Japan officially launched its National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) on July 31, the most significant restructuring of its intelligence architecture since the founding of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) in 1952.

In essence, the reform formalizes and expands CIRO’s existing mission under a new name and structure rather than creating a completely new capability. Stability and continuity are key: Kazuya Hara, NIB’s first director-general, was CIRO’s last director. Staff remains at around 700 officials, seconded from other ministries—just as before.

The new National Intelligence Council is functionally an elevation of the existing vice-ministerial Cabinet Intelligence Council to a ministerial body chaired by the prime minister, styled after the National Security Secretariat’s cabinet-coordination model rather than a standalone agency, and now sitting on par with it.

Yet this should not be mistaken for a semantic change. In practical terms, it enables smoother information sharing, better communication between agencies and alignment under Sanae Takaichi’s leadership. Its mandate covers counterterrorism, national emergency response and counter-foreign-intelligence. Beyond that, it reflects an ongoing shift in Japanese society from dogmatic pacifism to pragmatic realism, a shift also displayed by Japan’s recent foreign policy.

This is another link in a chain of reforms aimed at preparing Japan to address geopolitical uncertainty. The most notable previous overhauls were the 2008 intelligence community reform and former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2013-15 security legislation package, which built the political and legal foundation for the current reform.

There is also an operational layer to this story, which emerged in January 2015. As Abe visited Israel, news broke that ISIS had captured two Japanese citizens, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa, alongside a Jordanian pilot, and was demanding ransom. Abe sent an emergency response team to Amman, led by then-Deputy Foreign Minister Yasuhide Nakayama, to oversee negotiations. They achieved little, and ISIS murdered the hostages.

Japan learned a hard lesson that day about the limits of its ability to protect its citizens overseas, as well as the gap in its own understanding of Middle Eastern trends. Abe’s immediate response was to expand Japan’s regional presence, sending officials to learn about and deepen security cooperation, including with Israel. That 2015 decision laid the operational groundwork for what is unfolding now.

Abe blazed the path. Takaichi is walking down it. Doing so without a parliamentary majority by winning opposition support for the reform says as much about a shift in national mindset as does the reform itself. No one can ignore the growing threats from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and non-state actors anymore.

Days after the NIB’s launch, Japan’s cabinet approved the new edition of its defense white paper. The roughly 600-page document again named China as “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to Japan’s security. For the first time, it contained a chapter dedicated to drones and AI, drawing lessons mainly from the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East. The white paper also revised Japan’s arms export rules to extend the country’s security reach globally.

Takaichi isn’t stopping there. As promised after her election win, the government confirmed it will revise all three national strategic documents ahead of schedule: the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program. This comes alongside a defense budget that has exceeded nine trillion yen for the first time.

These steps are the manifestation of Japan’s proactive foreign and security policy, which in turn enables deeper cooperation with partners. The United States remains Japan’s dominant defense partner and provided much of the model for the NIB and the NSS alike. Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany have contributed as well.

Takaichi is building Japan’s self-reliance and autonomy in the security sphere, diversifying its intelligence partnerships beyond the U.S. alliance, and potentially turning the Asian nation into a more sophisticated intelligence player relative to its allies.

Despite rumors, formal accession to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—isn’t on the agenda. In any case, the added value of accession is questionable: Japan already has geographic proximity to Chinese, Russian and North Korean signals environments that none of the Five Eyes states can match, along with advanced technology and close cooperation with at least three of the five. What Japan can now do is expand intelligence and security cooperation with a much wider circle of like-minded countries.

What’s next for Japan? It still needs to build out its Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and counter-intelligence capabilities to make the NIB a world-class agency.

Israel is positioned to be the partner Japan needs to accomplish this and is far more suited for the role than it was in 2015.

The security dialogue between Jerusalem and Tokyo has matured steadily since Abe’s original outreach. And the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran have generated precisely the kind of operational knowledge that the NIB will need to absorb. This includes large-scale drone warfare, layered missile defense tested under live fire and, most importantly, the creative thinking that turns raw intelligence into mind-blowing operations in real time, such as the “pagers” operation against Hezbollah.

Israel has been forced to build and rebuild its intelligence-to-operations pipeline repeatedly while under fire on several fronts. Few countries can teach these capabilities to other countries the way Israel can. Thus, intelligence is simply the next layer in an Israel-Japan relationship that has already touched on trade, defense and technology.

Published in JNS, August 11, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

China launched the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in Shanghai on July 16, with some 29 countries joining as founding members. China’s aim is to reach at least 40 members to outnumber the American-led tech coalition Pax Silica. Even U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres attended the WAICO launch ceremony, handing Beijing a meaningful image win.

Yet compared to China’s other international initiatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative, which drew Western countries and even G7 members, WAICO remains isolated. Chinese President Xi Jinping told the audience that AI development “should not be a solo performance by one country, but a symphony of international cooperation,” an unmistakable jab at Washington.

In practice, WAICO is not a real coalition, but a Chinese effort to manufacture high visibility and the appearance of cooperation, deepening Chinese influence across the Global South, including in AI. The knowledge, technology and rules are all made in China. Moreover, WAICO members include Russia, Belarus, Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, South Africa, Senegal and about a dozen more African and Asian states already under some level of Chinese influence. Nearly every major BRICS economy has joined, except India, which signed onto the American framework back in February. The only country hedging its bets in both camps is resource-rich Kazakhstan, which recently joined the Abraham Accords in an effort to get closer to the United States.

On the other side stands the American-led Pax Silica framework, launched in December, which likely served as the trigger for WAICO’s creation. Israel is a founding member alongside the United States, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Australia and Greece, with additional countries joining later as partners. Under this umbrella, real cooperation is taking place, aimed at securing global AI supply chains among leading countries in their respective fields.

While WAICO is selling subsidized Chinese software models to countries that can’t afford or build their own, Pax Silica is built around the physical stack: critical minerals, energy, chips, manufacturing and logistics. That difference reflects exactly where each side holds the advantage. China controls roughly 60% of global rare-earth mining and about 90% of refining and separation capacity. The United States and its partners still lead in the development of the most advanced models and chip designs. Thus, each side is investing in shrinking its weaknesses while preserving its strengths.

China is not shy about using its advantages as weapons, not just assets. After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in November 2025 that a Chinese assault on Taiwan could be treated as an existential threat to Japan, Beijing tightened its rare-earth export licensing regime in December 2025 and banned dual-use rare-earth exports to Japan outright in January 2026.

On the American side, the Pentagon expanded its list of “Chinese military companies” to 188 entities on June 8, sweeping in civilian tech giants like Alibaba, BYD and Baidu, and the Trump administration layered on a 25% semiconductor tariff from mid-January alongside a tightly conditioned approval for Nvidia to sell China its H200 chip.

China hit back two weeks after the Pentagon’s move, adding 10 American entities to its own export control list, including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth—the two companies Washington is counting on to break free of rare-earth dependence on China. In the background, talks between U.S. President Donald Trump and Xi continue, with a potential meeting to take place in September.

Meanwhile, the supposed technology gap between China and the West is narrowing faster than it appears. Chinese models (DeepSeek, Zhipu’s GLM line, Alibaba’s Qwen) have been closing on Western benchmarks for over a year now, a product of the civil-military fusion Beijing has accelerated across its tech sector. Just before the Shanghai summit, Moonshot AI released Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter open-weight model that still trails Claude Fable 5 and GPT 5.6 but outperforms Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT 5.5 on a number of benchmarks. This is strong evidence that the software gap the West is counting on to offset China’s mineral advantage is closing fast.

WAICO accelerates this trend, but at the same time creates a risk for affiliated members. Even though Chinese models currently have the technical ability to integrate with Western models like Claude and ChatGPT, Western companies will likely block such cooperation in practice for fear that Beijing would exploit it for intellectual property theft and espionage. Middle powers’ room to maneuver is shrinking.

These developments carry implications for Israel. Unlike the mineral-rich Gulf states or the manufacturing powers in the Pax Silica coalition, Israel’s value lies not in raw materials but in AI expertise, chip design and cybersecurity. Israel therefore has a direct stake in Pax Silica delivering a non-Chinese supply chain for the inputs its own tech industry depends on. If the mineral chokepoint is used against Washington’s allies the way it was just used against Japan, Israel is exposed to high costs as well.

The deeper point Israeli policymakers and the business sector should focus on is whether Israel is investing enough, fast enough, in the parts of Pax Silica where its exposure is greatest. Israel needs to diversify mineral sources, chip manufacturing and energy security. It must be prepared for the potential impact of shifts in this field on leading industries (defense, aviation and space). Such preparation should also include creating more intimate frameworks with Pax Silica members separate from the larger Pax Silica forum—mainly with India, Singapore and Japan.

Published in JNS, July 28,  2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the Iran War, intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, and the continuing shift in the global balance of power, this article examines why many influential Chinese policymakers and intellectuals increasingly view the international system as evolving from a U.S.-led unipolar order toward a more competitive distribution of power.

The article identifies six major trends shaping this worldview: the enduring influence of China’s historical consciousness on the thinking of its leadership; Xi Jinping’s consolidation of political power and acceleration of China’s national rejuvenation; the emergence of the Chinese techno-economic model as an alternative for developing countries; China’s rapid advances in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing; Beijing’s interpretation of the Iran War and subsequent U.S.–Iran negotiations as evidence of constraints on American power; and the gradual fragmentation of the international financial system following Western sanctions on Russia and Iran.

The article does not argue that China is destined to replace the United States as the world’s leading economic and military superpower. Rather, it suggests that the international system may evolve toward competing spheres of influence, in which the United States and China remain strategic rivals while continuing to depend on one another economically and technologically. Alongside China’s growing sources of strength, the article also examines its significant domestic challenges, including demographic decline, high levels of debt, the prolonged real estate crisis, and slowing economic growth.

It concludes by considering the implications for Israel, arguing that its foremost strategic challenge will be to reinforce its alliance with the United States while simultaneously building a more self-reliant foundation of national power in technology, industry, and defense.

This article reflects the author’s observations from meetings in Beijing and Shanghai, together with publicly available historical and policy analysis. It is intended as an examination of contemporary Chinese strategic thinking rather than an endorsement of any particular geopolitical perspective. The views expressed are solely those of the author.

How Beijing Sees the Changing World Order

I spent the week preceding the 250th anniversary of American independence in Beijing. Walking through the Forbidden City—the world’s largest imperial palace complex, which served as the seat of China’s emperors from the 13th century onward and has witnessed centuries of transformation in the international order—I found it an appropriate place from which to reflect on the geopolitical changes unfolding today. During a two-week working visit to Beijing and Shanghai, I met with senior figures from China’s business, policy, and academic communities. Those conversations offered valuable insight into how China’s elites perceive the ongoing shift of global power away from the West and how they believe the Iran War has accelerated these trends. This article summarizes those impressions through six principal observations.

The first observation is that modern China is deeply shaped by its historical consciousness, particularly by the memory of its former centrality in world affairs and the trauma of what Chinese historiography calls the “Century of Humiliation,” which began in the nineteenth century.

While the United States celebrates 250 years of independence, Chinese civilization traces its history back roughly five millennia. Since the Qin Dynasty unified China in the third century BCE, the country has viewed itself as a continuous civilization governed by successive dynasties that ruled under the “Mandate of Heaven.” For much of recorded history, China was the world’s largest economy and among its foremost centers of scientific and technological innovation. It gave the world the compass, gunpowder, paper, printing, and paper currency, while also demonstrating extraordinary engineering capabilities through projects such as the Grand Canal and the Great Wall.

When the United States declared its independence in 1776, the thirteen American colonies had a population of approximately 2.5 million people. China, by contrast, was home to nearly 300 million inhabitants. Beijing itself was already one of the world’s largest and most advanced cities, with a population approaching one million.

For most of the past two millennia, China occupied the center of the East Asian regional order as the “Middle Kingdom.” Neighboring states maintained diplomatic and tributary relations with Beijing through a hierarchical regional system that recognized China’s preeminence. This conception of regional order, together with the strategic tradition of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, which emphasizes achieving political objectives without direct military confrontation, continues to shape Chinese strategic thinking today.

Beginning with the Opium Wars in the 1840s, however, Britain and later other Western powers forced China to open its ports, undermined its sovereignty, and imposed a series of unequal treaties. Japan subsequently joined this process, occupying large parts of China and committing widespread atrocities. This period, remembered as the “Century of Humiliation,” profoundly shaped China’s national consciousness. It reinforced the conviction that only sustained economic, technological, and military strength can prevent China from ever again experiencing such subjugation.

The second observation is that Xi Jinping has emerged as China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong and appears well positioned to remain in power for years to come. Under his leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tightened its political control while accelerating China’s military modernization, economic development, and pursuit of technological self-sufficiency.

After assuming the presidency in 2013, Xi abolished the constitutional two-term limit in 2018, effectively removing formal constraints on his tenure. Since then, particularly during his third term, he has removed numerous senior military officers and Communist Party officials through an extensive anti-corruption campaign. While officially presented as a campaign to strengthen party discipline, many scholars also interpret it as a mechanism for consolidating Xi’s personal authority and eliminating potential political rivals. At present, there is little evidence of organized opposition to Xi’s rule. He is widely expected to secure another term at the Communist Party Congress in late 2027 and to continue leading China well into the next decade.

If Mao Zedong unified China under communist rule in 1949, and Deng Xiaoping transformed its economy by opening it to global markets in the 1980s, Xi Jinping has articulated a new national mission: restoring China as one of the world’s preeminent powers during the present generation. Chinese students today study not only Mao’s writings but increasingly The Governance of China (2014) and other collections of Xi’s speeches and writings, which have become the principal ideological framework shaping contemporary Chinese politics.

Xi seeks to accelerate China’s emergence as a leading economic, technological, and military power capable of matching, and in key domains surpassing, the United States, particularly within Asia. To achieve this objective, he has elevated science and technology to the level of national strategy, prioritized technological and economic self-reliance, reaffirmed reunification with Taiwan as an essential component of China’s national rejuvenation, and strengthened the Communist Party’s control over the state and society in the name of preserving political stability. At the same time, Beijing has increasingly prepared for the possibility of prolonged strategic confrontation and international isolation, drawing important lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The third observation is that China has developed what many policymakers and scholars increasingly regard as a serious economic and political alternative to the Western liberal democratic model, one that is becoming increasingly attractive to many developing countries seeking rapid economic growth, advanced technologies, and effective digital governance.

For decades, many Western economists assumed that breakthrough innovation could flourish only within liberal democratic and capitalist systems. China, however, has challenged this conventional wisdom by combining one-party political rule with a highly competitive and dynamic private-sector economy. Companies such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Tencent, and Alibaba have expanded aggressively beyond their original markets, creating integrated technology ecosystems that increasingly rival those of the West.

China has also built an industrial manufacturing base without parallel in the modern world. It now leads globally in electric vehicles, batteries, drones, robotics, and renewable energy. While the United States is projected to account for roughly 11% of global industrial output by 2030, China is expected to produce approximately 45%. Such an industrial advantage could prove decisive not only in economic competition but also in future military conflicts.

These advantages have enabled China to expand its global influence. Chinese exports of software, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence are growing rapidly across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. As more countries adopt Chinese digital infrastructure and technology platforms, they may also become more closely aligned with Beijing technologically, diplomatically, and geopolitically.

The fourth observation is that China has significantly narrowed the technological gap with the United States in artificial intelligence while moving rapidly toward semiconductor self-sufficiency.

The emergence of large language models such as Kimi, DeepSeek, and Alibaba’s Qwen demonstrates that Chinese firms now compete at the global frontier of AI. At the same time, Beijing is investing enormous resources in building a complete domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Although China still lags the United States and Taiwan in manufacturing the most advanced chips and remains dependent on ASML’s EUV lithography systems, the technological gap continues to narrow. If these trends continue, the long-term effectiveness of American export controls is likely to diminish.

A defining feature of China’s strategy is its emphasis on embedding AI in the physical economy through robotics, autonomous vehicles, drones, intelligent factories, and industrial automation. Combined with China’s unmatched manufacturing base and a domestic market of more than 1.4 billion people, this creates a powerful platform for scaling new technologies. Chinese firms are simultaneously promoting open-source AI models and expanding computing infrastructure abroad, particularly in Southeast Asia, to mitigate the impact of U.S. export restrictions.

The fifth observation is that the Iran War and subsequent negotiations between Washington and Tehran are widely interpreted by Chinese elites in Beijing as further evidence of the erosion of the U.S.-led unipolar order.

Many of my Chinese interlocutors interpreted Iran’s ability to withstand sustained American pressure without regime collapse as evidence of limits on U.S. coercive power. In my discussions with Chinese academics and policy experts, a recurring view was that Washington struggles to sustain prolonged conflicts, is reluctant to deploy ground forces, and increasingly finds it difficult to mobilize broad international support for military operations. Whether this assessment proves accurate remains uncertain, but it illustrates how some influential Chinese observers are reassessing the limits of American power.

Some observers even suggested that the conflict could represent an American “Suez moment”—a reference to Britain’s loss of great-power status following the 1956 Suez Crisis. If Beijing concludes that Washington’s willingness to use military force is diminishing, it may reassess the credibility of American security commitments to allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Recent discussions in Washington about achieving “strategic stability” or an “equilibrium” with China reinforce the perception among some Chinese observers that the regional balance of power is gradually shifting in Beijing’s favor.

The sixth observation is that Western sanctions on Russia and Iran have unintentionally accelerated the development of alternative financial systems that are less dependent on the U.S. dollar and the SWIFT payments system.

Since the Bretton Woods era in the 1940s, the dollar has served as the world’s principal reserve currency, giving the United States extraordinary influence over the global financial system. Yet recent sanctions have also encouraged countries to develop alternative payment mechanisms. China has continued extensive trade with both Russia and Iran using yuan-denominated transactions and alternative settlement systems, reducing the effectiveness of Western financial pressure.

This does not mean that the dollar is about to lose its dominant international role. A more plausible outcome is the gradual emergence of a more fragmented financial system in which sanctioned states possess an expanding range of options for bypassing Western financial infrastructure. The growth of cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based financial systems may reinforce this trend over time.

Taken together, these six observations do not suggest that the United States is ceasing to be the world’s leading power. America is likely to remain dominant in many areas, including innovation, higher education, capital markets, and alliances. They do, however, point toward the gradual erosion of the post-Cold War unipolar order and the emergence of a more competitive international system.

Rather than returning to a Cold War characterized by two isolated blocs, one plausible trajectory is a more regionally differentiated international system characterized by intensified strategic competition alongside continued economic interdependence. The United States may increasingly concentrate on the Western Hemisphere while maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific through its alliance network. China, meanwhile, may continue consolidating its position as the dominant power in East Asia through expanding economic, technological, and security relationships that in some respects resemble the historical tributary system.

Competition between the United States and China is likely to be far closer than the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. At its peak, the Soviet economy was only around 50 percent the size of America’s. China has already reached parity with the United States in purchasing power parity (PPP) and continues to narrow the gap across multiple measures of economic, industrial, and technological strength. Nevertheless, China’s continued rise is far from guaranteed. Demographic decline, the prolonged property crisis, high levels of local government debt, slowing productivity growth, and intensifying tensions with the West may all constrain its future trajectory.

The possibility that major international decisions may increasingly require competition, negotiation, and selective cooperation between Washington and Beijing remains the subject of active debate in the United States. In important respects, the emerging international system resembles the 19th century more than the late 20th: a world of multiple great powers rather than a single dominant superpower.

If this is indeed the view from Beijing, the central question for Israel is not simply whether it is correct, but how Israel should prepare for it. Historically, China has admired Israel for its achievements in science, technology, and innovation. At the same time, Israel’s close strategic partnership with the United States has made its relationship with Beijing increasingly complex.

The appropriate response for Israel is not to distance itself from the United States, but rather to strengthen that strategic alliance while simultaneously building a more independent foundation of national power. If the international system is indeed becoming more competitive, with economic, technological, industrial, and military capabilities playing an increasingly central role in national security, Israel will need to invest even more heavily in innovation, advanced industry, artificial intelligence, energy, infrastructure, and manufacturing. Its foreign policy will require greater strategic agility while preserving its indispensable alliance with the United States. That will be Israel’s defining strategic challenge in the decades ahead.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

For the Full Report

• The U.S. State Department’s Strategic Plan for 2026-2030 declares: “The Department will no longer fund or support international organizations that act contrary to America’s interests or that erode our sovereignty.” This statement reflects an important paradigm shift. International institutions are not ends in themselves. The United States should participate in them only when the benefits to American interests outweigh the costs.
• The traditional American approach treated the United Nations as flawed but necessary, assumed its defects could be addressed through reform, accepted America’s disproportionate financial burden as the price of leadership, and viewed continued participation as necessary to preserve influence. These assumptions no longer stand up to scrutiny.
• In reality, the UN repeatedly undermines American interests, advances the positions of China and other adversarial powers, fails to deliver international peace and security, and has become a caricature of bureaucratic waste and bloat.
• The central problems with the UN are structural. The UN’s core Charter, procedures, membership, political blocs, and incentives create a system which undermines American sovereignty and interests while generating institutional sprawl.
• The flaws begin with the UN’s one-country-one-vote structure. Every member of the General Assembly has one vote, regardless of population, power or contribution. From 2015-2024, U.S. taxpayers provided roughly 28 percent of all government contributions to the UN, equal to the contributions of 183 other member states combined. In 2024 alone, the United States provided $14.3 billion to the UN system. By contrast, the lowest-assessed countries are charged less than $40,000.
• It is a mistake to think that the one-country-one-vote principle shapes only unimportant General Assembly resolutions. It in fact affects a wide range of UN bodies, elections, decisions, budgets, initiatives, and norm-setting processes. States that pay little can expand budgets, preserve politicized bodies, create mandates, block reform, and advance anti-American positions, while American taxpayers fund the machinery.
• China has learned how to exploit this system. Through the G77 and China bloc, Beijing can influence the votes of nearly 70 percent of UN members. The result is a system in which China and other hostile powers use the language of multilateralism to advance strategic goals.
• The UN has therefore become a platform for attacks on U.S. sovereignty and national security, including efforts to delegitimize U.S. sanctions, undermine nuclear deterrence, and advance migration norms over U.S. objections.
• Nowhere are the UN’s politicization and double standards clearer than in its treatment of Israel, a country described by the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy as a “model ally” of the United States. Israel alone faces a permanent, multi-layered machinery of condemnation across dozens of UN bodies, councils, special procedures, commissions, secretariat units, databases, and recurring annual resolutions. This directly harms American interests and creates tools that can be turned against America itself, including politicized reports, committees, special rapporteurs, blacklists, lawfare campaigns, and international criminal accusations detached from reality.
• The UN has failed at its most basic purpose: maintaining international peace and security. While UN regular and peacekeeping budgets grew, the number of global conflicts increased. From Rwanda to Srebrenica, Syria, the DRC, Lebanon and beyond, the UN repeatedly failed to prevent massacres, wide-scale displacement, sexual violence, and the build-up of terror armies. With UNRWA, the UN created a massive bureaucracy that promotes radicalization, perpetuates conflict, and was thoroughly infiltrated by terrorists.
• By contrast, U.S.-led diplomacy, leverage, and frameworks have repeatedly produced outcomes and breakthroughs that the UN could not deliver.
• The UN cannot and will not carry out the fundamental reforms necessary to fix the organization. U.S. pressure can produce cost-cutting and administrative efficiencies, but it cannot change the UN’s basic structure or member-state incentives. This is because the very countries that benefit from bureaucratic sprawl, waste, and bloat are the ones with the authority to determine the extent and nature of reform. UN80, the UN’s latest reform initiative, proves this point.
• UN80 exposed absurd institutional sprawl. Since the UN’s founding, more than 40,000 mandates have been adopted by the UN’s main bodies. 86 percent of active mandates lack sunset clauses or termination reviews. The UN Secretariat processes an average of 2,300 pages of documentation every day. In 2024 alone, it supported more than 27,000 meetings and produced more than 1,100 reports. Processing these meetings and reports costs roughly $360 million annually, about 10 percent of the UN regular budget.
• The internal management picture is no better. Only about 40 percent of UN entities have strategic plans, and only 30 percent operate with frameworks that connect resources to results.
• S. pressure has helped secure some administrative and cost-cutting measures, including a 15 percent budget cut, which removed $570 million from the UN regular budget. But achieving deeper and more substantive reforms, such as retiring mandates, closing bodies, and ending the operation of duplicative, politicized, or wasteful mechanisms, would require the consent of the very states that benefit from their existence.
• For American policymakers, the central question is therefore not whether the UN can be made marginally more efficient, cost-effective, or unbiased. The question is whether the UN system can become sufficiently accountable and aligned with American interests to justify continued U.S. engagement on a broad scale. The answer is no.
• The United States should therefore adopt a new strategy with relation to the UN: “Disengage, Withdraw, and Replace.” The U.S. should maximally disengage and withdraw from the UN, and replace it wherever possible with better alternatives.
• This does not mean America should leave the world. It means America should lead more effectively by distinguishing necessary international functions from the failed institutions that currently perform them.
• Congress should establish a presumption of zero automatic funding for the UN system. No assessed or voluntary contributions should be made unless Congress specifically authorizes the payment’s amount, purpose, duration, and safeguards.
• The White House should create an interagency task force to manage lawful and orderly disengagement, while preserving case-by-case cooperation with the UN as necessary.
• The United States should be willing to allow its General Assembly vote to lapse if withholding assessed contributions triggers Article 19 of the UN Charter. America’s influence does not come from possessing one vote in a chamber where it is routinely outvoted by blocs of states with competing interests.
• Responsible withdrawal requires replacement where possible. The United States should build non-UN mechanisms for humanitarian delivery, global health cooperation, technology development and governance, security, counterterrorism, standard setting, legal coordination, and strategic development. It should rely on bilateral agreements, alternative diplomatic frameworks, vetted NGOs, faith-based organizations, private logistics firms, and mission-specific coalitions, while preserving genuinely useful technical cooperation with the UN.
• Congress and the administration should end the presumption that UN credentials, privileges, and immunities shield misconduct. Where appropriate, the United States should deny or revoke visas and impose personal sanctions on UN officials or affiliated personnel who support terrorism, abuse diplomatic privileges, or target U.S. personnel and allies through politicized legal campaigns. Congress should clarify that U.S. courts should not recognize UN privileges or immunities for personnel accused of terror-related offenses, corruption, gross violations of human rights, or other serious criminal conduct. In cases such as UNRWA, Congress and the administration should determine whether specific UN-linked offices, committees, unions, contractors, or personnel meet the criteria for terrorism-related sanctions or designation.
• Withdrawal must be durable. Congress should repeal or sunset outdated statutory authorizations for U.S. participation in UN bodies from which the United States has withdrawn, and require congressional approval before future reentry. Washington should also align foreign aid and trade benefits with countries’ behavior in international organizations.
• Disengagement from the UN does not mean America is leaving the world. It means America is leaving failed structures. The U.S. should not treat outdated commitments as permanent obligations. It should build a new architecture of international cooperation grounded in sovereignty, accountability, burden sharing, measurable results, coalitions of capable allies, and peace through strength.

For the Full Report

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

In recent years, Japan has gradually changed the language it uses when discussing China and Taiwan.

Executive Summary:

• Open relations and normalized ties between Indonesia and Israel would advance the vital national goals of both countries and the United States in economic growth, innovation-based development, geopolitical alignment, supply chain resilience, regional stability, and interfaith tolerance.
• Such a development would represent the expansion of the historic Abraham Accords to Southeast Asia and the world’s most populous Muslim country.
• The path towards Indonesia-Israel ties is not simple. In the face of longstanding ideological, societal, and political barriers, advancing normalization will require incremental, holistic, and discrete strategies, grounded firmly in the critical national interests of all parties.
• An Israel-Indonesia relationship already exists in shadow form: through discrete and indirect trade, quiet security contacts, third-country business channels, and limited people-to-people engagement. Before October 7, Israel and Indonesia came close to opening reciprocal interest offices that would have encompassed business, innovation, cultural, interfaith, and consular ties. The Gaza war froze that process, but did not erase the underlying logic of engagement.
• While Indonesia’s current president, Prabowo Subianto, has maintained Indonesia’s traditional support for the Palestinians, he has also adopted a more pragmatic tone, including public recognition that Israel’s security must be guaranteed as part of any viable peace.
• Normalization should be framed as a practical instrument for supporting Indonesia’s most important strategic development and national security goals, particularly within the context of advancing the “Golden Indonesia 2045” vision.
• There are several high-potential sectors in which cooperation can produce immediate benefits for Indonesia. The first is agritech and food security, especially in support of Prabowo’s flagship free-meals program and Indonesia’s broader need for enhanced agricultural productivity and distribution.
• Second is water management and climate resilience. Indonesia faces flooding, water stress, subsidence, pollution, and major adaptation pressures; Israeli strengths in water and climate technologies could help provide solutions to these challenges.
• Third is cybersecurity, AI, and digital infrastructure. As Indonesia’s digital economy expands rapidly towards a projected $300 billion by 2030, Israeli capabilities in cyber defense, AI-enabled monitoring, secure systems, and industrial protection could directly support Indonesia’s digital and manufacturing ambitions.
• Fourth is maritime security and defense modernization, including maritime domain awareness, infrastructure protection, and UAV technologies for border and homeland security.
• Several recent developments have made expanded cooperation and coordination increasingly important and necessary. These include Indonesia’s deepening economic ties with the U.S., the growing connection in U.S. policy between trade relations and strategic alignment (including in light of Indonesia’s continued strong economic ties with China), Jakarta’s goal of OECD accession, and new multilateral frameworks related to the future of Gaza.
• The U.S.-Indonesia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), signed in February 2026, links trade decisions and considerations more closely to national security alignment. The U.S. should use the ART, sensitively but consistently, to signal that greater alignment and cooperation with key U.S. partners, including Israel, can improve Indonesia’s position in future national security-related economic, trade, and investment decisions.
• A second major lever is Indonesia’s OECD accession process. Because accession requires unanimity, Israel holds influence over one of Jakarta’s most important long-term economic goals. Israel should not use the OECD file as a blunt veto, but rather as phased diplomatic leverage, linking support to concrete incremental steps such as non-discriminatory treatment, improved visa access, working channels, and reciprocal interest offices.
• Regional partners can lower the political cost of normalization. The UAE is especially well positioned to serve as a bridge, given its strong ties with both Israel and Indonesia and its model of Abraham Accords engagement with Israel alongside continued support for the Palestinian cause.
• Singapore should remain a key intermediary business hub, while India can help embed Indonesia in a broader arc of Asian-Middle Eastern economic and technological frameworks aligned with the United States.
• An additional avenue for expanded coordination has been created by Indonesia’s acceptance of the role of Deputy Commander of the Board of Peace’s International Stabilization Force for Gaza, and its willingness to commit thousands of troops to such a mission. This role will require ongoing communication with Israeli authorities. While Hamas’ continued control over parts of Gaza makes the entrance of ISF troops risky at the current moment, now is the time for planning and dialogue between key stakeholders in order to facilitate a future successful deployment.
• Indonesia’s Papuan provinces constitute a key national security issue for Indonesia. As part of a broader geopolitical alignment that includes Indonesian integration into U.S.-led frameworks such as the Abraham Accords, the U.S. could help counter efforts to internationalize the Papua issue in ways that Indonesia deems contrary to its vital interests.
• The barriers to normalization are substantial. Israel has historically been framed in Indonesia as a colonial power, mandating a hostile attitude towards it due to Indonesia’s anti-colonial constitutional identity. On the level of domestic politics, major Islamic organizations can generate significant opposition to normalization, although they can also facilitate dialogue with Israel. The Gaza war has raised the political cost of overt movement towards greater ties. Bureaucratic, visa, and regulatory barriers also hinder progress.
• As a result, this paper recommends a phased roadmap towards normalization, moving from functional cooperation, to institutionalization, to formal diplomacy. This sequenced progress could advance according to the following four stages:
  • Stage 1: Strengthen quiet practical cooperation in food security, water, climate, digital security, cyber, industrial modernization, maritime resilience, and humanitarian technologies, using politically and commercially viable frameworks. While such cooperation should avoid drawing unnecessary headlines and should be carried out with sensitivity, it should not be clandestine.
  • Stage 2: Expand the broader ecosystem of ties through Track 1.5 and Track 2 channels, including business forums, innovation platforms, academic and medical partnerships, delegations, dialogues, interfaith discourse, tourism, sports, and civil society initiatives.
  • Stage 3: Translate practical ties into diplomatic infrastructure by establishing reciprocal interest offices, reforming visa procedures, creating coordination mechanisms, and setting up quiet official working groups in the most functional sectors.
  • Stage 4: Move from shadow ties to strategic normalization through formal diplomatic recognition, embassies, direct transport links, open sectoral agreements, and regular high-level dialogue.

Israel, Indonesia and the United States should pursue a disciplined, phased strategy that widens low-visibility cooperation, uses U.S. and OECD leverage carefully, takes advantage of trusted regional intermediaries, and translates functional success into formal diplomatic progress. If pursued with sensitivity, consistency, and strategic focus, Israel-Indonesia normalization is not a distant fantasy but a realistic objective with major benefits for mutually-beneficial peace, prosperity, security, and stability in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.

To read the full paper

In 1982, the Western world was shaped by two dominant leaders with a shared ideological outlook: US president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Both advanced a distinctly right-wing agenda grounded in free-market economics and a firm opposition to socialism.

Their ideological clarity, combined with strong political authority and broad public support, enabled an exceptionally close US-UK partnership throughout the 1980s.

This partnership was tested during the Falklands War. At the time, Argentina was ruled by a military junta led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, which governed through repression and the suppression of dissent. On April 2, 1982, Argentinian forces invaded the Falkland Islands – territory under British control since 1833. Britain responded decisively, deploying a naval task force across roughly 13,000 kilometers.

After more than 70 days of fighting, British forces defeated the Argentinian military and restored control over the islands.

Since then, British control has become an established political reality. Although the United States never formally recognized British sovereignty, it effectively accepted Britain’s de facto control. For decades, the dispute remained largely dormant, with Argentina avoiding concrete efforts to alter the status quo.

Recent developments, however, suggest a shift. Under President Javier Milei, Argentina appears to be adopting a more assertive posture. Milei – who maintains close ties with US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – has signaled renewed intent to reclaim the islands.

This position was articulated by Argentinian Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno, who called for renewed bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom and demanded an end to British “colonialism.”

He reaffirmed Argentina’s sovereign claims and rejected the applicability of self-determination in this case, arguing that the islanders constitute an “implanted population” rather than a recognized people under international law. Accordingly, he framed any future settlement around territorial integrity rather than the will of the islanders.

At the same time, a subtle but meaningful shift appears to be underway in Washington. While no formal policy change has been declared, the United States has signaled a willingness to reconsider its traditional alignment with Britain. Reports of Pentagon discussions regarding a reassessment of diplomatic support for British sovereignty, alongside US openness to arms transfers involving Argentina, point to a broader recalibration.

US critical of Britain’s internal political trajectory

This emerging shift must be understood in the context of growing tensions within the US-UK relationship. First, at the ideological level, American officials – including Vice President JD Vance – have voiced criticism of Britain’s internal political trajectory, questioning its standing as a leading liberal democracy.

Second, disputes within NATO have intensified friction, particularly following Trump’s demand for significantly higher defense spending from alliance members. Third, and most consequentially, Britain’s reluctance to participate fully in US and Israeli military actions against Iran has been interpreted in Washington as a lack of strategic commitment.

Against this backdrop, a more transactional American approach to alliances appears to be taking shape. As articulated by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, alliances are no longer viewed as one-sided arrangements. Allies are expected not only to benefit from US security guarantees but also to actively support American strategic priorities. Failure to do so may carry consequences.

In this context, the Falklands issue can be understood as a potential lever of indirect pressure on London – an implicit signal that US support is neither automatic nor unconditional.

It is plausible that recent Argentinian and American moves have been coordinated, at least partially, with Netanyahu during Milei’s recent visit to Israel. For Israel, these developments carry clear strategic significance. They underscore the depth of coordination with Washington and reinforce Israel’s position as a central strategic partner of the United States.

More broadly, renewed tensions over the Falklands highlight how dormant disputes can reemerge when shifts occur in the balance of power. They also reflect a broader transformation in the international system, one in which alliances are increasingly conditional, interests often outweigh principles, and commitments are judged by actions rather than declarations.

From Israel’s perspective, the policy implications are clear. Maintaining close coordination with the United States must remain a top priority while avoiding unnecessary friction. At the same time, Israel should adopt a pragmatic approach consistent with Ben-Gurion’s doctrine – demonstrating flexibility on secondary issues while remaining firm on matters vital to its national security.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, May 3, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

The current nuclear reality in East Asia is not the product of a sudden escalation, but rather the outcome of a cumulative process in which warning signs were identified in time, yet not translated into decisive action. North Korea’s nuclear program illustrates how delay, uncertainty, and reluctance to act can transform a preventable threat into a permanent and irreversible strategic condition.

The roots of the program lie in the decades following the Korean War. Already at an early stage, troubling indications emerged regarding technological progress with clear military potential. Nevertheless, the international community, particularly the United States, especially under the Clinton administration, refrained from taking decisive action. The combination of intelligence uncertainty and fear of regional escalation, above all – the prospect of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, led policymakers to favor a diplomatic track.

The agreements reached in the 1990s succeeded in slowing the program, but not in stopping it. In retrospect, they provided North Korea with valuable time, enabling it to develop alternative pathways and move closer to full nuclear capability. Once that capability was achieved, the strategic landscape changed fundamentally: the option of prevention largely disappeared, and the international community was forced to shift toward managing the threat through deterrence alone.

Subsequently, North Korea moved from concealment to demonstration. Missile launches became a central instrument of policy—not merely for technological testing, but as a means of political signaling and coercion. Some of these launches passed directly over Japanese territory, vividly illustrating the vulnerability of a modern state, even one protected by strong alliances with a superpower such as the United States.

Japan, as a key US ally and host of major American military bases, finds itself in a structurally complex position. On the one hand, it benefits from American protection; on the other, it is exposed to threats arising from the broader confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang. The quasi-pacifist doctrine Japan adopted after World War II, despite important modifications over time, continues to limit its ability to act independently and places its security largely on the credibility of US extended deterrence.

Against this backdrop stands the Israeli approach, which differs in fundamental ways. Since its establishment, Israel has developed a strategic doctrine based on self-reliance, early prevention, and a refusal to depend exclusively on external actors. The underlying assumption has been that existential threats cannot be managed once they mature; they must be neutralized at the earliest possible stage.

This approach has been applied over the years, particularly in relation to nuclear threats in Iraq and Syria. In recent years, Israel has defined Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and has consistently warned that delaying action could create an irreversible reality. Nevertheless, in recent years Israel itself has leaned toward managing the threat through agreements, covert operations, and deterrence rather than decisive early action.

From this perspective, a deeply troubling insight emerges. Looking back, especially in light of the extensive military actions recentlyu undertaken by the United States and Israel against Iran and its nuclear infrastructure, it is difficult not to wonder how close this reality came to becoming irreversible. A combination of factors, foremost among them – changes in leadership in the United States, appears to have prevented the crossing of the point of no return.

In retrospect, it is indeed chilling to consider how close we came, regarding Iran, to replicating the North Korean model.

In this sense, the Iranian case demands renewed reflection on the limits of restraint, the timing of action, and the responsibility of leadership in recognizing decisive moments.

Published in Israel Hayom, on April 23, 2026.

*The opinions expressed in Misgav publications are the authors’ alone.

Iran stands at an inflection point. The Iranian people have risen up with extraordinary courage and on an unprecedented scale to demand a better future. The ayatollah regime has responded with lethal repression.

But the regime’s brutality cannot hide the fact that it has no answer to the forces driving the unrest: economic collapse, failure to provide basic services, and a society that increasingly rejects the regime’s ideology in favor of freedom, dignity, and human rights.

A new Iranian government that ends the export of terror, ceases its ambition for military nuclear power, and chooses constructive relations with the West rather than allying itself with America’s enemies would be one of the most consequential developments for Middle East and the global order in modern history.

President Donald Trump’s urging of Iranians to keep protesting, promising that “help is on its way,” while signaling that the United States is prepared to sustain and escalate pressure stands in stark contrast to the approach of recent administrations.

In 2009, Iranians filled the streets in the Green Movement with a simple question—“Where is my vote?”—and the regime answered with brutality.

Prioritizing a nuclear deal with the regime over the Iranian people’s democratic aspirations, the Obama administration all but ignored the protestors. In 2022, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement revealed once again the courage of Iran’s youth and women, but the regime survived through violence and fear, emboldened by Western inaction.

Today, however, Iran’s rulers face a new reality. Trump has restored American power and standing on the international stage. Internally, the country is gripped by skyrocketing inflation, deep corruption, and a catastrophic water crisis—problems driven by the regime’s mismanagement, its refusal to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and its determination to send billions of dollars to terror proxies abroad rather than invest in Iran’s own people.

Externally, the Islamic Republic’s moment of maximum regional power has passed. On Oct. 6, 2023, Tehran’s terror proxy network threatened Israel, destabilized Lebanon, endangered U.S. partners in the Gulf, and menaced global shipping lanes.

In the war that followed Hamas’ Oct. 7 massacre, Israel, with U.S. support, dealt devastating blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. American and Israeli strikes severely degraded the Houthis’ ability to threaten shipping and regional partners.

And the 12-day war, culminating in Operation Midnight Hammer, did not just destroy much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile arsenal, but dismantled key elements of Iran’s air defenses, leaving the regime in a state of heightened vulnerability.

In other words, the ayatollah emperor has been revealed to have no clothes. Yet even as the regime’s weakness is exposed and the people’s desire for change is unmistakable, the most important question remains unanswered: What comes next?

The best available data regarding the preferences of the Iranian people comes from the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran. Its June 2024 survey, based on anonymous responses from more than 77,000 respondents, found that 70% of Iranians explicitly oppose the Islamic Republic. An extraordinary 89% say they support a democratic system. Two-thirds reject governance based on religious law.

On the preferred alternative, Iranians are not unified around a single blueprint: about 26% favor a secular republic and around 21% support a constitutional monarchy. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former shah, remains the most popular opposition figure listed, enjoying 31% support, but no figure is favored by a majority.

This mix of deep anti-theocratic sentiment, strong democratic aspirations, and fragmented opposition means both hope and risk. The hope is obvious. The risk is that a powerful force, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or elements of the military, could attempt to capture the state in the name of stability.

Still, if Iran’s future is a government that chooses normal relations with the world rather than theological extremism and revolutionary export, the strategic benefits for the United States could be historic.

First, such a shift could permanently extinguish Iran’s “ring of fire.” Tehran is the banker, trainer, and armorer of the region’s most destabilizing terror networks. A post–Islamic Republic Iran could reduce the threat to U.S. forces and allies, restore confidence in global shipping routes, and open the door to news regional integration architectures.

Second, it would strike a major blow to Russia. Today’s Iran is one of Moscow’s most important partners, supporting sanctions evasion and enabling Russia’s war machine. A new Iranian government seeking Western investment and sanctions relief would have strong incentives to sever that relationship.

Third, it would disrupt China’s strategic foothold in the region. Beijing has benefited from Iran’s isolation, importing discounted Iranian energy and using Tehran as an anti-American anchor in the Middle East. A normalized Iran, trading broadly and transparently, would reduce China’s leverage.

None of this will happen automatically. That is why America’s policy should be guided by a simple principle: support the Iranian people, deter mass repression, and prepare for multiple transition scenarios.

That means enabling communications and internet access during blackouts, documenting and sanctioning perpetrators of atrocities, and making clear that sanctions relief is available only in exchange for verifiable changes—ending terror exports, accepting robust nuclear and ballistic missile constraints, and respecting fundamental rights.

If the regime continues its brutal repression, a U.S.-led military response should follow.

The U.S. has the capabilities to deal a devastating blow to the regime, while protecting American assets and personnel. Under Trump’s leadership, the U.S. now has an opportunity to stand with the Iranian people and to shape a more stable and peaceful future for the Middle East and the entire world.

The article was co-written with Daniel Flesch, a Senior Policy Analyst for Middle East and North Africa at The Heritage Foundation.

Published in The Daily Signal, January  16, 2026.