Supporting Hamas

Under these conditions, there is no single point of gravity for Hamas that could cause its downfall. Defeat, in terms familiar to the world of interstate wars, is almost impossible without the widespread destruction of the civilian population, a war crime or a form of genocide that Israel would never commit.

The expectation of many for a clear victory in the style of the Six Day War, with Hamas waving a white flag, is an illusion. Fortunately, the Israeli government and the military are aware of the problems involved in defeating Hamas and understand that defeat, in this instance, means dismantling the organization as an effective governmental and military entity.

So, why, after two years, has Israel not yet succeeded in achieving that?

First, the strategic choice to attack Hamas and the Gaza Strip gradually, starting in the north of the territory and reaching other areas later on, turned out to be wrong. Secondly, the method of occupying an area, clearing it of terrorist infrastructure, and then abandoning it, also proved problematic. Israel found itself returning to the same areas it had already cleared multiple times. And finally, the IDF echelon’s reluctance to occupy the entire Gaza Strip and impose military rule in the early stages of the war also turned out to be a mistake.

International pressure

The fact that Israel faced a multi-front regional war forced it to spread its resources; it also found itself exposed to tremendous international pressure that was devoid of any strategic or moral logic.

The international community, including the US administration, forgot the October 7 attack very quickly. When reports began to emerge of Palestinian civilian casualties, the international community began forcing Israel to increase humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.

Israel was also forced to allow humanitarian aid to enter active combat zones and eventually found itself fighting Hamas while at the same time feeding Hamas, allowing this murderous terrorist organization to continue to sustain itself.

Hamas’s control over the distribution of humanitarian aid allowed the group to maintain its mechanisms of control over the territory and, especially, the people. It suppressed any possibility of rebellion and prevented the establishment of an alternative civilian government.

Beyond international pressure, Israel was exposed to the spread of false narratives by Hamas, narratives echoed by many in the international media, international aid organizations, and the UN.

Civilian casualties, starvation, and war crimes all became part of that narrative, despite the IDF’s efforts to reduce the extent of collateral damage.

Understanding the international media well, Hamas succeeded in increasing the effect and, as a result, the pressure ramped up on Israel.

Additionally, Hamas’s hostage-taking served to fuel tensions between Israeli society and the government, and between the military and political echelons. The regular protests by hostages’ families across the country gave the government little room to maneuver.

Those protests spread to the international sphere, especially to the United States, putting pressure on the administration in a significant way, making it very difficult for Israel to operate militarily in instances such as taking control of Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah and the strategic Philadelphi Corridor.

Under president Joe Biden’s administration, Israel was pressured to move forward in negotiations to end the war, even at the cost of impossible and unbearable concessions. This played into Hamas’s hands and encouraged the organization’s leadership to harden its positions.

In recent months, this international pressure has spilled over into economic and cultural spheres to the point of boycotts and refusals to allow the passage of planes or ships carrying weapons destined for Israel.