoying 31% support, but no figure is favored by a majority.

This mix of deep anti-theocratic sentiment, strong democratic aspirations, and fragmented opposition means both hope and risk. The hope is obvious. The risk is that a powerful force, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or elements of the military, could attempt to capture the state in the name of stability.

Still, if Iran’s future is a government that chooses normal relations with the world rather than theological extremism and revolutionary export, the strategic benefits for the United States could be historic.

First, such a shift could permanently extinguish Iran’s “ring of fire.” Tehran is the banker, trainer, and armorer of the region’s most destabilizing terror networks. A post–Islamic Republic Iran could reduce the threat to U.S. forces and allies, restore confidence in global shipping routes, and open the door to news regional integration architectures.

Second, it would strike a major blow to Russia. Today’s Iran is one of Moscow’s most important partners, supporting sanctions evasion and enabling Russia’s war machine. A new Iranian government seeking Western investment and sanctions relief would have strong incentives to sever that relationship.

Third, it would disrupt China’s strategic foothold in the region. Beijing has benefited from Iran’s isolation, importing discounted Iranian energy and using Tehran as an anti-American anchor in the Middle East. A normalized Iran, trading broadly and transparently, would reduce China’s leverage.

None of this will happen automatically. That is why America’s policy should be guided by a simple principle: support the Iranian people, deter mass repression, and prepare for multiple transition scenarios.

That means enabling communications and internet access during blackouts, documenting and sanctioning perpetrators of atrocities, and making clear that sanctions relief is available only in exchange for verifiable changes—ending terror exports, accepting robust nuclear and ballistic missile constraints, and respecting fundamental rights.

If the regime continues its brutal repression, a U.S.-led military response should follow.

The U.S. has the capabilities to deal a devastating blow to the regime, while protecting American assets and personnel. Under Trump’s leadership, the U.S. now has an opportunity to stand with the Iranian people and to shape a more stable and peaceful future for the Middle East and the entire world.

The article was co-written with Daniel Flesch, a Senior Policy Analyst for Middle East and North Africa at The Heritage Foundation.

Published in The Daily Signal, January  16, 2026.

Highlights

The fields of water, food and healthcare offer a strategic opportunity for regional collaborations between Israel and countries that signed the Abraham Accords (the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan) and with potential candidates, including Saudi Arabia. In addition to the top-priority defense and security needs, countries in the region are attributing increasing importance to addressing acute challenges relating to water scarcity, food insecurity and improving public healthcare systems – as an integral part of their national development plans:

Ÿ   In relation to water, countries in the region are contending with overexploitation of freshwater sources, a shortage of recycling and partial access to clean water. Israel offers proven solutions for desalination, wastewater recycling, smart water management and data-based forecasting technologies.

Ÿ   In relation to food, there is high dependence on imports, coupled with a desire to strengthen sustainable local production. Israel offers unique know-how in desert agriculture, precision irrigation, advanced cultivation technologies and food-tech solutions.

Ÿ   In relation to healthcare, relatively high morbidity rates, disparities in access to medicine in outlying regions and a growing need for personalized healthcare solutions create numerous opportunities for Israel, which is an innovation leader in fields such as digital medicine, telemedicine, genetic data analyses and bioinformatics.

Goal-oriented collaborations in these fields, harmonized with the target countries’ needs and national vision, could enable Israel to establish an ongoing regional presence and deepen partnerships based on the values of stability, sustainability and innovation. Considering the inherent potential, this document recommends a policy based on four key guiding principles:

Ÿ   Adapting Israeli solutions to local needs: Adapting innovative Israeli technologies and services to government plans and SDGs in Abraham Accords countries, by creating partnerships with local governmental and private entities.

Ÿ   Promoting integration into national ventures using a public-private partnership model (PPP): Encouraging Israeli companies to participate in wide-scale national projects in the Middle East, led by sovereign funds, by establishing local branches in order to reduce legal and regulatory obstacles.

Ÿ   Establishing a dedicated financial support mechanism: Devising a system of state guarantees and risk insurance for Israeli business activities in Abraham Accords countries, focusing on markets such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to contend with project financing difficulties.

Ÿ   Formulating of a multi-year strategic plan for international development: Adding a humanitarian layer to Israel’s commercial approach through joint ventures between Israel and Abraham Accords countries in developing countries, for the purposes of  promoting regional stability and humanitarian influence and establishing Israel’s standing as a responsible partner.

Germany, the leading European country in advancing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and a strong supporter of regional integration in the Middle East, can play a key role in supporting and building this process, in conjunction with the European Union, which has already formed a strategic partnership with the Gulf states. A trilateral partnership between Israel, the Gulf states and Germany/the EU can become a significant engine for promoting stability, innovation and sustainable development in the region.

To read the full article

While Israel grapples with the drama surrounding the military advocate general’s office and the murky diplomatic maneuvers in Gaza, Washington is fast-tracking President Donald Trump’s grand strategy for the Middle East.

The administration is aiming for November 18, the date of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the US. During the visit, the two sides are expected to announce an expanded defensive pact and new arms deals, even before resolving Saudi Arabia’s demand for independent uranium enrichment.

Statements by senior Iranian officials about their determination to rebuild damaged nuclear sites and continue enrichment are likely to be used by bin Salman to justify his nuclear ambitions. In light of this, he is expected to add the demand to the list of conditions for normalizing ties with Israel, after his previous request for a roadmap toward an Israeli-Palestinian political horizon was incorporated into Trump’s 20-point plan.

Saudi Arabia, which welcomed the Gaza ceasefire and voiced hopes for stability, remains, like the United Arab Emirates, skeptical about the feasibility of Trump’s plan for ending the war. Both nations have conditioned their participation in Gaza’s reconstruction on a sustained and stable ceasefire, a phased Israeli withdrawal, the disarmament of the Hamas terrorist organization, and the transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority or another internationally recognized body.

Trump and his team are likely to try to bundle these stipulations into the normalization deal Israel would be expected to accept.

About a week before bin Salman’s visit, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa is scheduled to visit Washington, where bilateral relations will be discussed. However, his ties with Israel are also likely to come up, in light of ongoing talks aimed at establishing security arrangements between the two countries.

Adding to this volatile mix is the growing tension on the Lebanese front, driven by Hezbollah’s rearmament efforts and the Lebanese government’s failure to dismantle the terrorist group.

US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack recently revealed troubling data about Hezbollah’s remaining firepower and the Lebanese government’s inability to address the threat. Combined with warnings from Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, this has reignited public discussion around the possibility of another round of fighting in Lebanon, despite official rhetoric about peace prospects.

So what does all this indicate?

First, instability remains the defining feature of the region. The intense involvement and close monitoring by Trump and his advisors reflects their understanding that the embers are still glowing on every front.

Second, ambiguity. The ceasefire and diplomatic arrangements in each arena were intentionally left vague to expedite agreements, but this has allowed for divergent interpretations. Reality on the ground will ultimately shape the outcome.

Third, disarmament. The idea that the so-called “resistance axis” can be disarmed through diplomatic agreements is, at best, naïve. An editorial last week on Hamas’ Al-Resalah website predicted that efforts to disarm both Hamas and Hezbollah will fail miserably.

The writers stressed the centrality of armed struggle to the resistance ideology and argued that disarming these groups would effectively spell the end of the axis, an outcome the groups cannot allow. In both Gaza and Lebanon, there is no governing authority capable of enforcing such a disarmament.

Was Israel too quick to ease military pressure?

The famous observation by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means has been frequently cited by those arguing that the time has come for diplomacy. But in light of the current picture, it’s worth asking whether Israel was too hasty in scaling back its military pressure.

Either way, it is not too late to learn the lessons and recalibrate.

First and foremost, Israel must avoid trading real strategic gains for vague future promises. This applies to preserving its military presence and freedom of action in Syria, to nuclear enrichment in Saudi Arabia, and to any future diplomatic frameworks with the Palestinians.

Second, Israel must not compromise in the fight to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah from rebuilding and rearming. With all due respect to mediators and even the US, this is a task that only Israel can carry out.

Third, no matter what agreements are signed or understandings reached, reality on the ground will be determined by action. Israel should take advantage of the current moment, while Hamas and Hezbollah are weakened, to impose the arrangements it deems necessary.

This policy may carry risks, of renewed hostilities, friction with mediators, and possibly even with the US administration, but the alternative is far more costly.

Published in  Israel Hayom, November 03, 2025.