Arsen Ostrovsky: You can have 100 countries saying the earth is flat and that won’t make it true.
Published in Jewish Journal, July 26, 2025.
Ruth Wasserman Lande: We tend to focus constantly on the Israel–Palestine conflict — the Muslim-Jewish, Arab-Israeli dynamic. But I want to offer a different lens. If we take a step back and look globally, the core struggle is actually between Shiite and Sunni Muslim extremists. Within that larger battle, we are caught in the middle. Both sides are striving to establish an extreme global caliphate based on Sharia law — one according to Shiite principles, the other Sunni. And what lies at the center of their ambitions? Jerusalem. That’s what makes us a target — not just Israel, but also America, Europe, Canada, and Australia. Understanding this broader context helps us better analyze events like October 7, the aftermath, and the recent 12-day Iranian-Israeli war.
The full conversation took place before student representatives in Washington, USA.
Prof. Kobi Michael: I’m not familiar with any such report, but I am familiar with many warnings that were published by international organizations about the catastrophe that exists in Gaza and how in two months or so, 40 or 50,000 people will die because of hunger, but nobody has died because of hunger, because there is no hunger, if there are some local problems of supply, it is because of Hamas – not because of the IDF.
Hamas loots, robs and steals the humanitarian aid, partially for themselves, to feed themselves and the rest is sold in very high prices to the local population in order to make money..
Published in Fox News, July 22, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: A temporary Israeli military occupation of Gaza is the best option for Israel if ceasefire talks fail. According to my understanding no entity on the planet is willing to dismantle Hamas entirely bar the Israeli military, so eventually this is only valid option we really have. Israel should gradually move from military occupation to handing control to a new civilian governing body over two to three years.
There is a risk to hostages with ongoing fighting but the Israeli assumption is that they are the most significant asset Hamas has left, therefore they will do the most to keep them alive as their ultimate insurance policy.
Published in The National News, July 22, 2025.
Meir Ben Shabbat: The events in Syria provided the whole world with an opportunity to see again what Jolani’s [Ahmed al-Sharaa] ‘base’ looks like. This does not mean that Israel should give up on the possibility of political arrangements while exploiting Jolani’s current weakness, but it requires calibrating expectations and ensuring that we do not give up on other interests just for the chance of an agreement.
Israel’s intervention had been a strategic necessity to secure its border.
The takeover of this region by extremist Sunni elements could allow the establishment of hostile elements and jihadist terrorists near the border and across the entire southern Syrian Golan. Israel’s intervention was intended to send a clear message: there will be no change in the balance of power in the southern Syria region without Israel’s consent, nor will there be a deployment of capabilities that could threaten Israel within a distance determined by it (in other words: defining a demilitarized zone).
Published in JNS, July 22, 2025.
Ruth Wasserman Lande: We have a very amazing minority in Israel, a Druze minority, largely in the north of the country. All of them are very loyal citizens and civilians of Israel, most of whom serve in the IDF, and some of them have even fallen in the war since October 7. This is like a brotherhood between Jewish Israeli civilians and Druze Israeli civilians. Many of the people in Suweida are in fact family members of those Druze in the north of Israel.
So it is expected by our own civilians, our own citizens, that the Israeli IDF would protect their family members from literally slaughter—and what we experienced on October 7th, which is similar to what happened actually in Suweida.
The interview took place in Al Arabiya on July 18, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: It was evident the Israeli military did take “some risks” when it comes to “collateral damage” when the “importance of a Hamas target is very high.” In other cases, there were “unfortunately some mistakes.
Published in NBC NEWS, July 16, 2025.
Prof. Kobi Michael: The American administration comes closer and closer to the understanding that they didn’t do or have not done enough with regard to Qatar. They have to increase the pressure on Qatar.
The idea that Hamas leaders still live in a very comfortable zone, which is Qatar — Doha — with all of their money, with all of the facilities that they use there, and they believe that they are with the upper hand and they can put demands in front of Israel and in front of the mediator including the Americans, is something that indicates that they are in a deep misperception with regard to their understanding the reality.
The interview took place on ILTV on July 15, 2025.
Ruth Wasserman Lande: Basically, there has been a lowkey behind the scenes cooperation and uh coordination with the Gulf countries for certain because of course they see the Shiite access something which is horrific. As I said, it’s first and foremost, and I’m sorry if I’m sounding like a a clock gone wrong, but this is the thing that It’s all about the Shiite and the Sunni war.
And what are they worrying about to create an Islamic caliphate? I’m talking about the extremist is Islam is not all of them an Islamic caliphate based on Sharia depending on which Sharia Shiite or Sunni. Now the Saudis see the Shiite threat as something quite horrific. I mean the Iranians have been feeding the Houthis that have been attacking the Saudis and their oil refineries and so on for years. Likewise, the United Arab and so on. Did they come out and say that openly? No. But have you ever visited the Arab League? Everything is said in between the lines.
A lecture in Washington to the Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC), 14 July, 2025.
Ruth Wasserman Lande: The Egyptian leadership operates under a deeply ingrained, distorted perception of Israeli intentions. There is no rational motive for Egypt to build a force that is essentially offensive against Israel. It doesn’t make sense.
For this, one needs to understand the Egyptian state of mind, which perceives, at the highest decision-making levels, the State of Israel as an imperialist state that aspires to expand, with an emphasis on the current government. That is, the highest echelons [in Egypt] see steps taken by Israel as steps whose purpose is imperialistic.
Published in JNS, July 11, 2025.
