Two years to October 7: The Strategic Costs of the IDF’s Operational Inadequacy

Two years to October 7: The Strategic Costs of the IDF’s Operational Inadequacy

Why Israel’s Wars in Gaza and Lebanon Exposed a Deeper Strategic Problem in the IDF – and What Must Change to Restore Decisive Victory

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Main Points

  • Israel neutralized Hezbollah’s missile threat but failed to dismantle its ground forces or Hamas’s rule in Gaza.
  • The IDF lacks a coherent concept of operational maneuver – the coordinated use of ground forces to destroy enemy capabilities and achieve strategic goals.
  • Brilliant air and intelligence operations were not matched by decisive ground campaigns, leaving enemy forces largely intact.
  • Operations in both Gaza and Lebanon unfolded too slowly, allowing the enemy to recover and denying Israel strategic momentum.
  • The IDF repeatedly fought over the same areas instead of seizing and controlling critical ground to deny Hamas sanctuary and supply.
  • These operational shortcomings weakened Israel’s deterrence and may embolden regional actors, notably Egypt, to reassess Israel’s military credibility.
  • The IDF must relearn the art of operational maneuver – integrating speed, initiative, and decisive ground action – to transform tactical superiority into strategic victory.
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